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ABSTRACT 
 
“WHO ARE THE TRUE CONSERVATIVES?”:  
A CRITICAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN CONSERVATISM IN THE NINETEENTH 
CENTURY  
Danielle M. Holtz 
Walter McDougall 
This dissertation explores the elaboration of “conservative” thought in the United 
States from its genesis in eighteenth-century transnational moral philosophy and bio-
medical research to its expression in national conflicts over race and slavery, empire and 
expansion, immigration and naturalization, and free trade and market capitalism from the 
1820s through the 1850s. Looking at competing groups of public intellectuals, politicians, 
activists, radicals, and religious leaders who defined themselves or their positions as 
“conservative” in the nineteenth-century United States, it argues that American 
“conservatives” developed a radically adaptive system of meaning that can only be 
understood within the contemporaneous development of conservative schema 
internationally. This intervention connects American conservatism to the organismic 
ontology of the state as a naturally progressing, living system, with its hybrid 
philosophical genesis in British sentimental theory and continental theories of organic 
generation and reproduction. The contest to represent the “true conservatism” of the 
country reflected a struggle over the nature of the United States as an organically unified 
society with a system of laws, government, and behavior that naturally developed to suit 
that society. This long history of conservatism establishes the integral link between 
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historical conservatism and contemporary racial nationalism and opens up an avenue for 
inquiry into the role that biology played in shaping America’s socio-political imaginary 
and its political and institutional genealogy. 
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INTRODUCTION: A RIPPLE APPEARS ON THE SURFACE 
On January 5, 1837, John C. Calhoun opposed Michigan’s application for 
statehood on the grounds that it corrupted the “old, established” forms put into place by 
“our ancestors of the revolution.” He warned that this state’s “irregular and monstrous” 
birth marked the commencement of a great change, “a tendency to revolution” that was 
“destined to go on till it has consummated itself in the entire overthrow of all legal and 
constitutional authority.” He explained that the “right of every people to form their own 
government, and to determine their political condition” provided the first, elementary 
principle of the US government and that the doctrine of state sovereignty and States’ 
rights codified in the US constitution had “done more for the cause of liberty throughout 
the world than any event within the record of history.”1 So long as he retained hope of 
reforming the country’s political system, therefore, Calhoun vowed to defend it in its 
“original simplicity and purity” as a “conservative, and a States right man.” Yet, should 
the “common sense” and “voice of mankind” declare federal corruption and oppression 
intolerable, Calhoun promised to tear that government down. “I am a conservative in its 
broadest and fullest sense,” he declared, “and such I shall ever remain unless indeed, the 
Government shall become so corrupt and disordered that nothing short of revolution can 
reform it.”2 At this point, presumably, Calhoun would become a revolutionary. 
More than one of Calhoun’s contemporaries noted the irony that Calhoun, who 
had frequently been accused of having “radical” views on state sovereignty, would 
                                                 
1 To distinguish between the “state” in the sense of a government that exercised authority over a population 
conjoined as a subject political community and the “States” federated under the American constitution, I 
am reverting to the nineteenth-century convention of capitalizing the latter referent. Hence, “state” 
sovereignty and “States” rights.  
2 Italics in the original. John Caldwell Calhoun, Speeches of John C. Calhoun: Delivered in the Congress of 
the United States from 1811 to the Present Time (New York, 1843), 249-59. 
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describe himself or his controversial political positions as “conservative,” particularly in 
the context of a speech where he openly advocated revolution as a legitimate method of 
institutional reform. Yet, Calhoun represented a growing movement of state-rights 
enthusiasts who self-identified as “conservatives,” even as they denied the legitimacy of 
executive orders, asserted the state’s prerogative to nullify federal statute, and called for 
dramatic limitations on the size and reach of the federal government. What might it mean 
for these men to be “conservatives” crusading for what they called “liberty”? For that 
matter, what did it mean for anyone in the nineteenth-century United States to be a 
“conservative,” at all? Or, to put it in the concise terms of the Quarterly Christian 
Spectator in 1838, “Who are the True Conservatives?”3 
 
*** 
Overwhelmingly, the historiography on conservatism has focused this inquiry on 
the twentieth century, producing a wide range of literature on the subject.4 Since George 
Nash’s quintessential 1976 monograph on The Conservative Intellectual Movement in 
America Since 1945, intellectual historians have profited from the inroads made in social, 
cultural, and institutional histories of post-war conservatism, including Kimberly 
Phillips-Fein, Jennifer Burns, and Kathryn Olmsted on the relationship between the 
ideology of free-market capitalism, the interests of big business, and the modern 
                                                 
3 Porter, Noah. “Who Are the True Conservatives?” The Quarterly Christian Spectator X (1838): 601 
4 Jesse Scarborough, “Modern American Conservatisms: Science, Activism and Political Identity in an Age 
of Fracture” (University of North Carolina Wilmington, 2016), 14–37, 
http://escholarship.org/uc/item/1b97w7zh; Julian E. Zelizer, “Rethinking the History of American 
Conservatism,” Reviews in American History 38, no. 2 (2010): 367–92; Kim Phillips-Fein, “Conservatism: 
A State of the Field,” Journal of American History 98, no. 3 (December 1, 2011): 723–43, 
doi:10.1093/jahist/jar430; Lisa McGirr, “Now That Historians Know So Much about the Right, How 
Should We Best Approach the Study of Conservatism?,” Journal of American History 98, no. 3 (December 
1, 2011): 765–70, doi:10.1093/jahist/jar478. 
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conservative movement; Darren Dochuk and Leo P. Ribuffo on the religious right; Leah 
Wright Rigueur on people of color in the conservative intellectual and political tradition; 
Andrew Hartman and Kevin Schultz on the American kulturkampf in the 1960s; Reba 
Soffer’s comparative analysis of American and British historians; and Niels Bjerre-
Poulsen and Juilian E. Zelizer, who both tease out the dynamic between intellectual 
conservatism and its political and organizational apparatus. Intellectual historians have 
also reacted to the resurgence of right-wing politics internationally with a slate of edited 
volumes highlighting the transnational histories of post-war conservatism, notably 
Clarisse Berthezène and Jean-Christian Vinel’s Postwar Conservatism, A Transnational 
Investigation: Britain, France, and the United States, 1930-1990; Anna von der Goltz 
and Britta Waldschmidt-Nelson’s Inventing the Silent Majority in Western Europe and 
the United States, Laura Jane Gifford and Daniel K. Williams, The Right Side of the 
Sixties: Reexamining Conservatism’s Decade of Transformation, and Andrea Mammone, 
Emmanuel Godin, and Brian Jenkins, Mapping the Extreme Right in Contemporary 
Europe: From Local to Transnational.5  
                                                 
5 George H. Nash, The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America Since 1945 (ISI Books, 2014); Kim 
Phillips-Fein, Invisible Hands: The Making of the Conservative Movement from the New Deal to Reagan 
(Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 2009); Jennifer Burns, Goddess of the Market: Ayn Rand and the American 
Right (Oxford University Press, 2009); Kathryn S. Olmsted, Right Out of California: The 1930s and the 
Big Business Roots of Modern Conservatism (The New Press, 2015); Darren Dochuk, From Bible Belt to 
Sunbelt: Plain-Folk Religion, Grassroots Politics, and the Rise of Evangelical Conservatism (W. W. 
Norton & Company, 2010); Leo P. Ribuffo, The Old Christian Right: The Protestant Far Right from the 
Great Depression to the Cold War (Acls History E Book Project, 2001); Leah Wright Rigueur, The 
Loneliness of the Black Republican: Pragmatic Politics and the Pursuit of Power (Princeton University 
Press, 2014); Andrew Hartman, A War for the Soul of America: A History of the Culture Wars (University 
of Chicago Press, 2015); Kevin M. Schultz, Buckley and Mailer: The Difficult Friendship That Shaped the 
Sixties (W. W. Norton & Company, 2015); Reba Soffer, History, Historians, and Conservatism in Britain 
and America: From the Great War to Thatcher and Reagan (OUP Oxford, 2009); Niels Bjerre-Poulsen, 
Right Face: Organizing the American Conservative Movement 1945-65 (Museum Tusculanum Press, 
2002); Julian E. Zelizer, Governing America: The Revival of Political History (Princeton University Press, 
2012); Clarisse Berthezène and Jean-Christian Vinel, eds., Postwar Conservatism, A Transnational 
Investigation: Britain, France, and the United States, 1930-1990 (Springer, 2017); Angus Burgin, The 
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Nonetheless, Nash’s work remains the standard-bearer for intellectual histories of 
American conservatism, forty years after its publication in 1976. Nash argued that the 
conservatives who emerged in the United States following the Second World War 
constructed a conservative intellectual tradition from a combination of heterogeneous (if 
predominantly Anglophone) sources, chosen from eighteenth and nineteenth-century 
political philosophers. In their search for a historical and philosophical apparatus on 
which to build American conservatism, however, these intellectual and political figures 
occasionally conflated their designation of historical and philosophical antecedents with 
the reality of a constant and historically operative precedent. In other words, they mistook 
their incidental inspiration for intellectual tradition. In their popular publications, they 
projected their political thought backward, committing the historiographic violence of 
reading nineteenth-century political actors through the lens of twentieth-century political 
thought.6 Those historians who have attempted to excavate a longer history of American 
conservatism, such as Yuval Levin, Adam L. Tate, and Patrick Allitt, have tended to 
follow suit, measuring nineteenth-century conservatives according to twentieth-century 
standards, with the Anglo-American tradition, in general, providing the foundation for 
analyses of nineteenth-century American “conservatives.”7  
                                                                                                                                                 
Great Persuasion: Reinventing Free Markets since the Depression (Harvard University Press, 2012); Laura 
Jane Gifford and Daniel K. Williams, eds., The Right Side of the Sixties: Reexamining Conservatism’s 
Decade of Transformation (Springer, 2012); Andrea Mammone, Emmanuel Godin, and Brian Jenkins, eds., 
Mapping the Extreme Right in Contemporary Europe: From Local to Transnational (Routledge, 2012). 
6 George H. Nash, The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America Since 1945. (Wilmington, 2014). 
7 Phillips-Fein, “Conservatism”; Yuval Levin, The Great Debate: Edmund Burke, Thomas Paine, and the 
Birth of Right and Left (Basic Books, 2013); Adam L. Tate, Conservatism and Southern Intellectuals, 
1789-1861: Liberty, Tradition, and the Good Society (University of Missouri Press, 2005); Patrick Allitt, 
The Conservatives: Ideas and Personalities Throughout American History (Yale University Press, 2009). 
Kim Phillips-Fein, “Conservatism: A State of the Field,” Journal of American History 98, no. 3 (December 
1, 2011): 723–43. 
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This approach has generated a provincial and analytically constrained 
understanding of American conservatism in its historical contexts. As political historian 
Kim Phillips-Fein observed, scholars tacitly agree that “liberalism” and “conservatism” 
remained contested, variable, and contextually contingent concepts—not only across 
national boundaries, but also within the United States and historically. The transnational 
turn in intellectual history has compounded this problem, adding the task of literal 
translation to the discursive challenge of historical translation. Yet, these categories have 
persisted as active discursive fictions within the historiography. That is, historians have 
continued to categorize historical actors and their socio-political positions as 
“conservative” in spite of the fact that they might not have considered themselves 
“conservative”—or even that “conservative” did not exist at the time as a political 
category or personal characteristic. Even when intellectual historians recognize 
conservatism as historically-contingent and variable, they continue to take recourse to an 
essential “conservatism” that operates as the organizing principle of their work. For 
example, in his intellectual history of conservative ideas and people in America, The 
Conservatives, Patrick Allitt distinguished between categorically and nominally 
conservative figures, writing that “certain people throughout American history can be 
understood as conservatives, but with the important caution that this was not a noun most 
of them used about themselves.”8 Allitt may have acknowledged that his subjects did not 
necessarily consider themselves “conservative” and that the “word itself has meant 
                                                 
8 Allitt construed conservatism as an “attitude to social and political change that looks for support to the 
ideas beliefs and habits of the past and puts more faith in the lessons of history than in the abstractions of 
political philosophy,” but did nothing to distinguish this “conservatism” from historicism. A case could be 
made that historicism as it was theorized at the turn of the nineteenth century significantly overlapped with, 
influenced, or even directly contributed to the basic tenets of conservative philosophies, but, as Joep 
Leerssen demonstrated in National Thought in Europe, historicist thought also formed the basis for 
emancipatory and revolutionary movements in the nineteenth century. Allitt, The Conservatives, 2. 
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different things at different times and that there is no consistency in conservatives’ beliefs 
about what should be conserved,” but none of those considerations prevented him from 
advancing his own conception of conservatism as an attitude that transcended those 
material and historical constraints. If “conservative” was not a viable political category in 
the nineteenth-century United States, as some historians have argued, then what purpose 
does calling nineteenth-century political figures “conservative” serve? If contemporary 
historians must construct the metric by which they identify “conservatives,” then what 
analytic freight does “conservative” carry as a historical category? Unwittingly echoing 
the nineteenth-century Quarterly Christian Spectator, Phillips-Fein asked, “Who are the 
true conservatives, and what do they really believe?” 
In The Reactionary Mind: Conservatism from Edmund Burke to Sarah Palin, 
political scientist Corey Robin called it a “necessary condition of intelligent discussion” 
that scholars “understand what the term [“conservative”] means, independent of its use.” 
Unless the right “has some set of common features that make it right,” other than the fact 
that it calls itself “right,” Robin asked, how can scholars “understand why individuals 
from different times and places, adopting different positions on different issues, would 
call themselves and their kindred spirits conservative?” Defining conservatism as, 
essentially, an ideology of reaction, Robin set out to prove that conservatism was “forged 
in response to challenges from below.”9 Yet, intellectual histories like Robin’s that seek 
to identify a unified transnational conservatism (whether Anglo-American or “western” 
in their approach) risk mystifying the historical, intellectual, and operational differences 
between British, European, and US “conservatives.” Furthermore, their structuralist 
                                                 
9 Corey Robin, The Reactionary Mind: Conservatism from Edmund Burke to Sarah Palin (Oxford 
University Press, USA, 2011), 42–43. 
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approach often results in mischaracterizing or naturalizing the claims that self-identified 
conservatives made about their own role in their particular society, and missing essential 
figures that contemporaries considered “conservative,” like, in Robin’s case, Daniel 
Webster and the America Whigs. Without exploring the advantage a politician like 
Calhoun might gain from describing himself as “conservative” and his opposition as 
“radical,” Robin elides the historical evidence that Calhoun’s contemporaries (allies and 
antagonists, alike) frequently considered his “conservative” positions to be “radical” or 
“revolutionary,” themselves, and that his anti-slavery opposition and other progressive 
reformers simultaneously described their own politics as “conservative.” When anti-
slavery Whig Charles Sumner addressed the “Anti-Slavery Duties of the Whig Party” 
during Massachusetts’s 1846 Whig State Convention, for example, he challenged his 
party to renew its commitment to the “conservatism of the Whigs of '76” by embracing 
the abolitionist platform. According to Sumner, the name “Abolitionist” first legitimately 
belonged to the “fathers” of the country: Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, and 
George Washington.10 If the Whigs truly deserved to be called “conservatives,” he 
maintained, they must honor the memory of their Constitution’s “revered authors,” whose 
“truest and highest conservatism” guarded and preserved the “vital truths of freedom.” In 
undertaking the vital battle against slavery, then, the Whigs would fulfill the 
                                                 
10 Sumner attested that Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson both advocated abolition, and that George 
Washington privately expressed his own wish that the country abolish slavery and then set the standard by 
emancipating his own slaves in his will. Sumner paraphrased George Washington’s 1786 letter to John 
Fenton Mercer, having him say, “It is among my first wishes… to see some plan adopted by which slavery 
in this country may be abolished by law.” In the actual body of the letter, Washington wrote that he never 
meant to “possess another slave by purchase; it being among my first wishes to see some plan adopted, by 
the legislature by which slavery in this Country may be abolished by slow, sure, & imperceptable degrees.” 
(“From George Washington to John Francis Mercer, 9 September 1786,” Founders Online, National 
Archives, last modified December 28, 2016, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/04-04-02-
0232. [Original source: The Papers of George Washington, Confederation Series, vol. 4, 2 April 1786 – 31 
January 1787, ed. W. W. Abbot. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1995, pp. 243–244.]) 
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“progressive” promise embodied in their founding documents—the sublime ideal, 
imperfectly instituted, “that all men are born equal”—making them conservatives “not of 
forms only, but of substance,” not of the letter of the law, alone, but of its “living 
spirit.”11 In other words, as Transcendentalist author and publisher Elizabeth Peabody put 
it in the 1838 Democratic Review, in a society founded “to make free individuals,” 
conservatism should protect and support individual freedom.12 
In effect, historian Hyrum Lewis noted, approaches like Allitt’s and Robin’s have 
perpetuated an “essentialist myth” that has rendered illegible the complexity and 
contestation of conservatisms in their historical contexts. While the “term “conservative” 
may serve as a useful heuristic device with which to navigate the historical landscape,” 
Lewis acknowledged, historians must recognize that “it is nonetheless a protean, socially 
constructed category which takes on new connotations and sheds old ones over time 
without retaining any definitional core that transcends historical context.” Conservatism 
has a history—“moments of mutation when dislocations, electoral necessities, special 
interest demands, economic forces, influential figures, or institutional pressures caused 
epistemic shifts in the meaning of conservatism”—but no essence. In its place, Lewis 
called for intellectual historians to approach “conservatism” with the same theoretical and 
methodological sophistication with which scholars have examined the historically-
constructed meanings of race, gender, ethnicity, and nation. Instead of focusing on “how 
                                                 
11 Charles Sumner, “Speech on the Anti-Slavery Duties of The Whig Party, Before the Whig State 
Convention, at Faneuil Hall, in Boston, Sept. 23, 1846,” in Orations and Speeches [1845-1850] (Boston: 
Ticknor, Reed, and Fields, 1850), 117–30. 
12 Elizabeth Peabody, “Claims of the Beautiful Arts,” Swackhamer, Conrad. Ed. The United States 
Democratic Review. Langtree and O’Sullivan, 1838, 256. 
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conservatism changed America,” then, Lewis suggested an “evolutionary” paradigm that 
would shift the focus towards “how America changed conservatism.”13   
Pushing past the question of authenticity (“who are the true conservatives?”), this 
mode of inquiry asks, instead, what might it mean to be a “true conservative” in the 
United States and why an individual or a group might choose make that claim. Who 
invoked “conservatism” and in what context? What were the areas of contention? In what 
linguistic, political, social, and cultural ecosystems did “conservatism” thrive, and why? 
Or, to borrow the animating question that social and political historian Lisa McGirr 
placed at the heart of the twentieth-century historiography of conservatism, “How did 
radical free-market ideas, staunch unilateralism, a deeply hawkish nationalism, and 
conservative religiosity—all with deep roots in American life but increasingly 
marginalized” in US political economy and political culture—become so “prominent in 
policy and politics” that it succeeded in “reshaping common wisdom about the proper 
role of the federal government in the economy and society?”14 That twentieth-century 
puzzle cannot be resolved without exploring the development of these conservative topoi 
in their nineteenth-century context. Furthermore, to sufficiently grasp “how America 
changed conservatism” in the nineteenth century, that investigation must integrate the 
historical literature on nineteenth-century politics and political culture; social and labor 
movements; race, gender, ethnicity, and nation; the history and sociology of science; the 
history of readership, print, and oral culture, as well as censorship, education, and the 
postal service. More importantly, it must triangulate between divergent “conservative” 
                                                 
13 Hyrum Lewis, “Historians and the Myth of American Conservatism,” Journal of The Historical Society 
12, no. 1 (March 1, 2012): 27–45, doi:10.1111/j.1540-5923.2011.00354.x. 
14 McGirr, “Now That Historians Know So Much about the Right, How Should We Best Approach the 
Study of Conservatism?” 
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stances on the essential issues of the early American republic: states’ rights and federal 
power; slavery and abolition; banking, capitalism, and free trade; the relationship 
between the American people and their government; and the relationship between the 
United States and the rest of the world.  
 
*** 
Calhoun’s language reflected a particular understanding of the nature of the state 
and its relation to the people that developed in the eighteenth century. Though twentieth-
century American conservatives associated their political thought primarily with 
Anglophone philosophers, such as Edmund Burke, nineteenth-century American 
“conservatives” drew heavily from continental sources. The “conservative principle” was 
originally conceived in the natural sciences as a mechanical and teleological force that 
protected organic life from decay. It grew out of a century-old controversy over 
metaphysical explanations for natural phenomena in organic life. On the one side, 
Enlightenment philosophers, such as Rene Descartes, denied God an active role in the 
world. Life had been set in motion by some cosmic force at some distant time and the 
proper provenance of the sciences was to observe and catalog the natural laws that 
determined the physical operation of these universal forces. The other side of the debate, 
epitomized by German philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, argued that natural 
phenomena could only be understood as the product of vital or living forces [vis viva] 
that tied life continuously to a higher power. In this literature, the “conservative power” 
was synonymous with the soul in organic life, the engine that generated the organism 
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itself.15 It described an inborn ideal, something essential to the body’s continued 
existence that God had granted and that God alone could remove. In all organisms, the 
“principe conservateur” reflected God’s inviolability as the absolute source of power and 
the elemental source for the body’s preservation and perseverance.  
After passing through the life sciences and into German philosophy, it became 
one of the “special causal forces” that the German Naturphilosophen invoked at the end 
of the eighteenth century “to explain the instantiation of archetypes and their progressive 
variations.”16 In the related body of medical discourse, the “vital spark of heavenly 
flame,” the “animal spirits” of Descartes, and Leibniz’s “vis viva,” flowed into the “vital 
principle” and “nervous fluid” of William Cullen, the “vis insita and vis nervosa” of 
Albrecht von Haller, the “principe vital” of Paul Joseph Barthez, and John Hunter’s 
“materia vitae.” In Johann Friedrich Blumenbach’s pivotal work, the vitalist and 
materialist arguments represented by Leibniz and Descartes merged in the 
“nisus formativus” or Bildungstrieb (the formative drive), which Balthasar-Anthelme 
Richerand, Pierre Jean Georges Cabanis, and Sir Gilbert Blane would call the “principe 
conservateur” and the “conservative principle,” respectively, at the turn of the nineteenth 
century.17 Like Blumenbach’s Bildungstrieb, the “conservative principle” was a 
teleological force materialized throughout the body’s constitution that preserved it from 
putrefaction. According to Blane, who popularized the concept in English, an individual’s 
original constitution and morbidity determined the relative strength of the body’s 
                                                 
15 Immanuel Kant and Eric Watkins, “Introduction,” Kant: Natural Science (New York, 2012), 1-7. 
16 Robert J. Richards, The Romantic Conception of Life: Science and Philosophy in the Age of Goethe, 
(Chicago, 2002), 9-10. 
17 Samuel Lytler Metcalfe, Caloric: Its Mechanical, Chemical, and Vital Agencies in the Phenomena of 
Nature (London, 1843), 613. 
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“conservative” power in its ceaseless fight for self-preservation. Combined with its 
nervous sensibility and capacity for self-regulation, the body’s “conservative energy” 
formed the “main basis, or stamina” of an individual’s “simple vital existence.”18 Bodies 
with an exuberance of “conservative energy” in their constitutions could resist 
disorganization in their vital parts; constitutions lacking conservative energy inevitably 
decomposed.   
Still, for Calhoun to call himself a “conservative” or to refer to the “conservative 
principle” of a presumably artificial structure, like a state constitution, would have made 
no sense without a parallel transformation in the political concept of statehood. 
“Conservative” became a political category as the result of a comprehensive shift in how 
people understood the nature of the state in the century before the French Revolution. 
Political systems and institutions had to be categorized as expressions of organic life 
before theorists could discuss whether a state’s “conservative” principles effectively 
guarded it against vitiating forces. And people could only be conservative once they 
became parts of a larger organism—organic elements in a living social body.  
This schema traces back to Locke’s empirical “science of man,” in which he 
situated individual bodies in their temporal and material conditions, and developed a 
theory of association based on the relationship between context, consciousness, and 
understanding.19 Through their phenomenological experiences, he argued, people became 
connected sympathetically to a particular social body and, through the extension of their 
                                                 
18 Sir Gilbert Blane, Elements of Medical Logick, Illustrated by Practical Proofs and Examples; Including 
a Statement of the Evidence Respecting the Contagious Nature of the Yellow-Fever (London: T. & G. 
Underwood, 1821), 37–57, at 39, 43. 
19 Locke’s sensorial empiricism generated a natural history of understanding, which Voltaire called the 
history of the Soul. Rousseau, George S. Nervous Acts: Essays on Literature and Sensibility. (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005), 165; Zammito, John H. Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology. (University of 
Chicago Press, 2002), 224-225. 
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nervous sensibility, to widening social circles. Over the course of the next century, 
Locke’s theory of association provided the foundation for an organic model of society, 
developed in collaboration between moral philosophers and natural scientists, which 
stressed the role that social groups and government institutions played in cultivating 
healthy and thriving national bodies. In shaping the sympathetic nervous system—the 
material body and the mind—society fashioned the nature and behavior of its citizens, 
generating the patterns imprinted on the individual mind.20 In turn, the people became the 
component parts of a synthetic, organic system, ideally situated in a state structure that 
had developed naturally out of those people’s particular, collective constitution. 
The attendant political theory treated the state’s organization as a living system, 
with the same vulnerabilities as other species of organic life and the same formative drive 
(nisus formativus or Bildungstrieb) pumping through its organs. In this sense, a society’s 
conservative principles, powers, and forces, embodied in its organic institutions and 
expressed in the character of its people, maintained its health and stability and kept the 
living machinery of its government operating in cosmic harmony. As the contemporary 
literary critic Paul Youngquist put it, a “good government” in the organic framework 
“collectively incorporate[d] a physiology of function.”21 Like physiologists, statesmen 
and political theorists examined the body politic to discover the key to maintaining states 
in their vitality and, like other medical researchers, they disagreed about what constituted 
a country’s fundamental or vital principles, as well as the best methods and means to 
ensure their continued operation. Social stability and progress relied on a socio-political 
                                                 
20 Hartley, Observations, 321, 505, 582. 
21 Youngquist, Paul. Monstrosities: Bodies and British Romanticism. (University of Minnesota Press, 
2003), 24. 
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organization adapted to a society’s particular circumstances and genetic makeup: its 
environment, climate, geography, economy, and age, and the character of its people (their 
language and customs, religion, occupations, and habits.)22 The nature of the system 
suited the population. An organic constitution required the harmonious balance between 
the different systems that governed the body—everything held in its proper sphere and to 
its proper function. Ideally, a society’s political system developed holistically from the 
organic combination of all of these factors, leading to an organization co-constitutive 
with society, infused with both conservative and regenerative principles—a state-
organism.  
In an organic state, a conservative power worked only insofar as it was allowed to 
operate without obstruction, and a country’s conservative principles depended on the 
healthy and interdependent action of the organs vital to its constitution.23 Social or 
political disorder indicated that some fault or corruption prevented the conservative 
principle from flowing to all of the body’s parts, like foreign contagions attacking the 
body’s nervous system—a problem that could be addressed by neutralizing or excising 
the irritant. Alternatively, a dysfunctional state might develop if the country’s population 
failed to live up to the intellectual and moral requirements of free citizenship, particularly 
if they had not been sufficiently cultivated to the needs of their socio-political 
organization. This condition was endemic to highly mobile, heterogeneous, and 
industrialized populations, like the United States, but could be addressed through public 
education. 
                                                 
22 “Genetic” in its ontological and developmental sense. 
23 In particular, in Jefferson’s analysis, it required the harmonious balance between the state and federal 
governments; the unencumbered exercise of the franchise and the assurance of regular and representative 
elections; an educated and intelligent public; and an active free press. 
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When a system continuously malfunctioned, however, it signaled a fundamental 
problem—either the state’s constitution lacked the conservative principle entirely, and 
needed a change at the foundational level (e.g., by a constitutional amendment), or the 
state had contravened its organic principles. As Fichte explained in “Foundations of 
Natural Right,” no treatment, medicant, or structural remedy could reconcile a people to a 
political community alien to their interests and affections, or to a government that 
systemically silenced their common will. In that case, he wrote, the subject population 
retained the power to hold a convention and form a new government, if they saw fit, fully 
justified in tearing down a corrupt and artificial state.24 By definition, every state-
organism contained conservative principles, vital to their self-preservation, but not all 
states were organic and, therefore, not all states were meant to endure. 
Once the body politic took on vital corporeality—once the concept of the organic 
state naturalized—medical and biological knowledge became relevant to questions of 
state. As Secretary of War (1818-1825), John Calhoun created the Army Medical Corps, 
the office of the Surgeon General, and organized the army's medical department, 
directing the surgeons at each army post to gather local medical statistics, as well as 
information about the relationship between climate and disease in different parts of the 
country, and report them back to the Surgeon General. This impulse, which grew out of 
                                                 
24 “Self-preservation,” Fichte wrote, “is the condition of all other actions and of every expression of 
freedom.” In forming a real state, organized as a product of nature, each individual melted into the whole, 
merging his will and impulse toward self-preservation with the will and preservation of the entire organism; 
as a corollary, every part of the state-organism viewed harm to the other parts as harm to itself. 
Reciprocally, the state-organism treated the recognized rights and property of its individual members as its 
own, and protected them, accordingly, regarding “any injury to such property or rights as injury to itself.” 
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the “enlarged views and devotion to science which have ever characterized him,” inspired 
the same organization in England, according to his 1843 campaign biography.25 Although 
Calhoun never expressly referenced Sir Gilbert Blane, whose Elements of Medical Logick 
(1819) established the “conservative principle” as the essential constituent power in every 
living system, he undoubtedly came across his theory. Blane had pioneered naval medical 
science, particularly around contagion and quarantine, and drafted the authoritative model 
for comprehensive public health reform in port cities like London.26 As the head of the 
Royal Navy's medical board, he drafted Britain's 1799 Quarantine Act.27 When Blane 
published the Elements of Medical Logick in 1819, his contemporaries considered it the 
definitive authority on military hygiene, naval medicine, contagious disease, and 
quarantine. Blane’s Elements remained on the index-catalogue of the Library of the 
Surgeon-General's Office of the United States Army into the twentieth century.28 
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Furthermore, Calhoun's work with the army reputedly spurred a life-long interest in 
medical broadsides and scientific literature.29  
In the ensuing decades, Calhoun and his pro-slavery allies adopted the logic and 
legal apparatus of morbidity, quarantine, and self-preservation to inoculate the institution 
of slavery against federal colonization, foreign contagion (in the guise of abolition), and 
capitalist control. Starting in the 1820s, they advanced the idea that the southern states 
formed their own separate organic nations, each of which retained the “conservative” 
power of self-protection, be it through policing the bodies of people who would cross 
their borders or through their state’s nullification of federal legislation that threatened or 
corrupted their organic institutions. The organic schema provided men like Calhoun with 
the cover to call themselves “conservative,” while still promoting the “glorious right of 
rebellion and revolution.” Like all organic life, they asserted, the States followed the 
physiological imperative for self-preservation, even at the cost of the Union. 
Accordingly, when confronted with the risk of admitting the free State of Michigan into 
the Union in 1837, for example, Calhoun declared, “while I thus openly avow myself a 
conservative… Should corruption and oppression become intolerable, and cannot 
otherwise be thrown off—if liberty must perish, or the Government be overthrown, I 
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would not hesitate, at the hazard of life, to resort to revolution, and to tear down a corrupt 
Government that could neither be reformed nor borne by freemen.” Organic states 
retained an inherent right to protect themselves and their institutions—by force, if 
necessary—and a categorical imperative to dissolve a civil constitution that 
systematically and unalterably undermined their own organic constitutions.30 
One other change had to come over the spirit of this dream before it made sense 
for Calhoun (or any other individual) to call himself a “Conservative.”31 To be a 
“Conservative,” an individual must first consider themselves the living embodiment of an 
organic vital power. That conceptual shift occurred after the romantic “man of genius” 
created the space for individuals to materially manifest life forces (like the conservative 
force). In German and British romantic thought, the man of genius (generally an artist or 
a poet, but plausibly a military figure or politician) authored the socio-political 
imaginary, fixing the image of the social body in each individual’s mind, connecting their 
nerves to the social nervous network, and bringing them into organic unity with their 
social totality. In the work of British romantics William Wordsworth and Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge, the masculine, male artist played the role of intercessor between impulse and 
action. The man of genius restrained and channeled society’s nervous reactions, 
correcting and controlling the monstrous body, as outside forces and conditions irritated 
and excited its nervous sensibility. In freeing individuals from their particular 
circumstances and revealing their role in the larger system, the man of genius cultivated 
                                                 
30 As Michael O’Brien summarized, “what began as a constitutional quarrel ended up as a cultural 
assertion… a quarrel with the emerging discourse of American nationality… eventually the state came to 
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speaker declares, “A change came o’er the spirit of my dream…”  
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in them a sense of duty that they would feel intuitively and reflectively. Recognizing their 
organic relation to society, individuals would willingly subordinate themselves and fulfill 
their duties to the whole. Because he instilled in each individual a sense of society’s 
“antecedent Unity” (i.e., its Bildungstrieb), the man of genius, himself, manifested the 
state-organism’s “conservative and reproductive Power.”32 By this logic, the right men, in 
the right position, could themselves be Conservatives—and if they joined together to 
guide the state-organism along its organic trajectory, then they will have formed a 
Conservative party.33  
In Great Britain, the first Conservative party started with a clever bit of 
rebranding by Tory leadership. Contemplating the “propriety” of maintaining the name 
“Tory,” a contributor to the January 1830 Quarterly Review advised they change the 
name of the party to “Conservative” to indicate their willingness to promote “prudent and 
practical” reforms to the state.34 At the same time, the name conveyed stability during a 
period when the “signs of revolution” disturbed the “public mind.” In this moment, the 
writer counselled, “a few honest words and intelligible acts from the proper quarter 
would exert a magical influence.” Within a year, the parliamentary representative for 
Tamworth, Sir Robert Peel, identified “two parties among those who call themselves 
                                                 
32 Coleridge, Samuel Taylor, and James Marsh. Aids to Reflection: In the Formation of a Manly Character, 
on the Several Grounds of Prudence, Morality, and Religion: Illustrated by Select Passages from Our 
Elder Divines, Especially from Archbishop Leighton. 1st American, from the 1st London Edition. 
(Chauncey Goodrich, 1829), 42. 
33 Meyer Howard Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition 
(London, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 167–77, 184–225; James Engell, The 
Creative Imagination: Enlightenment to Romanticism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981); 
Forest Pyle, The Ideology of Imagination: Subject and Society in the Discourse of Romanticism (Stanford 
University Press, 1995), 27–58. 
34 The Quarterly Review, vol. XLII (London: John Murray, 1830), 276; Coleridge, Samuel Taylor, Kathleen 
Coburn, and Anthony John Harding. The Notebooks of Samuel Taylor Coleridge: 1827-1834. (Princeton 
University Press, 2002), 572. 
 20
Conservatives” in the new Whig-controlled Parliament. One party, he attested, 
recognized that no government could exist without restraint and authority and so 
supported monarchy, property, and public faith. The men of the other group, on the other 
hand, pretended to be Conservatives, but merely sought power.35 Between the two, Peel 
observed that a “Radical and a Republican avowed are dangerous characters; but there is 
nothing half so dangerous as the man who pretends to be a Conservative, but is 
ready to be anything, provided only he can create confusion.” The Tory party adopted the 
name “Conservative” in 1832 after their defeat in the passage of the Whig-sponsored 
Reform Bill, which expanded the franchise to the middle class and shut down the rotten 
boroughs.36 Some contemporaries viewed this change as an effort to attract moderate 
members of the opposition party. A Whig would never be a Tory, one commenter later 
observed, but they might be willing to be a Conservative, if it meant saving the “altars 
and throne” of their “imperial nation.”37 
In the United States, normatively republican and foundationally revolutionary 
politics complicated this calculus, as did the fact that the people most likely to identify 
their politics as “conservative” in 1832 belonged to a group generally despised as 
revolutionaries (the Nullifiers). Party names stood in for wholesale arguments about who 
should govern, how they should govern, the balance of power in government, and the 
relationship between the people and those men whom they elected to represent or govern 
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them. In 1830s US politics, single parties often operated under several names (some of 
which they coined, and others they had thrust upon them). For example, a December 
1833 article in the Niles’ Register listed the following political designations for the 
members of the 23rd United States Congress: the Jackson party, proper; the Jackson-Van 
Buren party; the Jackson anti-Van Buren party; the anti-Jackson party; the nullifying and 
anti-Jackson party; the anti-masonic and anti-Jackson party, and “one or two whose 
political character is not easily classed.”38 Because names ostensibly represented the 
principles that a party prioritized, however, when parties did publish official material, 
they tended to choose names identified with the American ideals of liberty, revolution, 
and popular representation: Democratic-Republican, Democrat, Republican, and Whig.  
Nonetheless, in the late 1830s, a contributor to the Quarterly Christian Spectator 
observed that conservatism had “speedily crossed the Atlantic” ever since its emergence 
in British party politics, “eagerly” taken up by “more than one party, in politics and 
religion” in the United States. The word “conservative” disgorged “from the mouth of the 
genteel aristocrats of our cities,” from the “talking philosopher of our colleges,” and even 
from “our preachers,” some of whom seemed “more anxious to preach conservatism” 
than the gospel. According to the Spectator, American readers imported British 
conservatism especially in the pages of the London Quarterly, Blackwood’s Edinburgh 
Magazine, the Church of England Magazine, and the British Critic, in the publications of 
writers Samuel Taylor Coleridge and William Wordsworth, dramatist Henry Taylor, and 
the reprinted works of Anglican theologian Richard Hooker, who enjoyed (though not 
personally) a resurgence of posthumous fame in the guise of the High Church Anglican 
                                                 
38 Niles’ Register, December 7, 1833, 228. 
 22
Oxford movement. American critics of “foreign” conservatism also identified it in the 
scholarship of German theologians Friedrich Schleiermacher and August Tholuck, 
French philosopher Victor Cousin, and Swiss evangelical Jean-Henri Merle d’Aubigne. 
By the end of the decade, this author noted the irony that he had even heard of 
“conservatives” among the abolitionists and other “movement parties” of the day, a 
paradox that proved both that the term effectively demarcated internal boundaries 
(separating real reformers from reactionary pretenders) and also that it would inevitably 
fall victim to its own ideological vacuity.39 
The Spectator’s claims notwithstanding, self-identified US “Conservatives” were 
just as likely to quote from revolutionary, democratic, utopian, or socialist sources as 
anything considered “conservative” by British or continental standards. The incursive 
“foreign conservative” was a strawman, like the “monarchist” or the “Jacobin.” Aside 
from a few outliers—dedicated Puseyites, for example, or radicals who valorized 
Robespierre—neither European conservatism nor European radicalism openly thrived in 
the United States, even if European conservative and radical thought influenced its social 
and political movements. Or, as Charles Dickens’s radical Daily News put it, “American 
conservatism is so nearly akin to European radicalism, that many of our readers might 
scarcely recognise the claim” a US party might make to conservatism, even if it did 
consider itself “less intensely popular than its rival.”40 Unlike Great Britain, Europe, or 
South America in this period, the United States lacked a single, cohesive conservative 
party, drawn from particular classes or vested groups, that articulated an intelligible 
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platform to protect long-established and legally-codified interests. In the United States, 
those men whose wealth and position may have predisposed them towards a European-
style conservative politics failed to form a single, unified conservative party because they 
fundamentally disagreed on the nature of the country’s political, social, and cultural 
institutions. Without this necessary condition for consensus, they could hardly agree on 
which forces and institutions would best perpetuate, preserve, and protect that system, let 
alone muster the resources for a lasting political coalition to institute and enforce them. 
Instead, they wielded the word “conservative” like a shibboleth—a way to demarcate 
political and ideological boundaries within and between conflicting groups, to co-opt and 
express social power, and, ultimately, to silence dissent. 
In this period, naming had incredible power. The politicians, intellectuals, and 
journalists writing in the mid-nineteenth century had a robust concept of language and 
constantly reflected on its use and misuse. Particularly in a democracy, they insisted, 
“words are things.” Changes in political discourse acted as symptoms, alerting listeners to 
larger changes in the socio-political imaginary, and providing early-warning signs for a 
revolutionary pathogeny. “If you wish to mark the first indications of a revolution, the 
commencement of those profound changes in the character of a people which are 
working beneath, before a ripple appears on the surface,” Calhoun advised, “look to the 
change of language.”41 These profound changes first materialized in the “altered meaning 
of important words,” in language that ignited and accelerated the transformation of the 
people’s “feelings and principles,” until the words themselves induced “an entire 
revolution.”  
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Calhoun’s formulation broaches the central question for this project: What did the 
protean meaning of “conservative” in this period indicate for the changes working 
beneath the surface of the American people’s skin and what would the revolution signify 
when it reached its eruptive stage? To put it more simply, what kind of work did 
“conservatism” do in the nineteenth century? How did it fit within transnational 
discourses around conservatism and how did it reflect and change American political 
culture and society? 
What distinguished American conservatism from European conservatism was not 
its emancipatory potential, as some contemporaries claimed, but the nature of its organic 
component, and, specifically, its distinctions based on “race.” In later years, critics would 
use “racial” or “racist” to describe the warrant that undergirded the policies, legislation, 
institutions, and socio-political organizations that promoted the “white” race over people 
of color. Although proponents of white hegemony and white nationalism used “race” to 
signal and reinforce hierarchical organic differences between groups, neither “racial” nor 
“racist” existed as categories in this period. Since Blumenbach’s De Generis Humani 
Varietati Nativa (1775), scientists sub-divided the human race into varieties based on 
their physiological differences, attributed to their ancestral anthropography, and 
developed hierarchical theories of differentiated development based on their comparative 
study of these different races. Still, for most of the period at issue in this dissertation, race 
remained relatively interchangeable with “nation.” The discursive shift to distinguish 
between “race” and “nation” followed the proliferation of scientific theories of race and 
race-difference in the first half of the century.42  After the 1848 revolutions, when nation-
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states became the predominant ‘western’ model for political statehood, “race” 
demarcated ethnographic distinctions between groups living within the same nation, and, 
in this context, advocates of race theory argued that “racial” disparities arose out of the 
organic, physiological differences between different races. Functionally, then, the 
distinctions bred by these policies predated the language used to describe them, and the 
“conservative” legislation and legal decisions that codified them. For that reason, this 
dissertation will use “organic” in the place of “racial,” addressing projected “organic” 
differences and “organic” discrimination to characterize what would be reified later as 
“racial” differences and discrimination. Furthermore, US statues restricting the legal 
rights and civil liberties of non-“white” residents (excluding Native Americans) “deemed 
and adjudged” anyone “descended from negroes or mulattoes either on the father's or the 
mother's side” as “persons of color” or “people of color.”43 Because “color” (or the 
designation of “color” conferred by ancestry) was the distinguishing designation in 
popular and political discourse as well as in legal documents, this project will follow the 
common convention and refer to “people of color,” unless a specific source or the clarity 
of a debate dictates otherwise, in which case the terminology will appear in quotations.44 
                                                 
43 Many State laws specifically differentiated between color and race (indicating “nation”), such that they 
legally distinguished “people” or “persons of color” from “Indian,” “Asiatic,” or “Polynesian” races, as 
well as “Africans” or the “African race.” Since both “color” and “race” represented partial objects in this 
period, and the laws were created to police and control suspect populations, no hard line existed between 
the two categories, particularly in the deep South. For example, South Carolina’s 1823 and Georgia’s 1829 
quarantine laws, which will be addressed in chapter five, prohibited “free negroes” (SC) or “free persons of 
color”(GA) from disembarking in their ports, but not “free American Indians, free Moors, or Lascars [East 
Indian sailors], or other colored subjects of countries beyond the Cape of Good Hope.” This legal 
ambiguity reflected the reality that “colored” functioned primarily as a broad category of exclusion by 
which the state (and the States) controlled their populations. John Codman Hurd, The Law of Freedom and 
Bondage in the United States (Little, Brown, 1862), 36, 37, 50, 55, 67, 82, 88, 92, 97-99, 102, 104–8, 146, 
151, 152, 163, 165, 172, 195, 197, 199, 217, 339-340. 
44 Colin Kidd, The Forging of Races: Race and Scripture in the Protestant Atlantic World, 1600–2000 
(Cambridge University Press, 2006); Robert W. Sussman, The Myth of Race: The Troubling Persistence of 
an Unscientific Idea (Harvard University Press, 2014); Mark M. Smith, How Race Is Made: Slavery, 
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As much as possible, this dissertation will adhere to the language used by the 
actors in question and avoid anachronistic terminology. Occasionally, this commitment 
requires some lexicographic acrobatics. For example, “economic system” was not in use, 
but for some reason (luckily beyond the purview of this dissertation), “socio-political” 
was. Two brief lexicographic  notes should help lend clarity to the task of reading. First, 
to keep with the convention of the period, this dissertation will capitalize the modifier in 
party names, but not the noun (e.g., Conservative party, not Conservative Party), unless 
citing a specific source that uses alternative capitalization, and it will use the common 
form when referring to groups of people associated with ideas and parties, but not the 
parties themselves (e.g., democrats and whigs, not Democrats and Whigs.) For example, 
since the third chapter focuses almost exclusively on the twelve-year Jackson-Van Buren 
regime, this dissertation will refer to their party as the “administration party” and the 
various parties that rose to oppose them as the “opposition party” or “the opposition” in 
that chapter. Moreover, because party names and capitalization varied by region and 
source, and were deployed discursively, this dissertation will attempt to keep their usage 
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consistent with the source in question, or within regional conventions, and, where 
possible, indicate what purpose the name served.45 
Second, “capitalism,” as a term that referred to an economic system in which 
individuals or groups holding monetary assets (capitalists) controlled the production and 
distribution of goods, and created a market that determined the value of those goods as 
well as the price of labor used in their manufacture and delivery, came into use in the 
early 1830s. Eventually, capitalism became conflated with the philosophy of “Free 
Trade” and was designated “market” or “free market” capitalism, which carried a natural 
or scientific connotation. In the mid-nineteenth century, however, politicians and public 
intellectuals critical of “capitalists” generally understood capitalism to be a man-made 
“Industrial Order,” artificially supported by the paper money system (and credit), private 
banking, and government legislation (e.g., protectionist policies), that allowed a select 
group of wealthy people to control and manipulate commerce. In the early republic, it 
was not uncommon for people to oppose “capitalism” and promote “free trade.” Drawing 
the distinction between free-trade advocacy and a position favoring capitalism should not 
negate the historical role that southern “anti-capitalists” like John C. Calhoun played in 
creating the infrastructure, apparatus, and material conditions for market capitalism. But 
if you asked him, he would certainly have denied it.  
 
*** 
                                                 
45 When discussing New York political parties in the 1830s, for example, the opposition were variously 
known as the whigs (referring to a group of people self-identified with certain principles), Whigs (referring 
to a recognizable political party), the Bank party (identifying the opposition with the Second Bank of the 
United States and its interests), the Tory party, the aristocracy, the Federalists, and “the opposition.” The 
party in power were known as the democrats (referring to their ideological preferences), the Tammany 
party, the Tammany Hall party, the Van Burenites, the Van Buren party, the locofocos or loco-focos or 
Locofocos or Loco-Focos (beginning in 1835), and “the party.”  
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In the United States, the organic framework transmuted the social, civil, and legal 
construction of citizenship, circumscribing those rights for people of color within its 
geographic boundaries and generating the agenda for their expatriation, subjection, and 
exclusion. Its imprint can be found in the logic of the American Colonization Society, 
established in December 1816, which sought to gradually end slavery, but could not 
imagine people of color as citizens of the United States; in laws that increasingly 
regulated and restricted the conditions under which people of color lived and moved; and 
in quarantine laws that excluded free people of color from entering or residing in certain 
States.46 It identified the white, male, Christian body as the normative grounds for 
citizenship and civic participation, and interrogated the incorporation or involvement of 
anyone who did not fit that criteria. While the concept of an organic society motivated 
democratic, anti-slavery, and progressive social reformers, as well, the plenum of 
American politicians who expressed an ontological commitment to the organic state 
projected an increasingly exclusionary socio-political imaginary, until it included only 
those (white, male, Christian) citizens who supported white supremacy, in general, and 
the institution of slavery, in specific.47 Ultimately, these were the men who earned the 
name “Conservatives.” 
This project explores the dialectic of “conservative” thought and its elaboration in 
US politics, scholarship, and public discourse. Looking at individuals and groups that 
defined themselves or their politics as “conservative,” it traces the development of 
                                                 
46 The influence of organic thought can also be found in the shift in policy towards native peoples from 
assimilation to displacement, an attitude codified in the 1830 Indian Removal Act, and followed by the 
Trail of Tears in 1838 and 1839. Unfortunately, the complex debates over native peoples are beyond the 
scope of this project.  
47 Warren Breckman, Adventures of the Symbolic: Post-Marxism and Radical Democracy, (Columbia 
University Press, 2013), 104-108 
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competing claims to conservatism in the nineteenth-century United States from their 
historical and philosophical antecedents in eighteenth-century transnational medico-
philosophical treatises, to their translation, adaptation, and expression in debates over 
industry and slavery, State rights and federal power, capitalism and popular democracy, 
and immigration, in-migration, and territorial expansion from the 1820s through the 
1850s. The first chapter focuses on the genesis of “conservative” thought, starting with 
British moral sentiment, nerve theory, and physiology; working through the continental 
revival of vitalist theories in natural history, models of organic development, bio-medical 
research, and political theory; and concluding with German aesthetics, organic biology, 
and natural philosophy, which combined to frame an organic theory of sovereignty, in 
which naturally-formed societies constituted organic states infused throughout with vital 
forces.  
Following this long conceptual history, the main thrust of the dissertation tracks 
the influence of this organic thought in the United States and, particularly the political 
struggle to identify the country’s “conservative principles” with specific socio-political 
agendas. Chapter two establishes the central antagonism between the unilateral 
proponents of slavery (and their corollary commitment to State rights) and any forces 
they perceived as jeopardizing slavery (including federal authority, anti-slavery 
movements, and national education or culture). Reacting to the government’s 
protectionist commercial policies in the 1820s, pro-slavery southerners defended their 
“conservative” right to protect their particular social and commercial institutions against 
federal interference through the “conservative principles” of State rights and nullification. 
After the abolitionist movement mobilized in the 1830s, these pro-slavery forces joined 
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in a “Conservative” front with northern anti-abolitionists to enforce the “conservative 
principles” of “law-and-order” through censorship and violence against anyone 
associated with the anti-slavery movement, including all people of color. In response, a 
group of northeastern social reformers advocated a national movement to fund the arts 
and public education and to free religion from the tyranny of “false conservative” 
politics. Returning to the humanist potential of national culture theorized in German and 
British romantic thought, they re-envisioned American conservatism as a force for true 
(i.e., moral) freedom and justice. 
Chapter three focuses on the first official “Conservative party” in the United 
States, which splintered off from the Jackson-Van Buren party in the late 1830s. It 
represents a slight departure from the earlier history of ideas because it addresses the 
discursive function of “conservative” as an antagonistic label in American politics, rather 
than the mimetic relationship between parties yclept “conservative” in the United States 
and real transnational conservatism. In the 1830s, relatively unified, ideologically 
coherent conservative movements seemed to blossom organically wherever parties 
contended for power internationally. From the American perspective, these national 
Conservative parties presented a united front to secure their own country’s “established 
order” against the surge of transnational and international radical movements. Setting up 
safeguards for social hierarchies and national institutions, these foreign Conservative 
parties implemented policies to protect inherited wealth, the landed classes, and 
capitalists, while suppressing popular, democratic, and socialist movements. When 
opposition parties emerged in the United States to challenge Andrew Jackson’s 
administration—first, under the guise of the Whig party and then from within his own 
 31
party—Jackson’s party connected them in public discourse with reactionary, anti-
democratic “foreign” conservatism. This systematic smear campaign successfully 
marginalized the party’s internal critics, who eventually embraced the pejorative label 
“Conservative” and briefly formed their own party. As a result, Jackson’s party 
consolidated its image as the party “for democracy,” defending the people against 
capitalists, aspiring aristocrats, and corrupt career bureaucrats, while the Whig party 
remained indelibly linked with foreign strains of conservatism in both the American and 
international press for the duration of the party’s existence.48   
The second half of the dissertation returns to the primary conflict between the 
forces for slavery and the people who came in their way. Chapter four looks at the 
Democratic reaction after the “Conservative” (in the sense of “anti-democratic” 
European) Whigs took the White House in 1840. The electoral upset rattled the 
Democratic-party faithful, who had felt assured of another Democratic victory on the tail 
of such a popular, if socially-groundbreaking and politically polarizing, two-term 
president. Not to mention the fact that Van Buren had already won once. And it 
especially shook the workingmen’s and democratic wing of the party, who saw in the 
Whig victory a repudiation of everything they knew to be true in the world. Feeling they 
had to choose between political solvency and disavowing slavery, a substantial number of 
northern Democrats distanced themselves from the anti-slavery cause and anyone 
associated with it. One of these labor activists, public intellectual and internationally-
recognized American philosopher Orestes Brownson, used his public platform to theorize 
                                                 
48 Granted, that distinction stuck, in part, because some Whig positions resonated with the version of 
European and British conservatism represented in American periodicals and local newspapers, namely their 
express anti-radicalism and their flirtation with nativism. 
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John C. Calhoun’s pro-slavery democratic-republicanism, positioning Calhoun as a 
“conservative” reformer, crusading for justice, the Constitution, and the truly American 
way of life (i.e, white supremacy).  
The fifth and final chapter examines the process of confrontation, compromise, 
and dissolution between “national conservatism” and “slave conservatism” from Polk’s 
election in 1844 through the Compromise of 1850. The first type of conservatism, 
“national conservatism,” empowered banks and corporations, favored centralized 
organization and national planning (including protectionist commercial policies and 
federally-funded education and national culture), and endorsed federal authority, 
coordination, and oversight. Its commercial policies benefitted manufacturing, shipping, 
and industry. The other type of conservatism, “slave conservatism,” promoted free trade 
and open markets, proprietary rights, state sovereignty, and slavery. It opposed 
consolidated government, federal authority, and protectionist policies like the tariff. Both 
types of conservatism opposed “fanaticism,” in its various forms (e.g., socialism, 
agrarianism, Dorrism, and abolitionism) and both advocated “law-and-order 
conservatism,” provided that they defined the law and controlled the order. These two 
groups fleetingly cooperated to push through the Compromise of 1850, a collection of 
bills intended to resolve the festering question of slavery, including the role of the federal 
government in securing “fugitive” slaves, the slave trade in the District of Columbia, and 
the disposition of the Oregon territory and the Mexican annexations (California, Utah, 
and New Mexico). The resulting compromise legislation hit the republican high-mark of 
satisfying no one and agitating everyone else—in large part because its framers 
contended for two distinct ideological visions of American society that undermined any 
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common ground for compromise. In addition to their programmatic conflicts, “national” 
and “slavery” conservatives advanced mutually exclusive variations on the theme of 
white supremacy. “National” conservatives tended toward white nationalism, which 
envisioned a country populated exclusively by “white” people. “Slave” conservatives, on 
the other hand, demanded white hegemony, which predicated “white” freedom on the 
material co-existence and subjugation of a “black” population.49 The people could live in 
a “white” nation, or they could have slaves, but not both. 
Ultimately, the organismic ontology of the state transformed the socio-political 
imaginary in the nineteenth century, which changed the horizons of possibility for 
political actors to understand and articulate their role and their objectives in state 
formation and control. In this context, a society’s conservative principles, powers, and 
forces, embodied in its organic institutions and expressed in the character of its people, 
maintained its national constitution and social order and kept the living machinery of its 
government operating in cosmic harmony. The men who claimed to guide their state 
along this organic trajectory called themselves “Conservatives,” and these were the men 
who dictated what America looked like (or, at least, what it should look like, according to 
their ontological assumptions), and, unsurprisingly, it looked like them. 
  
                                                 
49 Emancipation (i.e., abolition without displacement) threatened both of those visions.   
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CHAPTER 1: VITAL POLITICS 
In the eighteenth century, a scientific and philosophic revolution in knowledge 
production (from abstract deduction to historical empiricism) led to an expansion of the 
legitimate subjects for scientific enquiry and an attendant transformation in theories of 
personhood, humanity, society, politics, and the state. As a result, organic materialism 
(genetic, progressive, operating by design, and susceptible to outside influences) 
gradually supplanted Enlightenment universalism as the over-riding paradigm for 
comprehending, controlling, and shaping the world.50 Uniting moral philosophy and 
physiology, empiricist John Locke advanced a theory of association that placed 
individuals in their particular historical and social contexts, establishing the foundations 
for a progressive model of individual development. The Scottish moral philosophers and 
physicians who followed Locke materialized morality in the human body. An 
individual’s nerves connected them to their humanity through their “common sense,” 
which tied them organically to their community, their society, and, with enough 
refinement, to the world. Meanwhile, as historical empiricism came to dominate 
epistemology, researchers in the incipient life sciences in Britain and on the continent 
jettisoned universalist explanations for natural life and replaced them with particular, 
dynamic, and progressive theories of organic development. Through their combined work 
on the nervous system, physiology, moral sentiment, and aesthetics, these medico-
                                                 
50 Tobias Cheung, “What is an “Organism”? On the Occurrence of a New Term and Its Conceptual 
Transformations 1680-1850” in Philippe Huneman and Charles T. Wolfe, eds, “The Concept of Organism: 
Historical, Philosophical, Scientific Perspectives [Special Issue],” History and Philosophy of the Life 
Sciences 32, no. 2–3 (2010): 155-94. 
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philosophers and moral theorists transformed society conceptually from a dead machine 
to a vital organism.51  
During this period, locating the proper mechanism for organic development 
gained social and political urgency in response to changes in the social order and 
challenges to traditional and hierarchical state structures. Like all organic life, societies 
carried within themselves a “conservative” ideal, an antiseptic and regenerative living 
force, which maintained their health and stability. At the beginning of the eighteenth 
century, the aristocracy performed this vital function. Poised at the top of a stable, natural 
hierarchy, they protected and preserved the social body; as the educated class, they 
served as society’s brain, guiding and ruling the lower orders. As the landed class, they 
represented the “true owners” of the “political vessel,” whose property enabled them to 
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embody a disinterested public spirit, in contrast with the vicissitude of newly-minted 
“monied men.”52 Gradually, however, it became clear to some people that the aristocracy 
represented a failed or putrefying form. The advent of a politically relevant and educated 
middle class, expanding geographic and social mobility, urbanization, and higher literacy 
rates (combined with the growing availability of affordable publications) all conspired to 
render aristocracy redundant. Meanwhile, integrated theories of the mind suggested that 
the body, itself, contributed the essential material for thought, while the brain merely 
served as a data repository from which the mind synthesized input from the nervous 
system. Parallel developments in sentiment theory likewise suggested that the mass of 
people who formed the body of the state might make substantial contributions to the 
state’s health and stability, if their moral senses were properly cultivated through 
aesthetic education. Aesthetic education broadened the people’s capacity to embody the 
vital principles of their society and prepared them for self-rule.53 
In the decades preceding the French Revolution, natural scientists and 
philosophers sympathetic to these changes looked to shifting models of organic 
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development programmatically. Empirical research on natural life led them to formulate 
the methods by which a state could change for the good of the body politic. Reciprocally, 
it gave them insight into how they could guide the parts of that national body, awakened 
to their distinct and vital functions in the life of the (national) mind, to operate in 
sympathetic and organic harmony. Since organic bodies had a hierarchy of parts, this 
schema accorded with hierarchical social organizations. Yet, because sentiment theory 
indicated that each individual had the potential to access a disinterested common sense 
that connected them to universal principles, it opened the gateway to more egalitarian 
organizations. The people (aristocrats, middle class, and commoners, alike) provided the 
material substance of the national organism. Their health, stability, and organization 
determined the fortitude and durability of the state. And their capacity to connect with 
universal morality (the “common sense”) dictated the state’s vitality.54 
 Germinating in eighteenth-century biology, aesthetics, and philosophy, the 
organic model of statehood came to fruition as a cultural and political project of 
resistance to French hegemony on the continent. In late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth-
century German thought, organic sovereignty represented the fulfillment of an essential 
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idea of a nation in state form. In the adversarial context of French imperialism, it 
projected the possibility of a state that embodied, preserved, and perpetuated the vital, 
conservative principle of an organic polity. Organic societies built organic states 
particularly suited to their needs, which prepared and developed the capacity of their 
citizens for individual perfection and, ultimately, for them to embrace their universal 
humanity. States that developed organically persisted and states constructed on artificial 
or mechanical principles, however sound, were doomed to fall.55 
For simplicity, the basic trajectory of this process can be compressed into a 
schema of proper names. After addressing the conflict between Enlightenment 
universalism and sensorial empiricism, this chapter starts in Great Britain, where Scottish 
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moral philosophers Lord Shaftesbury, David Hume, and Adam Smith, together with 
Scottish physician-physiologists William Cullen and Robert Whytt, and English 
physicians David Hartley and George Cheyne elaborated the idea of an organic 
(intersubjective and intertwined) society and tied “national” health to the behavior and 
habits of a country’s citizens. It then moves to the continent, where French naturalist 
George-Louis Leclerc (Comte de Buffon), Swiss physiologists Albrecht von Haller and 
Charles Bonnet, and German physiologist Caspar Wolff developed a vital theory of 
organic life and, through the work of the French Idéologues (physiologist-physicians 
Balthasar-Anthelme Richerand and Pierre Jean George Cabanis, and political theorist 
Antoine Destutt de Tracy) projected it onto the body politic. The chapter concludes in 
Germany, where German philosophers incorporated British moral sentiment and 
continental vitalism into a totalized image of organic sovereignty. Johann Herder and 
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe integrated this sentimental and vitalist evolutionary theory 
into their Volk philosophy and Sturm und Drung movement. At the same time, Johann 
Friedrich Blumenbach’s organic biology, which built on all of these influences, inspired 
the epigenetic turn in Immanuel Kant’s transcendental idealism, Friedrich Schiller’s 
aesthetics, and, finally, Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s organic nationalism, i.e., the concept of 
organic sovereignty as the ideal basis for state-formation or the ontological assumption 
that societies were organic and that states should be. 
THE BODY AND ITS ASSOCIATIONS 
During the Enlightenment, natural philosophers set out to discover, explain, and 
model the component parts of the universe, which they presumed to be and to function 
the same way everywhere. Using these universal rules, forms, and principles they 
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constructed a model of society that could be imposed everywhere, with more or less 
work. Two epistemological systems dominated in this period. The first, epitomized in the 
work of Rene Descartes and Isaac Newton in the late seventeenth century, approached the 
world through the realm of mathematics, producing a mechanistic dualism that 
distinguished between the physical and metaphysical realms.56 The second system, 
popularized by Newton’s correspondent John Locke, derived its epistemology from the 
burgeoning fields of medicine and physiology, and ultimately led to particular and 
progressive theories of natural life and organic development. 
In Newton’s model, the body was a machine, pulled by external levers and run by 
necessity.57 The body’s organs transmitted impressions and sensations via the nerves to 
the physical brain, which operated as a grand central station for sensation, a physical 
warehouse for sensory information.58 The physical brain served as the mind’s sensorium, 
which stimulated representative images in the mind.59 Similarly, the physical world 
served as God’s sensorium, a sensory field that manifested God’s will. Unlike the human 
sensorium (or sensoriolum, to distinguish it from God’s), God’s sensorium lacked the 
                                                 
56 Newton diverged from Descartes by factoring God into the machine, integrating the physical and 
metaphysical realms into a single world theory. In this framework, God served as the first cause of 
universal order and motion, the ontological author of all forms and substance, and the continuous and 
substantive mover of all time, space, and matter. At the individual level, the body’s ability to perceive, 
process, produce, and manipulate sensations demonstrated the body’s divinely constituted connection with 
the mind. The body connected the human soul to the physical world by a continuous act of God’s will. 
Geoffrey Gorham,“How Newton Solved the Mind-Body Problem.” History of Philosophy Quarterly 28, no. 
1 (2011): 21–44. For more on Newton’s use of God as an a priori law of nature, see Funkenstein, Amos. 
Theology and the Scientific Imagination from the Middle Ages to the Seventeenth Century. Princeton 
University Press, 1986., 192-202.) 
57 For further elaboration on Newton’s epistemological impact on the following century of scientific and 
philosophical inquiry, see Thomas Sturm, “Analytic and Synthetic Method in the Human Sciences: A Hope 
that Failed,” in Conflicting Values of Inquiry: Ideologies of Epistemology in Early Modern Europe. 
(BRILL, 2014). 
58 Saisset, Émile Edmond. Essay on Religious Philosophy, Tr., with Analysis, Notes [&c.]., 1863., 180.; 
Gorham,  “How Newton Solved the Mind-Body Problem,” 24 
59 The “mind” was understood to be the human soul resident in the brain. 
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limitations imposed by time and space. Human beings could only see the image of a thing 
and never the true thing because they were trapped in the machinery of the universe, 
limited to the present.60 Through the faculties of intellect and imagination, the mind 
manipulated these images and composed ideas, all within the rules imposed by God’s 
laws.61  
At the close of the seventeenth century, physician and moral philosopher John 
Locke developed a sensorial empiricism, predicated on the study of human experience, 
that radically altered the common understanding of the individual’s relationship to 
society and society’s relationship to the state. Whereas Thomas Hobbes and the French 
mechanists presumed that morality must be imposed unilaterally from the outside to 
constrain mankind’s animalistic nature, in Locke’s theory of association, individuals built 
their own morality on the foundation of their sensory experiences and through the 
operation of their imaginations. In this system of medical–philosophical thought, the 
imagination signified the material, nervous basis for consciousness and functioned as the 
primary model for explaining the connection between human anatomy and human 
behavior.62 Rather than being filled in by God, Locke asserted, the mind built itself. 
Sensation begat consciousness. The nerves transmitted the body’s sensations through the 
nervous system to the brain, which produced moral ideas through the process of mental 
association and reflection. Every man shared a “common sense” when first encountering 
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the world and the refinement of a man’s senses determined his ability to perceive nature’s 
primary truths. Because Locke’s natural history of understanding situated individuals in 
their temporal and material contexts, he provided the epistemological foundation for 
progressive theories of organic development in both moral philosophy and the life 
sciences, which, combined, contributed to an organic model of society. 
By the mid-eighteenth century, British moral and medical philosophers fleshed 
out the concept of morality as an organic, material faculty located in the body that could 
be conditioned by environment, refined by experience, cultivated through education, or 
stunted through labor. These synthetic works opened the possibility that all people had 
access to morality through the exercise of their senses. Following Locke, they advanced a 
theory of moral sentiments that embedded each individual into a social nervous network, 
stressing the intersectional role that individuals, social groups, and governing institutions 
played in cultivating healthy and thriving national bodies.63 According to moral sense 
theory, popularized by Locke’s student, Lord Shaftesbury, individuals intuited and 
generated morality through the combined faculties of their sensory impulses and 
imaginations.64 They developed their moral sense through their phenomenological 
experiences and refined it through their affective relationships with other people, 
becoming connected sympathetically to a particular social body and, through the 
extension of their nervous sensibility, to widening social circles.  
In the realm of medicine, physiologists extended the boundaries of the individual 
nervous system to include social, cultural, and national stimuli, effectively nationalizing 
                                                 
63 Robert Tavernor, Smoot’s Ear: The Measure of Humanity, (New Haven and London, 207), 43. 
64 John Locke served as the medical attendant to Lord Ashley, the Second Earl of Shaftesbury, and 
supervised his son’s education. 
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Locke’s nervous system. In the English Malady (1733), physiologist George Cheyne 
linked the health and stability of the individual body to the health and stability of the 
national body, implicating both individual choice and national habituation. Like 
individuals, nations developed distinctive nervous systems with characteristic nervous 
sensibilities and sensitivities. Cheyne attributed the proliferation of particular nervous 
disorders in England to the nation’s material conditions. Individual neuropathology 
flourished due to a combination of England’s climate, weather, soil, food, the growth of 
domestic wealth and foreign trade, the sedentary and decadent lifestyle common among 
its upper classes, and the surge of residents in large towns and cities.65 Wealthy, 
hierarchical societies, like England, were particularly vulnerable to nervous disorders 
because they bred an entire class that had sensitive nerves and destructive habits by 
design. To cure their national malady, Cheyne proposed a national remedy implemented 
through the behavior of the country’s citizens.66 
In the Treatise on Human Nature (1739) and Essays, Moral, Political and 
Literary (1742), David Hume traced the biographical and social contingencies of nervous 
development as they related to differences in sympathy and moral development. He 
noticed that proximity and association bred sympathy, building particular communities 
united by their common feeling. Similarly, environmental factors habituated members of 
the same community in common nervous reactions (common sentiment), which naturally 
and necessarily drew them together into communities, and ensured that members of the 
same societies felt a connective bond of affection for each other. At the same time, 
                                                 
65 Cheyne, George. The English Malady, Or a Treatise of Nervous Diseases of All Kinds,... by George 
Cheyne. (1733), ii. 
66 Cheyne. The English Malady, 92-3. 
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however, class stratification created sentimental estrangement within communities. In 
their effort to create stability, Hume explained, the people formed governments, which 
instituted hierarchies of power through property that determined occupation, 
environment, and education. Over time, these different stations in life generated habits of 
mind that reproduced these power structures in the individual’s imagination, naturalizing 
the social and political distinctions that fabricated these differences in the first place. 
These social distinctions shaped the “whole fabric” of a man’s nature, Hume wrote, 
“external and internal.” The “skin, pores, muscles, and nerves of a day-labourer” differed 
from those of a “man of quality,” and “so are his sentiments, actions and manners.” All of 
the factors of proximity and place that may have once united these men now served to 
alienate their affections from each other. Yet, because sympathy converted an idea into 
an impression by “the force of imagination,” it could enter into this breach and 
communicate the impression of common sentiment where it no longer naturally thrived. 
Even if members of the same community no longer felt the same sensations, a “man of 
quality” could experience the sensation in his imagination, overcoming the social barrier 
to common affection and ethical treatment.67 
In a parallel development, in a 1749 monograph David Hartley, George Cheyne’s 
personal physician, described the physiological process by which social contexts molded 
individual morality and compelled sympathetic communities.68 Everything a person did 
or encountered had the capacity to influence their associative network and, consequently, 
                                                 
67 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (London, 1817), 44, 70, 91, 314. 
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Society. He was also a committed Newtonian in a period when Newton’s mathematical approach had gone 
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arguments indicate that he was, at the very least, conversant with Hume’s ideas and, possibly, denied 
having read Hume because of Hume’s nefarious atheism, which offended his religious sensibilities.   
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their voluntary actions. Over time, different behaviors developed their own affections—
their own relationships to different kinds of pleasure and pain in the mind. These 
affections always functioned normatively, as they had in Locke’s model, directing action 
toward the pursuit of happiness.69 This reciprocal relationship in the nerves between 
action and feeling created the biological basis for interpersonal sympathy (sympathy 
between bodies) and for the individual’s drive toward social unity. Sympathetic affection 
acted as a powerful motivator that enabled individuals to transcend merely physical or 
personal pleasure or discomfort, and to attend to the happiness of others. Within the 
body, a well-developed sympathetic faculty enabled individuals to push past their 
immediate sensations toward a gradual annihilation of their individual “self.” It regulated 
humankind’s lower impulses and associations, reinforced their moral senses, and united 
them with their sense of God (theopathy). Furthermore, sympathy was learned behavior, 
picked up from nervous associations developed in childhood and refined over a lifetime. 
A person’s affection for their family, their sense of duty to their community and 
government, their reverence for authority and obedience to the law all introduced the 
patterns of behavior that opened them up to universal sympathy and unity in God’s true 
religion. The sympathetic drive incrementally awakened them to their membership in 
increasingly expansive communities, until they realized their connection to all other 
people as members of the same universal, mystical body. 
                                                 
69 Hartley’s Observations on Man, His Frame, His Duty, and His Expectations (1749) synthesized Locke’s 
theory of associations and Newton’s doctrine of nervous vibrations. Drawing on Locke’s Essay Concerning 
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heart pumping or the bowels moving) grew out of the power of its association with previous circumstances 
or bodily movements that left durable impressions (habits of vibration) on the nervous system. Habits of 
thought and behavior, therefore, reinforced patterns of vibrations in the nervous system and in the brain. 
 46
In the 1750s, Hume’s physician William Cullen, the President of the Royal 
College of Physicians and Surgeons of Glasgow and then Edinburgh, and Cullen’s 
colleague Robert Whytt reintroduced the soul into the body as part of a holistic theory of 
nervous sympathy in which the nerves served as the apparatus for an individual’s 
morality.70 Whytt argued that the nerves—although a material component of the body—
suffused the entire organism with a “sentient principle” (what Cullen and French 
physician Paul-Joseph Barthez later called the “vital principle”), an aspect of the soul that 
enabled the body to feel and respond reasonably, even in those cases where the outside 
stimulus never reached the conscious mind.71 Nerves could lead to an idea being created 
through association in the mind, to a physical manifestation, or to both.72  This 
                                                 
70 Whytt’s theory contradicted the dominant model of the body—hydraulic mechanism—fleshed out by 
Hermann Boerhaave and his acolytes at the Dutch medical school in Leyden. Whytt had studied under 
Boerhaave and his colleagues at Leyden in addition to his medical education at the Edinburgh medical 
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hydraulic mechanism), which ensured that the body carried out its vital functions. In this model, the nerves 
merely served as a system of transportation to deliver sensation to the brain. The soul might observe from 
its seat in the sensorium, but it remained disconnected from the body’s organic vitality. (David Philip 
Miller and Peter Hanns Reill, Visions of Empire: Voyages, Botany, and Representations of Nature (New 
York, 2011), 95; Christopher Lawrence, “The Nervous System and Society in the Scottish Enlightenment,” 
23-24.) 
71 William Cullen’s “vital principle” (exposited in print in 1789) coincided with Whytt’s “sentient 
principle,” but he rejected the immaterial element of “sentience” (i.e., the soul). Instead, he theorized that 
the body converted the sun into liquid fire (a process similar to photosynthesis), which traveled through the 
body’s nerves like electricity through a wire, connecting nerve theory with advancements made in 
chemistry and botany. Instead, he substituted an “aetherial fluid” that flowed through the nerves to the 
entire body. Because of his prominent academic role, Cullen did not publish until the 1770s. However, he 
served as a locus for all of the prominent figures of the Scottish enlightenment and his lectures had 
widespread influence on physiology and moral philosophy long before they entered print under his own 
name. Further complicating the issue, when Cullen did finally publish, he produced largely synthetic works 
that integrated most of the major theorists on sensibility, sociability, physiology, medicine, and moral 
philosophy. Historians of the sociology of science and medicine have dealt with this discrepancy by noting 
his significance, painstakingly connecting the published works of his students with the available record of 
his lectures, and explicitly accrediting him when possible. Similarly, I will attempt to balance between 
citing other intellectuals who published on the topic before Cullen and giving Cullen his due. 
72 Lawrence, “The Nervous System,” 24-5.  
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“sympathetic” faculty ensured that all of the body’s physical organs reacted together with 
the mind in harmony: a single, unified, vital organism.73 
At the end of the decade, Adam Smith elaborated this intrapersonal sympathetic 
network as a model for interpersonal social construction in his popular Theory of Moral 
Sentiments (1759), proposing that the mind (i.e., the imagination) created society.74 
Nervous sympathy generated a connective tissue between men, a “fellow feeling” that 
could potentially supersede political and social stratification. From this information, the 
imagination generated patterns of nervous sensibility and projected them onto the world, 
identifying and organizing as “society” the communities with which an individual 
connected sympathetically. Society developed from the aggregation and amalgamation of 
each individual’s nervous sensibility into one giant nervous system. These webs of 
sympathy, infused with the natural principle of humanity, tied together different organs 
within the social body, each of which carried out specialized functions within a single 
system. In this way, society functioned as an organism, with its individual members 
serving the social body just like the component parts served an individual body in Cullen 
and Whytt’s theory.75 
In forging a theory of moral sentiments predicated on the acuity of an individual’s 
imagination, Smith redefined sensibility as an intellectual and rational process that 
conjoined morality and aesthetics. Building on the framework established in Hume’s 
                                                 
73 Cutler J. Cleveland, David I. Stern, and Robert Costanza, eds, The Economics of Nature and the Nature 
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74 For Smith’s connection with Cullen and Whytt, see: Craig Franson, “‘Nothing is so soon forgot as pain’: 
Reading Agony in Adam Smith’s The Theory of Moral Sentiments in Megan J. Coyer, and David E. 
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Treatise, Smith speculated that the imagination facilitated and negotiated the relationship 
between the nervous system and the outside world, operating as a field of experience that 
mediated and elaborated upon the information received. An individual’s experiences 
(Hume’s “habit”) bonded together to form an imagined spectator, an ideal self separate 
from all material circumstances. When individuals sympathized with others, they 
projected their own imagined spectator into the other person’s situation and recognized 
the correctness of that person’s response to their conditions. The quality of their 
imagination determined their faculty for judgment because it increased the capacity of 
their imagined spectator to reproduce with accuracy all of the factors shaping another 
person’s behavior. Because it built and refined the imagination, aesthetic education 
enhanced an individual’s ability to transcend their own conditions and exercise accurate 
judgment of others.76 Through the process of broadening and refining their aesthetic 
sensibility, they gained the capacity to connect with and care for others in their 
community, and their sense of communal connection expanded outwards to encompass 
increasingly large and more diverse populations.  
Since, in theory, anyone with access to education—even the upwardly-mobile 
“monied men” and those occupying the “middle station” of life—could serve as the mind 
of society, sensationalism and sentiment opened up the field of possibility for egalitarian 
                                                 
76 Those members of society with more highly refined nerves had a greater concept of causality and a more 
acute ability to discern the structural and social factors that affected behavior. The cultivated (generally 
upper) and uncultivated (generally lower) classes performed similar functions in society as the conscious 
and subconscious mind performed in Cullen’s theory. The difference between cultivated and uncultivated 
classes correlated with the class structure in England, but, technically, class was only causal in so far as it 
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“theory of sympathy” developed by Smith and his fellow moralists ‘expressed and molded’ the ‘social 
solidarity’ of the ‘ruling elite,’ while the ‘related’ physiological “theory of sensibility” articulated by 
Edinburgh’s esteemed medical professors situated ‘the landed minority as the custodians of civilization, 
and therefore the natural governors, in a backwards society.’” (Franson, “Reading Agony,” 25.)  
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and republican models of statehood, in which the virtuous middle class embraced their 
responsibility toward their fellow man. Simultaneously, however, sentiment theory 
presented a set of existential and philosophical challenges to this kind of universal 
philanthropy. Because nations operated as organisms, they, too, developed a particular 
moral sense, a socially-determined and historically-contingent combination of sentiment 
and affections that drove all of their moral decisions. Societies might share frameworks 
and practices with other communities across time and space, but, like human organisms, 
they varied in their access to the universal moral standard; their organic makeup led them 
inexorably to differentiation, alienation, and conflict.  If Hume and Smith’s theory of 
moral sentiments had opened up the transformative possibility for an organically 
interconnected brotherhood of man, it simultaneously raised seemingly impervious 
barriers to that unity.   
In an effort to combat Hume and Smith’s skeptical and disaggregating 
conclusions, Henry Home, Lord Kames, explicitly reintroduced God into moral sense 
theory in the 1760s. In the “Preliminary Discourse Being an Investigation to the Moral 
Laws of Society” to his Principles of Equity (1767), Home argued that God had stamped 
mankind with an imprint of perfection, which gave rise to a universal and invariable 
moral standard, a common moral sense propelling all humanity progressively towards 
perfection. He elaborated, “In the order of Providence, the progress of our species toward 
perfection resembles that of an individual: we may observe an infancy in both; and in 
both a gradual progress toward maturity: nor is the resemblance less perfect that certain 
tribes, like certain individuals, ripen faster than others.” But even Lord Kames, who 
would restore the principle of universal teleology to the theory of moral sense, agreed 
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that societies varied in their access to the universal moral standard. This variation did not 
“disprove the reality of a common sense as to morals,” he noted, but it did reveal that 
“the moral sense has not been equally perfect at all times, and in all countries.”77  
Kames’s argument drew on concurrent advances in natural science, where 
physiologists had theorized the relationship between the organization of an original plan 
in organic life and the progressive or genetic changes in organic development. In 
conversation (and often overlapping) with the key players in the moral sense debate, they 
asked the same questions about organic life that moral philosophers were asking about 
human society: Did organisms develop progressively toward an identifiable end? Could 
novel forms develop or come into existence, and if so, by what mechanism did such a 
genetic awakening or organic change occur? Most importantly, what gave an organism 
vitality, extended its life, or preserved it? Over time, physiologists identified the vital 
forces that shaped an organism’s structure, its genetic expression, its growth, and its 
viability. As British sensibility and sentiment theory increasingly influenced continental 
philosophy, this system of thought migrated along with it, inflecting the parallel debate in 
moral and political philosophy over the natural structure, stability, and organic growth of 
society. The vital forces for organic change—in either the evolutionary or epigenetic 
model—formed the basis for the “conservative principle” in French and British 
physiology and the transformative concept of Bildunstrieb (the formative drive) in 
German thought. 
By the mid-eighteenth century, evolution and epigenesis emerged in natural 
science and history as the two dominant theories that explained variation in organic form. 
                                                 
77 Henry Home, Lord Kames, Principles of Equity. (London and Edinburgh: 1767), 8. 
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At the time, “evolution” signified preformation: the entire organism existed in its 
complete form from its inception and simply unfolded, often in reaction to various 
outside forces. In contrast, “epigenesis,” popularized by French naturalist George-Louis 
Leclerc (Comte de Buffon), advanced a dynamic, additive model of organic development. 
Like his counterparts in the Scottish Enlightenment, Buffon embraced Locke’s historical 
and experiential methodology over the mechanistic and reductive approach characterized 
by Swiss ecologist Carl Linnaeus. In the Linnaean system, all of nature already lay 
stretched out on the horizon, waiting for scientific observers to fit its species-variations 
into a pre-established hierarchical taxonomy. Conversely, in Buffon’s Histoire naturelle, 
générale et particulière (a thirty-six-volume natural history published between 1749 and 
1788), nature generated biological diversity epigenetically, bringing vital forces into 
balance against the impact of space and time.78 In this causal genealogy, organisms 
changed over time from their original types into their present forms as the result of a 
variety of factors, including climate, environment, and geographical location—the same 
factors that shaped the national body in the Scottish theory of moral sentiments.79 
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In the following decade, Swiss physiologist Albrecht von Haller argued for an 
evolutionary model in which an organism’s original organization dictated its final form. 
According to Haller, all organisms existed in potentia, but required external stimulation 
(irritation) to unfold from their nascent stage. Organisms had all of their preexisting parts 
in embryo, he observed, which unfolded into identifiable organs during gestation. Like a 
scroll of poetry, the parts of the organism were already written and merely required 
articulation. In support of this theory, Haller’s friend Charles Bonnet advanced the 
concept of “emboîtment [encapsulation],” a “natural evolution of organized beings” from 
original seeds that carried within them entire genealogies, spilling out over millennia. 
Everything that could ever exist, existed within those seeds, in complete formation.80 
Haller’s concept of creative irritation would reappear twenty years later in German 
aesthetics as the Sturm und Drang movement. 
In response to Haller and Bonnet, German physiologist Caspar Wolff formulated 
a dynamic, epigenetic theory of organic change in the 1750s and 1760s. He criticized the 
preformationists for paradoxically presuming a divine miracle delimited to the moment of 
the world’s creation and simultaneously denying “living nature” the power to change 
itself. Unless God intervened, change did not happen—in every womb, life developed 
automatically through the operation of a dead mechanism.81 Haller and Bonnet conceived 
of bodies as replicable machines, he concluded, and reduced biologists to the role of 
mechanics.82 In his research on the vascular system, on the contrary, Wolff observed that 
life changed in embryo and concluded that organisms developed epigenetically according 
                                                 
80 Richards, The Romantic Conception of Life, 213. 
81 Richards, Science and Its Conceptual Foundations, 215-216. 
82 Wolff first engaged Haller and Bonnet’s work in his 1759 doctoral dissertation and continued to publish 
cutting critiques of their theories until Haller’s failing health intervened in the early 1770s.  
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to a “principle of generation” through the agency of an “essential” drive [vis essentialis] 
that turned dead matter into a living organism that grew and changed.83 The vis 
essentialis transformed the body from a smattering of disparate materials into a proper 
organism, giving it an organic structure and coordinating all of its separate parts. Wolff’s 
epigenetic vis essentialis resembled Whytt’s “sentient principle” in that it worked as a 
vital force on the body, but was not, itself, a material mechanism. In this way, it 
incorporated both the vital and mechanical explanations for organic life, though it did not 
fully integrate them. They would remain in tension for another twenty years, until 
German physiologist Johann Friedrich Blumenbach unified them in the formative drive 
(the nisum formativum or Bildungstrieb), which will be addressed in the next section. 
British sentiment theory, in concert with these dynamic models of organic change, 
reanimated the vitalist hypothesis in French medical discourse, notably among 
Montpellier’s medical faculty, and in philosophy, particularly among Diderot and 
Montesquieu.84 Influenced by Whytt, Montpellier faculty-member Henri Fouquet 
collectively treated sensibility and sentiment as the “base and conservative agent [agent 
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conservateur] of life” in his 1765 Encyclopedia article on the subject.85 In the 1770s, the 
head of the medical faculty at Montpellier, Paul-Joseph Barthez, proposed that a “vital 
principle,” operating as an autonomous force, maintained homeostasis within 
organisms.86 Working in a pre-established harmony with organic life, the “principum 
vitale” regulated an organism’s active functions (the body’s motor, sensory, 
hematological, thermoregulatory, and circulatory systems) and determined its capacity 
for survival.87 The French Idéologues—physiologist-physicians Balthasar-Anthelme 
Richerand and Pierre Jean George Cabanis, and political theorist Antoine Destutt de 
Tracy—called this faculty the “principe conservateur,” an active agent that supervised the 
body, balanced its faculties, and struggled against the powers that might “interrupt its 
exercise” or extinguish its “vital motion.”88 In the field of medicine, the “conservative 
principle” described the faculty within the system that harmonized the parts. Echoing 
Hume and Smith, Hartley and Cheyne, Barthez and his colleagues at Montpellier detailed 
a comprehensive science of humanity which indicated that individuals and societies could 
improve themselves through the integrated treatment of their minds and bodies. 
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PHILOSOPHIE FÜR DIE WELT: MORAL SENSE AND EPIGENESIS IN GERMANY 
In the mid-eighteenth century, British moral sense theory migrated to the German 
states in its various medical, philosophical, and aesthetic iterations, where it emerged in 
the work of Immanuel Kant, Johann Gottfried Herder, and Gotthold Ephraim Lessing to 
form the foundation for an organic theory of national sovereignty.89 For those German 
philosophers dissatisfied with the dominant speculative and rationalist traditions in the 
decade after Christian Wolff died, sensibility offered a compelling—and 
transformative—epistemology. It corrected for the empirical and programmatic 
limitations of dogmatic philosophy and it promoted an egalitarian understanding of 
human potential. Spurred by Smith, Hume, and translations of other British moral sense 
theorists, Johann Herder and his contemporaries shifted their focus toward publically-
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minded questions.90 In the place of abstract, universalizing systems, Herder proposed a 
“philosophy of the healthy understanding,” communicated to the people in their 
language, which would connect them in a sympathetic community devoted to their 
common interest and moving toward their common destiny. Instead of teaching the 
people to improve themselves, this Volk philosophie would improve them through a 
program of systematic Bildung (education or cultivation), molding “the human being, the 
citizen, in accordance with better principles,” and giving them the “right directions” in 
logic, morality, and politics. Philosophy “thinks,” Herder wrote, so that others may act.91  
Combined with the dynamic theories of biological development publicized during 
the Haller-Wolff controversy, sensibility provided this new generation of German 
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philosophers with the model for creating organic unity and progressive change through 
aesthetics. When Herder joined forces with Johann Wolfgang von Goethe at Strasbourg 
University in the 1770s, they built a national aesthetic movement based on an 
evolutionary and sympathetic understanding of organic life. Like the germ of a chick 
nestled in a hen’s egg, the latent nation waited for the right irritating substance to initiate 
its development: the “sturm” (irritation) and “drang” (stress or drive) that compelled its 
evolution (in Haller’s sense).92 In Herder’s philosophy, aesthetics performed the irritating 
function. Every nation “has its own center of well-being within itself,” Herder wrote in 
1774, an “invisible germ of receptiveness to human happiness and virtue.”93 Aesthetics 
connected the people to their authentic selves, roused them to their organic relationship to 
the world, and opened them to the peculiar social and institutional expressions vital to 
their national well-being.94 National aesthetics, expressed in folklore and folksongs, knit 
a people into a single, unified nervous system, a national system of feeling. If the people 
functioned as a single cohesive organism in the form of a nation, then aesthetic 
expression operated as their vital force, driving their individual and collective evolution 
towards a unique national genus. To that end, Herder and Goethe’s Sturm und Drung 
movement promoted an ecstatic sentimental aesthetic designed to spark the vital life of 
individuals as independent and virtuous organs of a unified national organism.  
In his 1783 Prologmena to Any Future Metaphysics, Herder’s mentor Immanuel 
Kant warned that sensationist philosophy appeared to promote a radical model of 
individual fulfillment and human freedom, but, in reality, it cut humanity off from 
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morality, free will, and the cultivation of its higher destiny. By questioning the grounds 
of metaphysics, Kant noted, Hume exposed the emptiness of dogmatic philosophy, but 
Hume’s skepticism promised nothing in its place.95 Taking Locke’s empiricism to its 
logical conclusion, Kant argued, Hume’s experiential methodology opened a fundamental 
breach between particular and universal knowledge. Subjugating reason to sensation, it 
imprisoned human beings in their own bodies, in time and in space, in a fragmentary and 
amoral world.96 As Kant observed, a moral philosophy that predicated all cognition and 
behavior on phenomenological experience inevitably enforced a structure of contingency 
on human life.97 If no discernable order existed outside of the unity synthetically imposed 
by the individual imagination, then “it is useless to suppose that there is any human 
standard, obligation, or purpose independent of the actual course of human history.” 
Philosophers might employ reason to distinguish tendencies within a society and instruct 
whether specific qualities or actions would lead to human happiness, but these moral 
distinctions were meaningless outside of their social and historical contexts.98 With 
experiences, Kant wrote, “we always remain in the chain of appearances,” which makes 
“an intellectual intuition of objects outside of us, that do not exist through us” seem 
impossible.99 
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In Kant’s analysis, sensationalism opened the egalitarian possibility that all 
people had access to morality through the exercise of their senses, but none of that 
mattered if they had no critical capacity. Moral feeling “required that individuals take as 
much interest in the form as in the matter.” To make a moral decision, they must have the 
ability to consider an object either from the “perspective of universality” (teleological 
judgment) or connect it to their own feeling (aesthetic judgment), and they must have the 
cognitive leverage to make a disinterested (i.e., free) decision about their course of 
action. Moral judgment depended on this free exercise of will: the individual’s power of 
choice to subordinate their freedom for the universal good. Denied the capacity to 
transcend their immanent, interested feelings, individuals became severed from the 
transcendental ground of moral feeling; without the faculty to “consider something from 
the universal perspective,” they had no incentive for moral conduct and no free will to 
choose moral actions. Though connected in communities through the imagination in 
Smith’s writing, individuals were still imprinted by their bodies with an essential and 
insuperable otherness, cut off from transcendental principles. In light of this rupture, Kant 
asked, what compelled the imagined spectator in Smith’s system to adopt the universal 
good and how could critical philosophy provide an incentive for it to do so?100  
In part, Kant resolved this disconnect between individual bodies and their 
metaphysical contexts through Edmund Burke’s aesthetic theory of the beautiful and the 
sublime, which Herder recommended to Kant in 1768 and Lessing translated into 
German in 1773. In Burke’s theory, the beautiful formed the basis for the human drive 
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for society, and found its expression in sensory objects; it connected individuals through 
their sympathy to their surroundings and to other people. In contrast, the sublime applied 
to anything that belied description or representation and individuals experienced it as a 
nervous reaction to trauma. When witnessing the sublime, individuals experienced a flash 
of the supersensible; they existed, for a moment, both inside and outside of nature. The 
nerves transmitted this transcendental sensation to the mind, but the mind recoiled in 
terror, overwhelmed by the incomprehensible. The sentiments and the imagination failed 
to integrate the object of trauma, unable to transform it into an idea that fit into the 
imagination. Through aesthetics, then, individuals gained a cognitive awareness of the 
transcendental ground on which all relationships between phenomena rested. However, 
Burke’s aesthetic theory lacked a mechanism to assimilate reflective (aesthetic and 
teleological) judgment into the cognitive process. The aesthetic experience produced only 
a transitory knowledge, a fleeting sense of teleology, and then a negative space charged 
with affect, but no substance. For Kant, the question remained whether this aesthetic 
experience could be translated into a critical faculty—the problem that inspired his 
critiques.  
Like Herder, Kant found his answer in a model of organic formation that united 
the teleological and mechanical explanations for organic life in a single theory put 
forward by German physiologist Johann Friedrich Blumenbach. In Blumenbach’s 1781 
monograph on organic generation, Uber den Bildungstrieb und das Zeugungsgeschäfte, 
he introduced the concept of Bildungstrieb, a formative force (nisum formativum) that 
continuously connected the developing organism to its original organization, while also 
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regulating its growth, reproduction, and nutrition.101 Each organism operated 
concordantly with its natural purpose, evident in the objective working of its system, and 
every type of organism had its own Bildungstrieb that determined its final structure. 
External conditions and forces could change its path, and it could develop and adapt, but 
“change any of its constituent elements and the organization of the whole was not just 
altered; it was completely destroyed.”102 Where British sensationalism had exposed the 
disjuncture between the “physical-mechanistic” and teleological dimensions of 
“organized nature,” Kant wrote to Blumenbach in 1790, Blumenbach’s model of 
epigenesis reconciled them.103 
Bildungstrieb restored metaphysics to the material realm by introducing the 
teleological principle as a mechanical force in the body.104 Because he “virtually” united 
the organism’s mechanical and transcendental elements, Kant wrote, Blumenbach 
established a regulative principle for natural science, a thought machine that allowed 
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scientists to discover mechanistic explanations for organic phenomena. The fact of 
organized life proved the existence of final purposes, Kant explained in his third critique, 
but Bildungstrieb operationalized them. Organisms did not simply unroll mechanically, 
but were transformed through a continuous act of self-creation made in reference to a 
larger plan.105 The “Idea” of the whole organism determined “the form and combinations 
of all of the parts” and the parts “mutually depended upon each other both as to their 
form and their combination.” Every part of the body functioned as an organ with its own 
productive faculty, with all of the parts “reciprocally producing each other,” so that 
together they produced a complete organism “by their own causality.”106 In organic life, 
this embodied teleology propelled organisms to harmonize internally, in accordance with 
nature’s final purposes.  
Blumenbach’s dynamic theory of organic formation inspired the theoretical model 
for reflective judgment in Kant’s Critique of Judgment (1790). In its reflective capacity, 
Bildungstrieb translated morality (the object of reason) into an object of sense, 
represented in moral feeling. In human beings, it provided the reflective mechanism 
necessary for individuals to make disinterested decisions. For humanity, the “epigenesis 
of happiness (self-creation) out of freedom” provided the “ground of moral feeling.” As a 
categorical imperative, Kant noted, morality contained the “condition of the consensus of 
all of our actions in the universal,” i.e., the conditions under which individual actions 
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aligned with the universe’s formative drive. The human sense of morality developed out 
of an individual’s ability to reflect on something from the universal perspective, and their 
feeling of morality derived from the sense that a freely-chosen act harmonized with the 
universal whole. Nature provided individuals a sense of “complete self-approbation” (a 
formulation Kant borrowed from Smith) when they acted in harmony with the conditions 
of morality.107 Smith’s imagined spectator adopted the universal good, therefore, because 
it resonated with the “supersensible substrate” of his humanity. It gave him satisfaction 
because it accorded with the universal Bildungstrieb.108  
As a conceptual model for human cognition in Kant’s Critique, epigenesis 
functioned as a heuristic to explain how individuals processed and represented 
phenomena outside their understanding.109 It served as the mechanism by which 
individuals reached beyond their own interested experience (aesthetic judgment) and 
connected particular and universal representations in their minds (teleological judgment). 
Through the study of art and nature, they developed their capacity to detect the 
systematic nature of existence. In effect, the practice of thinking about the world as 
unified made the world unified.110 Though the mind lacked the ability to translate the 
sensory experience of the infinite (the noumenal) into a concept of infinity, it could 
reflect on its own failure to integrate that experience as, itself, an object for cognition. 
Individuals might not be able to conceive the infinite, but they could understand both that 
the infinite existed and that they cannot conceive it. The aesthetic experience of the 
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sublime made the incomprehensible legible as an opening toward the inconceivable 
infinite.  
In Kant’s philosophy, then, aesthetics served as the critical apparatus that freed 
people from their contingency in time and space and connected them to the universal 
good. Culture alone liberated individuals from the “despotism of their desires” and, 
therefore, prepared them for “a lordship, in which Reason alone shall have authority.” 
The beautiful arts and the sciences civilized them and trained them to subordinate their 
immediate needs in the formation of civil communities, in which they could fully develop 
their natural capacities. Though an imperfect system, a civil constitution created the order 
necessary for individuals to cultivate themselves in the beautiful arts and sciences, and 
citizens were obligated to obey the civil law in their various states so that civilization 
might progress. Taken together, civil communities formed a cosmopolitan whole, a 
system of states that co-existed perpetually on the verge of conflict, fomenting a 
productive tension that spurred each community to develop “all talents serviceable for 
culture.” Even when it incited war, Kant wrote, this tension reflected “a purposive 
striving of nature to a cultivation which makes us receptive of higher purposes than 
nature itself can supply.” Even disunity and social conflict became constructive in this 
model because it compelled change. This entire structure worked progressively toward a 
radical emancipation from the “tyranny of sense-propensions,” a transcendent departure 
from the material world in which humanity collectively realized the ideal of perfection in 
the dominion of pure reason.111  
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In the work of the Jena Romantics, Bildungstreib shaped the conceptual 
framework for the emancipatory philosophies that fermented in response to the French 
Revolution. During the decade and a half from the Tennis Court oath through Napoleon’s 
imperial march across Europe, Kant’s organic model engendered German idealism, 
which viewed the world’s phenomena as the material incarnations of spiritual principles, 
and germinated in German romanticism (romantisch), natural philosophy 
(Naturphilosophie), and the synthetic “doctrine of science” (Wissenschaftslehre).112 In 
that time, Jena’s illustrious ranks included the poet Novalis, Friedrich Schiller, Ernst 
Arndt, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Friedrich Hölderlin, the brothers Humboldt and Schlegel, 
Clemens Brentano, Ludwig Tieck, Friedrich Joseph Schelling, and Georg Wilhelm 
Friedrich Hegel.113 In the pages of their texts, these men fought the intellectual battles of 
the French Revolution. They asked: did the revolution’s descent into chaos demonstrate 
that the French people had not been prepared for sovereignty or that they were incapable 
of exercising it? Did the Terror invalidate the republican position on universal suffrage 
and political representation, or did this “monstrous birth” reflect that the French deviated 
from the universal moral standard? Could the advocates of representative government 
vindicate the people’s egalitarian and rational potential in the light of the overwhelming 
evidence of their inadequacy?  
These questions, viewed in the framework of Kant’s teleological biology, inspired 
Schiller’s aesthetics, Fichte’s “ego,” and Schelling’s “self-legislation.” Individuals could 
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not be made reasonable through mechanisms imposed externally; they must develop the 
capacity for reason within themselves and create the internal structures for their 
Bildunstreib to operate unimpeded. Given the proper conditions, individuals would be 
able to penetrate through the world’s material epiphenomena and grasp the transcendental 
reality of the ideal.114 In this schema, nations, governments, and their peculiar institutions 
could be understood as the historically situated manifestations of the ideal world and, 
potentially, the vehicles that moved individuals toward their transcendental future. 
After the French Reign of Terror shattered the illusion of “enlightened” revolution 
in 1793, Schiller wrote a series of letters to a sympathetic Danish prince in which he 
vindicated the ideals of human liberty and equality in light of French excesses. In their 
revolution and the Terror that followed, the French exposed the danger of treating the 
political body like a machine with isolated parts, rather than a living organism. Instead of 
evolving epigenetically upward, “this organization degenerated into a common and 
coarse mechanism.” To artificially prolong the “miserable life” of this “abstract whole,” 
the state extinguished the individual, reducing its citizens to numbers, set in a system of 
classification that measured them by their utility to the state. The individual members of 
this society, reduced to fragmentary cogs with “nothing in [their] ears but the 
monotonous sound of the perpetually revolving wheel,” became deafened to the vital beat 
of their common humanity. Their “darkened senses” trapped them in themselves; shut up 
in their individuality, they could not transcend their material and temporal determinants. 
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No wonder this society, when finally “set free,” collapsed into its elements. It contained 
no men, only fettered fragments.115  
Stirred by the democratic spirit of the age, Schiller recalled, people everywhere 
strove for self-rule, but the French revolution demonstrated that democratic ideals could 
not be imposed mechanically by the state, nor universally implemented. Rather, Schiller 
argued, the state must be understood in light of Kant’s organic system. Like any 
organism, “the state is an organization which fashions itself through itself and for itself,” 
and it could only function “when the parts have been accorded to the idea of the whole.” 
If they aimed to successfully refashion the state according to moral principles, then they 
must first work a change at the individual level. Each member of the social body must 
have the image (imagined object) of their totality fixed in their minds and integrated 
sympathetically in their bodies. They must be conditioned by habit to sublimate their 
particular needs in the service of their higher humanity, so that moral conduct became a 
natural impulse for each constituent member of that society. The state could not establish 
a “more perfect humanity,” Schiller concluded, but must instead be based on it.116 
Two years later (1795), Schiller revised and released his 1793 letters in the 
literary journal Die Horen (The Graces), which publicized his emancipatory program of 
aesthetic education.117 Aesthetics, he argued, served a dual purpose in society. On the one 
hand, it prepared individuals to ascend to the moral state; on the other, it prevented 
physical society from breaking down, as France’s had, while the moral society gradually 
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formed. In order for the people to evolve from their material state into moral beings, 
Schiller clarified, they must first enter a transitionary phase, the aesthetic, which primed 
them to be receptive to reason and truth.118 In the aesthetic, the soul passed from 
sensation to thought, simultaneously activated by sensibility and reason, but free from 
physical and moral constraint. In this province of “aesthetic liberty,” the “sensuous man” 
obtained a state of disinterest, the ground of his moral life. As it had in Kant’s Critique, 
aesthetics propagated man’s capacity for “rational liberty beyond the senses,” trained him 
to exercise self-restraint over his inclinations, and taught him to elevate his desires 
beyond his material interests. Ultimately, aesthetic education naturalized moral feeling: it 
trained individuals to be free, and therefore moral. 
In the imperfect state, aesthetic education served as a development and delivery 
system for sensibility, training nervous associations through habituated response. For the 
people to behave correctly, even though they lacked the objective faculty to understand or 
legislate their own behavior, they must feel their duties. Their duties must occur 
imminently in relation to their conditions. Aesthetic education trained the people’s 
habituated responses to their nervous associations, so that they felt the right sensations 
and reflexively responded correctly (sensibly) to their circumstances. Aesthetics refined 
the individual’s constitution, establishing a stable principle that functioned as their 
conscience and served as an internal check on their actions. Over time, they completely 
internalized the law of reason, developing a “free constitution,” a disinterested common 
sense that operated as an internal force, capable of judging the external impact of the 
world on themselves. In the long run, these people would no longer need legislative 
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organs to govern them because they would have become self-legislative. In the short 
term, free individuals who joined to form a constitutional state would not suffer from 
violent revolutions because their internal discipline prevented it. 
The same year as Schiller published his letters, Kant issued a short philosophical 
sketch stressing the importance of republican constitutions to rational freedom and world 
peace. Citizens living under a republican form of government would rarely consent to go 
to war, Kant claimed, because they would take into consideration its material and moral 
cost. Despotic legislators, however, subject to different laws and conditions than their 
constituents, did not bear the burdens of their wars and so would not hesitate to pursue it. 
In moving “Toward Perpetual Peace,” Kant warned against conflating democracies with 
truly representative systems. Republics, he professed, naturally and perpetually 
propagated peace, but democracies tended toward despotism. Kant distinguished these 
states by their constitutions, the “act of the general will through which the many persons 
become one nation [volk],” which determined the mode and the method by which the 
state administered its power over the people. In a representative government, the 
constitution bound the legislators to the same laws they enacted and ensured the consent 
of the governed in that legislation. The democratic mode of government, on the other 
hand, generated a majoritarian autocracy that placed the general will in conflict with itself 
and with freedom. Systematically, it socialized sovereignty, distributing the state’s 
executive power to “all” of the people, who, as a body, were vested with the authority to 
override the vote of its individual members. Though monarchies and aristocracies could 
be reformed so that they embodied the spirit of representation, Kant wrote, “the 
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democratic mode of government makes this impossible, since everyone wishes to be 
master.” Democracies could change, he granted, but only by “violent revolution.”119  
Kant and the Jena philosophers presumed that all legitimate and self-sustaining 
political states codified a natural organic form in which the state’s governing bodies 
expressed the popular will. For Kant, the violence necessary to produce this kind of 
representative government might be productive, but was never morally justified. In the 
more radical formulation found in Friedrich Schlegel’s essay on republicanism, the 
“deliberations and decisions of actual democratic bodies— the empirical realities— 
constituted the only access we had to that noumenal entity, the general will of the 
people.”120 Therefore, the people retained a right to revolution if their government 
undermined the structures of deliberative democracy. 
Similarly, Fichte argued that the “ultimate aim of all government,” was “to make 
government superfluous.”121 Like Schiller, Fichte described political society as a means 
to create the perfect society, but not an “absolute purpose” in itself. The political state 
existed merely to provide the conditions for individuals to achieve a perfect unity with all 
humanity through co-operation and reciprocal improvement. In Fichte’s epistemology, 
the act of reflection that Kant described created an epigenetic ego: a transcendental self-
consciousness that continuously regenerated and perfected the self out of the seed of 
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undifferentiated humanity implanted in the human mind.122 Recursively, he maintained, 
the individual’s awareness of their own humanity operated as a moral imperative that 
propelled them to improve the world, an epigenetic drive [Bildunstrieb] that drove them 
to form communities in which they could pursue their ultimate purpose. Individuals 
formed civil societies not out of fear (as Hobbes would have it), habit (Hume), or a 
natural drive for self-preservation (Rousseau), but as a compulsive complement to their 
own teleological progress. Ideally, societies embodied this ontological, dynamic, and 
fundamentally organic formation—a “free reciprocal activity founded on ideas” and 
“pervaded by design,” without which the individual remained incomplete. In fact, Fichte 
maintained, human beings could only obtain absolute freedom after they had been 
inculcated in the culture of morality by the state.123 
Therefore, Fichte argued in “Foundations of Natural Right,” a government 
remained lawful only insofar as it did not resist the “power of the people as a whole.”124 
A state government that abrogated the popular will ceased to be a civil government. The 
relationship, Fichte explained, could be understood as the same as the relationship 
between the parts and the whole in an organic body. Like the human body, he argued, the 
rational state existed for the sake of its parts; as an organized whole, it endured only as 
the result of the “reciprocal interaction of organic forces” that maintained its 
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equilibrium.125 The civil contract created an organically unified state comprised of a 
community of free beings who voluntarily entered into an interdependent relationship 
founded on their recognition of each individual’s personhood. The individual parts, each 
operating according to their own Bildungstreib, continually produced themselves and, so, 
continuously reproduced the whole.126 In its “natural institution,” which Fichte equated 
with the legal realization of individual natural rights, the rational state provided its 
individual members with the platform by which they could provisionally cultivate their 
own humanity.127 “It is only within the unity of the state,” Fichte wrote, “that the human 
being attains a particular place in the scheme of things.”128 In the case that the state 
obstructed the organic Bildungstreib, the sovereign power devolved to the people who, 
gathered in a convention, were then empowered to execute judgment against the 
administers of public power.129  
THE IMPERIAL AND NATIONAL SPECIES OF GOVERNMENT 
In the midst of this intellectual ferment about the meaning of the French 
Revolution, the French republic itself limped on, occasionally scrapping its constitution 
to see if a more “controlled” system of democracy might better suit its populace. In 
October 1795, the French formally established a constitutional republic, but the new 
executive (the Directory) struggled to maintain balance between the resurgent royalists 
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and the conventionnels (former Jacobins). The royalists, who dominated the 1797 
elections, were only forestalled when the Directory arranged a military coup and then 
deported them. The conventionnels exploited their advantage and prevailed in the 1798 
elections, overcoming the Directory’s popular repression and political manipulation, but 
the executive purged them soon after.130 In this system, French political theorist Antoine 
Destutt de Tracy noted a decade later, there was “something wanting to the political 
machine, in order that it may go regularly.” It had a “body for willing” and “a body for 
executing that will,” but it required a body to “facilitate and regulate the action of the 
other two,” to act as the “preserving power” of the republic and protect French society 
from “constant hazard and violence.” After the 1799 Napoleonic coup that brought down 
the Directory, the new French Consulate built a machinery of state designed to channel 
and control the popular will. At the top, they established a “Sénat conservateur,” which 
they entrusted with protecting the new constitution from democracy’s destructive 
impulses.131 In this “conservative body,” Destutt de Tracy wrote, they completed the 
organization of society.132  
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Five years later, with the blessing of a democratic election, the Conservative 
Senate crowned Napoleon the Emperor of France, a position that united the “conservative 
principles of the interest of all” in a “government of one,” and the “strength of a 
monarchy founded in a republic.”133 During Napoleon’s coronation on December 1, 
1804, Senate president François de Neufchateau announced the birth of a new form of 
government—the republican empire—an innovation in social science that combined the 
elements of liberty, “that first of all moving principles,” with the “grand conservative 
system” of nations, hereditary monarchy. Prior to this election, Neufchateau explained, 
French patriots presumed that no medium existed between popular government and 
monarchical regimes. With the revolution, they had attempted to create a chimera, an 
organization that united the oppositional spirits of liberty and power (or authority) in the 
same body. But the monstrous form nearly annihilated France. Powerless to stop the 
popular torrent, patriotic republicans realized that they could not establish a proper 
republic in a population “attached to monarchy by their wants, by instinct, and by the 
force of a habit,” which nothing could overcome. A man of genius, like Napoleon, might 
be able to create the illusion of democracy during his lifetime, shaping nature to his will, 
but a single man could not transform the national character within a generation. Though 
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“the chisel of a great artist forms at pleasure out of a block of marble either a tripod or a 
god,” Neufchateau said, “the body of a nation cannot be modelled on the same principle.” 
Like any living organism, it needed to develop gradually and it required a conservative 
principle (“principe conservateur”) to ensure its internal harmony. Emperor Napoleon I 
embodied this “principe conservateur” in the republic.134 As a democratically-elected 
emperor, he lay the foundation for a stable and secure form of representative government, 
implanting in France and its imperial states the “seeds” from which they would naturally 
progress toward their “future perfection.”135 
Still in the universalizing mode, however, Napoleon imposed the French order on 
his “imperial family,” seeking to establish by force what did not already exist by nature. 
The French model of statehood predicated sovereignty on systemic assimilation to their 
heteronomous standard. In their republic, they had uncovered a perfect organization, a 
living machine. Stability and security in their empire required that each state erect the 
correct form of government, implemented with the apparatus necessary to secure the 
corporate rights of its citizens, and the harmonious balance established by the Napoleonic 
code. Under Napoleon’s direction, the French army fought an expansionist battle of 
“liberation” across the continent (what their new tenants would call “conquest”), 
enforcing social, cultural, and political uniformity on its formerly autonomous vassal 
states.  
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Napoleon’s homogenizing imperialism provoked the organic nationalist turn in 
German philosophy. After the last Holy Roman Emperor capitulated to Napoleon and 
Jena burned in 1806, Fichte and his contemporaries turned decisively against what they 
perceived as the totalizing, mechanistic French state toward an ideal of a state built on the 
organic associations that grew out of a people’s inborn and intransigent love of their 
nation.136 In his Addresses to the German Nation (delivered in 1807 and 1808), Fichte 
explained that the French and their copyists thought that they could break apart and 
rebuild societies according to their specifications. Deeply rooted in the “mechanical view 
of society,” they intended to construct a “clockwork pressure-machine,” engineered to 
compel every part to serve the whole, but, first, they planned to “simplify the mechanism 
by making all the parts of the machine as alike as possible and by treating them all as if 
they were of the same material.”137 Standing over the corpses of the national bodies they 
had conquered, the French ground together “all the germs of what is human in humanity, 
in order to press the unresisting dough into some new form,” which Fichte described as a 
“monstrous act of brutality… against the human race.” Misguided by their political 
theory, the French proposed to spark the “living movement of society” from this 
“condition of death” through their statecraft, but, Fichte observed, their theories were 
inadequate to their task. A dead mechanism could not set a society’s reanimated corpse 
along an epigenetic (self-perpetuating and self-regulating) path.138 Though the French 
                                                 
136 The last Holy Roman Emperor was Francis II, alias: Francis I, Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and 
Croatia, and King of Bohemia. 
137 By the time the French decimated Jena in 1806, Fichte had already moved on to Berlin (after the atheism 
controversy in 1799). He had held a position briefly at the University of Erlangen (1805), but left for East 
Prussia (Königsberg) after the French victories at Jena and Auerstadt. When he delivered his addresses in 
Berlin, it was under French occupation. 
138 Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Addresses to the German Nation, trans. R.F. Jones and G.H. Turnbull (Chicago 
and London, 1922), 113. 
 77
system was serviceable to maintain humanity’s baser (sensuous) needs, it was a “fixed 
and dead order,” incapable of revitalizing the “dead bones” of a “national body.” For a 
perfect state to live—for the seed of human perfection to thrive—the political state was 
not enough. It needed a vital spark: a living principle. 
Fichte theorized a national Bildungstrieb, where the nation embodied the organic 
state’s living principles, and operated as its formative drive. The national spirit, retained 
in the nation’s original organs (its institutions, language, character, culture, and 
economy), was the first and only element by which a fallen nation might rise to a new life 
and the primary means for its preservation.139 The “love of the individual for his 
nation”—the definition of “nationalism” in English at the time—was the love of the 
eternal in the earthly realm.140 “Only when each people, left to itself, develops and forms 
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itself in accordance with its own peculiar quality” as a nation, Fichte said, “only therein is 
to be found the guarantee of their present and future worth, virtue, and merit.” Guided by 
their national spirit, the people formed the “enduring and unshakable principles” that 
governed their lives and thought as a corporate body. The nation’s peculiar forms and 
qualities, its social structures and institutions, could not be imposed unilaterally; they 
must grow organically from the nation’s living roots, which supplied the system’s “vital 
impulse and action.” In turn, these organic expressions of the national spirit served as the 
conduit for divine life in the national body, connecting it epigenetically to its “source of 
original life.” Institutions “peculiar” to that society could not be disturbed or 
compromised by outside forces without risking the entire system because they reflected a 
metaphysical imperative expressed in the nation’s material institutions. The nation—that 
community of feeling whose common history, common language, and common 
development tied the people together in organic (natural, transcendental, and teleological) 
unity—provided the ideal (natural) constitution for the state, while the civil constitution 
existed solely to regulate that community.141  
Both the German nationalist model and the French imperial system it criticized 
advanced an organismic ontology of the state as a naturally developing living system to 
which biological and physical rules applied.142 Because the organic model of state 
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sovereignty relied on the vitalist concept of conservative formation, it had both 
egalitarian and oppressive potential. The nature of a state’s conservative principles 
depended on the Bildungstrieb encoded in its constitution at the time of its original 
formation. In Fichte’s model, for example, the nation provided the living principle (or 
Bildungstrieb) of an organic state and the Germans, in particular, carried within 
themselves the power to manifest a republican future. But Fichte’s organic “nationalism” 
represented just one genus of organic statehood (and one that remained the purview of 
democratic and republican movements until the mid-nineteenth century.) Plus, Fichte 
theorized an organic nation-state before its existence, while other state actors dealt with 
pre-existing conditions. In autocratic states or constitutional monarchies, for example, the 
organic structure would presumably reinforce established institutions and a hierarchical 
social organization. 
After the French Terror, the organic framework provided a schema for state actors 
to control and restrain the over-active and over-excited body politic. Instead of abiding by 
the rules and laws that governed machinery, societies seeking to survive the French 
cataclysm looked to the impulses and principles that governed the body, the organic 
catechism. The “mind” (or spirit), which served as the harmonizing faculty in the body, 
was conceptually transformed into an organic theory of state in which the governing body 
united the body’s disparate forces in sympathetic harmony, maintained their connection 
to each other as a unified organism, and ensured the social body’s health and vitality 
                                                                                                                                                 
means of human consciousness (indicated in the philosophies of moral sentiment, nerve theory, and 
society). As the material manifestation of a teleological force, Bildungstrieb and its corollary, the 
“conservative principle,” epitomized the hermeneutic overlap between Newtonian physics and the Lockean 
sensorium in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century. Consequently, both lexicons inflected their 
translation from medico-philosophical discourse to political rhetoric and popular thought.  
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through changing conditions. Different ages had different spirits, and different nations 
had different conservative principles. Nations that adapted, prevailed. 
Only in this framework could it make sense for an individual or group to assert 
themselves or their doctrines as the “true conservatives” of the body politic. In this 
context, the “conservative principle” reflected the fulfillment of an essential idea of the 
nation in state form and the “conservative power” functioned recursively to protect and 
preserve its organic system. “Every existing body has the right of self-preservation,” 
Thomas Jefferson wrote in his 1811 translation of Destutt de Tracy, and “each species of 
government” had its own “conservative principle” of action, located not in interest or 
necessity, but in the “agents charged with conducting its concerns.”143 Jefferson’s 
translation of and correspondence with Destutt de Tracy in the early nineteenth century 
signaled the changes occurring in American political discourse that would eventually lead 
Calhoun, among others, to declare himself a “conservative” in nineteenth century. When 
Calhoun professed to be “a conservative in its broadest and fullest sense” in 1837, he 
made a claim about the nature of a living system and his function in keeping it alive. That 
he felt the need to clarify his position—that “because I am a conservative, I am a States 
rights man”—signified a profound disagreement about what it meant to be a 
“conservative” of this new political organism called the United States of America.144 The 
next chapter will trace the trajectory by which different groups translated, interpreted, and 
applied the “conservative principle” in the United States, the first step in clarifying the 
contested terms of nineteenth-century American conservatism.  
                                                 
143 In the 1817 French edition, the text read: “Tous ces gouvernemens sont existans ou peuvent l'être; et 
tous les corps politiques, dès qu’ils existent, ont droit à leur conservation.”  
144 Appendix to the Congressional Globe (Washington, DC), 24th Congress, 2nd Session, 281; McDougall, 
Walter A. "Chapter 1 Draft." Message to the author. 21 Mar. 2016. E-mail. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE MEN THAT CALL THEMSELVES CONSERVATIVES 
In the United States, the organic schema shaped the national conversation about 
federal power and State rights, popular representation and popular sovereignty, 
commercial progress and the institution of slavery. Like any living system, every society 
had conservative principles that ensured its continued preservation, and conservative 
powers that secured its “original principles” from “subversion” or “gradual decay.”145 
The identity and character of these principles depended both on the nature of the system 
and the spirit of the age, as well as the vantage point and personal politics of the person 
or group naming them.146 Because the United States represented an unprecedented 
political and social organism in the early nineteenth century, it generated a variety of 
opinions as to what comprised its “conservative” principles and by what mechanisms and 
institutions those principles functioned.147 Advocates of decentralized power, for 
example, argued that the primary “conservative” function in this system was performed 
by the States, which protected the people from ambitious and reactionary politicians. 
Proponents of federal authority, on the other hand, located the state’s vital impetus in the 
federal government, which, they argued, retained a “conservative power” to maintain the 
constitution’s original principles in their purity and to “the benefit of the people,” 
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147 Generally, contemporary commenters accorded on the “exceptional” nature of the US system, regardless 
of whether it could legitimately be considered “unprecedented” by historical standards. 
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especially against State power.148 To get at the dialectic nature of “conservative” and 
organic thought in the early republic, this chapter will examine the development of 
“conservative” discourse in the debates over Missouri’s constitution, during the extended 
1824 presidential campaign, and in reaction to the perceived threat of imminent abolition 
and slave-insurrection, which crystalized in a systematic and violent “Conservative” 
suppression of abolitionists in the 1830s.  
Characteristically, in the 1810s and 1820s, American statesmen connected their 
claims about the country’s “conservative principles” to its revolutionary foundation in 
liberty. Institutions that performed the conservative function in the United States, they 
argued, should ensure the unimpeded operation of principles essential to a democratic 
republic, like popular representation. In a free state, an organic constitution relied on the 
free exercise of the franchise and the assurance of regular and representative elections; an 
educated and intelligent public; and an active free press. Statesmen did not frame these 
positions in a political vacuum, of course. Often, their self-described efforts to defend the 
country’s organic establishment masked political or sectional motives. In the context of 
the 1824 presidential contest, for example, southern anti-federalists urged a constitutional 
amendment to preserve the popular nature of the country’s national institutions against 
the “geographical formation of parties,” by which they indicated the political alliance 
between northeastern capital and western protectionists that jeopardized their plantation 
economy and the commercial viability of slavery. In this case, the “conservative 
principle” of popular sovereignty was only endangered when the wrong party threatened 
to win an election. 
                                                 
148 Niles’ Weekly Register, Vol. 18 (1820), 293  
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In the South, the organic schema served as the basis of the nullification movement 
in the late 1820s, in which southern statesmen asserted their “conservative right” to 
defend the plantation economy against what they considered discriminatory 
(geographically and systemically-biased) federal legislation. Nominally a response to 
John Quincy Adams’s totalizing commercial policies (Henry Clay’s protectionist 
American System and the tariff, in particular), nullification expressly aimed to protect the 
institution of slavery against federal interference. Following Dr. Thomas Cooper—a  
British expat whose position as president of South Carolina College made him an 
influential figure in southern politics and whose pioneering work on metaphysics, 
physiology, and political economy made him notorious on three continents—they 
coalesced around the idea that the southern States formed their own separate national 
bodies, each of which retained the right to secure their own organic civil, commercial, 
and social structures against the “universal Yankee nation.”149 Discursively, the 
nullification (and later State-rights) party replicated the dynamic of resistance against 
French hegemony during the Napoleonic Era. To preserve their own organic bodies 
against federal assimilation, they advanced the “conservative principle” of nullification. 
Based in the essential law of self-preservation, nullification compelled States to reject 
any federal law that damaged the State's healthy operation. The Nullifiers grounded this 
                                                 
149 Cooper’s 1814 notes on the University of Virginia’s curricula pivoted around metaphysics, specifically 
“Ideology,” namely the “Scotch School. Reid. Dugald Stewart,” the “English School. Hartley. Priestley. 
Belsham,” the “French School. De Mairan. Condillac. Cabanis. Destut Tracey,” and the “Connection of 
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Abstract Ideas. Species intelligibiles &c history of these questions to the time of Locke. Liberty & 
Necessity. Hobbes. Leibnitz &c.” (“Thomas Cooper’s Notes on University Curricula, [ca. 15–22 September 
1814],” Founders Online, National Archives (http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/03-07-02-
0477 [last update: 2015-12-30]). Source: The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Retirement Series, vol. 7, 28 
November 1813 to 30 September 1814, ed. J. Jefferson Looney. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2010, p666–668.) 
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right on the “historical fact” that the States enacted the Constitution as “distinct and 
separate bodies politic,” and not “the American People as a single community.” At the 
height of the controversy over nullification, Calhoun rejected the “very idea of 
an American People” as a “mere chimera,” arguing that “Such a community never, for a 
single moment, existed” at any stage in the country’s development, either before or after 
the Declaration of Independence.150  
Because the organic framework encompassed all aspects of a society’s natural 
organization, it opened the space for pro-slavery southerners to displace their advocacy of 
slavery into the less provocative language of natural science, constitutional rights, and 
political economy, which allowed them to forge alliances across the North-South divide. 
Still, in every instance, southern arguments for organic sovereignty and the “original” 
constitution served to preserve and advance the interests of slave-holders and the system 
of slavery. When Calhoun referred to himself as a “conservative in its broadest and 
fullest sense,” promising to “restore the Government to its original simplicity and purity,” 
he implicitly equated the US Constitution with pro-slavery interests. By the mid-1830s, 
southern States-rights advocates, northern anti-abolitionists, and northeastern merchant 
capitalists briefly found common cause as “Conservatives ” who opposed Jacksonian 
levelers and radical abolitionists. At the state level, they fomented violence against anti-
slavery activists (in addition to dismantling their presses and supressing their literature) in 
the name of “law and order” conservatism. At the national level, Calhoun’s State-rights 
politicians joined with the “Conservative” Whigs in Congress to institue the first federal 
gag on receiving anti-slavery petitions in the House, and the Senate “Conservatives” 
                                                 
150 Calhoun laid out this position in a November 1831 working paper for the South Carolina legislature’s 
Committee on Federal Relations. Niles' Weekly Register, Vol. 41 (1831-1832), 334. 
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moved to place the postal service under State-jurisdiction, allowing the States to 
determine which publications should cross their borders.  
As conservatism became increasingly relevant in U.S. political discourse in the 
1830s and ubiquitous in international discourse, critics in the United States and abroad 
questioned what legitimate function “Conservatives” might have in American society or 
whether conservatism could even operate as an ideology in a democratic republic. 
Without the hereditary class distinctions and priestly orders that gave European 
conservatism its raison d’etre, what did American “Conservatives” conserve? For that 
matter, once they identified the fundamental elements in the American system, how 
would they decide what forces and institutions would best perpetuate, preserve, and 
protect those elements? What purpose would American conservatism serve? Of all of 
these classes who, “arrogate to themselves the almost exclusive possession of the 
conservative spirit,” the Christian Spectator asked, “Who are the True Conservatives?”151 
A HARMONIOUS BALANCE  
From his perspective, Jefferson had written to Destutt de Tracy in 1811, the 
United States possessed the “wisest Conservative power” against the destruction of 
liberty “ever contrived by man” in its State-governments. He described the States as 
“regularly organized,” but internally independent in their administrations, with 
legislatures and executives freely chosen by a population informed by a free press. In the 
case that a State voluntarily submitted to a single man’s usurpation, Jefferson wrote, 
alluding to Napoleon, the citizens of the other States would “rise up on every side” and 
take him down. By this arrangement, the states prevented their country’s citizens from 
                                                 
151 Porter, “Who Are the True Conservatives?,” 601 
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destroying their own liberty. Yet, as Calhoun would later note, every system had within 
itself “the seeds of its own destruction,” and, in his correspondence with Destutt de 
Tracy, Jefferson anticipated that the same “Conservative power” that ensured “the safety 
of the public liberty” in the United States might ultimately imperil their Union.152 
In the organization of the U.S., the State-governments played an essential (and, 
some would argue, primary) role in protecting civil liberties, but State autonomy and 
heterogeneity introduced instability at the federal level, threatening national cohesion 
and, by extension, the country’s viability. In its otherwise “perfect and distinct 
organization,” Jefferson acknowledged, the United States remained vulnerable to the 
danger of State secession. But Jefferson dismissed this outcome as improbable. If local 
discontents reached a majority in a State, he wrote, the electoral system transfigured them 
into the controlling power of the regular government, where they could redress their 
grievances peacefully and constitutionally. In the unlikely event that they successfully 
fermented their disaffection at the State-level, this group would be “paralysed and self-
checked” by the habitual censorship that political parties exercised over one another in all 
states where men had the liberty “to think, speak, & act freely, according to the 
diversities of their individual conformations.” In fact, though the State-governments acted 
as a perpetual check on the “liberticide views” of ambitious individuals, Jefferson 
admitted, these ceaseless party permutations might themselves prove to be “essential to 
preserve the purity of the government.” In effect, he implied, given the danger of 
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secession (however remote), the partisan divisions endemic to any free society acted as 
the real conservative principle of these United States. 
As the United States extended its territory over an expansive geography during 
the following decades, and on behalf of an increasingly diverse population, its 
representatives, reformers, and political theorists reiterated Jefferson’s concern that the 
country’s strength as a union of States might ultimately prove to be a liability. Like 
Hume, Cheney, Blumenbach, and Buffon, they assumed that regional, climatic, and 
geographic differences, alongside permanent inequalities of property, compounded the 
other factors that led groups in the same society to develop incompatible habits, 
institutions, and principles. Because it propagated heterogeneity between the States, 
geographic extension amplified the States’ centrifugal force, increasing the likelihood of 
separation. In a country that already boasted two distinct commercial systems (the 
mercantile North and the plantation South), it seemed only a matter of time before “all 
the American communities which compose the United States” declared themselves 
incompatible.153  
As early as 1820, Connecticut Governor Oliver Wolcott suggested that slavery 
had already generated a “diversity of habits and principles of government” that threatened 
the “natural equality which would otherwise exist between the states, and also between 
all free citizens.” After the Missouri Compromise passed in the Spring of 1820, following 
an extensive debate in the national legislature over the territorial extension of slavery, 
Wolcott warned that “slavery is gradually forming those distinctions, which, according to 
                                                 
153 "Proceedings and Debates of the House of Representatives of the United States, at the First Session of 
the Eighteenth Congress, Begun at the City of Washington, Monday, December 1, 1823." 41 Annals of 
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invariable laws of human action, constitute the characteristic difference between 
artistocratical and democratical republics.”154 In spite of the defensive claims made by 
slaveholders, Wolcott argued that a system which relied on slave labor inevitably 
replicated the hierarchies of proprietorship and penury characteristic of aristocracies. In 
effect, this dynamic also inhibited “agricultural emigration” from the free States, whose 
citizens had been habituated to enjoy certain political privileges and bridled at the 
constraints on their liberty that living in a slave State implicitly required. While federal 
law might restrain Congress from disturbing slavery in the States that had already 
established it, he declaimed, the constitution also imposed on Congress an active duty to 
defend “the great principles of the revolution, upon which our union depends.” Vitally, he 
argued, the constitution guaranteed the States and their populations a republican form of 
government—not the establishment of republics “in “form” only,” but a promise to 
“render civil liberty immortal” in the perpetuation of their “free and mild institutions,” 
which the institution of slavery clearly subverted. To fulfill its obligations and preserve 
the union, Wolcott asserted, the constitution vested a “conservative power” in Congress 
over all of the States to “protect the people against the masked batteries of aristocracy,” 
to safeguard the rights of its “agriculturalists,” and, therefore, “to inhibit the further 
diffusion of slavery” to new States.155 States might act as a conservative power against 
individual ambition, as Jefferson had suggested, but Wolcott insisted that the national 
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155 In this situation, he argued, the constitution vested a “conservative power” in Congress over all of the 
states “to protect the people against the masked batteries of aristocracy” an active duty to secure the states’ 
“original principles” from “subversion by force, or from gradual decay.”  
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government guarded the people’s civil liberties against the powerful commercial interests 
that controlled the States.156  
It was also apparent in 1820 that commercial considerations trumped both State 
and federal legislatures’ willingness to protect their residents’ civil liberties—at least 
where race was concerned. When Missouri officially applied for statehood in late 1820, 
its proposed constitution went beyond the structural prohibitions for entry that Wolcott 
feared for his agricultural constituents and included an explicit provision proscribing free 
people of color from entering the State.157 Pro-slavery representatives defended the clause 
according to the constitutionality of State quarantine laws. Every State retained the right 
to bar persons carrying “infectious diseases” from entering their borders, Virginia 
representative Alexander Smyth observed during the House debate. Their “right of self-
preservation” conferred this “right of exclusion.” No one would deny that “a State might 
exclude citizens of other States, for contagious disease, by quarantine regulations,” his 
colleague, William S. Archer (VA) confirmed, or the State’s capacity to reject anyone 
else that might otherwise endanger its population or contribute to their moral 
degeneration. In this category, Archer included paupers, criminals, and, most of all, free 
people of color, whom he did not consider capable of being safely absorbed into the 
organic community. Smyth redoubled this argument by including “free negroes” in the 
category of exclusion that covered “Indians, born in the States,” who were nonetheless 
alienated from the political community. “A savage cannot be a member of a civilized 
community; he is incapable of exercising political rights; and nature seems to have made 
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the negro a perpetual alien to the white man,” Smyth declared, “Slaves are aliens. 
Alienage was the first foundation slavery. Citizenship belongs to the civilized free man.” 
Unable to resolve the question of whether Missouri had the right to exclude free people 
of color who enjoyed (increasingly conscribed) citizenship rights in the other States, the 
House shunted the bill to a committee under the watchful eye of House Speaker Henry 
Clay. Clay’s committee resolved that the wording of Missouri’s constitution “shall never 
be construed to authorize the passage of any law” that violated the federal constitution’s 
privileges-and-immunities clause. Congress officially concluded the Missouri crisis on 
February 26, 1821, when it confirmed its admission into the Union without restriction 
(except for Clay’s conditional clause.) As historian Robert Pierce Forbes has noted, 
Clay’s legislative compromise effectively presumed that people of color could not be 
citizens, and set the precedent for States to enact prejudicial laws under the cover of 
health regulations.158 
During this three-month-long controversy over Missouri’s constitution, 
southerners and south-westerners repeatedly raised the spectre of secession, confirming 
Thomas Jefferson’s conviction that local prejudice, projected onto national politics, 
would rupture the Union. Ten years earlier, Jefferson had described the State-
governments to Destutt de Tracy as the “wisest Conservative power ever contrived by 
man” on the condition that party-politics kept sectional discontent in check. So long as 
each State was divided into parties, he had argued, their necessary electoral calculus 
would operate as a censor on partisan extremists. After Congress had rejected Missouri’s 
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constitution in December 1821, however, Jefferson judged that the northeastern 
politicization of slavery had finally tipped the balance in favor of geographical party 
lines. In an effort to convince his long-time ally Albert Gallatin to intercede with 
Pennsylvania’s representatives on Missouri’s behalf, he argued that the Northeast’s 
determination to demonize slavery and marginalize slaveholders represented a Federalist 
(i.e., Tory) ruse to revive their party and recapture the federal government from the 
Republicans (i.e., the Whigs). Unlike the old Tory-Whig division, however, this new 
geographical division of power posed an existential threat to southern “whites,” which 
would ultimately force them to secede to survive.159 On the question of slavery, Jefferson 
wrote to John Adams in January 1821, “The inquisition of public opinion overwhelms in 
practice, the freedom asserted by the laws in theory.” The northeastern “Holy Alliance” 
intended to restrict southern liberty (to move with their slaves wherever they pleased) just 
like its European analog restricted liberty on the continent. Given the numerical 
dominance of the northern and eastern States and the sway that geographical division 
held over public opinion, Jefferson worried that Congress might seize the power to 
“regulate the conditions of the inhabitants of the States, within the States,” which meant 
that they would have the power to emancipate the slaves. A long-standing colonizationist, 
Jefferson was convinced that an internal population of recently-freed slaves posed an 
imminent danger to the States in which they lived. From the perspective of the “States 
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afflicted with this unfortunate population,” Jefferson insisted, the “real question” was: 
“are our slaves to be presented with freedom and a dagger?”160  
 Jefferson also used the sectional anxiety that Missouri inspired to pressure 
Virginia’s recalcitrant legislature into funding his university. Writing to James 
Breckenridge and Joseph Carrington Cabell, both of whom sat on the University of 
Virginia’s Board of Visitors and served in Virginia’s House and Senate (respectively), 
Jefferson warned that the Missouri compromise marked out a “line of division” between 
“different portions” of the confederacy that would never be obliterated. Yet, the 
predominance of northern universities forced southerners to trust “those who are against 
us in position and principle, to fashion to their own form the minds & affections of our 
youth.” Virginia’s sons made up more than half of Princeton’s enrollment and a countless 
proportion of Harvard’s student body. These boys would “return home, no doubt, deeply 
impressed with the sacred principles of our Holy Alliance of [slavery] restrictionists.”161 
For the privilege of alienating their own children, Jefferson noted, they paid hundreds of 
thousands of dollars a year to these northern universities, where their sons imbibed 
“opinions and principles in discord with those of their own country.” This “canker” was 
“eating on the vitals of our existence,” Jefferson wrote, “and if not arrested at once will 
be beyond remedy.”162 Whereas Jefferson had once advocated for federally-funded 
national education, then, he now endorsed State-institutions. By endowing their own 
prestigious university, Virginia would fulfill its duty to educate its own sons under the 
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“luminous tuition” of their home country, from which they might rise to manifest 
“destinies of high promise.” The bad blood engendered by Missouri’s contested entry 
may have irrevocably tainted the national organization, Jefferson indicated, but the 
southern States could protect themselves by strengthening their native institutions and 
reclaiming control of their children’s education. 
The formal demise of the partisan system in the early 1820s compounded 
Jefferson’s anxiety that US politics would be reduced to a division between the 
“Northernmost” and “Southernmost” candidates, sparking another one of those 
“geographical schisms” that drove the States irresistibly toward separation. With the 
Federalist party professedly dead and buried, everyone appeared to unite behind 
republican principles, but Thomas Jefferson knew better. Despite the false impression 
conveyed by the deluded US press, Jefferson wrote to Lafayette in November 1823, the 
party system itself had not collapsed. The “name [Federalist] alone is changed,” Jefferson 
reported, but “the principles are the same.” In truth, Jefferson wrote, “the parties of Whig 
and Tory are those of nature, they exist in all countries, whether called by these names, or 
by those of Aristocrats and democrats, coté droite or coté gauche, Ultras or Radicals, 
Serviles or Liberals. [T]he sickly weakly, timid man fears the people, and is a tory by 
nature. [T]he healthy strong and bold cherishes them, and is formed a whig by nature.” 
These men would be true to their natures, regardless of their outward designations. Still, 
Jefferson fretted, the illusion of single-party politics gave the “tories” cover to call 
themselves “republican” as they consolidated power, pursuing a “geographical division 
of parties” so that they might win the 1824 presidential election. Jefferson recalled how 
the “coté droite” [right side], led by John Quincy Adams, had agitated on the Missouri 
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question in 1820 for this very purpose, and how the “people of the North went blindfold 
into the snare,” only belatedly realizing that “they had been used merely as tools for 
electioneering purposes,” “injuring instead of aiding the real interests of the slaves.” 
Enervated by similar tactics in advance of the 1824 presidential election, Jefferson 
warned his correspondents that corrupt politicians, running under the banner of the 
“republican” party, threatened to hijack the election for their own aristocratic and 
commercial gain. Four different candidates would compete as “republicans” in the 
upcoming election—William H. Crawford, John Quincy Adams, Andrew Jackson, and 
John C. Calhoun—but “reflecting men” should not be deceived by the nominal lapse in 
partisan politics; rather, they must separate the true “republicans” from their “tory” 
pretenders.163 
THE POPULAR CONSERVATIVE PRINCIPLE  
Facing the possibility of another Adams presidency, John Quincy Adams’s 
opposition in Congress mobilized around the idea that the present system reinforced the 
dangerous sectionalism against which Jefferson had warned. The elective process 
featured a party caucus to choose a nominee and an inclination toward a general ticket for 
the election, which effectively sacrificed popular representation in favor of an entrenched 
political elite.164 Each State under the general ticket system operated as a single unit, by 
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which all of a State’s votes went to a single candidate, instead of reflecting the more 
heterogeneous distribution that might be indicated by the popular vote.165 If the States 
operated as voting blocks, suppressing the minority vote within their State, then they 
became alienated from each-other and fell into sectional and regional alliances.  
When the Eighteenth U.S. Congress opened in December 1823, Calhoun-advocate 
and South Carolina congressman George McDuffie proposed a constitutional amendment 
to ensure that the popular will pervaded and sustained the machinery of government, 
starting with the presidency. In the Senate, he was joined by other men who identified 
their own politics with popular principles—Thomas Hart Benton (of Missouri), Mahlon 
Dickerson (of NJ), and Martin Van Buren (of NY)—each of whom proposed variations 
on McDuffie’s constitutional amendment in the Senate. McDuffie and other critics of the 
caucus system generally considered themselves political outsiders, who assumed that 
insiders rigged the system, since they took for granted that their own favored candidate or 
personal friends would monopolize the popular vote in a fair election, and, therefore, 
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to the legislature. Those that allowed the electorate to choose did so increasingly by the ‘‘general-ticket’’ 
system, where the ticket that won the popular vote could cast all the state’s Electoral votes. A shrinking 
minority of states used the ‘‘district’’ system, which tended to divide the state’s votes roughly 
proportionately, but (as we shall see) there were various ways of organizing that system. The technique 
used affected both the character of the election and the expression of popular preferences, especially 
wherever the electorate was districted in elections for either for an Elector-choosing legislature or directly 
for the Electoral College.” Donald Ratcliffe, “Popular Preferences in the Presidential Election of 1824,” 
Journal of the Early Republic 34, no. 1 (April 1, 2014): 45-77; Donald Ratcliffe, The One-Party 
Presidential Contest: Adams, Jackson, and 1824’s Five-Horse Race, (University Press of Kansas, 2015). 
165 This allusion to State rights should be distinguished from the reference to “state rights” in the work of 
strict constructionists and Jeffersonian republicans in the early republic, or the promotion of “States rights” 
against the federal government, as it would be later construed by the nullification party at the end of the 
decade. In this debate, an opposition to “States rights” indicated a position against the general ticket 
system.  
 96
could only lose as the result of political manipulation and corruption.166 In his 
correspondence with Calhoun, whom he was convinced had cornered the popular vote for 
the presidential nomination, McDuffie suggested that the structure of national elections 
systematically severed public opinion from national politics, breaking down the 
“conservative principle” of representative governments.167 Only a popular reformation of 
electoral politics could remedy this dangerous defect in their political organization.  
In December 1823, the House appointed a select committee to judge the propriety 
of a constitutional amendment with George McDuffie at its head.168 In the absence of a 
uniform system of election, McDuffie reported at the end of the month, an “artificial and 
complicated machinery” had been erected to “filtrate the popular will, in order to purify 
and enlighten it.”169 Modern European states required these kinds of checks on the 
popular will, he explained, because their people were inadequate to the task of self-
government. The European social and legal system—feudal in origin and constructed on 
feudal principles—generated a “permanent inequality of property,” which “naturally 
produced the extremes of proud aristocracy and degraded populace, without any 
                                                 
166 In specifying that this group identified their own politics with popular principles, I would like to 
distinguish between the labels and associations that political and social actors chose, those epithets ascribed 
to them, and any description that might be considered objective or representative by historiographic 
standards. Since this dissertation focuses on the way that individuals and groups position themselves and 
others, as well as the role of political discourse in shaping political and social agency, I will avoid making 
mimetic claims. Instead, I will clarify the origin and context for these depictions, whenever possible. 
167 John C Calhoun et al., “Correspondence of John C. Calhoun, George McDuffie and Charles Fisher, 
Relating to the Presidential Campaign of 1824,” North Carolina Historical Review. 7, no. 4 (1930). 
168 Officially, the committee was appointed “to inquire into the expediency of recommending to the several 
States the propriety of amending the Constitution of the United States, in such manner that the mode of 
electing the members of the House of Representatives in Congress may be uniform throughout the United 
States; also, that the mode of choosing Electors of President and Vice President of the United States may 
be, in like manner, uniform; and, also, that the election of the said officers may, in any event, devolve upon 
the House of Representatives.” "Proceedings and Debates of the House of Representatives of the United 
States, at the First Session of the Eighteenth Congress, Begun at the City of Washington, Monday, 
December 1, 1823." 41 Annals of Cong. 850-851 (1823-1824) 
169 "Proceedings and Debates of the House of Representatives of the United States, at the First Session of 
the Eighteenth Congress, Begun at the City of Washington, Monday, December 1, 1823." 41 Annals of 
Cong. 856-856 (1823-1824)  
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intermediate power sufficient to control their irregular tendencies.”170 In this system, 
McDuffie acquiesced, a popular election could only result in anarchy and ruin. In the 
United States, on the other hand, nearly the entire population corresponded with Europe’s 
enlightened middle class. In this context, extending the elective system did “nothing more 
than adapt our political to our social system.”171 To bring American politics up to speed, 
McDuffie proposed two constitutional amendments: the first, that Congress sub-divide 
the States into electoral districts to “infuse more of the Democratic principle” into 
national elections and, second, that these districts also determine congressional 
representation.172  
McDuffie contended that a statesman’s “responsibility to the people” furnished 
“the only adequate security for freedom, the great conservative principle of a 
representative government.”173 Without this “essential function of popular sovereignty,” 
McDuffie predicted, “cabals of politicians,” alienated from the people’s views and 
                                                 
170 This whole argument paraphrased lawyer and author John Bristed’s discussion of the comparative 
facility toward democratic forms in Europe, Britain, and the United States. Bristed, John. America and her 
resources; or a view of the agricultural, commercial, manufacturing, financial, political, literary, moral, 
and religious capacity and character of the American people, 1818., 227-233; for more on Bristed, see: 
Chandler, James. England in 1819: The Politics of Literary Culture and the Case of Romantic Historicism. 
University of Chicago Press, 1999. 
171 Contemporary political theorists considered this “intermediate power,” denominated the “middle 
interest” in England and the “enlightened middle class” in the historiography, the “soundest part” of a given 
population by the “most enlightened statesmen.”(See: Sarah Knott’s discussion of “middling” in Knott, 
Sarah. Sensibility and the American Revolution. UNC Press Books, 2012; Gordon Wood’s section on the 
“Middle Class Order” in Wood, Gordon S. The Radicalism of the American Revolution. Knopf Doubleday 
Publishing Group, 2011, 347-369; Appleby, Joyce Oldham. Inheriting the Revolution: The First 
Generation of Americans. Harvard University Press, 2009; Cocalis, Susan L. “The Transformation of 
‘Bildung’ from an Image to an Ideal.” Monatshefte 70, no. 4 (1978): 399–414; Horlacher, Rebekka. The 
Educated Subject and the German Concept of Bildung: A Comparative Cultural History. Routledge, 2015;) 
172 "Proceedings and Debates of the House of Representatives of the United States, at the First Session of 
the Eighteenth Congress, Begun at the City of Washington, Monday, December 1, 1823." 41 Annals of 
Cong. 858 (1823-1824) 
173 "Proceedings and Debates of the House of Representatives of the United States, at the First Session of 
the Eighteenth Congress, Begun at the City of Washington, Monday, December 1, 1823." "Proceedings and 
Debates of the House of Representatives of the United States, at the First Session of the Eighteenth 
Congress, Begun at the City of Washington, Monday, December 1, 1823." 41 Annals of Cong. 857-858 
(1823-1824) 
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interests, would eventually control national elections. Reflecting on the present political 
situation, McDuffie observed, “we need not the prophetic spirit of Washington to warn 
us” that the country’s tendency toward a “geographical formation of parties” would 
inevitably destroy the Union’s harmony and endanger its existence.174 Once the “citizens 
of this Republic” no longer considered themselves “one people”—born to a “common 
inheritance, purchased by the toils, the sacrifices, and the blood of their common 
ancestors,” and “united by the ties of common sympathy and kindred feeling”—they 
made themselves fodder for political jackals, who would manipulate their artificial 
discord in order to consolidate power over them. In the place of public representatives 
who affectively connected to the communities they served, the people would find 
themselves ruled by a “succession of factions,” with each faction “proscribing the 
members and destroying the work” of the faction that preceded it.175  
Though the House tabled McDuffie’s amendment a month after his report, the 
divisive 1824 presidential election kept the question of “conservative” popular reform 
alive. Without these “federo-republican” constitutional amendments, Jefferson cautioned 
his friends, “large fragments” of the people would break off from the political body, 
                                                 
174 Although the States served certain “essential purposes,” McDuffie conceded, the “citizens of this 
Republic” remained “one people,” born to a “common inheritance, purchased by the toils, the sacrifices, 
and the blood of their common ancestors,” and they “should be united by the ties of common sympathy and 
kindred feeling,” as well as by their “common interest.” In this context, McDuffie said, “Every thing that 
tends to strengthen the peculiar and exclusive feelings of State pride and sectional prejudice, inevitably 
weakens the bonds of the Union.” "Proceedings and Debates of the House of Representatives of the United 
States, at the First Session of the Eighteenth Congress, Begun at the City of Washington, Monday, 
December 1, 1823." 41 Annals of Cong. 858 (1823-1824) 
175 Under these conditions, the system would experience “all the unsteadiness of a turbulent democracy, 
and all the tyranny of a temporary despotism.” "Proceedings and Debates of the House of Representatives 
of the United States, at the First Session of the Eighteenth Congress, Begun at the City of Washington, 
Monday, December 1, 1823." 41 Annals of Cong. 863 (1823-1824) 
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possibly by force.176 Like other “old republicans,” Jefferson had become convinced 
during the eighteenth congressional session that the manufacturing interests and the 
“consolidationists” (representatives who favored a broad construction of the constitution 
and a strong central government) had conspired to subvert the popular will in Congress, 
eking out majorities on the tariff, for example, that would have revolted a “great portion 
of the people of the states,” had it been exposed to public opinion.177 Responding to one 
of Jefferson’s missives, former Attorney General Richard Rush (then serving as the US 
Minister to the United Kingdom) expressed confidence that the country’s democratic 
system “carries within itself the conservative principle, so that if a bad choice be made at 
this election, a few years will bring the people back again to principles that have been 
found safe, and to men who are best identified with them.”178  
In December 1824, the presidential contest ended in electoral stalemate and the 
choice of president devolved on the House. When Henry Clay gifted his votes to John 
Quincy Adams in return for political patronage the following February, he 
simultaneously secured Adams the presidency and confirmed to his opposition that their 
elective process effectively cut off the voice of the people, counteracting the putative 
conservative principle of representative government. The outrage at the outcome was 
general, but Calhoun loyalists were the most evocative and proactive in their reactions. 
                                                 
176 "Proceedings and Debates of the House of Representatives of the United States, at the First Session of 
the Eighteenth Congress, Begun at the City of Washington, Monday, December 1, 1823." 41 Annals of 
Cong. 1181 (1823-1824); “From Thomas Jefferson to Robert Selden Garnett, 14 February 1824,” Founders 
Online, National Archives (http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/98-01-02-4052 [last update: 
2016-03-28]). 
177 “From Thomas Jefferson to Richard Rush, 5 June 1824,” Founders Online, National Archives 
(http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/98-01-02-4316 [last update: 2016-03-28]).  
178 “To Thomas Jefferson from Richard Rush, 17 July 1824,” Founders Online, National Archives 
(http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/98-01-02-4412 [last update: 2016-03-28]). Source: this 
is an Early Access document from The Papers of Thomas Jefferson: Retirement Series. It is not an 
authoritative final version. 
 100
On the floor of the House, McDuffie argued that the current system “literally” immolated 
the people at the “shrine of an ideal phantom,” sacrificing the “fundamental principles of 
the Republican system” to the “elusive and mistaken idea of preserving the rights of the 
States” under the general ticket system.179 This scheme “infallibly introduced corruption 
and death into our political Eden;” having contaminated Congress, it assailed liberty in 
the “very seat of its vitality.”180 
On the first day that the Nineteenth Congress addressed new business (December 
9, 1825), McDuffie reintroduced the constitutional amendment that the last Congress had 
tabled.181 When the House finally got around to debating it the following February, he 
urged his colleagues to treat the disease of political corruption immediately: 
We are admonished by the experience of Nations, that if we would resist 
corruption effectually, it must be done in the incipient stages of degeneracy. No 
nation ever has been seen to retrace her steps after having fairly and fully 
commenced the downward march. The tide of corruption never flows backwards. 
If once the fatal poison is infused into a vital part of the system, nothing is left to 
us but to await the issue with melancholy resignation.182 
The “responsibility of public functionaries to the People,” McDuffie reiterated, was the 
“great conservative principle” that pervaded and sustained the US government. Like the 
                                                 
179 When McDuffie alluded to State rights in this speech, he did not refer to the promotion of “States rights” 
against the federal government, as it would be later construed by the nullification party. Rather, an 
opposition to “States rights” in the mid-1820s indicated a position against each state operating as a single 
unit under the general ticket system, by which all of a state’s votes went to a single candidate, instead of 
reflecting the more heterogeneous distribution that might be indicated by the popular vote. 
180 Register of Debates in Congress 2, pt. 1 (1826):1390  
181 Register of Debates in Congress 2, pt. 1 (1826):797-798 
182 McDuffie’s description recalls the findings from dissection experiments being done at the University of 
Pennsylvania and surrounding anatomy schools in this period. Register of Debates in Congress 2, pt. 1 
(1826):1393; Michael Sappol, A Traffic of Dead Bodies: Anatomy and Embodied Social Identity in 
Nineteenth-Century America (Princeton University Press, 2002), 59–60. 
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“principle which sustains the harmony of the material universe,” McDuffie explained, 
this representative principle acted as the “gravitation of our political system,” 
harmonizing liberty and power. Without an effective mechanism for elective 
responsibility, the “body politic” suffered from a “general paralysis,” exciting a “morbid 
action” in its parts. Without a galvanizing popular investment in the presidential election, 
the people lost their motivation to care about public affairs, sinking into a fatal 
indifference that spelled “death” for American liberty. “The general patriotic excitement 
of the people, in relation to the election of the president, is as essential to the health and 
energy of the political system, as the circulation of blood is to the health and energy of 
the natural body,” McDuffie advised, “Check that circulation and you inevitably produce 
local inflammation, gangrene, and ultimately death.”183  
In addition to reviving the debate over the district system, therefore, McDuffie’s 
renewed amendment resolved that the people should determine the outcome of a failed 
presidential election, rather than the House of Representatives. This recursive act of 
popular will simultaneously reinforced the “conservative principle” of “elective 
responsibility” and re-invested the American people in the outcome of their elections.184 
Individuals and nations attained a moral elevation proportionate to the “magnitude of 
their efforts” and the “disinterested magnanimity of the impulse under which they act,” 
McDuffie said, but the American people tended toward popular apathy, a national evil 
exacerbated by their idolatry of wealth and their inclination to worship liberty only in the 
form of property.185 To attain their high political destiny, then, the people must first be 
                                                 
183 Register of Debates in Congress 2, pt. 1 (1826): 1378, 1380, 1385-1387  
184 Register of Debates in Congress 2, pt. 1 (1826): 1378  
185 Register of Debates in Congress 2, pt. 1 (1826): 1386  
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“trained and educated to freedom” through the act of voting. As the world’s “last hope,” 
McDuffie concluded, Congress had an obligation to humanity to preserve their system of 
Government “in its purity” by adopting his amendments, protecting their liberty as a 
“vestal fire” never to be extinguished. Only the constitutional promise of popular national 
elections secured and perpetuated the true principles of American liberty.186  
According to Virginia representative John S. Barbour, who had shifted his 
allegiance to Calhoun after the election, popular reform was the “natural offspring” of the 
agitations that shook the “public heart” during the prior election. In a republic, he said, 
the judgment, passions, and interests of men acted as “moral agents,” which, “aided by 
the lights of progressive intellect,” gave impulse to the “public mind” to improve the 
defective parts of the national superstructure before its “political evils” grew “inveterate” 
and became “incurable.” Like the contest of 1800, he said, the 1824 election “rent 
asunder the veil of the Constitution, and exposed to public gaze its weakness and 
deformity.” It proved, beyond doubt, that the Constitution failed to provide its “own 
inherent means for continued existence,” the “essential principle of self-preservation” in 
a representative government that protected the sovereign will from encroachment and 
displacement. Without the necessary power to create and protect its own “essential 
organs,” he cautioned, their political system could not be considered safe. Congress must 
act on these amendments before the “germ” of corruption in the Constitution poisoned 
the Republic, leaving a “diseased and debilitated” Government expiring from 
“complicated miseries” in “some distant age.”187   
                                                 
186 NB: this speech became a major example of public oratory, published widely in newspapers, as 
broadsides, in books of oratory, and in rhetoric books. 
187 Register of Debates in Congress 2, pt. 2 (1826): 1893, 1894, 1896, 1918   
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During the protracted debate, a small group of Adams-supporters noted the irony 
that those congressmen who purported to support popular rights in the form of these 
amendments all hailed from slave States.188 Though these men seemed eager to “extend 
and enlarge popular rights” in the House, New Hampshire representative Thomas 
Whipple observed, they still clung to the “great conservative power” of the Senate “as the 
ark of their political safety” because it sustained their local interests and checked 
“encroachments by the free states” against slavery, “should they be disposed to make 
them.”189 In fact, he noted, McDuffie’s amendment kept intact the proportional difference 
in representation between the slave and free States, effectively amplifying the southern 
voice in the case of another failed presidential election.190 In refusing to redress the three-
                                                 
188 This generalization did not strictly reflect reality. The amendments’ more vocal advocates all 
represented slave states, but more than two-thirds of the House supported the first part of the amendment, 
which deprived Congress of its right to decide a failed presidential election, including a majority of 
representatives from Indiana, New York, Pennsylvania, and Illinois (all constitutionally free states or states 
in the midst of gradual emancipation acts), and significant support from Ohio and New Jersey 
congressmen. The free states roundly rejected the second part of the amendment (to establish a system of 
district-voting for the presidency) with the exception of New York, where the vast majority of 
representatives favored the change. New York’s representatives may have supported the second part of the 
amendment because the New York state legislature nearly passed a similar reform before the 1824 election. 
At the time, Martin Van Buren had marshalled his Republican regulars (the Bucktails) to prevent the 
popular electoral law from passing the NY Senate because the recent state-wide election indicated that John 
Quincy Adams dominated the popular vote over Van Buren’s preferred candidate, William H. Crawford, in 
which case, a district-based vote would have ensured that Adams swept New York’s electoral college. As it 
happened, it controlled a large portion of those votes, regardless. Donald Ratcliffe, “Popular Preferences in 
the Presidential Election of 1824.” Journal of the Early Republic 34, no. 1 (April 1, 2014): 71-72. 
189 "Nineteenth Congress..First Session." Register of Debates in Congress 2 (1826): 1828. 
190 In his article on “Popular Preferences in the Presidential Election of 1824.” Ratcliffe concluded that 
Jacksonians “backtracked” on McDuffie’s amendment “when they realized that a single nationwide ballot 
would deprive the South of the advantage that it derived from the Electoral College’s respect for the state 
unit and therefore the three-fifths clause,” but that does not accurately reflect the record. As Ratcliffe 
himself referenced in his book on Ohio party-politics, John Sloan of Ohio suggested a resolution on 
February 24, 1826, that would have altered McDuffie’s district-system to reflect the national population, 
irrespective of the three-fifths rule: “Resolved, That the Constitution of the United States ought to be so 
amended, that the free white males of the several States, above the age of twenty-one years, by a general 
vote, per capita, throughout the United States, shall elect the President and Vice President thereof.” The 
resolution was not adopted and the House ultimately voted on a version of the amendment that maintained 
the proportional power of the slave states dictated by the three-fifths rule: “To establish in all states a 
uniform system of voting by districts, such districts to be equal in number to the number of senators and 
representatives to which each state may be entitled in congress; and each district having one vote.” Barbour 
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fifths rule, these measures increased the political power of slave-holders at the expense of 
freemen.191 Slavery, Whipple said, “is a disease which has “grown with our growth and 
strengthened with our strength”,” but it “should not be irritated and aggravated by the 
rash hands and nostrums of political Charletans [sic]” willing to exploit public passion 
for their own cynical ends. If they were truly interested in creating a “more perfect 
symmetry” in the US Constitution, New Hampshire representative Ichabod Bartlett 
remarked, the advocates of these measures would not have proposed a “partial remedy” 
to the problem of political representation. Rather, he argued, they clearly intended to 
silence the spectre of dissent over slavery: to “check the fountains, that the nervous 
sensibility of the hypochondriac [the slave-owner] may not be disturbed by the murmur 
of the rivulet.”192 In a reversal of McDuffie’s argument, Bartlett warned that these 
proposed changes to the constitution would create a “dead political calm,” indeed, an 
“indifferent lethargy, which precedes the sleep of death.”193 
                                                                                                                                                 
alluded to this purpose in his own speech, arguing that the Electoral College destroyed the defensive 
“conservative principle” of popular representation in the House because it allowed the “combined action” 
of smaller States to overpower the interests of the larger States (like Virginia). In his speech the following 
day, Ichabod Bartlett cheekily reminded his southern colleagues that “some States, of no small dimensions, 
are found North of a certain well-known line,” i.e., the Mason-Dixon line, and could not be counted on for 
their unmitigated support against certain “minorities.” Donald Ratcliffe, “Popular Preferences in the 
Presidential Election of 1824”: 75-76.; Cf: Donald Ratcliffe, The Politics of Long Division: The Birth of the 
Second Party System in Ohio, 1818-1828. Ohio State University Press, 2000., 202-203.; "Nineteenth 
Congress..First Session." Register of Debates in Congress 2 (1826): 1463-1464, 1911, 1927, 2003.) 
191 If they were truly interested in creating a “more perfect symmetry” in the US Constitution, New 
Hampshire representative Ichabod Bartlett agreed, the advocates of these measures would not have 
proposed a “partial remedy” to the problem of political representation. Both Bartlett and Whipple 
contrasted the “owners of slaves” with “freemen” (or “free People”) in their speeches, implying that slave-
owners were, themselves, not free. Register of Debates in Congress 2, pt. 1 (1826): 1828; Register of 
Debates in Congress 2, pt. 2 (1826): 1917-1918 
192 "Nineteenth Congress..First Session." Register of Debates in Congress 2 (1826): 1929  
193 In a much-cited section of his speech, McDuffie quoted Lord Byron’s “Bride of Abydos,” abjuring his 
colleagues who would “make a solitude, and call it peace.” In response, Bartlett quoted “Darkness,” an 
1816 poem in which the sole survivors of an apocalypse murder each other. After the people were lulled to 
sleep, he said, “Then will come that political darkness, of which may truly be said—“It was not all a dream; 
The bright sun was extinguished, and the stars/Did wander darkling through the eternal space,/Rayless and 
pathless”.”  
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OBSTA PRINCIPIIS (RESIST THE BEGINNINGS) 
Slavery had never been far from the surface of debate in any period, but the 
election of a president expressly hostile to the institution (and the first president not to 
own slaves since the elder John Adams) exacerbated these tensions, as did Adams’s 
declared intention to join the Panama Congress, which included South American states 
that had recently moved to end slavery and aimed to discuss controversial topics such as 
the slave trade and the condition of Haiti, Cuba, and Puerto Rico.194 In late December 
1825, Adams formally submitted a list of nominees to attend the conference: John 
Sergeant of Pennsylvania (a long-standing member of the “Pennsylvania Society for 
Promoting the Abolition of Slavery, the relief of free negroes unlawfully held in bondage, 
and for improving the condition of the African race,” and notorious in Congress for his 
opposition to slavery) and the US Minister to Gran Colombia, Richard Clough Anderson, 
Jr., a lawyer and politician from a slaveholding family in Kentucky, who nonetheless 
publically endorsed the notion that agricultural societies benefitted from excluding 
slavery. While the Senate Foreign Relations Committee chawed over this delicate matter 
in conclave, the infamously indelicate Virginia senator John Randolph submitted a 
motion requesting that the president provide intelligence on the “principles and practice 
                                                 
194 Gran Colombia (Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, Panama) instituted compensated manumission after the 
Congress of Cucuta in 1821 and the Federal Republic of Central America (Guatemala, El 
Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica) abolished slavery in 1824. This hemispheric move toward 
manumission exacerbated the anxiety that Southern slave-owners expressed over several domestic incidents 
in the early 1820s, including the 1821 Supreme Court decision in Cohen v Virginia granting federal 
jurisdiction over the states, the unrealized Denmark Vesey insurrection in Charleston in 1822, and the 
establishment of an international Anti-Slavery Society in Great Britain in 1823, and the Ohio Resolutions, a 
plan for gradual emancipation that the Ohio state legislature submitted to Congress in January 1824. 
Adams’s impolitic choice of ministers further provoked the issue. Freehling, William W. The Road to 
Disunion: Secessionists at Bay, 1776-1854. Oxford University Press, 1990, 79, 159; Dippel, John Van 
Houten. Race to the Frontier: “White Flight” and Westward Expansion. Algora Publishing, 2005., 110; 
Zakim, Michael, and Gary John Kornblith. Capitalism Takes Command: The Social Transformation of 
Nineteenth-Century America. University of Chicago Press, 2012., 22; Rodriguez, Junius P. The Historical 
Encyclopedia of World Slavery. ABC-CLIO, 1997., 202, 400. 
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of the Spanish American States,” relating to “Negro slavery.”195 Randolph’s motion and 
subsequent soliloquy on the “character and color” of the South American body politic 
ignited a conversation over the “character and color” of the North American body politic, 
which trickled into the concurrent debates over McDuffie’s amendments in the House.196 
Before the United States entered into “Congress” with the Spanish American 
“Confederation,” Randolph declared, the Senate must be informed which of these South 
American States explicitly endorsed the “black crusade” for abolition. The threat of 
abolition struck a chord in the bosom of every southerner, Randolph said, and vibrated 
“the heart of every man in our country.” Slavery was a disease, “a cancer in your face” 
that could not be hidden, but it “must not be tampered with by quacks, who never saw the 
disease or the patient, and prescribe across the Atlantic.” The “nostrum” of abolition 
thrived in the physical and moral atmosphere of London—where the “pulse of life is so 
habitually stimulated”—but it would “shake the nerves of such as are not used to it.” In 
the atmosphere of this country, abolition acted as a medicinal poison, not a cure. Rather, 
the disease of slavery must be allowed to “run its course” in the South as it had in the 
North, Randolph prescribed, dying a “natural death” when it ceased to be profitable.197 In 
contrast with New Hampshire’s Thomas Whipple, then, who had described slavery as a 
disease that threatened the entire republic, Randolph limited both its treatment and its 
impact to the States in which it continued to operate, insinuating that those States 
                                                 
195 "Nineteenth Congress..First Session." Register of Debates in Congress 2 (1826): 113 
196 Randolph’s motion and harangue took place in the middle of the debate over McDuffie’s amendment: he 
submitted his request on March 1 and expounded on it the following day. In the chronology of this chapter, 
it occurred after McDuffie defended his amendment and before Barbour, Whipple, and Bartlett spoke. Most 
of the speeches given after Randolph’s infamous Senate address alluded to its race politics in some way.  
197 "Nineteenth Congress..First Session." Register of Debates in Congress 2 (1826): 117, 118, 121, 129-
130. 
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constituted discrete organic communities into which the federal government and the other 
States had no right to intrude. 
Holding up a volume of Edmund Burke’s works, and quoting liberally from his 
1792 speech on the Unitarians, Randolph cautioned his colleagues on the “small danger” 
of ignoring their States’ peculiar circumstances and governing themselves, instead, “by 
abstractions and universals.” In accepting this invitation and opening diplomatic relations 
with the Spanish American States, Randolph announced, the president openly allied 
himself with a group of men committed to the “genius of universal emancipation,” an 
abstraction anathema to a “white population” and implicitly threatening to a country with 
a “large Negro population.” If the Executive Office pursued this course and the Senate 
endorsed it, Randolph said, he could not predict whether the “blacks shall be turned into 
whites, or the whites into blacks, the slaves into masters, or the masters into slaves.” But 
he was convinced that it would be the first step in an irreversible course ending in 
tragedy. As the French had made use of “liberté, egalité, fraternité” to bludgeon the world 
into submission two decades earlier, these South American States would wield abolition 
as an “instrument of revolution and conquest.” In fact, he argued, their principles dictated 
that they pursue a proxy war with Cuba as a means to force universal emancipation on the 
United States. And when the Spanish American States invaded Cuba, Randolph asked, 
“what is the situation of the Southern States?”198 
Content to play the Cassandra (so he said), he cried out to the Senate, “obsta 
principiis.” This popular reference to Ovid’s Remedia Amoris, commonly used in medical 
discourse, read in full: resist the beginnings, the medicine is prepared too late when the 
                                                 
198 "Nineteenth Congress..First Session." Register of Debates in Congress 2 (1826): 114, 121. 
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malady has become entrenched.199 Once the Senate contracted this “black alliance,” he 
warned, it would be too late. They will have opened their door to the South Americans, 
who would cross the borders from Cuba and Mexico with their “proclamation of negro 
emancipation in the van,” setting the slaves to cutting their master’s throats, “by way of 
making allies of them” and “effectually invading and conquering the country.” In this 
eventuality, he concluded, the Southern States must act for their own self-preservation, 
regardless of “whatever the ink and sheepskin” of the Constitution might say “or be made 
to say” and “whatever Congress may decree.” As “self-preservation is in individuals the 
first law of nature,” Randolph quoted Burke, “so it is with societies.”200  
Following immediately on Randolph’s heels, South Carolina senator Robert 
Hayne left no room for ambiguity.201 In the event that a crisis arose involving the 
“peculiar interests of the Southern States,” questioning their “policy” (slavery), or  
endangering their safety, he proclaimed, the Senate should not doubt that the whole South 
                                                 
199 The Latin: Principiis obsta; sero medicina paratur/Cum mala per longas convaluere moras. I used 
Yasmin Haskell’s translation from Prescribing Ovid: The Latin Works and Networks of the Enlightened Dr 
Heerkens. This reference followed a long allusion to Ovid’s Metamorphoses, in which he cast the 
Executive as the petulant Phaeton, the Senate played the role of Helios, and the slaves along the Mississippi 
River underwent a transformation echoing the Heliades turning into poplars along the Po. "Nineteenth 
Congress..First Session." Register of Debates in Congress 2 (1826): 131; Haskell, Yasmin. Prescribing 
Ovid: The Latin Works and Networks of the Enlightened Dr Heerkens. A&amp;C Black, 2013, 205. See, 
also: “Physician, Heal Thyself! Emotions and the Health of the Learned in Samuel Auguste André David 
Tissot (1728-1797) and Gerard Nicolas Heerkens (1726-1801) in The Discourse of Sensibility: The 
Knowing Body in the Enlightenment, ed. Henry Martyn Lloyd (Springer Science & Business Media, 2013), 
105-124. 
200 "Nineteenth Congress..First Session." Register of Debates in Congress 2 (1826): 121, 122; “Speech on a 
Motion for Leave to Bring in a Bill to Repeal and Alter Certain Acts Respecting Religious Opinions, 11 
May 1792” in Burke, Edmund. The Works of Edmund Burke: With a Memoir, in Three Volumes. Harper, 
1837, 454.  
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will act and  “will be as one man.”202 For now, he acceded, the Southern States would be 
content if the Senate simply postponed the resolution.  
In what some consider the sole congressional coup of his administration, John 
Quincy Adams sent his chosen representatives to the Panama Congress, but the 
opposition’s delaying tactics ultimately triumphed. By the time that the House approved 
the cost of sending Sergeant and Anderson to Panama, reports of a yellow fever epidemic 
(also known as the “black vomit” disease) stalled Sergeant’s departure.203 Anderson, 
already en route, contracted the disease and died before reaching his destination. When 
Sergeant finally arrived in Panama the following year, the South American Congress had 
already dissolved.  
McDuffie’s amendment, meanwhile, suffered a similarly anti-climactic fate. Two-
thirds of the House approved of the first part of the amendment (preventing the 
presidential election from devolving on Congress, again), but evenly split on the part 
pertaining to the district system and it failed to pass by a slim margin.204 On May 8, the 
Senate briefly considered the surviving portion of the amendment. In a succinct 
                                                 
202 Italics in the original. "Nineteenth Congress.First Session." Register of Debates in Congress 2 (1826): 
131-132 
203 The epidemic also raged across New Orleans in 1826 and 1827, doubling their mortality rates. (Clay, 
Henry. The Papers of Henry Clay: Secretary of State 1827. University Press of Kentucky, 1981., 145-146.) 
204 The first part of the amendment received nearly unanimous support from the southern states (excepting 
Virginia, which split: 8 yays and 11 nays) and the Midwest (discounting Ohio, which also divided: 6 yays 
and 7 nays), as well as Pennsylvania and New York. New Jersey’s representatives split their vote with 2 
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Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Maine.) The second part of the amendment—to establish a 
uniform district system of voting for the president and vice president—failed to pass, with 102 votes 
against it and 91 in support. Unlike the first part of the amendment (which 96% of the opposition who 
voted supported and which had evenly divided Adams’s supporters, 51% in favor and 49% opposed), the 
second part of the amendment cut across party lines: 36% of Adams’s supports favored the bill and 64% 
opposed it, whereas 60% of Jackson’s party favored the bill and 40% opposed it. (NB: these percentages 
reflect the number of votes given out of the total number of votes and not the number of votes given out of 
the total number of representatives of each party. For both parts, about 10% of the representatives were 
recorded as “no vote” and I have left them out of these calculations of voting percentages.) 
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statement, Van Buren confirmed that a change to the mode of election was indispensable 
to “preserve the purity of the system,” and to “restore the balance of power among the 
States.” He hoped that the “all-powerful agency” of public sentiment on this point would 
be able to carry the next election with it. In the meantime, on Thomas Hart Benton’s 
motion, they swiftly tabled the resolution.205 Having served its purpose in consolidating 
Adams’s opposition in the House, electoral reform could be dealt with at some future 
date. 
On the issues raised in these debates—slavery, popular representation, and 
“balanced” government— Martin Van Buren established the foundations for a political 
movement coherent enough to unseat John Quincy Adams and to dominate the next thirty 
years of American politics.206 As soon as Adams had made his intentions regarding 
Panama clear, Van Buren visited Vice President Calhoun at his home to suss out his 
attitude toward the administration’s course of action and, thereby, to gauge his 
willingness to act against them.207 Finding Calhoun similarly hostile to the administration 
he served, Van Buren set out to unite the rest of Adams’s opposition, a challenge that 
Adams’s political misadventures made easy. By the end of the session, Van Buren had 
determined that Andrew Jackson, alone, had a broad enough appeal to align the country’s 
                                                 
205 The quotes come from Martin Van Buren’s short speech on the resolution. Missouri senator Thomas 
Hart Benton, who would become essential to Jacksonian politics, had the honor of making the motion to 
table the resolution. "Nineteenth Congress..First Session." Register of Debates in Congress 2 (1826): 694-
696. 
206 The Jacksonian (and subsequently Democratic) party controlled both the Senate and the House in eleven 
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disparate forces behind a single candidate.208 Though Jackson had resigned his Senate 
seat in October 1825, before the second Congressional session met, he had impressed 
Van Buren with his political acumen and personal charisma when the two sat near each 
other during the prior session. In the course of his time in Washington, Jackson had also 
attracted the support of other influential politicians, including his former aide-de-camp 
Thomas Hart Benton, now a junior senator and a rising force in Missouri politics, who 
had bloodied him in a duel a decade earlier. Over the summer, Calhoun also made clear 
his intentions to join Jackson’s camp for the next presidential election. When Congress 
reconvened the following December, Van Buren again parleyed with Calhoun, 
committing his band of Crawford-supporters and his own considerable political prowess 
to resurrecting the country’s “natural” party distinctions and, thereby, to electing Andrew 
Jackson.   
Capitalizing on the traction he gained in the first congressional session, Van 
Buren set out to generate support in vulnerable States. He recruited Thomas Ritchie, who 
ran both the Richmond Enquirer and the Richmond Junto in Virginia politics, and laid 
the groundwork for a New York-Virginia alliance based on “old party feelings.” In his 
opening salvo to Ritchie in January 1827, Van Buren proposed they form a combination 
between the “planters of the South and the plain Republicans of the North.”209 Echoing 
Thomas Jefferson, who had died six months earlier, Van Buren wrote, “We must always 
have party distinctions” because they generated an “antidote” to sectional prejudice “by 
producing counteracting feelings.” Unless they proactively resurrected the old party 
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attachments, he warned, “geographical divisions founded on local interests or, what is 
worse, prejudices between free and slaveholding states,” would inevitably fill the 
political vacuum. In the absence of trans-sectional party affiliations, the “clamour against 
Southern influence and African Slavery” would remain an effective political tool in the 
North.210 Influential New Hampshire editor Isaac Hill and the dynamic Kentucky 
journalist-politicians Amos Kendall and Francis P. Blair (editors of the Argus of Western 
America) soon joined Ritchie’s Enquirer and Duff Green’s national United Telegraph in 
sounding the call for a party devoted to “principles, and not men.” Propelled by Southern 
paranoia, Northern political discontent, and Western disillusionment with the corrupt 
politics of Adams and Clay, the new party rallied under the dissoluble platform of 
“Jackson and Reform.”211  
On the strength of this proliferating print network, Jackson’s party swept the 
national elections in 1827, taking both the House and the Senate.212 This political coup 
allowed them to tailor the congressional agenda so that it promoted Jackson’s candidacy 
and undercut Adams. Based on their projections, Jackson supporters monopolized the 
South and, in spite of Isaac Hill’s heroic efforts, he was not likely to make headway in 
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the northeast.213 But the mid-west and the mid-Atlantic remained up for grabs and one 
issue united them: economic protection.  
As northern industry and western agriculture expanded in the 1820s, protective 
policies had become increasingly popular. In the last congressional session (which ran 
December 1826 through March 1827), the Adams-dominant House had crafted an 
imports bill that appealed to western protectionists, but primarily catered to Adams’s 
stronghold among commercial interests in the northeast. That bill passed the House in 
early February 1827, but failed to pass the Senate when South Carolina senator Hayne 
moved to table the bill and Vice President Calhoun cast his tie-breaking vote in the 
affirmative.214 Once Congress closed its doors for the summer, Adams’s surrogate in the 
West, Henry Clay, concentrated his stump speeches on his party’s protectionist policies, 
namely the protective tariff, which was also the focus of a national convention held in 
Harrisburg, PA, that summer.  
At the beginning of the congressional session, therefore, Jackson’s party opened 
with a legislative gambit devised to siphon protectionist votes from the Adams camp. 
Van Buren charged Silas Wright, one of his loyal Regency disciples in the House, with 
formulating a bill on import duties that would leverage support in the manufacturing 
                                                 
213 In point of fact, some Jacksonians rejected the imputation that New England would “infect” Jackson 
with their vote: “Some Jackson men, now affirm, that Jackson will receive some of the votes of New-
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States that had gone to Clay in the 1824 election (Missouri, Ohio, and Kentucky) and 
consolidate power in the mid-Atlantic electoral behemoths (New York and 
Pennsylvania.) Virginia Jacksonian Andrew Stevenson, handily elected Speaker of the 
House, packed the Committee on Manufactures with a disproportionate number of 
Jackson men, including Wright, almost all of whom represented pro-protectionist swing 
States.215 Privately, Calhoun fretted that this combination of capitalist and manufacturing 
interests in Washington set a “dangerous example” of separate representation and 
association based on geographic divisions—a prospect that threatened to “make two of 
one nation”—but, publically, he held his tongue.216 The resulting tariff bill passed both 
the House and the Senate in February 1828 with the overwhelming support of 
Jacksonians from the mid-Atlantic and the West, and against nearly monolithic resistance 
from the South.217  
In the aftermath of the bill’s success and the constitutional crisis it engendered in 
the late 1820s and early 1830s, Jackson’s detractors contended that the Jackson-
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controlled Congress misplayed their hand—pushing through an exorbitant duties bill with 
the expectation that it would be defeated in the Senate or saddled on Adams. Yet, in light 
of the tariff’s relative popularity in the period and Jackson’s electoral position in 1828, 
the tariff might reasonably have been considered a strategic gamble, a bill designed to 
seduce the agricultural and manufacturing States with the understanding that it might 
alienate the South (of whose vote Jackson’s party was assured), as well as northeastern 
merchants and importers, whose support for Adams was never in question.218 Even with a 
relatively high tariff, Jackson’s party had no reason to expect a southern mutiny. Every 
major candidate had supported some version of protection during the prior election, 
Jackson had voted in the Senate for the previous comprehensive tariff, and even Calhoun 
was on record in support of certain kinds of protections.219 Irrespective of the bill’s 
success, then, the Jackson party could position themselves as champions of the 
manufacturing interests during the election and, by extension, American industry, 
American jobs, and the working man.  
Nonetheless, conditions had changed since the previous tariff had bill passed in 
1824, particularly for the beleaguered representatives of debt-plagued South Carolina, as 
had the structure of national politics. Still recovering from the 1819 economic crash, 
South Carolina planters took a serious hit when international cotton prices plummeted in 
1826; and the cotton market remained depressed until 1832, as did the price per pound of 
rice.220 Cotton and rice plantations exported about twice as much product in these years, 
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but made basically the same amount of money before expenses as they had in the first 
half of the decade, all while the cost of slaves increased, driving down their net gain. At 
the same time, South Carolina senator Robert Y. Hayne asserted, the “Colonization and 
Abolition” societies reduced the value of slave property with their resolutions and tracts, 
and Congress compounded the problem, granting these groups tacit legitimacy when it 
humored their memorials.221  
Meanwhile, a massive portion of the population migrated out of state, with 
dispossessed planters and farmers seeking their fortune in the southwest and Carolina-
born intellectuals migrating to the major cities in the north.222 Under the “painful belief 
that the days of South-Carolina have been numbered, and her prosperity is gone,” South 
Carolina senator James Hamilton, Jr., lamented, “our countrymen are journeying in quest 
of some more propitious land,” a “sorrowful pilgrimage” that reflected “the last 
testimony of a decaying country” upon its inhabitants. In comparison, “Yankee” 
manufacturers enjoyed an unprecedented boom in this period, supplemented by federal 
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and private investment, and northeastern and mid-Atlantic agriculture also flourished 
with the benefit of federal protection.223  
Arguably, the tariff clinched Andrew Jackson the presidential election in 1828, 
but it also became a flashpoint for both partisan and sectional politics, inspiring 
Calhoun’s doctrine of States rights, enflaming southern separatists, and spawning the first 
coherent “conservative” movement: nullification.224 In the summer of 1828, Calhoun 
communicated to James Monroe his doubts that the system could sustain itself any longer 
“under its natural action.” Pushed to its “present extreme,” it applied an imbalanced 
pressure on its numerous parts, “which has of necessity a most pernicious tendency on 
the feelings of the oppressed portions.” Theoretically, elections were meant to check 
systemic abuses, but no effective remedy existed for a substantial minority in a 
democracy who bore the burden of unequal laws. The “system is getting wrong,” 
Calhoun concluded, and without a “speedy and effective remedy,” they must all expect a 
shock.225 
NULLIFICATION: THE GREAT CONSERVATIVE PRINCIPLE OF OUR SYSTEM- 1828-1832 
As the nation’s politicians descended on Washington that fall, rumors circulated 
that anti-tariff “disorganizers” in the South plotted to dissolve the Union. In its 
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introductory editorial remarks for the new political year (September 1828), the anti-
Jackson Niles Weekly Register accused Southern politicians of attempting to obtain “by 
intimidation or force” what they could not accomplish by “republican practice.” The 
Register followed this charge with a series of exposes leading up to the first 
congressional session, picked up by papers across the United States, in which it detailed a 
South Carolina disunion “conspiracy,” instigated the prior spring. It claimed that South 
Carolina’s congressional delegation, led by representative George McDuffie and South 
Carolina senators James Hamilton, Jr., and Robert Hayne, held secret meetings, plotting 
to resign en masse from Congress, take up British muskets, and incite a civil war. Upon 
their return to Charleston, the Register reported, this “cabal” of “traitors” met with British 
ex-pat, Dr. Thomas Cooper (currently the president of South Carolina college and an 
“avowed advocate of disunion”) who fed them the inflammatory rhetoric, which would 
turn virtuous southern yeomanry into “infuriated dupes” willing to vote against their own 
interests.226 Cooper’s involvement proved to the Register that the “disunion junto” 
conspired with British agents, who fanned their “anti-republican, if not treasonable” 
attacks on the tariff and funded their activity.227 A succession of intemperate and 
defensive anti-tariff proclamations emanating from South Carolina fueled this 
speculation, as did the sudden discovery of a “conservative” solution to sectional 
disparity in the doctrine of nullification.228  
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In an October 1828 address, James Hamilton, Jr., accused the federal government 
of systematically “degenerating” South Carolina through its intrusive commercial 
policies and illegal internal legislation. Ever since South Carolina adopted the federal 
constitution, Hamilton charged, the government had drained out “the very heart and 
blood” of the State through its custom house and, in the last decade, the “miserable 
empiricism of the prohibitory system” had slowly poisoned the South. At the same time, 
the protective system destroyed the “natural sympathy” that bound the citizens of a 
common country together as “one people” with “one home,” alienating the northern, 
middle, and western States from their brothers in the southern States.229 Though the 
manufacturing interests claimed that the protective tariff served a transitory purpose—a 
scaffold for American industry that would last only until they built enough capital to 
compete on the international market—Hamilton warned that the “manufacturing spirit” 
would never be satisfied.230 Citing Adam Smith, he predicted that its “unrelenting avarice 
and selfishness” would drive its advocates to increasingly exclusive measures, until they 
willingly defended it with violence against those men who dared speak against it. In the 
struggle against capitalist hegemony, Hamilton declared, only “NULLIFICATION” 
could arrest the progress of this evil and preserve the South from “fast coming decay.”231 
According to Hamilton, nullification represented the “rightful remedy” to the 
problem created when unscrupulous politicians perverted their constitution’s 
“fundamental and distinctive character.”232 In response to the Register’s accusations that 
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the “revolutionary enthusiasm” and “treasonable aspirations” of some “political 
incendiary” had birthed this doctrine, Hamilton appealed to the authority of Thomas 
Jefferson and James Madison, “names venerated and endeared” to them “by associations 
connected with everything that has been proud, valuable, and consoling, to our country.” 
In their 1798 Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, he professed, Jefferson and Madison 
had advanced the same right to State-interposition against the same kind of power grab 
that the general government had executed with the Alien and Sedition Acts. Not only had 
Jefferson and Madison authored this “rightful remedy”, Hamilton claimed, but the “great 
republican party” had immediately “canonized” it as part of their “catholic faith,” which 
meant that anyone who opposed it committed heresy and should no longer be considered 
republicans.  
In this discourse, the “conservative principle” functioned at the cross-section of 
theology and medicine—it reflected the divine will operating through an organized 
physical structure, a process definitive of organic life that distinguished it from inorganic 
matter. For the States, Hamilton said, this principle of self-preservation could be found 
“in ourselves.” It flowed through every facet of their organization, each of which 
provided an honorable and secure remedy to their systemic degradation: in the “sacred 
Aegis of the constitution,” in their reserved rights as sovereign members of a civil 
compact, in their legislative obligation to protect their citizens, and, not least, in the spirit 
of their people “reared amidst those memorials which tell them they were once free and 
educated by a constitution which instructs them that they have an imprescriptible claim 
still to be so.” On these unshakable grounds, Hamilton promised, they might “build as 
upon a rock,” trusting in the “conservative principle” that infused the States’ reserved 
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rights to make them impervious to the “tempests and billows” that beat them, an allusion 
to the Sermon on the Mount. Indeed, Hamilton noted, their system would be a “miserable 
mockery” if it lacked a “conservative principle” to safeguard its constituent parts. Like all 
living things, he explained, the constitution contained a “sanitive [sic] principle within 
itself, by which the corruption and injustice which have been fastened upon it will be 
shaken off.”233 To those gentlemen disheartened by their country’s “irreversible decay,” 
Hamilton promised that while there was still “life” in the U.S. constitution, “there is 
hope.”234 
In identifying nullification as “conservative,” Hamilton ascribed to it all of the 
positive characteristics associated with the “conservative principle” in physiology and 
supplied a defensive strategy to those of its proponents accused of inciting revolution 
(i.e., all of them.)235 Characterizing this position as authorized, historical, legislatively 
sanctioned, sanctified, and vital, Hamilton implicitly reversed the charges leveled against 
him and his colleagues. Theirs was not the revolutionary position; they were not the 
disorganizers. Rather, those gentlemen who would maintain the status quo in direct 
                                                 
233 “Sanitive principle” should read “sanative principle.” (35 Niles’ Weekly Register. 208 1828-1829) 
234 In full, Hamilton’s quote alluded to Cicero’s dictum from his Letters to Atticus, “dum anima est, spes 
esse,”—or, in Hamilton’s words (and in the common English translation), “Whilst there is life there is 
hope.” Though Hamilton never attended college, he received four years of classical education from Scottish 
transplant John Frazer. The full Latin quote is “ut aegroto, dum anima est, spes esse dicitur…” [“there is 
said to be hope for the sick man while there is life…”] Though “anima” was generally translated as “life,” 
it more accurately conveyed the sense of the animating principle that infused the physical body with life. 
The “anima,” which combined the material and divine faculties in a living being, provided the conceptual 
framework for vitalism in the seventheenth century. (Cicero and Marcus Tullius Cicero, Cicero: Letters to 
Atticus: Volume 4, Books 7.10-10, vol. IV (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 170–71; Robert 
Tinkler, James Hamilton of South Carolina (LSU Press, 2004), 24.  
235 Though the bloated Adams press branded them with the crime of treason, Hamilton said, they did not 
derive their dictates from the “revolutionary enthusiasm” or “treasonable aspirations” of some “political 
incendiary,” but, rather, from the authority of “names venerated and endeared” to them “by associations 
connected with everything that has been proud, valuable, and consoling, to our country,” and “canonized at 
once by the catholic faith of the great republican party of our country.” (Niles’ Weekly Register. Vol. 35. H. 
Niles, 1829, 206-208) 
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contravention of their stated allegiances and national faith were the true traitors to their 
common country. Regardless of the truth value of this claim, it put their adversaries on 
the defensive, compelling them to explain their reasons for opposing Madison, Jefferson, 
and the Union. Even if they successfully refuted Hamilton’s facts or complicated his 
interpretation, they still implicitly validated his perspective, merely by engaging with his 
argument. 
The South Carolina State legislature formalized this position in late 1828 when it 
disseminated 5,000 copies of the anti-tariff “Exposition and Protest,” an (initially) 
anonymous treatise commissioned from Vice President (and vice president-elect) John C. 
Calhoun that laid out the ‘authoritative’ rationalization for nullification.236 As he 
understood it, Calhoun drafted, the United States suffered from a “disease” in which the 
majority of States forced the General Government to exercise power outside of its proper 
sphere, at the minority’s expense. In their sovereign capacity, the States could remedy 
this imbalance and compel the General Government either to return to its prior 
construction or to implement a constitutional amendment granting it the relevant power. 
Through State interposition, Calhoun clarified, the “creating becomes the preserving 
power; and we may rest assured it is no less true in politics than in theology, that the 
power which creates can alone preserve,—and that preservation is perpetual creation.” 
Calhoun may have borrowed that last clause from Swiss physiologist and theologian 
Emanuel Swedenborg’s True Christian Religion, which translated into mystical terms his 
earlier work on the vital principle organic life. In Swedenborg’s version of vitalism, the 
soul unfolded throughout the different parts of the body, where its ends existed 
                                                 
236 NB: the legislature did not vote to adopt the “Exposition and Protest,” but they ordered 5,000 copies 
printed, paid for its publication, and orchestrated its distribution. 
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“simultaneously.”237 In Calhoun’s analog, the State took on the role of God; interceding 
in its function as the “preserving power,” it gradually perfected the country’s constitution, 
while protecting it from corruption or disease. Without this essential intercession, 
Calhoun predicted, the totalizing “American System” would progressively corrupt the 
country’s public morals and destroy its liberty.238 
Because it relied on the ontological assumption of an organic state, nullification 
essentially turned on the question of organic sovereignty in the United States. Did the 
people of this country comprise distinct political communities, conjoined by a 
constitutional compact, or should they be considered a unified “American people” who 
collectively constituted a single nation? If the States retained their distinct national 
character, then, as the British and European theorists had established, they reserved the 
right to defend themselves against illegitimate and artificial power. In the case of the 
tariff, the Federal Government could not legitimately deprive “one portion of the 
confederacy” of its “natural advantages and natural rights” so that it might indemnify 
“other portions of the confederacy for the natural sterility of their soil, or the unavoidable 
mutations of commerce.”239 To substantiate their prerogative to void federal law, 
therefore, South Carolina’s nullifiers had to also establish their State’s distinct 
nationality. In protecting their “peculiar and rightful commerce,” Southern statesmen 
                                                 
237 Richard Cralle, his close friend and the editor of his papers, was a devoted Swedenborgian. Elizabeth 
Fox-Genovese and Eugene D. Genovese, The Mind of the Master Class: History and Faith in the Southern 
Slaveholders’ Worldview (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 600. 
238 Calhoun, John Caldwell. The Works of John C. Calhoun: Reports and Public Letters, (D. Appleton, 
1855), 51, 57. 
239 For those dupes who thought that this system would eventually satisfy the “unrelenting avarice and 
selfishness” of the “manufacturing spirit,” Hamilton suggest they turn to the works of Adam Smith, “and 
see how mammon works.” 
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claimed that they merely conformed to the dictates of nature.240 In this way, the battle 
against the tariff constituted a proxy war for slavery, discursively disguised as a struggle 
to protect “free trade,” the natural order, and the trodden rights of a subjugated nation. 
For too long, McDuffie recounted in the Southern Review, the North had built its 
industry at the expense of the South, while the South slumbered under the “fatal 
delusion” that “all parts of the Union have the same interest.” Now, these “combinations 
of capitalists” from the Northern and Middle States, finding that wage labor made their 
overhead too dear, set out to eradicate the only market advantage the South retained: 
slavery. These same men who reaped the bounty of federal largesse sought to eradicate 
the basis of Southern commerce, all while they literally minted money. Taking advantage 
of the “fixed feeling of alienation” that grew out of the “habitual and long continued” 
collisions between the country’s geographical interests, they seized on the “national 
peculiarity” that distinguished the Southern States, fanning the “flame of national 
animosity” against the “existence of negro slavery” in the South. As the Jacobin leaders 
had done in Paris, these manufacturers and monopolists formed associations, clubs, and 
juntos to satisfy their lust for private gain, manipulating the “common feelings” of the 
“whole body” of the people with “all the external symbols and self-deluding professions 
of disinterested patriotism.” In pamphlets, newspapers, and congressional speeches, they 
relentlessly indoctrinated their constituents in “miserable and anti-social prejudices” 
against the South by invoking the “cabalistic watchwords” of “free States,” and “slave 
States,” “northern farmers,” and “southern planters,” “domestic industry,” and “English 
                                                 
240 The Southern climate required slavery, senator John Rowan stated in the 1830 debate over the Foote 
resolution. Gesturing to the authority of Montesquieu, he noted that “slavery is the natural state of man in 
warm, and liberty his natural state in cold climates,” asking, “Of what Southern country were the people 
ever free, who did not tolerate slavery?” Niles’ Weekly Register, Vol. 38 (1830), 148. 
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commerce.” With the tariff, the Federal Government endorsed and codified this 
geographical prejudice, “fatally” misdirecting its active energies exclusively against the 
citizens “of the Southern country,” and “literally devouring” the objects committed to its 
guardianship and care.241 
Although George McDuffie had once encouraged his colleagues to consider 
themselves “one people,” the 1828 tariff exposed the South’s essential estrangement from 
the rest of the Union. Just as they would never say that “all the nations of the earth” had 
the same interest, McDuffie reflected, they could no longer be “permitted to believe” that 
“all the parts of the Union” shared the “same interest.” The differences between the states 
developed “from the laws of nature and the dispensations of Providence” and could not 
be “obliterated by vain human theories,” like emancipation. Without comity or the public 
sympathy, however, the South lacked the congressional capacity to redress federal 
overreach. So long as the “united capital of the tariff States” retained control over public 
opinion, Southern political representation was an “empty delusion,” as worthless in the 
US Congress as West-Indian representation was in British Parliament “on the question of 
negro emancipation.” Against this “perversion of the great conservative principle of 
political responsibility,” McDuffie urged the Southern States to seek refuge in the 
“protecting genius of the Constitution,” the States’ right to void an unconstitutional law 
of Congress.242  
                                                 
241 Southern Review (A.E. Miller, 1828), 584, 594, 595, 597, 611. 
242 South Carolina governor Stephen Miller put an even finer point on the question at a Fourth of July 
celebration in Charleston the following summer: “Should the tariff break down our great staple, we have 
still a conservative principle. Events prove the truth of the position that slave labor can sweep free labor 
from the field of competition from cambric and needles, to blankets and cannon.” Niles’ Weekly Register, 
Vol. 36 (1829), 370. 
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Some States rights advocates argued that the States did not merely have the right 
to oppose federal incursion, but the constitutional imperative to do so. Each individual 
State had its own “self-preserving power” generated by the “individuality of its people” 
and measured in their “moral and physical energy,” Kentucky senator John Rowan 
explained during 1830 Webster-Hayne debate. Once formed, the State’s “unity and its 
life are inseparable.” At the foundational moment, he contended, the States could not 
have transferred any of their sovereignty to the federal government without destroying 
themselves and a “self-destroying will, or purpose, would be as unnatural in a body 
corporate as in a body natural.” Therefore, he concluded, each State must, by its nature, 
“exert its self-protecting power, through the organs of its government, or through a 
convention,” against any “attempt by any of the members of the society to thwart or 
counteract” its will. Given that all human institutions—even religious institutions—
degenerated, Rowan noted, the people invested in their governing bodies would 
inevitably confront a choice between reform and revolution. In opposing centralized 
power and Northern imperialism, Rowan claimed that the Southern advocates of States 
rights had sought reform and been denied. If revolution came, he implied, the intransigent 
North must be considered its author.  
For the first three years of Jackson’s presidency, Calhoun maintained a public 
face of supporting the administration while privately feeding the nullifiers, but he could 
not sustain this balance  indefinitely. First, because Calhoun no longer found his political 
interests in line with Jackson’s administration by 1831.243 A succession of incidents had 
                                                 
243 Petticoat affair: Calhoun out; Martin Van Buren ascendant. Kirsten E. Wood, ""One Woman so 
Dangerous to Public Morals": Gender and Power in the Eaton Affair." Journal of the Early Republic 17, no. 
2 (1997): 237-75.  
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alienated Calhoun from President Jackson since their election in 1828, including the 
notorious Petticoat affair, in which Calhoun’s wife led Washington’s socialites in 
blackballing Secretary of War John Eaton’s wife; Duff Green’s February 1831 
publication (at Calhoun’s behest) of Calhoun’s 1818 correspondence with Jackson about 
the Seminole war, framed to vindicate his own character at Jackson’s expense; and the 
dissolution of Jackson’s cabinet in the spring of 1831, which eased out Calhoun’s 
partisans in favor of Van Buren’s. Ultimately, Calhoun concluded that Jackson’s 
popularity weakened, distracted, and divided the South. Because people liked him, they 
placed their confidence in the General Government; and their infatuation with the man 
obscured the “true nature and character” of the General Government’s dangerous, 
oppressive, unjust, and unconstitutional projects.244 Meanwhile, their “unfounded hope” 
that he would provide relief prevented them from seeking their own forms of redress. 
Their salvation from big government, then, must lie, in part, in discrediting Andrew 
Jackson. 
Second, the nullifying position allowed no real room for compromise. Not only 
did the tariff damage the Southern economy, nullifiers argued, but it also granted the 
federal government a toehold in legislating local commerce. If this infringement on local 
autonomy went unchallenged, they alleged, Southern statesmen would have no grounds 
to stop the federal government from legislating away their right to own human 
                                                 
244 Calhoun, John Caldwell, John Franklin Jameson, and William Pinckney Starke. Correspondence of John 
C. Calhoun, 280-283. 
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property.245 Any concession on the tariff ceded essential territory; any acquiescence 
surrendered the South to federal intervention and control.246  
Charleston’s “disunion junto” finally forced Calhoun’s hand on nullification in 
the summer of 1831. At a Charleston dinner in George McDuffie’s honor, the city’s ex- 
mayor (Elias Horry) outed Calhoun during a succession of State rights toasts. Tucked into 
tributes to “the cause of the south,” the “reserved rights of the states,” and the 
“conservative principle of the federal union [nullification]” and its application in 
“resisting federal aggression,” Horry saluted “John C. Calhoun,” who had been “tried in 
the balance, and found not wanting.”247 In June, Calhoun expressed his regrets over the 
incident to ex-Treasury Secretary Samuel D. Ingham, late of Jackson’s cabinet. He would 
have preferred to choose his time, Calhoun wrote, but matters had been brought to a 
crisis, compelling him to go public in his support of State rights. A month later, on July 
26th, Calhoun wrote an open letter “on the Relations which the States and General 
Government bear to each other,” published in the August 3rd Pendleton Messenger, in 
which he basically reprised his anonymous 1828 “Exposition” and publicly defended the 
“great conservative principle” of nullification for the first time. 
Looking at the problem from the structural, logical, historical, political, and moral 
perspective, and considering the nature of the “disease,” Calhoun determined that the 
country’s political institutions depended on the sovereign State’s right to check federal 
power, which he called the “fundamental principle of our system.” This “right of 
                                                 
245 William W. Freehling, The Road to Disunion: Secessionists at Bay, 1776-1854, (Oxford University 
Press, 1990), 284. 
246 They had made a parallel argument when the American Colonization Society petitioned Congress for 
funding in 1827 and, again, in 1830. 
247 “John C. Calhoun—A distinguished son of South Carolina; honest, wise, talented—in office dignified. 
He has been tried in the balance, and found not wanting.” Niles’ Weekly Register, Vol. 40 (1831), 236. 
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interposition,” he wrote—whether it was called the “State-right, veto, nullification, or by 
any other name”—must be understood in the context of the country’s original 
organization. At its foundation, Calhoun contended, the “constitutional compact” treated 
both the General Government and the State governments as “a whole”, each “perfectly 
adapted to its respective objects” and acting independently in its “proper sphere.” To 
ensure the duration of their Constitution, their Union, and their liberty, they must 
“preserve this sacred distribution as originally settled, by coercing each to move in its 
prescribed orbit.” From this perspective, nullification functioned as the “great 
conservative principle” not merely because it reflected traditional or historical principles, 
but because it maintained the essential balance in the American political system. Though 
their opposition characterized this doctrine as “anarchical and revolutionary,” Calhoun 
avowed his solemn belief that it provided the “only solid foundation of our system, and of 
the Union itself” because it allowed States to seek redress, “not in revolution or 
overthrow, but in reformation.”248 In some distant age, Calhoun projected, they might 
imagine a people so advanced in knowledge with a “state of intelligence so universal and 
high” that they could “fully realiz[e] the sublime truth” undergirding peace, justice, and 
harmony. Until then, the States’ right to call a convention on constitutional questions 
offered an intermediate point between outright submission to oppression and State 
resistance by force.  
As his political fortunes waned over the next year, Calhoun determined that the 
“whole system” was “deeply diseased.” Adams’s election in 1824 had given the 
government a “downward impulse,” instigating an extensive and rapid “political 
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degeneracy,” accelerated by the very man whose administration should have arrested the 
descent.249 In May 1832, after Jackson’s “Republican delegates” nominated Martin Van 
Buren for vice president at their first national convention (not even deigning to place the 
incumbent  in the running), Calhoun resolved to “make it the criterion of patriotism” to 
refuse federal office until he had liberated the South. Articulating his support for 
nullification in increasingly vivid terms, he reinforced the rhetorical infrastructure for 
States rights as he helped build the political network to support a South Carolina State 
convention on nullification. In an open letter to former senator James Hamilton, Jr., now 
serving as South Carolina’s governor, Calhoun cast the mounting evidence of “disorder 
and decay” in their system of government as symptoms of consumption:  
“In the midst of youth, we see the flushed cheek, and the short and feverish 
breath, that mark the approach of the fatal hour; and come it will, unless there be a 
speedy and radical change— a return to the great conservative principles which 
brought the Republican party into authority, but which, with the possession of 
power and prosperity, it has long ceased to remember.” 
This image simultaneously challenged the authenticity of the reigning “Republican” party 
and naturalized the State rights position as conservative, even as it expressly committed 
to a “radical” cure. To remedy their political disease, Calhoun turned to vitalist theory. 
Amplifying his previous correspondence, Calhoun reaffirmed that the States functioned 
as the regulatory agents of the political organism. In their power to obstruct 
unconstitutional acts of Congress in their State conventions and through their exercise of 
nullification, interposition, and State veto, the individual States manifested the “great 
                                                 
249 Correspondence of John C. Calhoun, 310. 
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conservative principle of our system.” When the political system required correction at 
the constitutional level, as it did now, the States activated the “vis medicatrix [healing 
power] of the system.”250 In their sovereign and confederated capacity in a General 
convention, they directed the “energy of the repairing power” to amend the constitution 
or otherwise correct systemic abuse and derangement. To begin the healing, Calhoun 
resigned as Andrew Jackson’s vice president and took one of South Carolina’s seats in 
the US Senate.251 
In the fall of 1832, South Carolina administered the conservative remedy of 
nullification. Though marginalized nationally, the State rights party cleaned up at the fall 
1832 South Carolina elections, taking three-fifths of the statewide vote and capturing 
eighty percent of the State House and seventy-five percent of its Senate.252 Two weeks 
later, Governor James Hamilton, Jr., convened a special legislative session to elect 
delegates for a State Convention on Nullification, held the following month (in the 
middle of the month-long presidential election, which lasted from November 2nd to 
December 5th). On November 24, 1832, the delegates passed an Ordinance of 
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Nullification declaring the 1828 and 1832 Tariff Acts unconstitutional.253 They gave 
Congress until February 1, 1833 to change the federal tariff or face the penalties. Should 
Congress attempt to enforce its commercial authority over South Carolina’s citizens, they 
declared, then they would consider their political obligations and social connections to 
the union dissolved, and organize an independent state.254 
Within weeks, the South Carolina Unionists organized an opposing convention to 
protest nullification and declare, unequivocally, that they considered it an act of rebellion 
cloaked in “conservative” language. Calhoun and his comrades commanded obedience in 
the “language of despotism,” they declared. Against their better judgment, the people of 
South Carolina had been “induced” to sanction nullification “upon the most solemn 
assurance of its being a conservative,” and “not a revolutionary measure,” but the 
Nullification Ordinance exposed that doctrine’s true nature in “all its deformity.” Not 
only did the ordinance advance a “revolutionary” doctrine, they announced, but an 
“essentially belligerent” one, which would naturally lead to civil war and disunion. Under 
its auspices, they predicted, the Nullifiers intended to fragment the Union under the 
“pretense of maintaining it” and plant their “bloody flag of anarchy” on its ruins.255 In 
their “Remonstrance and Protest,” issued on December 10, 1832 (five days after Andrew 
Jackson’s election and the same day that he issued his formal proclamation against 
nullification), the Unionists rejected the notion that they owed their exclusive allegiance 
to the State or that the State should be considered the primary guarantor of their rights. 
                                                 
253 Given that four-fifths of the convention delegates identified as Nullifiers, no one was surprised at this 
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254 “Avalon Project - South Carolina Ordinance of Nullification, November 24, 1832,” n.d. 
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Instead, they wrote, they looked to the union to protect them from the treasonous and 
despotic men who currently controlled their own State.  
Jackson had diplomatically opened the space for compromise on the tariff in his 
December 4th message to Congress, but his December 10th proclamation dwelt on the 
same themes as South Carolina’s Union Convention. In it, he renounced the “illegal and 
disorganizing” ordinance in the strongest terms and pleaded with its “deluded” supporters 
to arrest its dangerous trajectory. From his perspective, the Nullifiers manipulated the 
“honest prejudices” of people who essentially misunderstood the “nature” of their 
government. Blinded by their “passions” their “State pride,” their “native courage,” and 
their “sense of real injury,”, the people of South Carolina had been led to believe that the 
Constitution formed a league of sovereign States, which retained the right to secede from 
the Union, and that the general government operated on the States and not directly on the 
people.256 Operating under this fatal delusion, they accepted the fundamental lie that the 
“United States are not a nation.”  
Nevertheless, Jackson professed, “We are ONE PEOPLE.” Contradicting 
Calhoun’s account, Jackson clarified that the people of the United States had jointly 
declared themselves a nation before the Declaration of Independence, collectively (if 
imperfectly) formed a nation under the Articles of Confederation, and incarnated a 
“single nation” in the United States Constitution. “In none of these stages,” he declared, 
“did we consider ourselves in any other light than as forming one nation.” Succession, 
therefore, must be considered a revolutionary act designed to destroy the nation’s unity. 
Any other conclusion could only arise from an “abuse of terms,” a “solecism” 
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perpetuated by men like Calhoun who intended to mask their true object (disunion) and 
precipitate an otherwise patriotic people into committing treason.257  
Sounding eerily similar to the patriarch of a British sentimental novel, Jackson 
appealed to the “fellow citizens” of his “native State” to think of him like a father 
stopping his children from rushing “to a certain ruin.” He asked them to consider their 
privileges as American citizens and contrast it with the language their leadership had 
used to deceive them. These men who had brought them to the “brink of insurrection and 
treason” were not “champions of liberty emulating the fame of our Revolutionary 
fathers,” Jackson protested, and, no matter how often they said it, the people of South 
Carolina were not an “oppressed people” contending against conditions “worse than 
colonial vassalage.” The government would soon redress the unequal commercial 
burdens unwisely (though not unconstitutionally) saddled upon them, Jackson promised, 
but the people of South Carolina must first reject the “disorganizing edict” of 
nullification. If they loved freedom and valued peace (not to mention their own lives), 
then he advised them to re-assemble their State convention and, this time, ensure that it 
reflected the “decided expressions” of their will—to reject disunion and restore their 
country’s tranquility. That they might not be “dishonored and scorned” while they lived 
and “stigmatized when dead” as the “authors of the first attack” on their country’s 
                                                 
257 NB: Jackson carefully avoided naming names and mostly stuck with a passive construction to elide the 
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Constitution, he urged them to say to those men whose names they once respected, “WE 
TOO, ARE CITIZENS OF AMERICA.”258 
To back up his rhetoric, Jackson attacked the problem on two fronts. First, as a 
sign of good faith, he deployed a loyal New York representative, Gulian C. Verplanck, at 
the start of the December 1832 congressional session to introduce a tariff bill that 
seriously undercut protection.259 Second, he demonstrated his readiness to use force, if 
necessary, to execute federal law. On January 16, 1833, he submitted his own “Force 
Bill” to Congress, which would authorize him to employ military aid in South Carolina. 
On the Senate floor, John C. Calhoun responded apoplectically, but, behind the 
scenes, he encouraged his hawkish colleagues in South Carolina to keep their cool.260 
While Hayne and Hammond prepared for “protracted warfare” and Hamilton drilled his 
troops, Calhoun reminded them that their interests lay in victory, not martyrdom.261 At 
the moment, he wrote, they lacked the strength and the sectional support to secure their 
sovereign rights through military means, but even a year would make an “immense 
difference” in their prospects. Moreover, if they acted on a (relatively) arbitrary deadline, 
without material provocation, they abrogated the basis of their claims—that they acted 
for “self-preservation,” alone. For the “conservative” theory of State rights to hold, 
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Jackson must be seen to be the aggressor; South Carolina could only fight in self-defense. 
The leaders of the South Carolina ‘States Rights and Free Trade’ party agreed and when 
they met on January 21st they gave the federal government until the end of the 
congressional session (basically an extra month) to comply with their ordinance.262 
Contrasted with Jackson’s apparent belligerence, South Carolina’s temperance granted 
politicians from outside South Carolina the pretext to support State rights without 
seeming to sanction rebellion.263  
In the meantime, Calhoun navigated a rapprochement with Kentucky senator 
Henry Clay, whose devastating turn in the 1832 presidential election redoubled his 
determination to bring down Andrew Jackson. Back in December, Clay drafted a bare-
bones proposal that promised equal protection for all domestic industries (that all duties 
would be applied equally, without consideration for particular commercial sectors) and 
the repeal of all existing protective laws in March of 1840.264 By mid-January, rumors 
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263 At the end of January, Virginia Governor John Floyd affirmed that Virginia had “long regarded” the 
“sovereignty of our states” as the “citadel of our liberty” and called for a general convention. Projecting the 
State rights doctrine back to the Middle Ages, he denounced the federal power “lately seized” and 
“promulgated as rightfully belonging to it” and he rejected the recent doctrine that the states now compose 
a “single nation.” On the basis of this falsehood, he said, Jackson would make federal power absolute and 
himself a dictator. In the Senate debates on the tariff, Kentucky Senator George M. Bibb located the 
conservative principles of State rights in the letters of Publius during the Constitutional Convention, the 
Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 1799, and Jefferson’s first inaugural. Without these 
“conservative principles, these “bodies of perpetual observation”,” he argued, nothing prevented the federal 
government from gradually absorbing and exercising total power. South Carolina Senator (and former 
governor) Stephen D. Miller dismissed the entire controversy over nullification. The crisis focused on 
locating a guarantee for the “conservative principle of state rights” he noted, but it already existed in that 
“true theory of our government,” which Jefferson indicated in supporting State rights to call a convention to 
support their construction of the constitution in 1799, and in the “right to fight” as codified in international 
law. South Carolina did not invent the doctrine of nullification, but merely “followed in the footsteps of 
other distinguished members of the union, sustaining the true principles of the Jefferson or democratic 
school.” 
264 Draft Proposal of the Compromise Tariff of 1833, Philadelphia, Mid-December, 1832. Henry Clay, The 
Papers of Henry Clay: Secretary of State 1827, (University Press of Kentucky, 1981), 604. 
 137
circulated that Clay parleyed with Calhoun to settle terms, secure southern support, and 
cement the rupture in Jackson’s party.265 Meanwhile, Verplanck’s bill met resistance 
from protectionists who charged that it conciliated the nullifiers entirely and from 
Jackson’s opposition, who opposed on principle a bill that appeared to have been made to 
order and filtered through the interests of Van Buren’s New York Regency. Both Clay 
and Calhoun benefited from offering an alternative that might supplant Verplanck’s 
proposal and show up the “popular dictator,” Andrew Jackson.266 
Having gone through the rigor of a select Senate committee that included southern 
and western representatives, the Clay’s compromise sailed through the House and the 
Senate on the strength of a deep-south-southwest alliance. The resulting tariff (gradually) 
met South Carolina’s demanded reduction (at the same horizontal rate that Robert Hayne 
proposed in the 1832 debates) and took the tariff off the table for the rest of the decade, 
giving Calhoun’s crew time to regroup and allowing Clay and his colleagues to reassess 
what policies might best serve their interests.267 After it passed, Calhoun redirected his 
efforts toward the underlying issue of government involvement in domestic concerns 
(and its projected implications for slave-ownership), while Clay reassessed whether he 
could advance American manufacturing without threatening slavery (or, at the very least, 
if he could sustain an anti-Jackson coalition that included Calhoun’s cohort without 
compromising American industry.) 
                                                 
265 January 11, 1833 letter from Peter B. Porter, Albany, NY. The Papers of Henry Clay: Secretary of State 
1827, 612-613. 
266 Clay introduced his bill to the Senate on February 12, 1833. “Debates in the Senate.” Register of 
Debates in Congress 9 (1833): 603-604.  
267 William Edmunds Benson, A Political History of the Tariff 1789-1861, (Xlibris Corporation, 2010), 93. 
 138
Jackson considered nullification “dead” after he signed the Compromise Tariff 
and the Force bill into law on March 2, 1833, but the report of its death was an 
exaggeration.268 When the South Carolina convention re-assembled in mid-March, its 
members defended the principle of nullification as sound, even if they acquiesced to its 
repeal in deference to the “united vote” of the “whole southern states.”269 South Carolina 
still felt confident in the “conservative character of her remedy, which she believes to be 
in perfect harmony with a true exposition of the doctrines of the resolutions of 1798.” 
They backed up this claim by immediately re-invoking it. After they suspended the 1832 
nullification ordinance, they reported a new ordinance nullifying the Force bill. 
Furthermore, they left the door open to succession when they re-issued a test oath that 
required all civil and military officials to declare their allegiance to the “free and 
sovereign state of South Carolina” and renounce any allegiance “incompatible” with their 
faithful citizenship to that State. This framework definitionally rejected Jackson’s 
premise that South Carolina’s citizens must consider themselves American citizens, first. 
In a letter to his constituents after the Senate shuttered its doors for the summer, 
Calhoun likewise urged his constituents to consider the outcome a successful application 
of conservative State rights doctrine. During the crisis, he claimed, nullification had 
proved to be the “great conservative principle of the system,” which, “like some powerful 
but dangerous medicine, cannot be prescribed, till the disease has become more 
dangerous than the remedy and when the life of the patient with or without it is almost 
despaired of.”270 They might shelve the medicine for the time being, but, he cautioned, 
                                                 
268 With apologies to Mark Twain. Jackson quoted in Freehling, 286. 
269 This framing highlighted their push for a sectional sovereignty. 
270 “Mr. Calhoun’s Letter,” Niles’ Weekly Register, Vol. 44 (April 20, 1833), 125. 
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they had “but checked the disease” with the present compromise, not cured it. The tariff 
must be considered a symptom of a systemic disorder that constantly threatened their 
State rights, which meant, primarily, their right to own people.271  
While the disease remained in remission, he advised his constituents to guard 
against its contributing forces—systemic imbalance, corruption, and despotic rule. In 
practice, that entailed rooting out big government, capitalist interests, King Andrew 
Jackson and his heir apparent, Martin Van Buren. When the disease inevitably relapsed, 
they would recur to the same “conservative” remedy of nullification and succession. The 
battle for nullification may have ended (though neither side agreed on who won), but, in 
the war for slavery, its partisans would be satisfied with total victory, alone. In the 
meantime, the “conservatives” of slavery must remain vigilant. 
THE AMERICAN CONSERVATIVES 
In the early 1830s, self-identified “Conservatives” surfaced in national politics as 
part of a strategy to secure the southern vote. Even on his best day, southerners viewed 
Martin Van Buren with suspicion. A career politician from New York, he had an 
inconsistent voting record on slavery.272 While his southern supporters might concede 
                                                 
271 NB: As usual, Calhoun did not explicitly mention slavery, but used the language that stood in for 
slavery. 
272 As a member of the New York State Senate, he had drafted a militia act in 1814 that allowed for free 
people of color and slaves to serve (and for the slaves to be manumitted after their service); in 1817, he 
voted for New York’s emancipation bill; in 1819, his name was attached to a memorial related to the 
Missouri Compromise, stating that Congress had the constitutional power to prohibit slavery in the 
territories and prevent new slave-states from entering the Union, and, in 1820, he had also supported 
Senator Rufus King’s re-election, even though King had opposed the Missouri compromise on these 
grounds; in 1821, during the NY state constitutional convention, Van Buren voted against exclusive white 
suffrage, and favored limited suffrage for people of color; as a US Senator, he voted to restrict the slave 
trade in the Florida Territory and flip-flopped on Congress’s power over slavery in the District of 
Columbia. (NB: Van Buren did not attend the 1819 meeting in Albany concerning the Missouri 
Compromise and he subsequently objected to having his name signed on his behalf, claiming that he agreed 
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that Van Buren’s political ambition would probably overcome any of his personal 
convictions that had survived his time on the national stage, their lingering uncertainty 
gave his opponents a wedge issue. At the congressional level, Van Buren’s opposition 
conspired to force his allies into a position on slavery that would either hobble Van 
Buren’s chances in the South or discredit him in the North. Adding fuel to the fire, Great 
Britain abolished slavery in its colonies in the late summer of 1833, a fact that stoked 
southern paranoia and increased the likelihood that the southern States would form a 
sectional alliance around slavery.273 To court the South, then, both the Jackson party and 
their opposition set out to demonstrate their commitment to southern values and 
institutions by silencing and repressing anti-slavery activists and sentiment—to style 
themselves the “conservatives of the Union” and portray the other side as soft on 
abolition.274  
In his effort to control the southern vote in the 1836 presidential election, John C. 
Calhoun, Duff Green, and the rest of the States-rights crew cynically revived and 
aggravated intense sectional conflict. Working with the popular press in the deep south, 
Calhoun, Duff Green, and the rest of the States-rights crew cynically revived and 
aggravated intense sectional conflict, exploiting the “fears, prejudices and pride of the 
slaveholding States” to “blow the unquenchable fanaticism of the south into a devouring 
                                                                                                                                                 
to be cited as a member of the committee calling the meeting, but not on whatever product they 
issued).Smith, 44-47. 
273 From the southern perspective (or, at least, in their rhetoric), British emancipation in the West Indies 
cordoned off the United States in a hostile sea of free people of color, an imminent threat to American 
shores. However, because British abolition took several years to go into effect, and it approached 
emancipation gradually, and since British imperialism imposed a restrictive, hierarchical power dynamic 
irrespective of nominal citizenship rights, it nearly goes without saying that the threat the southerners 
described existed far more vividly in their language than it did in reality.   
274 The Globe (Washington, DC), March 19, 1835 (Issue 239).  
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flame.”275 In particular, they fixated on a new genre of anti-slavery activist, generated in 
England and infiltrating the United States: the immediatist. On January 1, 1833, William 
Lloyd Garrison published the first issue of The Abolitionist, a monthly journal committed 
to immediate abolition and opposed to colonization on the premise that the “native 
country of the colored people of the United States” is the United States and that the 
“blacks of America” could be “amalgamated, in all respects, in equal brotherhood with 
the whites.”276 In fact, in arguing that people of color constitute a separate (or lesser) 
race, Garrison declared, the American Colonization Society endeavored to make 
“practically true” a social and civic alienation “which is one of the greatest stains in the 
American character.”277 Over the next two years, the immediatists organized a national 
Anti-Slavery society, which pursued a more aggressive and visible line of attack against 
slavery than the uncoordinated regional societies had been able to effect, including a 
systematic and unrelenting media blitz, delivered through the national postal service 
directly to the heart of the South. In the summer of 1835, alone, they posted 175,000 
separate mailings to the men on their list of twenty thousand “prominent” southerners.278 
                                                 
275Leonard  Bacon, Slavery Discussed in Occasional Essays, from 1833 to 1846, (New York, Baker and 
Scribner, 1846), 90. 
276 As the official organ of the New-England Anti-Slavery Society, the Abolitionist only lasted for a year, 
sending out monthly editions from January through December 1833. Manisha Sinha, The Slave’s Cause: A 
History of Abolition (Hartford, CT: Yale University Press, 2016), 221–24. 
277 Some historians point to Garrison’s insistence on amalgamation and the prevalence of pro-
amalgamation themes in abolitionist discourse to explain the intensity of reaction against them. They 
imply, as did the gradualist of the period, that this impolitic choice generated an animus that a less extreme 
position (such as emancipation and separation, or co-existence without exogamy) would not have. But 
Garrison did not seek mere emancipation, but, rather, he called for freedom, which could only come from 
actual equality. People of color could only be free if their fellow citizens rejected and falsified the racial 
distinctions that the colonizationists and slaveholders sought to naturalize. The Abolitionist (Boston: 
Garrison and Knapp, 1833), 3. 
278 Postal historian Richard R. John put this number into perspective when he noted that the abolitionists 
sent out “roughly half of the total number of items that the entire New York City periodical press ordinarily 
sent through the mail in a comparable period of time.” Richard R. John, Spreading the News: The American 
Postal System from Franklin to Morse, (Harvard University Press, 2009), 261; Gross, Robert A., and Mary 
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Outrage against abolitionist mailings united the southern constituency against a common 
enemy, however vague their actual threat, and also kept the recent post office scandal in 
the public mind, with its indictment of Jackson’s party patronage and corruption.279  
As the 1836 presidential election drew closer, the “self-styled conservatives of the 
public peace” instigated a national culture war against the abolitionists and other 
“movement” parties that swiftly turned to material violence. Anti-abolitionists nationwide 
agitated against the whiff of anti-slavery sentiment in public media, in churches, and in 
voluntary societies. Working to silence social activists, they organized campaigns to 
suppress their literature, prevent them from making public appearances, and effectively 
stop their societies from meeting.280 Fearful of damage to their property, landlords 
evicted their abolitionist tenants, effectively shuttering their papers. Across the country, 
outspoken advocates for the abolition of slavery encountered mounting popular violence, 
as lynch-mobs destroyed presses, burned down newspaper offices, and murdered men 
with anti-slavery sympathies.281 The Niles’ Register reported thirty-five anti-abolitionist 
riots and violent attacks on people of color between 1833 and 1838.282 The anti-slavery 
                                                                                                                                                 
Kelley. An Extensive Republic: Print, Culture, and Society in the New Nation, 1790-1840, (UNC Press, 
2010), 243. 
279 John, Spreading the News: The American Postal System from Franklin to Morse, 206-256. 
280 In March 1836, prominent New Haven Congregationalist minister and social reformer Leonard Bacon 
described this behavior as a “literary inquisition” that suppressed “every discussion of slavery, whatever 
quarter, and in whatever form,” putting the “fear of Lynch law” into public intellectuals, ministers, and 
anyone else interested in discussion, debate, and free inquiry. Leonard Bacon, “Present State of the Slavery 
Question,” Slavery Discussed in Occasional Essays, from 1833 to 1846, (New York, Baker and Scribner, 
1846), 87-88, 97. Original article published in the March 1836 edition of the Quarterly Christian Spectator. 
281 According to one account, over two-hundred anti-abolitionist mobs threatened anti-slavery activists 
between 1830 and 1840. Philip A. Klinkner, and Rogers M. Smith, The Unsteady March: The Rise and 
Decline of Racial Equality in America, (University of Chicago Press, 2002), 39. 
282 David Grimsted, in American Mobbing, 1828-1861, counted forty-six attacks on abolitionists from 1834 
to 1836. Both Richards and Grimsted placed specifically anti-abolitionist and racial violence in the context 
of a general increase in crowd-sourced violence nationwide. David Grimsted, American Mobbing, 1828-
1861: Toward Civil War, (Oxford University Press, 2003, 35). Cf. Leonard Richards, Gentlemen of 
Property and Standing: Anti-Abolition Mobs in Jacksonian America, (1970), 14-16. 
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newspapers put that number a little higher, reporting 165 incidents of violence against 
abolitionists and people of color in the same period. That violence peaked in the summer 
of 1835.283  
The perpetrators maintained that they acted in self-defense, righteously protecting 
their lives and their property from people who brought disorder and race-based division 
to their doorsteps. To support their case, they pointed to recent anti-slavery activism 
(with varying degrees of veracity): abolitionists had orchestrated slave insurrections in 
Mississippi, established hundreds of “revolutionary” anti-slavery societies across the 
country,284 deluged them with their subversive propaganda,285 and, worst of all, invited 
“foreign emissaries paid with foreign money” to come to their country and destroy their 
“peculiar institutions.”286 Functionally, then, the abolitionists incited these riots, bringing 
violence on themselves and the people of color whose freedom they claimed to advance, 
and they must be held responsible for it.287   
Wary of losing southern support and southern dollars, northern politicians, 
bankers, and merchants held a series of “Conservative meetings” at the end of the 
                                                 
283 Rioting peaked in general in the summer of 1835, with 109 separate incidents between July and October. 
Grimstead, American Mobbing, 1828-1861, 17. 
284 The American Anti-Slavery Society’s annual report, made public that summer, announced 215 auxiliary 
anti-slavery societies in the northern states. Idem. 
285 The historiography on anti-abolitionism tends to reinforce the notion that the 1835 mass-mailing 
campaign triggered the public violence against the abolitionists. Though violence intensified that summer, 
it preceded their epistolary offensive (by years). Furthermore, as Grimsted noted, the causal chronology did 
not fit this narrative: the insurrection panic and subsequent riots in Mississippi occurred before the mailing 
campaign or any other material evidence of the abolitionists’ national strategy existed. Grimsted American 
Mobbing, 1828-1861, 5; Richards, Gentlemen of Property and Standing: Anti-Abolition Mobs in 
Jacksonian America, 12, 14-16, 21-45. 
286 For the record, the abolitionists did not invite many “foreign emissaries” to the United States. William 
Lloyd Garrison invited one foreigner to headline a series of abolitionist lectures in New England: British 
immediatist George Thompson, whom he had met during a trip to Edinburgh. Grimsted, American 
Mobbing, 1828-1861, 12. 
287 Grimsted provided a graphic account of this “defensive” violence: "Philadelphia’s antiblack mob, in 
which the rest of were Irish, included a castration the rape…  Slaves were burned alive in Alabama; the 
flesh was ripped from the back of a white by the claws of the tomcat the mob swung over him; and a 
Mississippi mob beheaded a victim, played kickball his head, and threw his body to hungry pigs.” Ibid., 16. 
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summer.288 First, Van Buren’s opposition gathered (in Portland and Bath, Maine, in 
Boston, and in Philadelphia) and then his supporters (in Albany and New York City).289 
Like they had in Britain, “Conservatives” in the United States claimed the position of 
“law and order” against agitators whose activism threatened social stability. They turned 
anti-abolition into a vehicle for them to perform their support for slave-owners without 
explicitly endorsing or legislatively reinforcing the institution of slavery, itself.290  
In their rhetoric, these conservatives endorsed the basic premises underlying the 
State rights movement: that the States remained inviolable even after forming the Union 
and the northern States had no right to interfere with slavery in any way. Speaking at 
Faneuil Hall in August 1835, Boston’s ex-Mayor Harrison Gray Otis echoed the popular 
southern narrative established during the nullification crisis.291  He reminded his audience 
that the North acquiesced to slavery when they appealed to the southern colonies during 
the revolution, implicitly confirmed this position when they confederated, and explicitly 
ceded control of internal commercial regulation to the southern States when they framed 
the constitution, which, he noted, included the right to import property and the right to 
                                                 
288 According to constitutional historian Michael Curtis, “almost every sizeable Northern community” held 
one of these meetings. A particularly cynical observer might note that these riots and subsequent meetings 
were auspiciously timed for electioneering purposes, particularly in Pennsylvania, where the Jackson-party 
split the prior spring opened the field for the Anti-Masonic candidate (Joseph Ritner) to take a shot. 
Michael Kent Curtis, “Curious History of Attempts to Suppress Antislavery Speech, Press, and Petition in 
1835—37,” Northwestern University Law Review 89 (1994-95): 808. 
289 Curtis observed that “pro-Van Buren papers were particularly assiduous in publishing such items in a 
transparent effort to hold the South for the first Northern nominee of the Democratic Republicans;” 
however, with the exception of New York, Van Buren’s opposition overwhelmingly held the floor at these 
meetings. In October 1835, the American Colonization Society’s organ, the African Repository, reported 
six such meetings all in the span of a month: in Portland, ME; Bath, ME; Boston, MA; Philadelphia, PA; in 
New York, NY; and in Albany, NY. The African Repository. Vol. XI, (Washington, D.C.: American 
Colonization Society., 1835), 289; “Great Conservative Meeting at Philadelphia,: Daily National 
Intelligencer (Washington, DC), August 27, 1835 (Issue 7033); “Conservative Meeting at Philadelphia,” 
Boston Courier (Boston, Massachusetts), August 31, 1835 (Issue 747); “Great Conservative Meeting in 
Boston.” Daily Cleveland Herald (Cleveland, Ohio), September 11, 1835 (Issue 88); Curtis, “Curious 
History of Attempts to Suppress Antislavery Speech, Press, and Petition in 1835—37: 808-809. 
290 Ibid., 807-817. 
291 Otis was a former Federalist who had attended the Hartford Convention. 
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hold whatever property might be imported. As a result, northerners had a positive 
obligation to protect the institution of slavery that superseded their duty or capacity to 
make changes, regardless of their “ardent desire for the freedom of the African race.”292 
Not only must abolitionist principles be considered hostile to the “spirit and letter 
of the constitution,” but also “imminently dangerous.” To the southern mind, even 
discussing slavery was the same as ending the union. Otis explained that southerners 
regarded all abolitionist-related discourse as a “war in disguise, upon their lives, their 
property, their rights and institutions, an outrage upon their pride and honor, and the faith 
of contracts—menacing the purity of their women, the safety of their children, the 
comfort of their homes and their hearths, and in a word all that man holds dear.” 
Basically, abolition threatened their white masculinity and, in so doing, destabilized their 
entire world. These southerners might be mistaken in their opinions, Otis granted, but 
northerners must understand that they were “hereditary” and “habitual” opinions that 
could not be dismissed merely because they were irrational or inconvenient.293  
In general, the men at these Conservative meetings treated human enslavement as 
the price of doing business with the South. Slavery represented an unfortunate, morally 
problematic, and, perhaps, embarrassing fact of the southern economy that had developed 
naturally and could not be eradicated externally. Moreover, if they abjured the right to 
move against slavery in order to meet their political and social obligations, they refused 
to stand by and let some snooty foreigners judge them for it. At the Philadelphia 
Conservative meeting, Jesse R. Burden put a fine point on this sentiment when he 
remarked, “England had placed upon us the sore of slavery, and now pointed at us in 
                                                 
292 The African Repository, 220. 
293 Ibid. 
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scorn because it festered on our body”294 Though some speakers (like Joseph Reed 
Ingersoll, a Whig representative from Pennsylvania and vice president of the American 
Colonization Society) sought to end slavery gradually and constitutionally, others 
“disapproved of any interference” with slavery, even colonization, because it deprived 
southerners of their “rightful property” and beggared “the whites by benefitting the 
blacks.”295 This sense of rights as a zero sum game between the races reverberated 
through the long-form speeches and newspaper articles reacting to the immediatists.296  
Immediate abolition would “change the civil polity,” Otis projected. Inevitably, it 
would give “political power to those who have none, and the dominant power to them in 
all places where they happen to be a majority of the population.” In the Black Belt south, 
then, formerly enslaved people of color would outnumber the white population and hold 
political power over them and, in Otis’s estimate, this power-dynamic represented the 
best case scenario, one in which the abolitionist revolution obtained emancipation 
without a “servile war.”297 Yet, southerners had spent years arguing that outside agitation 
on the question of slavery would inescapably lead to just such a war—that, in fact, their 
enslaved population could either be “contented and ignorant” or violent once informed.298 
Once the abolitionists incited this war, Otis concluded, either the “citizens” would 
                                                 
294 Former speaker for Pennsylvania’s Senate, chairman of the State Library, president and director of the 
Philadelphia Fire and Inland Navigation Insurance Company, incorporated 1835 (he would become a 
director for the Philadelphia Loan Company, as well, chartered in 1836). Also, NB: quote from the Daily 
National Intelligencer transcript, which differed from the official version (that Burden likely edited and 
submitted after the fact) published in Hazard’s Register of Pennsylvania the following year. “Great 
Conservative Meeting at Philadelphia. Morton M’Michael, Chairman. From the U.S. Gazette,” the Daily 
National Intelligencer (Washington, D.C.),  August 27, 1835 (Issue 7033); Samuel Hazard, Hazard’s 
Register of Pennsylvania. (Philadelphia: W.F. Geddes, 1836), 188-189. 
295 The African Repository, 226. 
296 The term “servile war” was short-hand for race war. 
297 Given the increasingly binary treatment of race and freedom, a “servile war” functionally meant a race 
war. 
298 David Grimted drew this parallel in his chapter on “1835: Year of Violent Indecision” in his book on 
American Mobbing. Grimsted American Mobbing, 1828-186, 20. 
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triumph and exterminate “the blacks” or the slaves would conquer and “the whites must 
in their turn be exterminated.” Afterwards, he predicted, the “republics of the colored 
race will have supplanted that of their masters” and northerners would be forced to 
choose between alliance and constant war “with those who occupy the soil and the 
habitations of the good and the great and the brave of our brethren.”299  
From his first day in the Senate, Calhoun had used his position to systematically 
politicize the question of slavery in order to seize power from Jackson’s party, and to 
crush Van Buren’s chances for succeeding him in the next election.300 During the 
Twenty-Fourth Congress, he (and his proxies) increased the pressure, introducing 
explicitly pro-slavery and State rights measures, including a bill to enforce State 
censorship of the post at the federal level and series of resolutions proscribing Congress 
from interfering with or discussing slavery. When Jackson advised Congress in his 
annual message to prohibit certain types of “incendiary” publications from the southern 
mail, the opposition-controlled Senate directed the question to a special committee led by 
                                                 
299 Not to be outdone, New York’s Van Buren loyalists swiftly held their own meetings, led by Mayor 
Cornelius W. Lawrence in the city and Governor William L. Marcy in Albany. But their heavily modulated 
resolutions—big on ambiguous language, light on legislative promises—failed to inspire Van Buren’s 
southern wing. By October, all eyes turned toward Utica, where the New York Anti-Slavery Society had 
booked the courthouse for their state convention. When Van Buren’s surrogate, Samuel Beardsley, declared 
his intention to stop the abolitionists from meeting at all costs, his opposition held their own “conservative 
meeting” resolving protect the abolitionists’ “right of free and temperate discussion.” For short, they called 
themselves “the citizens of Utica who were not abolitionists, but who were nevertheless in favour of 
maintaining the supremacy of the laws at all times, and under all circumstances, and who were opposed to 
any abridgement of the right of free and temperate discussion guarantied [sic] by the constitution.” (The 
enemies of the Constitution discovered, or, An inquiry into the origin and tendency of popular violence- 
Containing a complete and circumstantial account of the unlawful proceedings at the city of Utica, October 
21st, 1835, 68.) 
300 The anti-Jacksonians held a majority of the seats during the Twenty-Third Senate (from March 1833-
March 1835) and through the first session of the Twenty-Fourth Senate. By the end of the Twenty-Fourth 
Senate’s second session, Jacksonians dominated. 
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Calhoun and comprised almost entirely of his critics.301 Jackson’s message gestured 
toward preventing people from mailing specific publications determined by a federal 
mandate, in which case the person or people posting the publications would be liable for 
breaking a federal law and punished accordingly.302 Instead of this federal standard, 
Calhoun’s proposed legislation compelled postal employees to conform to each State’s 
chosen standard. For legal precedent, Calhoun looked to federal legislation on disease 
control. Congress lacked the power to pass federal “quarantine laws,” he recalled, but it 
had passed legislation “to abstain from the violation of the health laws of the States.” 
Similarly, Calhoun’s law shifted the onus to federal employees to follow the target 
State’s directives and held them accountable if they received and mailed or delivered 
items prohibited in their destination State.303 Calhoun implied that the federal government 
had put crypto-abolitionists into office in the South—men whose sympathies led them to 
turn a blind eye to the dangerous publications pouring across their borders that put both 
slavery and slaveholders at risk. “While the southern States contained so many 
postmasters opposed to their institutions,” Calhoun explained, “it was absolutely 
                                                 
301 In addition to Calhoun, Massachusetts senator John Davis and North Carolina senator Willie P. Mangum 
were both anti-Jacksonians. John P. King, who had been elected a Jacksonian in 1833, formed part of the 
internal resistance to Jackson’s banking policies and would resign from the Senate in 1837 as part of the 
Conservative dissenters from the party (whom I will cover in Chapter 3.) Including Calhoun, four of the 
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the Charleston post office to receive abolitionist publications… then he considered himself legally 
obligated to detain those publications in New York. This doctrine, which would soon become known as the 
federal reinforcement of state law, provided Gouverneur with legal cover for a decision that could 
otherwise be closely divided as arbitrary and capricious.” John, Spreading the News: The American Postal 
System from Franklin to Morse, 267. 
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necessary for them to take effectual measures for their own security.”304 In case his 
motivation remained obscure, he clarified explicitly that he grounded this bill on the 
doctrine of “State rights and State intervention,” the “assertion of the principle, that the 
States had a right to protect themselves.” That bill narrowly failed to pass the Senate in 
February 1836, but it served the ancillary purpose of reinforcing sectional division and, 
therefore, weakening Van Buren’s chances.305 Towards the end of the session, in May 
1836, the House adopted all of South Carolina representative Henry L Pickney’s 
resolutions, confirming that Congress lacked the constitutional power to interfere with the 
institution of slavery in the States or in the District of Columbia (DC), and that they 
would table any all “petitions, memorials, resolutions, propositions, or papers” related to 
the subject of slavery.306 
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For the better part of the decade, “rational” anti-slavery activists had encouraged 
the more radical members of their movement to neutralize their rhetoric and work 
through the proper hierarchies.307 When the anti-abolitionist backlash initially turned 
violent, they argued that the resistance that the anti-slavery movement encountered grew 
out of its tactics, not its purpose: its incendiary language unnecessarily antagonized 
potential allies and riled their natural predators.308 Within a couple years, however, the 
rational abolitionists could no longer sustain the argument that they could change the 
conversation by going through the proper channels or adjusting their language. For one 
thing, they no longer had access to public platforms. In addition to gagging the radical 
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As a group, Bacon wrote, the abolitionists lacked the force to overcome the “intrinsic power by which 
words retain their popular signification.” For example, though they might define “immediate emancipation” 
as the “immediate cessation from the sin of treating men as chattel,” most people understandably assumed 
that they sought the “instantaneous dissolution” of the master-slave relationship—by “some sudden 
violence” or tyrannical act of federal legislation. Because they did not control the discourse, the 
abolitionists were misconstrued, denounced as “visionary and reckless agitators.” If they truly wanted to 
effect social change on a monumental scale, Bacon advised, they must first learn to speak so that they could 
be heard and understood. In questions of political right and practical morality, Bacon wrote, words 
mattered. Paraphrasing Coleridge, he explained: “words in such a case are not mere breath, but things, and 
things of great importance in their effect on the public mind, and their effect on those who use them.” 
Unfortunately, the pro-slavery regime had also embraced this concept, and they had both the will and the 
means to completely control the national discourse—to suffocate their opposition. Leonard Bacon, “The 
Abolition of Slavery,” The Quarterly Christian Spectator, (A. H. Maltby, 1834). 343; Bacon, Slavery 
Discussed in Occasional Essays, 77. 
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wing of the anti-slavery movement, anti-abolitionist “conservatives” tramped down on 
voluntary societies, in general. Shuttering churches and persecuting printers, they barred 
meliorist avenues for anti-slavery reform and set in motion legislation that effectively 
silenced anti-slavery reformers at the federal level. This “literary inquisition” suppressed 
“every discussion of slavery, whatever quarter, and in whatever form,” and put the “fear 
of Lynch law” into public intellectuals, ministers, and anyone else interested in 
discussion, debate, and free inquiry. For another, even if the immediate abolitionists had 
been able to spread their message unfiltered, it had become clear that the immediate 
abolitionists had been the “occasion rather than the cause or source of the mischief.” 
Their agitation did not cause the “bitter passions and fierce fanaticism” raging in the 
South: politics did.309 
In his 1836 farewell address to the New York Anti-Slavery Society, Judge 
William Jay condemned the capitalist cynicism that traded political liberties for southern 
commerce. In the North, he wrote, where wealth made men “politically conservative,” 
anti-slavery activists had assumed themselves relatively safe from physical assault 
because conservatives, they knew, invested in law and order to secure their own interests. 
However, the recent riots in New York City (1835), Utica (1836), Boston (1836), and 
Cincinnati (1836) revealed that today’s “Jacobins” were arrayed among the “political and 
commercial aristocracy in the North.” Making “merchandise” of “peace and good order,” 
northern politicians sold the constitution and its laws for southern votes and its “great 
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 152
capitalists” speculated not merely in lands and banks, but also in the people’s liberties. 
These men could hardly be considered truly conservative, he argued, given their 
willingness to introduce “anarchy and violence on a calculation of profit.” Jay declared 
the time ripe for abolitionists to spread their “truly conservative principles” across the 
nation—with their last breath, if necessary. They now carried the sole responsibility to 
restore “the tranquility of society, the security of property, and the continuance of 
freedom” in America. 
The following year (1837), the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church set 
a national precedent when it shuttered churches that had served as venues for abolitionist 
dissent and reform. In language that made clear that the question of slavery had decided 
the issue, the assembly abrogated the 1801 Plan of Union with the Congregationalists and 
excised synods known as “hot-beds of abolition.”310 Though the schism nominally turned 
on a question of doctrine, the specter of abolitionism haunted its primary targets. When 
Lyman Beecher and Albert Barnes stood trial in 1835 for heresy, for example, they 
defended themselves against charges normally associated with abolitionist preaching, 
namely the doctrine of perfection and the denial of human inability, both associated with 
Yale professor Nathaniel W. Taylor’s “New Haven” or “New School” theology.311 When 
                                                 
310 In the Exscinding Acts, the assembly never explicitly mentioned the word slavery, but it removed four 
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abolitionists pressed the question in the Presbyterian General Assembly in 1835, they 
provided their opposition with the material necessary to expel them from the Presbyterian 
polity. Reverend George A. Baxter, who published his infamous pro-slavery “Essay on 
the Abolition of Slavery” in 1836, celebrated the “end to the abolition question” after the 
General Assembly excised the offending synods in 1837. Speaking to a group of 
seminary students after the 1837 Exscinding Acts passed, Baxter confirmed that the 
“Presbyterian church, by getting clear of the New School, will at the same time get clear 
of abolition”312 
Without the means of production or dissemination, without pulpits and public 
spaces, the abolitionists, in particular, and social reformers, in general, lacked the 
mechanism to share their truth. Rational abolitionists might debate strategy, but tactics 
required a coordinated effort—in this instance, among people with some serious 
philosophical differences—and socio-political change required an unpredictable (and 
often unmanageable) alchemy of forces and conditions. Having gone into uncharted and 
hostile territory without a coherent plan of action, anti-slavery activists now found 
themselves in a quagmire. Instead of being welcomed as liberators, they encountered 
violence, political resistance, and entrenchment. The people were not primed for the 
message and their religious leadership had abrogated their duty to ready them for it. In 
the midst of this sustained attack, the barely coordinated branches of the anti-slavery 
movement splintered. The anti-slavery perfectionists, led by William Lloyd Garrison, 
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responded to this state of affairs by rejecting organized religion, the political process, 
and, eventually, the American union.  
THE “TRUE CONSERVATIVES” 
Writing in response to the Presbyterian split, Congregationalist ministers Horace 
Bushnell and Noah Porter attempted a radical intervention in defining the content of 
American conservatism in the late 1830s. Up to this point, self-described “Conservatives” 
had blamed the country’s social ills on abolitionists—a problem they attempted to resolve 
by suppressing the irritant (through violence, censorship, and excision) and preventing its 
spread (by policing the media, people, and theology that crossed State borders). In 
contrast, Bushnell and Porter viewed the rampant social disorder as the symptom of a 
graver pathology corroding national morality that state and religious censorship 
compounded. The problem was not in the people, Bushnell charged, but in a socio-
political culture that treated the people as means of production, and a learned class 
(sacred and secular alike) that failed in its duty to teach them otherwise. “The political 
tendencies of slavery have always been adverse to our free institutions,” Bushnell 
announced in the midst of the 1835 riots, “claiming to itself the monopoly of liberty… It 
has gendered a fearful spirit of radicalism and demolition.” Slavery engendered a moral 
evil that only the unfetter spread of the gospel could counter. If slavery gradually 
degraded the American people, then could the men whose actions artificially extended 
the life of slavery be considered conservative? Could reactionaries who staunched the 
flow of the gospel be considered conservative? Re-orienting sources like Coleridge and 
Burke in the American context, Bushnell and Porter raised the possibility that in a society 
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founded on the “true idea and settlement of liberty,” conservatism should struggle to 
obtain the “true doctrine of civil freedom.”313 
This approach distinguished between conservative models developed in British 
and German romantic thought and the specific forms and institutions that British and 
European Conservatives advocated. Though they drew on intellectuals who had become 
associated with British and European conservatism by the 1830s, Bushnell and Porter 
insisted that the theoretical logic of conservatism implicated different institutional and 
social forms in a democratic republic. That is, they could adopt the Romantic mode of 
thinking about the relationship between the people and the state—and even their models 
for education—without advocating for monarchies or principalities. Though conservatism 
promoted a reactionary adherence to anti-egalitarian and anti-democratic forms and 
institutions in places like Britain and Europe, they argued that nothing inhered in the 
concept of conservatism that necessarily bound it to regressive, repressive, or reactionary 
policies or structures. In both medical discourse and political theory, conservative forces 
aided an organism’s natural progress as a function of its living or vital force. 
Conservatives did not have to function hierarchically to secure the power of one group 
over another; rather, they were compelled to serve the constitutional needs of the society 
in which they lived. In the United States, these ministers insisted, “True Conservatives” 
would conserve democracy, instead of privilege, and liberty, instead of subjugation.  
In the decade before this confrontation, British and German romantic thought 
suffused US intellectual discourse. Several influential New England scholars matriculated 
at German universities, primarily at the University of Göttingen, where Johann Friedrich 
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Blumenbach continued to teach until 1840. Among them, editor, orator and politician 
Edward Everett received his PhD from Göttingen University in 1817 and contributed 
most of Harvard’s collection of German scholarship; historian, educator, and statesman 
George Bancroft followed his 1820 Göttingen PhD with a stopover in Berlin, where he 
attended Hegel’s lectures (among others), and returned to the US committed to 
disseminating Herder; and George Ticknor left Göttingen (to become Harvard’s first 
Smith Professor of the French and Spanish Languages and Literatures) before completing 
his doctorate, but not before becoming close personal friends with Blumenbach. Ticknor 
brought German-émigré Charles Follen onto Harvard’s faculty as its first professor of 
German language and literature, where he taught Lessing, Herder, Schiller, Goethe, 
Novalis, and August Wilhem Schlegel to future Transcendentalists George Ripley, James 
Freeman Clarke, and Theodore Parker. During his popular public lectures on German 
philosophy, which tended to focus on Fichte and Kant, Follen made friends with William 
E. Channing (the god-father of Transcendentalism), Ralph Waldo Emerson (its widest 
purveyor), Margaret Fuller (its “truth-teller”), and James Marsh, whose influential 1829 
edition of Coleridge’s Aids to Reflection, 1831 edition of Coleridge’s The Friend, and 
1833 translation of Herder’s Spirit of Hebrew Poetry served as the foundational texts for 
the Transcendentalist Club (which he helped establish in 1836). Even before Marsh 
popularized Coleridge in 1829, however, Horace Bushnell and Noah Porter had read it as 
undergraduates at Yale University. Later in life, Bushnell reportedly said he was more 
“indebted to Coleridge than to any extra-Scriptural author.” At the same time, 
Transcendentalist author and publisher Elizabeth Peabody started building the foreign 
library that eventually became her legacy. In 1826, Peabody’s sister Mary described her 
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as “living” on “Coleridge, Wordsworth, and Dr. Channing.”314 Alongside Bronson Alcott 
in 1834, Peabody founded the Temple School in Boston based on her understanding of 
Herder’s progressive pedagogy and Swiss romantic Johann Pestalozzi’s model of 
elementary education. Unlike Bushnell, who got his German romanticism in translation 
from Coleridge and Bancroft, Peabody read it straight from the source, reporting in an 
1836 letter, “I made quite easy progress in Schiller—but find Goethe harder.”315 As 
historian Thomas L. Buckley observed, one-third of the journal articles written in the 
United States between 1817 and 1865 concerned either Schiller or Goethe.316 Meanwhile, 
Harvard philosopher Francis Bowen remarked in 1838, Coleridge and Carlyle enjoyed an 
even “greater” popularity “on this side of the Atlantic” than they did at home.317 A 
decade after these events, Noah Porter (by this time the Clark Professor of Moral 
Philosophy and Metaphysics at Yale) reflected that Coleridge’s writings had “dawned 
like a new light” on “many hundreds” of minds since their first publication in the United 
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States.318 In Porter’s own study, Coleridge’s portrait kept company with portraits of 
Schiller, Robert Burns, and Sir William Hamilton, as well as statuettes of Immanuel Kant 
and Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (reproductions of German sculptor Christian Daniel 
Rauch.)  
Stepping into the moral vacuum generated by a society without an 
institutionalized social hierarchy or established national church, Bushnell pushed to 
institutionalize morality at the national level through a comprehensive, centralized system 
of social and moral reforms, premised on publically-funded arts and education. As 
Coleridge had explained in The Friend (1818), education operated as the 
“nisus formativus” or “Bildungstrieb” of “social man,” the “appointed protoplast” of 
man’s “true humanity” and essential to his “vital and harmonious body.” (Like Ticknor, 
Coleridge learned his Blumenbach straight from the source, having attended 
Blumenbach’s lectures at Göttingen and studied with him privately.)319 Writing On the 
Constitution of Church and State in 1830, Coleridge identified the same process in the 
national body. Under the tutelage of the clerisy—scholars of the liberal arts and 
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sciences—the “national education” served as the “nisus formativus of the body politic,” 
bringing out the “latent” humanity in “all the natives of the soil” and “train[ing] them 
up” to become “citizens of the country” and “free subjects of the realm.”320 By their 
scholarship, the clerisy balanced the nation’s “progressive civilization” (its advances in 
the arts, access to amenities, and its spread of information and knowledge) with its 
cultivation. Without proper cultivation, Coleridge clarified, civilization acted as a 
“corrupting influence” on a nation, bringing out the “hectic of disease.”321 In Coleridge’s 
sense, cultivation referred to the “harmonious development of those qualities and 
faculties that characterize our humanity,” including “all the qualities essential to a 
citizen,” without which no one could be counted on for the “conservation or promotion” 
of  the state’s essential interests.322 In other words, Coleridge wrote, the clerisy taught the 
people to “be men,” so that they might “be citizens.”323  
Fundamentally, the clerisy aimed to achieve “civilization with freedom,” 
Coleridge declared, but its aims had been frustrated by the “diseases in the body politic” 
and the “morbid symptoms” that kept them chronic in Great Britain.324 Among these, 
Coleridge specified the salmagundi of ad hoc instruction that passed for “education” in 
his country, and the government’s dedication to alienating the nation’s wealth from the 
people’s welfare. Divorced from religion and morality, Coleridge reported, education had 
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been drained of its higher principles, its spiritual drive, and reduced to empiricism and 
utility. At the same time, Coleridge continued, Britain’s commercial laws and practices 
“mechanized” its population, turning them into “engines” for the “manufactory of new 
rich men,” so that the “machinery of the wealth of the nation” was made up of the 
“wretchedness, disease and depravity of those who should constitute the strength of the 
nation.” Britain’s political economy condemned the people to disease, vice, and poverty, 
Coleridge claimed, while its statesmen promised to despoil them of whatever 
commonwealth remained. Senators demanded public land as a right to pay down the 
government’s debts to landowners, stockbrokers, and stockowners, while the country’s 
laborers clung to its “magic wealth-machine,” praying that it did not stop and throw them 
into pauperism. “Has the national welfare, have the weal and happiness of the people, 
advanced with the increase of the circumstantial prosperity?,” Coleridge asked, “Is the 
increasing number of wealthy individuals that which ought to be understood by the 
wealth of the nation?” In practice, Coleridge concluded, this gross calculus substituted 
the “wealth of the nation” for the “well-being of the people,” ultimately leaving Britain 
with neither.325 Only the “permanent, nationalized, learned order” of the clerisy rightly 
constituted the nation because it suffused the entire population with the idea of the 
“nation, considered as one body politic,” which acted as the “vital principle” of the state 
and without which its “vital functions” would fail.326 The clerisy developed the “seminal 
principle” of the nation’s particular body, aiding the “progressive development” of the 
“original germ” embedded in its constitution, and “transplanting” that “germ of 
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civilization” to every part of the country, so that every community had a “nucleus, round 
which the capabilities of the place may crystallize and brighten.”327 
During the first years of  in the Presbyterian church, Bushnell had served as a 
peace-maker between the Old and New School factions in Hartford. In his estimation, the 
schism distracted from the true work of the church. Now that the Presbyterian Church 
had closed down heterodox congregations and impaired the work of the American Home 
Missionary Society—seeming to fear the unfettered spread of the gospel, itself, even in 
its most ‘neutral’ iteration—Bushnell came out against its reactionary leadership and any 
“conservative” too cowed by interests to stand for truth. Adopting the Romantic model of 
national cultivation, Bushnell argued that a unified national spirit, inculcated through a 
system of national education and disseminated through the vasculature of a cohesive 
national culture, served as the one truly conservative force in a republic.  
Speaking three months after the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church 
met and a month before Congress convened its special session on US monetary policy in 
September 1837, Horace Bushnell identified the “present crisis” as a uniquely American 
challenge: a social disorder that grew out of the conjunction of materialism and 
democracy.328 In an address to the Phi Beta Kappa Society in New Haven on the 
“Principles of National Greatness,” he attributed the recent outrages against free speech 
and rational liberty to the national “deification of money,” which, he argued, fostered 
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fatal, fractal tendencies in their republican society.329 “Piety to God, and piety to 
ancestors, are the only force which can impart an organic unity and vitality to a state,” 
Bushnell declaimed, but America’s politicians had replaced the nation’s higher principles 
with the empty liturgy of political economy. In an effort to distract the people from their 
country’s over-whelming moral crisis and their own dwindling political freedoms, they 
perpetuated the destructive notion that the “good of the governed” could be measured in 
“money and possessions,” inaugurating a “new era of misgovernment.”330  
Following Adam Smith and his disciples, Bushnell argued, the people’s 
representatives increasingly focused their policies and public measures on questions of 
finance and trade, “as if property were the real end of statesmanship.”331 On one side, the 
Whigs advocated federal oversight, flexible credit, and a national bank, ascribing the 
pervasive sense of popular unrest to Loco Foco agitation for free trade, wealth 
redistribution, and social democracy. The Jackson-Van Buren party, on the other hand, 
blamed intrusive federal regulations, bank monopolists, and corporate abuse for causing 
both the current economic depression and public disaffection from national politics. In 
deifying the laws of trade, however, both of the dominant political parties turned the 
government into “a dead and brute machine,” reliant for its perpetuation on an ignorant 
populace likewise consumed by their own material interests. Trading on men’s greed and 
                                                 
329 Originally published as “An Oration: Pronounced Before the Society of Phi Beta Kappa, at New Haven, 
on the Principles of National Greatness, August 15, 1837,” in 1837. I will be using the page numbers from 
the identical version published in Bushnell’s collected works, Work and Play, Or, Literary Varieties, where 
he retitled the lecture, “The True Wealth or Weal of Nations.” Bushnell, Horace. An Oration: Pronounced 
Before the Society of Phi Beta Kappa, at New Haven, on the Principles of National Greatness, August 15, 
1837, (Herrick and Noyes, 1837); Bushnell, Horace. “The True Wealth or Weal of Nations.” In Work and 
Play, Or, Literary Varieties, (Scribner, 1866), 43–77. 
330 Bushnell, “The True Wealth or Weal of Nations,” 49. 
331 Bushnell’s address criticized an image of Adam Smith (and, particularly, the allusions that bankers and 
capitalists made to Wealth of Nations), but Smith’s actual writing aligned with Bushnell’s cause.   
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fear, American statesmen sanctified property as the sign of individual liberty, but liberty 
was not property, Bushnell declared, echoing the anti-slavery discourse, “Liberty is 
Justice Secured.”332 
For their part, the country’s “cultivated citizens” had forsaken their responsibility 
to making the people fit to rule. Alienated by their government’s mercenary policies and 
despairing of democracy, America’s religious and intellectual leaders had fled the 
nation’s barren “groves of paper cities,” seeking refuge in a “sickly and copied 
conservatism” that valorized the British state and constitution and reduced American 
literature to a flaccid imitation of British sources. These conservative intellectuals did not 
betray their country because they embraced conservatism, Bushnell clarified, but, rather, 
because they demanded “that which is radically opposed to [the state’s] fundamental 
elements, and which God and nature have sternly denied.” Rather than nurture a national 
literature that would “enthrone in the spirit and opinions of our people” the “true idea and 
settlement of liberty,” they reached the false conclusion that only a hierarchical social 
order could save the country. Grafting a borrowed nationality on their country, they 
inhibited the development of a distinctly American literature by which the nation might 
become “conscious of itself,” infused with a national spirit, and morally unified.  
In faulting popular government, religious revivals, and other disruptive parties, 
Bushnell said, America’s “conservatives” misunderstood the nature of the present 
conflict. American leadership failed in their “conservative attempts” not because the 
American people were inherently unworthy or because they needed hierarchical forms to 
inspire their “public devotion,” but because their principles were too low. Neither 
                                                 
332 Bushnell, “The True Wealth or Weal of Nations,” 49, 61, 68, 72, 74. 
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democracy nor fanaticism caused the present crisis—materialism did. Without an 
educated class to guide them, or a national culture to inspire them, the people succumbed 
to the “miserable delusion” that their welfare could be measured by the number of their 
possessions. Bushnell called this “dead consumption” of material goods a “great cancer 
of destruction” on society, which he claimed originated in the “corruption of quality in 
the people.” Meanwhile, the ceaseless pursuit of material wealth transformed the 
republic’s representatives into political mercenaries, who treated their countrymen as 
secondary to property and goods. They defunded general education, neglected the 
nation’s history, refused to invest in public monuments or national parks, and condoned 
popular violence against public intellectuals. A state should function “like a body whose 
breathing, pulsing, digesting, assimilative, and a hundred other, processes, all play into 
each other, in that wonderful reciprocity that makes a full-toned vital order,” Bushnell 
said, but a “state torn from its beginnings is fragmentary.” Having devoted itself to 
material production, it was an incomplete creature, a body with only one function, its 
men reduced to mere copies of each other. “Incapable of public love, or of any real 
nationality,” it lacked the principles for national greatness.333 
Reflecting on the state of American society, Bushnell, like Coleridge, asked: what 
is the definition of the “wealth of a nation” that included its “weal, or solid well-being?” 
Bushnell identified the national wealth as “personal, not material,” measured by the 
“natural capacity, the industry, the skill, the science, the bravery, the loyalty, the moral 
and religious worth of the people,” and not in goods or gold.334 Since the founding, 
Bushnell recalled, the “germs of a mighty nation” had manifested in its law, industry, 
                                                 
333 Bushnell, “The True Wealth or Weal of Nations,” 68. 
334 Ibid., 51.  
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power, and territorial expansion. To propel the country to true national greatness, 
however, the state would have to invest in the “personal value” of its people, whose 
“highest treasures as a state, they behold in capable and manly bodies, just principles, 
high sentiments, intelligence, and genius.” True statesmen nurtured their people’s natural 
abilities and organized the population according to their various capacities—determining 
“who shall be the directing head” and who the “nerves of action”—ultimately compacting 
all of the people into “one energetic and stately body inspirited by public love.” As 
Coleridge had, Bushnell clarified his point with an example from organic life: “It is a 
well known principle of physiology,” he said, “that cultivation, bodily and mental, and all 
refinements of disposition and principle do gradually work, to increase the native volume 
and elevate the quality of a people.” Because this process of cultivation occurred 
gradually over the course of generations, it opened up a “truly sublime” opportunity for 
American statesmen to implement practical policies directed at “ennobling” their 
country’s “stock.” For example, Bushnell suggested restricting immigration to “races in 
the higher ranges of culture and character” and enforcing morality by outlawing 
corrupting vices that “poison the blood of the nation” (like drunkenness).  
Ultimately, however, if they wished to perpetually revitalize the “whole body of 
the state,” they must find a way to enter the “seat of the soul’s regency,” and establish 
“order and principle” in each individual’s conscience, from which a “conservative and 
genial power” could flow to every faculty, disposition, bodily habit, employment, and 
enterprise. Abandoning their “mercenary and merely economical” policies, they must 
concentrate the state’s resources on suffusing the spirit of religion through the nation, 
building a system of national education for the country’s youth, and, central to both, 
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nurturing a national literature. Although the United States lacked a unifying established 
religion in the traditional sense, Bushnell claimed that a national culture would inspire a 
religious faith in the nation, making religion “virtually incorporate in the principles and 
feelings of the people.” He imagined a truly American “voice of faith” echoing in the 
country’s colleges and universities, in a “spirit of public devotion,” inspiring the “special 
culture” that befitted a “republican nation.” At its heart, Bushnell described an “American 
and characteristic” national literature that would inscribe the “American mind wrestling 
with itself,” powerful enough to overwhelm “demagogues and factions” and expose 
abuses. This distinctly American nationality was the only elemental force strong enough 
to counteract the deadening effects of slavery. Borne on the “high waves of revolution” 
and “reclining at peace in the establishment of order and justice,” it would engage with 
the “fearful questions” that slavery engendered, “deriving lessons of wisdom from the 
conflicts of experience.” Acting as both liturgy and catechism, this literature would instill 
a national faith based in the “true doctrine of civil freedom” that conjoined liberty with 
justice. Bushnell predicted that the country’s literature would eventually substantiate the 
foundational truth that “Liberty is Justice Secured” and establish its permanent authority 
(e.g., through a constitutional amendment), finally raising the nation to the same level as 
the divine government, “which knows no liberty other than law,” and fixing it forever on 
the rock of immortal principle.335 
Bushnell insisted that the anti-national and “law-and-order” types were spreading 
a “sickly and copied conservatism” contracted from reactionary British and European 
models. Under its influence, these “false” Conservatives repressed the only truly 
                                                 
335 Bushnell, “The True Wealth or Weal of Nations,” 70, 72-74. 
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conservative forces of a republican society: its literature, its intellectual discourse, and its 
beautiful arts.336 In contrast with this “morbid spirit of conservatism,” these social 
reformers claimed to represent the “true Conservatives” of the American revolutionary 
promise, acting in the interests of the republican principles that alone would constitute a 
“perfect” or “true” society—that is,  “a society which has for its end, the welfare of its 
individual members, and the preservation of its unity among the nations.” Explicitly 
adapting British and German romantic thought, they sought to propagate a unified 
national culture that would organically topple the slave-holding regime.337 Yet, the 
romantic and sentimental intellectual tradition that these reformers marshalled to make 
this argument presumed that “national greatness” required habitual, historical, cultural, 
and biological homogeneity. Consequently, Bushnell replicated a normative model for 
organic statehood that privileged certain physiological and behavioral characteristics as 
markers or prerequisites for national belonging. Fundamentally, in their texts, white 
(preferably Anglo-Saxon) Christian males comprised the presumptive organic parts of the 
aspirational American nation. Ultimately, then, they reinforced the exclusionary organic 
premises that circumscribed the emancipatory potential of American politics. 
Meanwhile, in his scathing 1838 critique of “modern conservatism” in America, 
“Who are the True Conservatives?,” Nathaniel W. Taylor’s son-in-law, Congregational 
                                                 
336 Ibid., 72-74. 
337 For the US reception of German and British romantic thought in this period, see: Kurt Mueller-Vollmer, 
Transatlantic Crossings and Transformations: German-American Cultural Transfer from the 18th to the 
End of the 19th Century (Lang, Peter GmbH, 2015); Kurt Mueller-Vollmer, The Internationality of 
National Literatures in Either America: Transfer and Transformation (Wallstein Verlag, 2000); Buckley, 
“The Bostonian Cult of Classicism: The Reception of Goethe and Schiller in the Literary Reviews of the 
North American Review, Christian Examiner, and the Dial (1817-1865)”; Michael O’Brien, Conjectures of 
Order: Intellectual Life and the American South, 1810-1860 (Univ of North Carolina Press, 2004), 692-
701-1046; Michael O’Brien, Rethinking the South: Essays in Intellectual History (University of Georgia 
Press, 1993), 54–111. 
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minister, moral philosopher, and future president of Yale University Noah Porter 
condemned every one of “the conservatives of order and orthodoxy” who had taken it on 
themselves to police American society.338 The problem with American conservatism, 
Porter argued, was that the language itself gave “self-styled Conservatives” license to do 
more harm in the name of conservatism than the radicals had ever done in the name of 
reform.339 Having imported “conservative” philosophy without attending to its particular 
application, these men cultivated a “morbid spirit of conservatism,” nurturing a temper 
“destructive of our institutions,” and “at war” with the “American spirit.” Citing the 
“great master” of conservatism, Edmund Burke, Porter clarified that “True 
Conservatives” did not create new models or break up theories, but, instead, attached 
themselves to all of the habits, local attachments, associations, and religious forms that 
shaped a people and followed their natural development. In resisting change “under the 
name of conservatism” in a nation founded on the principle of innovation, he argued, 
these “false” conservatives “made void the law of God.” Even more than those activists 
who agitated for abolition and other social reforms, these men who claimed to be “the 
only conservatives of order and orthodoxy rather deserve the name of the destructives.” 
340  
                                                 
338 Porter wrote the article anonymously; it was attributed to him posthumously. G.S. Merriam, Noah 
Porter: A Memorial by Friends, (New York: C. Scribner’s sons, 1893), 291. 
339 In the 1838 Quarterly Christian Spectator, Porter sketched the general features of those men who “claim 
to be, but are not, true conservatives in politics, literature, and religion.” In general, he wrote, they were 
timid, indolent, inactive, fond of paradoxes, oppositional, harsh in judgment, unsympathetic, and 
unforgiving. Bigotedly attached the olden times, he wrote, they extolled the ancients with indiscriminate 
praise, and condemned the present, innovation, and any improvement, explanation, or addition to ancient 
scholasticism. Content with a state of subservience to merely literary influences, they failed to master them.  
340 Porter, Noah. “Who Are the True Conservatives?” The Quarterly Christian Spectator X (1838): 608-
610, 614-615, 621, 627.  
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These “Conservatives” were not simply bad Americans, Porter argued, they were 
bad Conservatives. Their attempt to transplant foreign conservatism opposed “every 
principle of conservative doctrine,” down to the very name. While an English 
Conservative in Great Britain “contends for something which he would save,” Porter 
explained, his American imitators set out to destroy and then re-construct on the English 
model.341 Disengaging from their communities, these “subservient copyists” ignored the 
wisdom espoused by “all the Doctors of Conservative Law”—that institutions must be 
saved in their present form because they already exerted a strong hold on the people’s 
affections.342 Porter warned his audience that the greatest danger to the church and to 
American society, at large, did not come from the “disorganizers”—“a few scores of 
perfectionists, who have appeared but for a week”—but from this false conservatism that 
“severs the unity of the spirit and breaks the bond of peace.”343 Forced into “a short-lived 
existence by artificial influences,” this foreign species of conservatism would inevitably 
wither in the United States, but not before exerting a destructive influence on American 
society. 
In the article, Porter called out the Old School, anti-abolitionist authors of the 
Presbyterian schism by name, decrying them for their bigoted, un-American attachment 
to the past. Men like Robert J. Breckinridge, who spear-headed the attack on the New-
School ministers during the General Assembly, and Bennet Tyler, who antagonized 
Porter’s father-in-law in New Haven and worked to marginalize the New-School 
                                                 
341 In addition, he argued, they would basically import British party politics. Ibid., 627. 
342 Ibid., 606. 
343 Further, Porter made frequent reference to seventeenth-century Puritan Richard Baxter in what was 
plausibly an elliptical allusion to the anti-abolitionist Old School leader George Baxter, whom he did not 
name explicitly.  
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theology, “love the past better than the truth,” and “antiquity better than the progress of 
the kingdom of Christ.”344 Such men could not be considered “the True Conservatives” of 
the country’s civil or religious order, he wrote, because “this class of men were not even 
the True Conservatives of the Presbyterian church.”345 Though they presumed to speak 
for the Edwardian tradition, their every act negated the “New England spirit” in which 
Jonathan Edwards laid the foundation for the American church. According to Porter, 
Edwards privileged investigation and toleration, and devoted his entire life to shed “new 
light” on the question of man’s agency and God’s moral government. The “pretended 
conservatives,” on the other hand, silenced new inquiries and open theological 
discussions, going so far as to excommunicate men because they dared update their 
language. In open violation of Jonathan Edwards’s spirit, these men embodied “a spirit 
which under the name of conservatism has, in every age of the world, made void the law 
of God.”346 
Still, Porter observed, the fact that “the word conservative” had so effectively 
penetrated and suffused the American lexicon indicated that it served some purpose 
beyond the merely instrumental. The “frequent use of a new term” he noted, always 
signaled “some movement in the minds of those who receive and give it currency.”347 In 
                                                 
344 “Their spirit is not the spirit which has breathed into that church its life and vigor and generous 
growth…Their works testify of them, for they are works of destruction; and had to church been under their 
control before this, it would have been shivered asunder by their fulminating orthodoxy.” Porter, “Who Are 
the True Conservatives?” 614-615. 
345 Ibid., 614. 
346 Rejecting the present or any improvement, explanation, or addition to ancient scholasticism, Porter 
wrote, these “false conservatives” failed to even recognize the country’s true spirit, let alone conserve it. 
Wherever they went, he remarked, their methods brought ruin, undermined the country’s principles, and 
threatened to tear down its native institutions. They even sought to destroy the nation’s voluntary 
associations, the “very symbols of the New England character. Porter described the voluntary associations 
with the exact same language he identified with Burke’s characterization of conservative institutions earlier 
in the article. Ibid., 614, 616, 617, 621, 622, 632. 
347 Ibid, 602. 
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other words, to name a thing is to give it power; to take that name is to claim its power. 
Each system had its own conservative principles and forces, Porter explained. Ideally, 
conservatism kept a system in balance, countering destabilizing and extremist forces that 
naturally developed in any system. A society that developed from conservative principles 
would naturally tend toward stability; and if it fostered conservative forces, it could grow 
and change, without destroying itself.348 Like all societies, then, America needed 
conservatism, but it needed the right kind of conservatism: a unified, consistent, 
exceptionally American conservatism, cultivated organically from native sources, and 
tailored to America’s unique political and social system.  
With the country on the precipice of disaster, Porter proclaimed, the time had 
come for “True Conservatives” to step forward in the American spirit of innovation, 
investigation, and toleration.349 In the United States, he wrote, the “True Conservative” 
firmly held that, “he who aims not to improve upon the past, is a traitor to the cause of 
humanity, and a high-handed rebel against the course of God’s providence.”350 True 
Conservatives did not hole up in their private studies, reading dead texts and suffocating 
the spirit of religious revival in the United States, like the Old Light Congregationalists 
had, or shutter reform-minded churches, as the Old School Presbyterians had. Rather, 
                                                 
348 Cf. “moral law” and “moral progress” in Oshatz, Slavery and Sin: The Fight Against Slavery and the 
Rise of Liberal Protestantism, 78. 
349 In Porter’s estimation, the “True Conservative,” firmly held that, “he who aims not to improve upon 
past, is a traitor to the cause of humanity, and a high-handed rebel against course of God’s providence.”349 
The “True Conservative” lived and acted as a moral agent in the present, engaging with the national 
network of social and moral reformers. Instead of suffocating the spirit of religious revival in the United 
States, “True Conservatives” embraced the gospel’s “onward progress” to serve as a mechanism to promote 
man’s “highest well-being” and “perfect development.” They encouraged church ministers and lay 
members of all backgrounds to act as moral agents in society at large, forming voluntary associations for 
benevolent purposes and bringing the gospel into spheres where religion had not yet flourished, so that 
every member of a community had the opportunity for grace. 
350 Italics in the original. Porter, “Who Are the True Conservatives?,” 624- 625. 
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truly American Conservatives, having rejected the “morbid spirit of conservatism” 
imported from abroad, empowered church ministers and lay members of all backgrounds 
to act as moral agents in society at large, formed voluntary associations for benevolent 
purposes, and bringing the gospel into spheres where religion had not yet flourished, so 
that every member of the community had the opportunity for grace. They lived and acted 
as moral agents in the present, engaging with the national network of social and moral 
reformers. To accomplish this task, Porter directed his readers to the work of Richard 
Baxter, a seventeenth-century Puritan theologian understood in Porter’s time as an 
“abolitionist” who had vocally criticized the institution of slavery.351 Baxter would lead 
each one of them to become “a true conservative, indeed,” trusting in the gospel as the 
mechanism to promote man’s “highest well-being” and “perfect development,” secure in 
their faith that the gospel’s “onward progress” would lead them to a more perfect 
world.352  
On the surface, Bushnell and Porter presented themselves as the standard-bearers 
of an organic (and, therefore, legitimate) American conservatism that fortified the nation 
against radical change while facilitating its moral progress. Nonetheless, the language 
they used to articulate their claims situated them in the increasingly heated national 
conversation about slavery, abolition, and intellectual and civil freedom in the public 
                                                 
351 For an example of the contemporary treatment, see: Thomas Clarkson, The History of the Rise, 
Progress, & Accomplishment of the Abolition of the African Slave-Trade, by the British Parliament: By 
Thomas Clarkson, M. A.(London, 1808), especially 41, 92, 211  and the 1830 edition of Richard Baxter’s 
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352 Porter, “Who Are the True Conservatives?,” 633-637. 
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sphere. The anti-abolitionist censorship of public culture reflected the proslavery 
paranoia that a centralized intellectual and moral culture would indoctrinate the entire 
American community in antislavery ideology, particularly if the “New England spirit” 
and “New England morality” dominated.353 In this context, slavery inflected every 
conversation about cultural production and moral reform, even the advocacy of tent 
revivals and a free-range gospel. Like the proslavery camp, Bushnell and Porter operated 
on the premise that a unified national culture would reflect the dominant national spirit: if 
a spirit antithetical to slavery predominated, then the people, once assimilated, would not 
be able to abide its continued existence.354 In advocating a national cultural solution for 
social disorder, therefore, they promoted anti-slavery aims. By framing their arguments in 
the adjacent realm of moral discourse, however, they sidestepped the unambiguous 
danger attendant on those public intellectuals who voiced explicit opposition to the 
institution of slavery.  
Using coded language, they attacked the apparatus that artificially maintained a 
slaveholding republic without marking themselves as targets for anti-abolitionist 
violence. Though politicians and other prominent figures painted the North and South as 
two completely separate economic structures, social reformers increasingly described 
them as an integrated system, with northeastern merchant-capitalists financing and 
                                                 
353 Christopher C. Apap, The Genius of Place: The Geographic Imagination in the Early Republic, 
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profiting from southern slavery. In this discourse, the language of political economy—
e.g., “material wealth” and “finance and trade”—signified northern capitalists and 
indicted their complicity in slavery, and the argument for a unifying national culture 
signaled an attack on a system (slavery) that thrived only in a moral vacuum. Contending 
that the country’s focus on wealth at the expense of liberty posed the real threat to the 
country’s permanence and progress, Bushnell implicated both southern slave-holders and 
the northeastern capitalists and merchants who benefitted from slavery. From this 
strategic position, Bushnell implicitly attacked slavery as a national sin, buttressed by the 
mindless production of wealth and the mass consumption of material goods.355 Without 
directly addressing slavery (or any other controversial progressive platform), Bushnell 
and Porter advocated institutionalizing a national morality through a program of 
systematic moral reform that they presumed would lead to the end of slavery as an 
institution. A unified American spirit, grounded in the law of republican feeling and the 
practice of pure morality, would not suffer the systemic sin of slavery to live. 
Because Bushnell and Porter predicated their program of moral regeneration on 
an organismic ontology of the state, however they reproduced and, in some cases, 
scaffolded the very structures they critiqued.356 The organic framework served as the 
                                                 
355 I have chosen to use the term “national sin,” instead of “social sin,” which has been more commonly 
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basis for both radical and repressive political thought in the nineteenth century, but it 
tended toward social, cultural, and gender normativity, and organic exclusion. Like the 
pro-slavery and anti-abolitionist conservatives, these “progressive” conservatives 
presumed and incidentally promoted an organically homogenous and essentially 
hierarchical republic. The philosophical assumptions and tactics embedded in their 
organic metaphysics conspired to encode a normative organic marker in the structure of 
the American genome, producing a fundamentally discriminatory epigenesis expressed in 
the organization and hermeneutics of the American system, inscribed in its institutions, 
language, and politics. Although their texts may be read as a strategic intercession against 
slavery or on behalf of other progressive causes, therefore, they struggled to generate real 
(let alone radical or revolutionary) alternatives to the reactionary, capitalist, and pro-
slavery schema that dominated American culture and political economy in this period. 
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CHAPTER 3: HOW THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY GOT ITS NAME 
In the 1830s, a group of politicians formed the first Conservative party in 
American politics. Initially, the Conservatives maintained their identification with the 
Jackson-Van Buren administration, but eventually they severed ties, forming their own 
party. In 1840, they held the first “National Conservative Party Convention,” with 
William Cabell Rives, former ambassador to France and one-time star of the Jacksonian 
party, as their keynote speaker. The narrative of Rives’s political career appears to 
encapsulate the career of a nineteenth-century conservative: a moneyed pseudo-aristocrat, 
who, in opposing banking reforms, democratization, and States’ rights, resembled a 
“new-styled” federalist who wanted to maintain the privileges of the slave-owning class 
without sacrificing the Union. In the words of John M. Niles (a Jacksonian senator from 
Connecticut), Rives’s politics corresponded with the “present doctrines of the 
conservatives in all the Governments in Europe… advocates of arbitrary power, and of 
existing abuses, however flagrant.”357   
After leading the Conservatives to small federal and State victories in the late 
1830s and early 1840s, Rives joined the Whig party, traditionally considered 
“conservative” by political historians and political scientists.358 When the Whigs 
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dissolved in the 1850s, he identified as a Unionist. As threats of secession neared reality 
in 1860, Rives appealed to border State newspapers to maintain the Union, and even 
attended the impotent 1861 “Compromise Convention”—the “hope of the country” 
among “conservative men.”359 After Virginia seceded, he represented the Ablemarle 
district in the First and Second Confederate Congresses, and, when he resigned, he 
promised his constituents, “we shall still be bound together by common 
sentiments and common interests in the future as in the past. My constant prayer shall be 
to make that future as propitious and glorious as heart can wish. But whatever it be, I 
share it with you.” Echoing the opening to the biblical Book of Ruth, in which Ruth 
pleads with her mother-in-law not to abandon her, Rives pledged to his constituents, 
“Whither thou goest I will go; where thou lodgest I will lodge; thy people shall be my 
people, and thy God my God; and where thou diest I will die; and there will I be 
buried.”360 To that end, he represented Virginia at the post-war National Union 
Conservative Convention in 1866. When Rives died in 1868, the New-Orleans 
Commercial Bulletin compared him with Great Britain’s Robert Peel because, “Like Sir 
Robert Peel, he had the courage to change his political position, but like Sir Robert Peel, 
he preserved the personal respect of those who were most dissatisfied with his measures. 
                                                                                                                                                 
and Persistence in Social Structures (Transaction Publishers, 1960); Merrill D. Peterson, The Jefferson 
Image in the American Mind (University of Virginia Press, 1960); John Ashworth, “Agrarians” and 
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359 The weekly Portage sentinel. (Ravenna, Ohio), 27 March 1861. Chronicling America: Historic 
American Newspapers. Lib. of Congress; Cincinnati Enquirer, Feb. 13, 1861. 
360 Confederate States of America Congress, Journal of the Congress of the Confederate States of America, 
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Mr. Rives was always a Conservative.”361 
But was he?  
Rives was man who learned law and politics directly from Thomas Jefferson at 
Monticello; whom both Jefferson and James Madison considered a protégé and, later, a 
close personal friend; to whom Jefferson confided his private thoughts on the presidency 
and banking in the last decade of his life; and with whom Dolley Madison entrusted her 
husband’s legacy after Madison’s death in 1836. Although Rives eventually accepted his 
association with the “Conservative party,” he refused to concede his rightful place as a 
“Republican” or as a devoted supporter of Andrew Jackson’s “liberal, beneficent, and 
statesmanlike” policies, even as the dominant forces in Jackson’s party made it clear that 
he no longer had a place among them. Acknowledging his split with the Jackson-Van 
Buren party in 1838, Rives said, “I do not know that there is anything in this name of 
Conservative, as applied to American institutions, which an American patriot ought to 
wish to disown.” As applied to American institutions, he argued, conservatism would 
preserve and defend Republican principles and practices against all “schemes of wild 
innovation and destruction.”362 In fact, Rives noted, in opposing Van Buren’s speculative 
Independent Treasury scheme—the proximate cause of his exile from the party—he was 
attempting to preserve something that Jackson, himself, had put in place (the State bank 
system). Rives may have led the first Conservative party in the United States, but he 
                                                 
361 Death of a Southern Statesman. New-Orleans Commercial Bulletin (New Orleans, Louisiana),Tuesday, 
May 12, 1868; Issue 113. Category: Editorial. Gale Document Number:GT3007844217 
362 Speech of Mr. Rives, Of Virginia, In Senate, February 5 and 6—In opposition to the Sub-Treasury bill 
and in support of his substitute,” Appendix to the Congressional Globe 25th Congress 2nd Session, 5th 
February, 1838, 610 
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accepted that label conditionally, identifying it as American and explicitly rejecting 
foreign conservative ideologies. 
Rives’s politics had been deeply influenced by European political thought, but 
not the kind of thought that contemporaries considered “conservative.” When Rives 
served as the American minister to France from 1829 to 1833, for example, he became 
close friends with General Lafayette, who operated as the epicenter for a diverse group of 
reformers, radicals, and international intellectuals.363 In 1831, he joined Samuel Morse 
and James Fennimore Cooper in the American Polish Committee, raising money for the 
Polish revolution, and even interceded on behalf of reformer and abolitionist Samuel 
Gridley Howe when that habitual revolutionary found himself tucked away in a Prussian 
prison. Through General Lafayette, Rives became acquainted with radical utopians 
Robert Owen and Fanny Wright, socialists Charles Fourier and his disciple Albert 
Brisbane, and liberal republican Benjamin Constant.364 Their writings informed his 
politics and inflected his speeches for the duration of his career. As president of the 
                                                 
363 Indeed, Rives and his wife were staying with Lafayette at his chateau when the General received news 
of the second French revolution. On the evening of Tuesday, July 26, 1830, William Cabell Rives chatted 
quietly with the Marquis de Lafayette when a party returned from town with a message from Lafayette’s 
granddaughter: “The Chamber of Deputies is dissolved. The law of Elections changed. The liberty of the 
press is suspended.” General Lafayette rushed to Paris the next day and, on July 28th, Rives and his wife 
followed. They entered Paris after dark and made their way past the barricades through the “blank and 
desolate” streets, the streetlamps “strewed in fragments on the pavements.” In a letter to her sister, Judith 
Walker Rives described a lone gunman standing on the Pont d’Austerlitz bridge, a musket in one hand and 
the tricolored flag of rebellion in the other. She wrote, “The roar of the artillery and musketry mingled with 
the incessant and ominous sound of the tocsin, and even the distant cry of the multitude reached our ears. 
All night this continued." The next morning, the Marquis de Montaigne, a royalist who had survived the 
first French revolution, suggested to the Riveses that they raise the American flag in front of the house, “as 
some protection from those lovers of liberty.”  By nightfall, General Lafayette had restored order, taking 
his place as the head of the Provisional Government and as Commander-in-Chief of the National Guard. 
Four days later, on August 2nd, King Charles X and his son abdicated their right to the throne. On August 
9th, Foreign Minister Rives smuggled Washington Irving into the Chamber of Deputies to witness the Duke 
of Orlean’s accession to the throne as King Louis-Philippe. Asked about the absence of his tricolor ribbon, 
Rives responded, “C’est dans mon coeur.” [French: It is in my heart] 
364 Kramer, Lloyd. Lafayette in Two Worlds: Public Cultures and Personal Identities in an Age of 
Revolutions. University of North Carolina Press, 1999. 
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Albermarle (VA) Agricultural Society, he drew inspiration from Robert Owens’s socialist 
model of voluntary association, encouraging his listeners in an 1842 speech to consider 
their meetings a “community of goods,” in which everyone contributed their experiences 
and observations to a “common stock for the benefit of all.” No one should be content 
merely to preserve the status quo when, by the communal refinement of their intellectual 
and manual labor, they could enjoy a constant “progressive improvement” of their 
conditions. To that end, he called on his audience to look to Swiss reformer Philipp 
Emanuel von Fellenberg, whose work in the field of education with Swiss romantic 
Johann Pestalozzi produced “prodigies of moral and physical improvement.”365 In his 
1847 “Discourse on the Uses and Importance of History,” a speech comparing the 
American and French Revolutions delivered to the Historical Department of the Society 
of Alumni of the University of Virginia, he drew liberally from radical Joseph Priestley’s 
“Lectures on History.” He warned his readers against adhering to or maintaining the past 
in all things, “without change or alteration,” and encouraged them, instead, to allow 
history to lift them from “the narrow vale of familiar and parochial associations” and 
“enlarge and liberalize” their minds. “In all wise plans for the amelioration of the 
condition of man,” he said, “the past must furnish the fulcrum, at least, upon which the 
lever of improvement is to be planted.”366 If anything, Rives’s personal relationships and 
                                                 
365 Pestalozzi’s educational theory also served as the basis for Fichte’s model of national education in his 
Addresses and for Bronson Alcott and Elizabeth Peabody’s Temple School in Boston, MA, that and 
mentioned in chapter two. (The Farmer’s Monthly Visitor (Wm. P. Foster, 1841), 8, 9; David James, 
Fichte’s Social and Political Philosophy: Property and Virtue (Cambridge University Press, 2011), 188.) 
366 A life-long member of the American Colonization Society, among his other unpalatable associations, 
and outspoken against slavery in a period when southerners doubled down behind Calhoun’s “new school” 
proslavery, Rives could never quite break free of the charge that he was part of a cabal of southern 
abolitionists, an indictment confirmed for many when his son, William Cabell Rives, Jr., married Grace 
Winthrop Sears, daughter of Boston philanthropist and abolitionist David Sears. (See: Ford, Lacy K. 
Deliver Us from Evil: The Slavery Question in the Old South. Oxford University Press, 2009., 526-527.) 
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acknowledged influences connect him with Jeffersonian republicanism and the growing 
socialist tradition, not with people and sources traditionally considered “conservative.”  
Rives’s affiliation with European socialists, reformers, and radical utopians 
raises the question of what, if anything, made him a conservative, and, if he was, what 
that might mean in the early American republic. The Conservatives discussed in this 
chapter represented a political movement from within Jackson’s party who argued that 
Van Buren’s policies diverged too much from Jackson’s republican precedent. 
Examining the role that Conservatives played in this period, then, reveals the instability 
and incoherence of party politics in the 1830s, and calls into question the taxonomy of 
American parties and their express identification with particular ideologies.  
PARTY NAMES: A LONG STRING OF ET CETERAS367 
The story of Conservatives in America traces a mode of thought and discourse, 
but it is also a story of names and the way that language shapes and obscures politics. In 
the rare cases when the secondary literature refers to the 1830s Conservatives, it most 
often labels them “conservative Democrats,” a name that implies that they represented 
the conservative wing of the Democratic party. This convention reflects an implicit value 
judgment on the relative liberality or democratizing tendencies of their political stances, 
compared with some aggregate measure of Democratic party norms. Yet, the 
Conservatives held their positions against what they viewed as the party’s illiberal 
tendencies, particularly Van Buren’s move to consolidate federal banking under the 
executive branch, and the anti-monopolist pressure to move from a mixed currency to 
gold. When Rives and his cohort opposed Van Buren’s Independent Treasury Bill in 
                                                 
367 “Party Names.” Niles Weekly Register 13 Sept 1834. 
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early 1837, they did so in an effort to preserve the banking reforms that Andrew Jackson 
had instituted only eighteen months earlier—reforms that had been lauded as 
emancipatory and democratic when Jackson implemented them.368 Unlike the Whigs, 
then, who amalgamated as a party against Andrew Jackson, the “Conservatives” 
remained loyal to him, even as they grew increasingly hostile to Van Buren. This 
confusion over the relationship between names and ideologies developed out of the 
period’s use of party names as demarcation lines, political tools, and machines of 
adherence (and consent.)  
Historiographical convention traces the Democratic party itself back to Andrew 
Jackson’s election in 1828, and his ascension to the presidency did mark a tidal shift in 
the democratic tenor of political rhetoric. For the first time, “the choice of a free people” 
had appointed the president—at least, according to the first line of Jackson’s first 
inaugural address. In contrast, Washington had been “summoned by his country” (twice.) 
Adams obliquely attributed his election to “the sagacious injunction of the two Houses.” 
Jefferson’s “fellow-citizens” twice assigned the presidency to him, and Madison’s 
country called him to this station in 1809 and “placed” him in it in 1813. Monroe’s 
“fellow-citizens” called him in 1817 and renewed their confidence in 1821. And John 
Quincy Adams, in 1825, having lost both the popular and electoral vote, acknowledged 
that he had been “afforded the opportunity” of the presidency by “peculiar 
circumstances,” and accepted “the station to which [he] had been called” in passive 
                                                 
368 The Congressional Record, newspaper articles, speeches, and letters from the period referred to Van 
Buren’s 1837 proposal for a new banking system as the “Independent Treasury” system or scheme, and the 
“Sub-Treasury” system or scheme, among other shorthand and derisive titles. For simplicities sake, I will 
use “Independent Treasury” as the modifier unless fidelity the source requires otherwise, and vary the noun 
(e.g., scheme, system, bill) depending on the context. 
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voice. Whereas John Quincy Adams’s inauguration address dedicated his presidency to 
upholding the Constitution, Jackson’s held him accountable first and foremost to the 
people, promising to reform the federal government primarily through limiting its reach 
and reducing its size. The implication was that the entire people had elected Jackson, 
whereas only elites had elected his predecessors, and that Jackson would serve the entire 
people, and not just the dictates of partisan interests (as, Jackson insinuated, John Quincy 
Adams had.) 
Still, although many of Jackson’s followers aggressively identified their party 
as the “Democratic party” and the only repository of democratic principles, the historical 
record does not reflect either this nominal clarity or ideological coherence.369 Starting in 
the 1820s, Van Buren projected New York’s machine politics onto the national scene, 
building an institutional and bureaucratic infrastructure that could successfully negotiate 
national elections, and navigate the dynamic between federal, State, and local political 
success.370 National party conventions became normative by the 1840s, an institution—
combined with an exponential boom in newspaper coverage—that rationalized and 
ossified party names. But these conventions and the existence of unified national parties 
were not axiomatic in the 1830s.  
                                                 
369 Daniel Walker Howe adroitly summarized this issue in What Hath God Wrought: “The campaign for the 
presidential election of 1828 lasted the whole four years of John Quincy Adams’s administration. 
Eventually defenders of the national administration started calling themselves “National” Republicans, 
while the supporters of the man who claimed the popular mandate called themselves “Democratic” 
Republicans, later simply “Democrats.” The terms came into use only very slowly. For Adams and his 
followers, to recognize the emergence of partisanship was to confess failure. Jackson and his followers saw 
themselves as the legitimate Jeffersonian Republican party and referred to their opponents as a corrupt 
clique of “federalists.” Accustomed as we are to a two-party system, we seize upon labels that 
contemporaries hesitated to employ. By the time the new party names gained acceptance, the election was 
over.”  Howe, Daniel Walker (2007-09-29). What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 
1815-1848 (Oxford History of the United States) (275). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition. 
370 Daniel Walker Howe, What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815-1848 (Oxford 
University Press, USA, 2007), 241. 
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Through the 1830s, Jackson’s party took a heterogeneous approach to their 
party’s name. When Jackson’s allies held their first national convention in Baltimore in 
May of 1832, for example, they published the proceedings as the record “of a convention 
of Republican delegates.”371 Three years later, in 1835, the Globe reported on the 
“National Democratic Convention at Baltimore,” but the party itself submitted the 
“Proceedings of a Convention of Delegates appointed by the Democratic 
Republicans.”372 In their speeches, the delegates themselves used “Democratic,” 
“Republican,” and “Democratic-Republican” interchangeably. On May 23rd of that year, 
that same group informed Van Buren that the “National Republican Convention” had 
nominated him for the presidency. Even Andrew Jackson treated the party’s name with 
fluidity. In a letter to James K. Polk later that year, he renounced the “once Democratic” 
Tennessee apostates from the “republican fold” who had refused to send their delegates 
to the “republican national convention.”373  
An 1834 editorial in the Niles Weekly Register titled “Party Names” complained 
that this heterogeneity placed an undue burden on newspaper publishers, especially when 
speaking of elections, since their readers mostly wanted to know which party prevailed. 
Unfortunately, the dominant party seemed pleased to take a “personal name” and call 
themselves “Jacksonians… or “Jackson-democrats,” with a long string of et ceteras,” but 
they had not made clear what appellation they preferred to be called in print. To further 
                                                 
371 My italics. In contrast, in 1840, the party published the “Proceedings of the National Democratic 
Convention.” Claflin, Alta Blanche. Political Parties in the United States 1800-1914: A List of References. 
New York public library, 1915, 36. 
372 Francis Preston Blair and John C. Rives, eds., Extra Globe (City of Washington: Blair, 1835), 1. 
373 Tennessee nominated Hugh Lawson White to run as an opposition candidate to Van Buren. Usually, 
historians describe his party as Whigs, but they tended to call themselves the “White party” and considered 
themselves democrats. James Knox Polk and Wayne Cutler, Correspondence of James K. Polk: 1835-1836 
(Univ. of Tennessee Press, 1975), 191.  
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confuse matters, the administration’s supporters were called by the same general name, 
but the parts of the party—the “Jacksonmen” and the “Jackson-Van-Buren-men”—had 
very different objects and ends in their political view-finder. The Niles defended the right 
for all parties to call themselves by whatever name they pleased, but chastised them for 
using party names to score political points. Serendipitously, the whig-friendly Niles 
Register explained, “as if by universal consent,” all parties opposed to the administration 
had independently taken the name “whigs,” but they had no right to call the Jacksonians 
“tories;” and the administration party—be they “democrats” or “Jackson-democrats” or 
“Jackson-Van-Buren-Wolf- democratic-republicans”—had no right to denominate their 
opponents as “federalists,” “apostates,” or “bank men.”374  
Two years later, the New Hampshire Patriot and Gazette, the pro-
administration paper run by New Hampshire Governor Isaac Hill, also published an 
editorial titled “Party Names,” protesting the practice of calling the dominant party “Van 
Buren men, Jackson men, and administration men” or “having any other name attached to 
the individuals of the democratic party than that of democrats.”375 Hill published the 
article on “Party Names” during the month-long period from November 3rd to December 
7th, 1836, when popular voting remained open for the presidential election, and four 
different opposition candidates opposed Martin Van Buren. During the election, anti-
administration papers habitually refused to call Van Buren a “democrat,” instead 
addressing their criticism to the “Van Buren ticket” or the “Van Burenites,” and 
                                                 
374 “Party Names,” Niles Register, September 13, 1834 
375 For simplicity’s sake, I attribute this essay to Isaac Hill, even though he may or may not have written 
this particular editorial, because the New Hampshire Patriot and Gazette conformed to his political agenda 
and the editorials were commonly perceived as his. "Party Names"- New Hampshire Patriot and State 
Gazette; 11-28-1836; V 3; Issue 113; P [2].  
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promoting their own candidates as the “Anti-Van Buren” ticket, the “People’s Ticket,” 
the “National ticket,” and, where applicable, the “Whig ticket.”376 Another anti-
administration New Hampshire journal, in quoting Governor Hill of the “Democratic” 
party added “(Van Buren?)” in parenthesis, as if they could not be sure to which party 
“Democratic” might apply, employing irony to signal the name’s inaptitude.377   
Governor Hill touched on this phenomenon himself when he suggested that the 
opposition take any name they pleased, since they have “disgraced and abandoned every 
name they have heretofore assumed,” but he insisted that they not impose any other name 
than that “which has ever designated the advocates of democratic principles.” As clearly, 
then, as he stated at the outset that the individuals of the democratic party must be called 
democrats, Hill concluded that, “the individuals of our party are democratic republicans, 
and ours is the democratic republican party, and nothing else.” At the very least, this final 
statement redounds upon the practice of referring to Jackson’s followers monolithically 
as “the Democratic party,” but it also speaks to the question of how party names 
functioned historically.    
Like the “Whigs,” who formed a party out of a coalition of anti-Jacksonians, 
Jackson’s party had formed out of a coalition of his supporters. Both groups suffered 
from relatively permeable boundaries, and lost allies when party leaders enacted concrete 
policies, and when the object of their (dis)affection left office. For a successful transfer of 
power in the 1836 election, the party had to have a transcendent and not an embodied 
name and that name had to be identified with Van Buren as closely as it had been with 
                                                 
376 “Burlington Free Press. (Burlington, Vt.) 1827-1865, October 14, 1836, Image 2,” October 14, 1836. 
377 “New-Hampshire Patriot; Gov. Hill’s; Ohio; Lost; Democratic; Van Buren; Georgia”; Portsmouth 
Journal of Literature and politics, published as The Portsmouth & Great-Falls Journal of Literature and 
Politics; 11-05-1836; vol XL VII; issue 45, 3. 
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Andrew Jackson. So, Hill’s “Party Names" declared, the dominant party were not “any 
man’s men,” (not merely Jackson’s men,) but were men of principle, who followed a 
cause: equal rights. Of course, anyone who opposed them opposed that cause, and those 
men willing to be “any man’s men”—as anyone who voted for the various opposition 
candidates running on independent ballots would have to be—abandoned democratic 
principles. The article declared the existence of a single Democratic party unified by 
principle and not by a man precisely because no such party cohesion existed. In fact, in 
spite of Hill’s refutation, even pro-administration papers continued to endorse the “Van 
Buren ticket” (in addition to the “Van Buren Democratic ticket,” the “Democratic-
Republican ticket,” and the “Republican ticket”), instead of the “Democratic ticket.”378  
To project a (nominally) uniform “Democratic party” back onto this period, 
then, implicitly privileges one group’s democratic bona fides over another, and marks all 
dissenters as expressly anti-Democratic and, by implication, anti-democratic. In his book 
on the Whig party, Michael Holt argues that party names serve as a “literary 
convenience” that have allowed historians to discuss loose coalitions of opposition before 
they cohered around a central organization or developed institutional loyalties.379 
Explicitly, Holt speaks to the convention of referring to all of Jackson’s opponents as 
“Whigs” or the “Whig party” before 1836, but the insight also applies to Democrats and 
the Democratic party. These names all served as arguments, as they ostensibly reflected 
                                                 
378 e.g., "Good News from Illinois." Daily Cleveland Herald [Cleveland, Ohio] 8 Nov. 1836: 
n.p. Nineteenth Century U.S. Newspapers.; "Election News." Globe [Washington, District Of Columbia] 12 
Nov. 1836: n.p. Nineteenth Century U.S. Newspapers.; Vermont Patriot and State Gazette [Montpelier, 
Vermont] 7 Nov. 1836: n.p. Nineteenth Century U.S. Newspapers.; “The North-Carolina Standard. 
(Raleigh, N.C.) 1834-1850, December 07, 1836, Image 3,” December 7, 1836; Hagerstown [Md.] Mail. 
"Democracy Again Triumphant!!!" Arkansas State gazette [Little Rock, Arkansas] 1 Nov. 1836: 
n.p. Nineteenth Century U.S. Newspapers.; "Democratic Republican Ticket."  
379 Holt, Michael F. (2003-05-01). The Rise and Fall of the American Whig Party: Jacksonian Politics and 
the Onset of the Civil War (Kindle Locations 1211-1218). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition. 
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the party’s ideology. Choosing one name, even as short-hand, naturalizes the argument of 
one part of one party about its ethos, and, as a result, falsifies the political and ideological 
history of the period. Not all of Jackson’s opponents considered themselves “Whigs” and 
not all of Jackson’s supporters considered themselves Democrats, or, for that matter, 
democrats. On the other hand, those politicians who opposed the “Democratic party” did 
not necessarily oppose “the Democracy,” in spite of the vitriolic partisan arguments to the 
contrary.  
Likewise, the Conservatives who emerged in the 1830s were not necessarily 
conservatives. As discussed in the previous chapter, some American politicians in this 
period embraced “conservative” as a descriptor of the types of policies or politics they 
pursued. Their self-identification as “conservatives” grew out of the connection between 
ideological conservatism and the organic approach to government. These men argued for 
a distinctly American conservatism that defended the fundamental structures of American 
government: in particular, States’ rights, popular suffrage, and democratic politics.  
At the same time, because the term had yet to become fixed politically, it also 
served as a general term of opprobrium lobbed between political factions. After the 
American conservative impulse became identified with the Conservative party in 
England, no one could avoid the sense of conservatism as an essentially foreign 
contagion, associated with international banking interests, capitalism, and state power, 
even if the content of Americans’ conservatism belied those associations. This usage 
developed from the American habit of denouncing the opposition as “Tories.”380 As the 
                                                 
380 e.g., “The Federal party would have heretofore considered the name of Whig a disgrace.” From the 
Wilmington People's Press The Globe (Washington, District Of Columbia),Friday, October 17, 1834; Issue 
109. Category: News. Gale Document Number:GT3012214852 
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Conservatives in Great Britain gradually took over the disintegrating Tory party after the 
1832 Reform Acts, “Conservative” gradually entered the American lexicon as an 
alternative (or addendum) to calling the enemy “Tory.”381  
The first national Conservative party in the United States did not arise because a 
group of men identified with an international conservative movement or universally 
recognized conservative principles. Instead, the “Conservative” party began as “some 
cant designation,” a name inflicted by the opposition to mock Van Buren’s party, and, 
ultimately, adapted to marginalize and control dissent within that party. None of the 
Conservatives ever shook the association with banking and capitalism generated during 
their opposition to the Independent Treasury. By and large, historians have accepted the 
characterization of their party authored by their opponents: that they represented a small 
group of capitalists who lashed out at their own party in order to protect their interests in 
the State banks.382 Otherwise, how would the “Conservative” label make sense? Yet, the 
Conservative party had no higher proportion of bankers or merchants than the 
administration or opposition parties, and—with the possible exception of the New York 
                                                 
381 Pro-Jackson papers calling the opposition “conservative”: “Read!—From an Intelligent Correspondent, 
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contingent—they did not hold their position against democratizing or egalitarian 
principles.383 In spite of partisan rhetoric, the Conservatives did not present a uniform 
front or a single set of interests. Instead, they coalesced around their position of dissent. 
Or, as it may be more accurate to say, the administration democrats who entered a 
position of dominance in the mid-1830s forced the newly unorthodox members of that 
party into a coalition as diverse as Jackson’s party had been at its inception. 
The first part of the story about how the Conservative Party got its name begins 
in New York, where local party politics set the stage for the dynamic on the national 
level. After a particularly violent election, “Conservative” members of New York’s 
Tammany party (the city’s wing of Van Buren’s political machine) resolved to put a lid 
on the manipulative aristocrats in the opposition. By the end of 1835, however, the 
“Conservatives” sought to muzzle the radical elements in their own party— in particular, 
a small group of men occupied with dismantling Wall Street, destroying banking, and 
restoring equal rights. In 1836, these New York “Conservatives” joined with a 
heterogeneous group of dissenters to oppose Jackson’s (and then Van Buren’s) more 
radical banking reforms. At its source, the Conservative apostasy emerged at the national 
level during the debates over State banks and the distribution of the federal surplus that 
began in 1836, swelled in the wake of Jackson’s Specie Circular, and then ruptured 
Jackson and Van Buren’s consensus party after the 1837 economic panic. 
                                                 
383 As the only state with a “Conservative” party before the treasury debates, New York tended towards a 
conservative-vs.-radical egalitarian binary in its political discourse. Tallmadge, for example, in his 
September 1837 speech on the subject, opposed the Independent Treasury as a “disorganizing,” 
“revolutionary” scheme, an act of “warfare against the banking institutions of the country” executed by 
levelers on Jacobinical terms. In the face of their “anti-bank” and “anti-social” doctrines, he defended the 
utility of the state banks. (53 Niles' Nat'l Reg. 155 (1837-1838) November 4, 1837) 
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The Conservative defection disrupted the balance of power in American 
politics, kicking off a “complete reorganization of the political elements of the 
country.”384 For the duration of Van Buren’s presidency, the Conservatives shifted the 
balance of power at the national and State level by siphoning votes and sympathy from 
the administration toward the Whig party. Without the Conservatives, the opposition 
would never have toppled the Albany regency or the Tammany machine in New York, let 
alone the Richmond Junto in Virginia. The Conservatives disrupted the party’s control 
over New York and Virginia’s national representation, and destabilized Van Buren’s 
carefully maintained political machine.385 As a result, the Conservative movement 
created the conditions for Van Buren’s fall in the 1840 presidential election. 
THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY, PART I: SOME CANT DESIGNATION  
The first Conservative party in the United States started with a riot. Actually, it 
started with several. In April of 1834, during New York City’s first popular mayoral 
election, a “gang of a hundred infuriated wretches of the Jackson party” tore down 
Independent Republican flags, invaded the Committee rooms, robbed them of their 
ballots, and, armed with knives, commenced an assault on the Independent Republican 
citizens trying to keep the peace.386 Jackson Tories and Jackson rioters flooded the Sixth 
Ward, where they delineated the “true spirit of Jacksonism… in characters of 
                                                 
384 Calhoun Letter to James Edward Calhoun. c. c. Washington, 7th Sept. 1837, J. Franklin 1859-1937 
Jameson, William Pinckney Starke, and John C. Calhoun, Correspondence of John C. Calhoun., 1900, 377-
378. 
385 In the Twenty-Sixth US Congress (1839 to 1841), New York’s opposition outnumbered the 
administration party for the first time since Andrew Jackson had taken office in 1827. Virginia repeated this 
phenomenon in the following Congress, where Virginia Democrats held fewer seats than their opposition in 
Congress and two opposition members served concurrently in the Senate for the first time since the 
beginning of the national government (taking the Democratic party’s Jefferson-Madison-Monroe lineage at 
face value.) 
386 Before 1834, the New York City Common Council appointed the city’s mayor.  
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BLOOD!”387 The New York Courier and Enquirer reported that Tories and Hessian 
mercenaries commenced a “reign of terror” in the Sixth Ward, that “the blood of Freemen 
has been shed; the Whigs have been assailed, trampled upon, and beaten to earth” by 
Tammany Alderman George D. Strong and his band of hired “BULLIES and 
ASASSINS.”388 The New York Spectator speculated that those who opposed Jackson’s 
war on the National Bank were marked, and asked, “has the exterminator of the 
Seminoles sworn in his wrath to hang the advocates of that institution, and placed halters 
around their necks, preparatory to execution?”389 Denouncing the shillelagh-wielding 
mobocracy, the Spectator called on every “candid and honorable man," who once 
marched under Tammany’s banners to rescue the city from those Tammany men seeking 
to prevent “the free expression of sentiment, and the free exercise of the right of 
suffrage—the last, best hope of American liberty” by resorting to violence.390  
In ideological and practical terms, the perception that New York Tammany 
democrats allied with British radicalism touched on a perennial phenomenon in New 
York politics. The Tammany leadership embraced the city’s radical elements only when 
the opposition party truly threatened to unseat “the party.” When they felt insecure about 
their electoral fortunes, they opened their doors to a group known alternately as the 
                                                 
387 “Bloody and Disgraceful Riots!.” New-York Spectator (New York, New York),Thursday, April 10, 
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York Spectator (New York, New York), Monday, April 14, 1834. Category: News. Gale Document 
Number: GT3003770245 
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“working men’s” or “equal rights” party. Influenced by British radical egalitarianism, this 
group was primarily pre-occupied with banking reform, bankruptcy laws, and labor 
practices, and they advocated free trade, hard currency, and opposed banks, in every 
form. Although instrumental in the 1829 and 1830 elections, they had gone to ground in 
the early 1830s. By 1834, however, they regained traction, particularly in the Sixth Ward, 
just as Tammany seemed to be losing influence. To get the working men’s votes, 
according to the opposition press, Tammany marshalled their proxies in print and on the 
street to spread vitriol against big banks and paper money, cynically riling up their 
constituents enough to draw blood on election day.391  
 “There are two sides to the story,” Jackson’s presses protested, and they 
offered a radically different account.392 The New York Standard blamed the opposition 
papers for “enflaming the passion of the multitude” in the lead-up to the election, setting 
the conditions for violence. On the first day of the election, they claimed, the merchants 
had taken the “unprecedented” step of closing their stores and dismissing their daily labor 
“for no other purpose than that of political coercion.” Abusing their position, anti-Jackson 
“task-masters” threw all of their forces into the sixth ward, forcing “thousands of 
individuals dependent for bread on the breath of their employers” to vote for their 
candidates.393 In spite of this “outrageous conduct of the aristocrats,” however, “the 
                                                 
391 "The Nominations." New-York Spectator [New York, New York], November 02, 1835.   
392 "New York Election." Floridian [Tallahassee, Florida] 3 May 1834: n.p. Nineteenth Century U.S. 
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393 As the New York Standard reported, “It is difficult to speak with patience of the scenes of riot, disorder 
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deep indignation against the promoters of lawless violence, the instigators to deeds of blood, who for their 
own selfish and unhallowed purposes, have excited more tumult than our inhabitants have....” From the N. 
Y. Standard”; The Globe (Washington, District Of Columbia), Thursday, April 17, 1834; Issue 263. 
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People’s candidate,” (Tammany’s Cornelius Lawrence) won over Knickerbocker Gulian 
Verplanck.394  
Though the sources diverged on the identity and political orientation of the 
aggressors, they agreed that the present political process bred violence and that the 
burden lay either with their elected officials to stop it. In the six months that intervened 
between the April 1834 and November 1834 elections, chronic violence (and a cholera 
outbreak) plagued the East coast. New York City hosted seven riots in this time period, 
and major riots occurred in Philadelphia (including an election riot in October 1834) and 
around Boston, culminating when an anti-Catholic mob burned down a convent in 
August 1834.395 
The Tammany political machine used this social unrest as an opportunity to 
distance itself from the more radically democratic members of their party and to appeal to 
“law and order” moderates, but they avoided implementing legislation that might alienate 
their baser elements. In June, the Tammany Mayor approved a special committee of five 
New York Alderman to investigate the conduct of election inspectors in the riotous 
mayoral election, but the summer passed without any resolutions. Meanwhile, several 
“law and order” Jackson men held meetings at Tammany Hall on strategies to maintain 
order during the next election cycle. Because of their interest in organizing a police force 
modeled after Conservative MP Robert Peel’s “bobbies,” this group identified as 
“Conservatives.” The pro-Jackson New York Evening Post, known for its advocacy of 
organized labor, praised this “great Conservative meeting” for neutralizing the effects of 
the wild and incendiary “Bank party,” which it had blamed for instigating the riots in the 
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first place. In September, this group of law-and-order “Conservatives” proposed that “all 
friends of public order” confine their “political exertions” to their own wards.396 The 
resolution passed New York’s Board of Assistants unanimously—“the democratic 
members voting in favor of it, of course”—but did not go so far as to provide the wards 
with the resources they might need to enforce them.397 They offered one resolution 
authorizing Mayor Lawrence to employ additional officers during the election, but 
“Every Conservative” on the Board of Aldermen voted against it, according to the N.Y. 
American (a Whig newspaper). It passed by a “pure Whig vote.” This duplicity proved 
the “real disposition of “the Conservatives” to keep the peace,” the N.Y. American noted, 
and should finally shutter their “Tory pretensions to uphold order and the law.”398 Thanks 
to the Whigs, the New-York Spectator reported in November 1834, the November 
election passed without bloodshed, riot, or row.399 
As the N.Y. American indicated, the predominantly Whig-affiliated opposition 
press in New York referred to the “law and order” Tammany men as “Conservatives,” 
but purely as ironic posturing.  For the opposition papers, the “Conservative” label served 
a dual purpose: it explicitly identified the Tammany Hall democrats with British politics 
and it gave them an easy hook to mock them. The Whig presses emphasized the 
distinction between calling the Jacksonians “Conservatives” in their reporting, and 
actually conceding that the Jacksonian “Conservatives” held legitimately “conservative” 
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principles or supported recognizably “conservative” politics. 400 As an editorial in the 
Spectator explained, “Jacksonism” and “Albany Regency-ism” resonated not with British 
Conservatism, but with the radicalism of Irish “Emancipator” Daniel O’Connell, who 
sought to overthrow England’s glorious institutions and destroy its constitution. In the 
present age, the Spectator continued, the “Conservatives” of every party contended with 
the “Destructives,” no matter what they called themselves. In Britain, the “real Whigs” 
and the “ablest and most liberal of the old aristocracy” had banded together as 
“Conservatives” to battle the “Demagogue-Whigs, the Trades Unions, and the Radicals.” 
In the United States, men with “whig” principles opposed the “hydra-monster of 
Jacobinism—or Jacksonism—for they are one,” as well as the “kindred isms of other 
countries.”401 In the context of international politics, the Jacksonians might reasonably be 
called “Tyrants,” the Spectator attested, because, like Tyrants, they encroached on the 
rights of the people through the free use of gold; or they might be called “Tory” because 
they challenged measures that allowed the mechanics, merchants, and workingmen to 
exercise their right to vote, just like the Tories in England. Because they openly 
associated with radicals and employed violent tactics to achieve their ends, however, the 
Jacksonians could only be called “Conservatives” in scare quotes.  
In response, the Jacksonian and Tammany presses began referring to the 
“falsely denominated” Whig party as “whig conservatives” because, they claimed, 
American “whig” politics mirrored European and British Conservative politics. These 
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“pseudo-whigs,” the argument went, adhered to the “same conservative political school” 
that banished Rogers Williams to the wilderness, and condemned witches and wizards to 
hang at Salem. These “whig conservatives,” intent on undercutting the popular will, 
imported the politics of England’s Conservative aristocracy to secure their “pecuniary 
interests” through control of the public purse. Like the British Conservatives, the 
“haughty” American Whigs used men of “obscure birth” and “vulgar manners,” such as 
Davy Crockett and George Poindexter, as their agents in securing place and power. These 
wily politicians exercised the “old and hackneyed means of corrupt governments,” 
promising that their laws would serve the people’s interests, making “money plenty for 
them, through the banks,” and constructing “great national roads” for their benefit. 
Instead, they saddled the industrious classes with unequal and indirect taxes, threw the 
burden of the State on them, and, in reality, increased the inequality in society.402  These 
ruinous policies slowly eroded the “real conservators of good order,” the farmers and 
mechanics of the north, who possessed the “major part of the wisdom, the wealth, the 
morality, and the religion of the country.” Moreover, as southern statesmen had observed, 
this partial and local legislation generated sectional division and jealousy, threatening the 
preservation of the Union, itself. These men might be considered “conservatives” in the 
sense of European reactionaries and British paternalistic aristocrats, the Globe declared, 
but “the conservatives of [the] Union are the Democrats.” All other parties, “under 
whatever name they may appear, are its enemies.” Anyone that opposed the Democrats, 
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as the Globe defined them, undercut the people’s independence and prosperity, damaged 
the vital interests of the States, and disordered the Union.403 
By the time the next New York City election rolled around, the Tammany 
democrats determined that the working men’s party had joined the ranks of these 
“disorganizers.” Like the other parties that opposed the “Democrats,” the working men’s 
leadership had the audacity to question their policies; in this case, challenging Tammany 
authority and pushing to move the party in a more radical direction. When Tammany had 
needed the working men’s votes in 1834, the Spectator observed, Tammany’s “master-
spirits” instructed their followers to “howl maledictions upon the banks, monopolies, 
chartered institutions and rag money.” As the Spectator recalled, “They were all agrarians 
then.”404 Now, Tammany had so successfully squelched the opposition that it seemed 
they no longer needed the working men. Without a common enemy to battle, the leaders 
appeared anxious to dispose of their former auxiliaries.405  
This noxious situation came to a head in the fall of 1835, when the Republican 
General Committee met at Tammany Hall to vote on their ticket for the imminent 
elections to the New York State Legislature. The Tammany men held the political power, 
but quickly found “King Numbers” against them.406 To pass a straight ticket, then, the 
Tammany “regulars” had to hold off and otherwise ignore the increasingly rowdy internal 
opposition. On the evening of October 29, 1835, the regulars met at Tammany Hall and 
attempted to vote on and announce their ticket before the “motley crew” of Radicals, 
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Rowdies, Fanny Wright Men, Agrarians, Infidels, and Ringtails rushed in and carried 
theirs.407 The chairman had just announced the official ticket when the “irregulars” 
captured the podium and set to nominating their own docket for the forthcoming election, 
replacing the “bank men” with anti-monopolists and equal rights activists. A 
confrontation ensued, the lights extinguished, and the well-prepared agrarians reached 
into their pockets and retrieved thousands of candles and newly-marketed lucifer 
matches—known in America as locofocos—thus igniting a riot and, subsequently, a new 
party moniker, the Locofocos.408 
Tammany’s official organ, the Times, blamed the “wild doctrines” of Fanny 
Wrightism, Agrarianism, and other egalitarian heresies for causing a completely 
unprecedented scene of turbulent and violent faction.409 The Times asked, “Has it come to 
this, that the rights of citizens are to be invaded, that the old democrats are to be driven 
from Tammany Hall by the exercise of brute force?” After years of vehemently denying 
its party’s aggressive tactics, the Times now turned against the newly minted Loco-Foco 
party as men who had come among them “under the mask of democracy” only to betray 
them “with lawless violence.” The Times denounced the entire proceedings as “illiberal, 
unjust, and undemocratic,” but the opposition press rushed to “vindicate the seceders, as 
                                                 
407 N. Y. Star. "Row at Tammany." United States' Telegraph [Washington, District Of Columbia], 
November 03, 1835.  
408 Fitzwilliam Byrdsall, The History of the Loco-Foco, Or Equal Rights Party: Its Movements, 
Conventions and Proceedings, with Short Characteristic Sketches of Its Prominent Men (New York: 
Clement & Packard, 1842); Lee Benson, The Concept of Jacksonian Democracy: New York as a Test Case 
(Princeton University Press, 2015), 94–97; Sean Wilentz, Chants Democratic: New York City and the Rise 
of the American Working Class, 1788-1850 (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 235–
36; Walter Hugins, Jacksonian Democracy and the Working Class: A Study of the New York Workingmen’s 
Movement, 1829-1837 (Stanford University Press, 1960), 5–6, 38–48; Edward K. Spann, Ideals and 
Politics: New York Intellectuals and Liberal Democracy, 1820-1880 (Albany: SUNY Press, 1972), 78–108; 
William Trimble, “Diverging Tendencies in New York Democracy in the Period of the Locofocos,” The 
American Historical Review 24, no. 3 (April 1919): 396, doi:10.2307/1835776. 
409 Niles’ Register, November 7, 1837, 164.  
 200
they are called—the agrarians—for their consistency.” Democratic doctrine indicated that 
all participants must be allowed to post their handbills and distribute their tickets. Surely, 
having promised democracy, Tammany could not now begrudge their followers’ 
resistance to their “undemocratic” process.410 The “disorganizers” had felt their own 
power, and the anti-Jacksonian Commercial Advertiser, for one, did not fault them for 
using it against their “former masters.”  
The split between the Tammany regulars and the Loco-focos gave new life to 
criticism of “the Democracy” as an unholy alliance between secret bank monopolists and 
radical insurgents.411 In describing the scene at Tammany, the New York Spectator 
alluded to popular narratives of the Jacobin-led Sans-Culottes march across Paris on June 
20th, 1792.412 “Singing and hooting, as erst their prototypes, the Poissardes and Sans 
Culottes,” the “radicals” turned on the “regulars,” that portion of “the Democracy” who 
like the French Girondin had tried to keep the people “in the dark.” Victorious, with loco-
focos ablaze, the radicals paraded the streets “to the tune of the Marseillois Hymn” and 
although they did not “bring any one to the lamp-posts [to hang] that night,” the 
Spectator predicted that the prospects for such a result “were exceedingly fair.”413 
Meanwhile, the Herald noted without surprise that the Times and its owner, Commercial 
Bank president and former Sixth Ward Alderman George D. Strong, had thrown off the 
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mantle of democracy. Last seen at the head of a hired band of “BULLIES and 
ASASSINS” leading a “reign of terror” in the Sixth Ward in 1834 riots, Strong had 
secured the Commercial Bank’s charter after the 1834 election, and could now afford to 
come out against the “poor, duped, humbugged workies, who oppose all banks.”414 The 
Tammany-controlled Times amplified the effect by editorializing against “disorganizers” 
who, according to its own report, comprised four-fifths of a purportedly democratic 
meeting. In anticipating that the election would effectually weed the party’s ranks of 
“interlopers,” “who have tried so long to force honest republicans into supporting their 
new-fangled doctrines,” the Times gave the distinct impression that the “old democracy” 
could only survive at the expense of the great mass of the people. During this election, 
the “democrats” merely revealed themselves to be the self-interested, hypocritical 
aristocrats that the opposition had always claimed they were. 
Having spent several years calling Tammany to task for its expressly 
unqualified embrace of “the Democracy,” the opposition press now gleefully recorded 
Tammany’s “ludicrous lament” against the devil it had raised. The Daily Advertiser 
described the symptoms of disaffection at Tammany Hall as the product of the “fever of 
the democracy.” In the eyes of the opposition, Tammany leaders merely reaped the 
discord they sowed; they could not now “unteach the doctrines they have taught.” When 
the Daily Advertiser described the scene as a confrontation between the Locofocos and 
those who adhered to “conservative doctrines,” they hit on a fissure that would ultimately 
splinter the party at the national level.415  
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In its undoubtedly instrumental critique, the opposition press voiced a real 
tension in the administration party between radical egalitarian and “regular” democrats. 
The anxiety expressed in pro-Tammany editorials conveyed a rising sense that the party 
was getting away from them, that a radical contagion had infected them and threatened to 
change the party into something unrecognizable. As usual, New York politics betrayed 
the early symptoms of a national divide: their rift heralded a greater rupture in Andrew 
Jackson’s party.416 Over the next half decade, “Conservatives” from within Jackson’s 
party united to counter the influence of Loco-foco democrats and to mediate their party’s 
banking reforms. As apostates from the “democratic” authority, they must be considered 
its enemies. Foreign conservatism had come to America.  
THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY, PART II: A NEW SCHOOL OF DIPLOMATISTS 
The consensus cabinet of Jackson’s early years had long given way to loyal 
Jacksonians and Van Burenite cronies, who combined to advance an anti-monopoly, 
metallic agenda.417 When the Twenty-Fourth US Congress had opened in December 
1835, the power in the administration party at the national level appeared to have shifted, 
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and these few hardline hard-money and anti-monopolist democrats seemed to exert an 
outsize influence on the thrust of party policy and the tone of political discourse. Van 
Buren’s protégé Silas Wright (of New York) and old Jackson stalwart Thomas Hart “Old 
Bullion” Benton (of Missouri) monopolized the Senate floor, and, after years of 
jockeying to be elected public printer to Congress, Francis Preston Blair and his Globe 
finally received the House commission during Congress's first week in session.  
Whereas the administration party once housed a recognizably republican 
coalition under its expansive tent, it now seemed to tilt towards those “American 
Democrats” who argued that federal banking and corporate legislation tended against the 
equality that naturally resulted from industry, skill, and economy, “free from all 
controlling power through the laws.” In a series of letters home during the first 
congressional session, John C. Calhoun observed, “a very great change” that transformed 
the “aspect, if not the condition, of parties.” He wrote that he first recognized the shift 
during the Senate’s deposit bill debates, when a conflict developed between the “real 
plunder and humbug” portion of the party, led by Senators Benton and Wright, and the 
more “honest” portion, represented by William Cabell Rives and Nathaniel P. 
Tallmadge.418 On one side, Benton and Wright “furiously opposed” the bill. On the other, 
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Rives and Tallmadge rose to its defense on the “old doctrines of the Republican party, of 
economy, retrenchment,” attacking the Senate’s extravagant appropriations and “Mr. 
Benton's gold Humbug.” In the Senate, at least, they had arrived “at a point at which it is 
difficult for these two portions to go on together much longer.”419 Calhoun had hopefully 
predicted Jackson’s party’s demise ever since Van Buren edged him out half a decade 
earlier, but, this time, the party infighting on the Senate floor, in partisan newspapers, and 
in local elections supported his claims.   
The 1836 presidential contest, in particular, strained the party’s inchoate 
ideology, exacerbating the tension in its ranks. Although it did not dominate American 
media, ideologically populist democratic rhetoric plagued the pages of the dominant 
democratic presses, from kitchen cabinet members Francis Preston Blair’s Globe and 
Isaac Hill’s New Hampshire Patriot to William Cullen Bryant’s New York Evening Post. 
The “secret language of party” subtly changed until being a member of the democratic 
party meant going for the “Benton yellow boys, and down with all monopolies.”420 These 
Democrats advocated, in the words of one proponent, a leveling “let-us-alone” policy, 
“predicated on the principle of disorganization.”421 
                                                                                                                                                 
a permanent schism. Ultimately, forty senators favored the bill, only four opposed it on principle: Wright, 
Benton, Felix Grundy of Tennessee, and Alfred Cuthbert of Georgia. (The other two senators who voted 
against the bill, John Black and Robert Walker, both from Mississippi, did so because their state 
constitution precluded their support.) At this point, any action Jackson took in reaction to the bill would 
only serve to accelerate the demise of his party. In spite of reports that Jackson, “furious,” threatened a 
veto, no veto came to pass. The law stood, but, as Calhoun observed, the damage was done. (Calhoun 
Letter to James H. Hammond. Senate Chamber 4th July 1836, J. Franklin 1859-1937 Jameson, William 
Pinckney Starke, and John C. Calhoun, Correspondence of John C. Calhoun., 1900., 362-363.) 
419 Calhoun Letter to James H. Hammond. Washington, 19th June 1836, J. Franklin 1859-1937 Jameson, 
William Pinckney Starke, and John C. Calhoun, Correspondence of John C. Calhoun., 1900., 359-361. 
420 “Benton yellow boys” referred to gold. Burlington free press. (Burlington, Vt.) 1827-1865. 24 June 
1836.  
421 In using the phrase “let-us-alone,” the Spectator alluded to free trade arguments advanced by the States’ 
rights party during the nullification crisis, which adopted its usage from similar arguments advocated on 
behalf of manufacturing interests in the early to mid-1820s. My second chapter goes into this debate in 
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Over the summer and through the end of the presidential election, the 
administration party cohered, even as Jackson and Van Buren pressed their appeal to the 
metallic and radical egalitarian democrats. In July of 1836, Jackson issued an executive 
order, colloquially known as the “Specie Circular,” which dictated that the public lands 
offices would only accept payment in metallic currency in order to protect aspirational 
homeowners from predatory land speculators pedaling debt.422 By August, the major 
newspapers reported that Van Buren and his running mate, Richard M. Johnson, had 
written flattering letters to the “General Convention of the Democratic party of the city 
and county of New York, in favor of Equal Rights and opposed to all monopolies.” For 
the opposition, these letters provided tangible evidence that Van Buren operated in the 
interests of the “New York Loco Focos—i.e., a mixture of the dregs of ultra democracy, 
agrarianism and infidelity.”423 The incident hit two of the opposition’s favorite Van 
Buren talking points: as an elite New Yorker, he was disconnected from real America and 
its interests; and as an extremist, he was unfaithful to America’s republican tradition. Van 
Buren’s letter hardly implicated him in utopian egalitarianism, and the Equal Rights party 
                                                                                                                                                 
more detail. The Spectator also clarified that the American system of government was predicated on the 
principle of disorganization: “all good men who believe in the perfectibility of society, or even in the use of 
education to improve our species, should ever pray that this disorganizing process may never cease, till 
mankind arrive at that point of moral and physical perfection, beyond which it cannot go. It is the very 
essential attribute of a self-governed people, to be always disorganizing for the purpose of reorganization.” 
(Communication. Spectator, The Globe (Washington, District of Columbia), Thursday, March 19, 1835; 
Issue 239. Category: News, Gale Document Number:GT3014150496; Communication. Spectator, The 
Globe (Washington, District Of Columbia), Friday, March 27, 1835; Issue 246. Category: News, Gale 
Document Number:GT3014150523) 337. 
422 In the debates and the press, Jackson’s executive order was more commonly known as the “Treasury 
Circular” or “Treasury Order,” and tended to be referred to as the “Specie Circular” in the opposition 
presses. I will use “Treasury Circular” and “Treasury Order” when I need to maintain clarity with the 
primary sources, and, otherwise, will use “Specie Circular” to keep in line with the historiography.  
423 The designation “the New York Loco Focos—i.e., a mixture of the dregs of ultra democracy, 
agrarianism and infidelity” came from the anti-administration Vermont Watchman, quoted in the pro-
Jackson Vermont Patriot and State Gazette in order to rebut its claims about Van Buren’s ultraism. (“Van 
has written a flattering letter to the New York Loco Focos.” Vermont Patriot and State 
Gazette (Montpelier, Vermont), Monday, August 08, 1836; Issue 32.)   
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themselves found it unsatisfactory, but the mere fact that he found it expedient to respond 
signaled their role as a legitimate interest that required attention.424 Van Buren’s 
inclination to publically address this party’s concerns corroborated the administration 
party’s transition toward more radical, egalitarian, and anti-capitalist policies. Over the 
next couple years, this affiliative adjustment would lead them to divest themselves of the 
more “conservative” members of their own party.425  
Jackson’s final annual message amplified this sense of ideological tension in 
Congress. In his past messages, he had spoken of monopolies, but never of capitalists, 
bloody revolutions, or the laboring classes. On December 5th, 1836, Jackson warned 
Congress that their current fiscal and monetary policy would inevitably lead to “one of 
those bloody revolutions which occasionally overthrow the despotic systems of the Old 
World,” and that paper currency led to the “ruin of debtors, and the accumulation of 
property in the hands of creditors and cautious capitalists.” The democratic presses 
praised his “benevolent views,” but the anti-Jackson Telegraph announced, “we have 
                                                 
424 The party had solicited a statement of principles from all the major contenders in the presidential 
contest. Van Buren’s letter caused an extended debate at the convention because the delegates found it 
“unsatisfactory” and several opposed its publication. In Fitzwilliam Byrdsall’s 1842 history of the party, he 
recalled, “It is very probably [Van Buren] intended it for a very conciliatory production; if he did, he 
entirely failed in his design, for it neither excited placable [sic] feelings towards himself, nor harmony 
amongst those to whom it was addressed.” (Fitzwilliam Byrdsall, The History of the Loco-Foco, Or Equal 
Rights Party: Its Movements, Conventions and Proceedings ... (Clement & Packard, 1842)., 55-56) Van 
Buren’s running mate, Richard Mentor Johnson, on the other hand, often accused of being an abolitionist, 
agrarian, and amalgamationist, wrote an impassioned reply to the party’s solicitation that won their 
unqualified plaudits. (For an example of the accusations against Johnson, see: “The Globe the other day, in 
enumerating the qualifications of Mr. Van Buren for the Presidency, says that one of his claims is based 
upon his private moral character, which they say, and which we cheerfully admit, to be 
unexceptionable.” Daily Cleveland Herald (Cleveland, Ohio), Wednesday, September 07, 1836; “Thoughts 
from the Arm Chair.” United States' Telegraph (Washington, District Of Columbia), Monday, August 01, 
1836. 
425 Donald B. Cole, Martin van Buren and the American Political System (Princeton University Press, 
2014); Joel H. Silbey, Martin Van Buren and the Emergence of American Popular Politics (Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2005); Wilentz, The Rise of American Democracy, 2006, 457–60; John Ashworth, Slavery, 
Capitalism, and Politics in the Antebellum Republic: Volume 1, Commerce and Compromise, 1820-1850 
(Cambridge University Press, 1995), 326–29. 
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fallen on evil times. A large portion of the Van Buren party are undisguised anarchists 
and agrarians—and nothing is so pleasing to them as commotion and uproar.”426  
By the end of 1836, both the administration and opposition presses designated a 
fundamental division in the administration party, which they characterized as roughly 
split along agrarian-versus-capitalist lines. As Calhoun laid out six months earlier, the 
anti-Jacksonian Burlington Free Press reported that William C. Rives of Virginia, 
Nathaniel P. Tallmadge of New York, and Henry Hubbard of New Hampshire led a small 
faction of “Conservatives” in Congress, who had emerged to challenge the supremacy of 
hard currency and anti-Bank men, notably Thomas Hart Benton, Silas Wright, and (ex-
Federalist) Pennsylvanian James Buchanan.427 The Free Press described a “mighty 
contest” among the leaders of “what has been known as the Jackson party.” Two factions 
had emerged: the Anti-Monopolists (also known as the “loco-focos”), who wanted to 
annihilate all civil society’s ancient landmarks, and the Conservatives, who urged the 
Anti-Monopolists not to destroy all law and all of the country’s institutions.428  
Democratic papers also jumped into the fray. The articles in question rejected 
William C. Rives and his “NEW SCHOOL of diplomatists,” who served in the 
“conservative party of the new president.” Devoted to patronage and the money system, 
these treasury parasites flirted with the chartered monopoly system of State banks, and 
                                                 
426 Pleasing Anticipations. United States' Telegraph (Washington, District Of Columbia), Thursday, 
December 15, 1836; Issue [324].   
427 NB: While in Washington, Rives and Tallmadge lived together: “Arriving in Washington in 
December1836, Rives was delighted to find a six room apartment for his family at Mrs. Kennedy's on 4 ½ 
Street, only fifty yards from the avenue. This gave him two extra rooms and he persuaded his friends N.P. 
Tallmadge and Bedford Brown of North Carolina to take them. Enthusiastically he wrote Judith that they 
would be, “In the fashionable end of the city for, since "Editor Blair" had moved to the President's square, 
all the gentility among the members of Congress seemed instinctively to have shied away from there…” 
(Dingledine, 258) 
428 Although I paraphrase the Free Press here, I lifted the language directly from the article. (Burlington 
free press. (Burlington, Vt.), Tuesday, December 20, 1836.) 
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defiled themselves among the “deposite prostitutes.” They could be nothing but “hateful 
to the democracy of the country.” Now, the Democratic Herald predicted, only a “noble 
republican of the Jackson radical school of simplicity and reform”—like Thomas Hart 
Benton—could save the party.429 Reprinting these articles, Duff Green’s Telegraph 
concluded that whatever else might come from this “mutiny” in the “Usurper’s camp,” 
Thomas Hart Benton and Amos Kendall aimed to lead a “democratic division of the 
democratic republican party.”430  
In the immediate context, both sides were reacting to the positions assumed on 
Jackson’s Specie Circular at the beginning of the second session of the Twenty-Fourth 
US Congress in December 1836. Once again, Senators Benton and Rives became 
figureheads for the conflict developing on the floor of the Senate, and in the attendant 
newspaper coverage. Benton championed those Jacksonians who wished to build upon 
the Specie Circular as the first step in an essential fiscal reform. Rives represented the 
“conservatives,” those who wanted to moderate it in order to more effectively and 
organically generate the same reform. Both policy positions countered the Whig proposal 
to rescind the Specie Circular entirely at the beginning of the congressional session. 
Benton attacked anyone who sought to reverse course from a system of 
exclusive metallic currency, accusing them of indenturing the federal government to an 
endless cycle of paper debt. He argued that the paper system went against America’s 
founding principles. As Jackson had proclaimed in his most recent annual message, “It is 
                                                 
429 Publicola. "'Dear Sir—I am here." United States' Telegraph [Washington, District Of Columbia], 
Washington City, Dec 21, 1836. FROM the DEMOCRATIC HERALD (PHILADELPHIA) 
430 Even though it generally abjured newspapers of “that ilk,” (i.e., “devoted” administration papers), Duff 
Green made an exception in the case of the Philadelphia Democratic Herald because it exposed the “angry 
and excriminating war” in the Jacksonian party being waged behind the scenes. (Texas. Omega. United 
States' Telegraph (Washington, District Of Columbia), Tuesday, January 03, 1837; Issue 2.) 
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apparent, from the whole context of the constitution as well as the history of the times 
which gave birth to it, that it was the purpose of the [constitutional] convention to 
establish a currency consisting of the precious metals.”431 Benton, like Jackson, defended 
the circular as returning the country to first principles.  
On the same side of the aisle, William Cabell Rives, who had, up to that point, 
served as a loyal party lieutenant in spite of being waylaid in his trajectory to the White 
House, advocated a policy of practical, gradual reform. While he agreed with Benton on 
the principle of reforming the currency, he warned against “Utopian and visionary” 
notions of an exclusively metallic medium. Not only would a complete suppression of 
bank paper be impractical, in the American system it was impossible. In the current state 
of global commercial development,432 he noted, such a radical reform would encounter 
nearly insurmountable barriers anywhere in the world; but, in the United States, where 
States exercised the power to create banking corporations, the federal government could 
not proceed on such a course of suppressing the banking system without abrogating a de 
facto (if arguably not de jure) State power.433  
Instead, Rives introduced a measure to mediate Jackson’s circular without 
repealing it.434 In place of Jackson’s moratorium on bank paper, he suggested gradually 
suppressing small bills and systematically enlarging and diffusing specie as a circulating 
medium. His proposal substantially relied on Andrew Jackson’s seventh annual message 
                                                 
431 United States Congress, Joseph Gales, and William Winston Seaton, Debates in Congress (Gales & 
Seaton, 1837), 39. 
432 Rives used the phrase “commercial progress and refinement.” 
433 In Rives’s words: “Whatever speculative doubts exist in the minds of some as to the constitutional 
validity of this power, the states now actually possess and exercise it, as they have invariably done since the 
foundation of the Government, and there is not the slightest probability that they will ever be divested of 
it.” (United States Congress, The Congressional Globe [afterw.] Record. 23rd (- ) Congress, 1837, 114.) 
434 Dingledine, 259-260. 
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to Congress delivered a year earlier in December 1835.435 Jackson had sought “a practical 
reform in the whole paper system of the country,” and, to that end, recommended that 
Congress adopt conditions for the State banks “with a view to the gradual disuse of the 
small bills.” Thirteen months later, Rives recalled Jackson's message when he argued that 
gradually introducing metallic currency into actual circulation would have the effect of 
making it a “practical currency of common life,” the “universal medium of ordinary 
transactions.” By this process, specie would become the money of “the farmer, the 
mechanic, the laborer, and the tradesman” and the merchant would still enjoy “the 
facilities of a sound and restricted paper currency for his larger operations.”436 In this and 
other speeches that Rives made defending his proposal in late December 1836 and early 
January 1837, he echoed the major democratic talking points of Jackson’s administration. 
Though he would be accused of switching his allegiance from “Jacksonian” to “Whig” or 
“Conservative,” he had changed neither his political nor his programmatic orientation. 
Rather, the locus of Jackson’s party and the stakes of fiscal policy had shifted radically 
during the last year of Jackson’s presidency.  
Partly, this phenomenon grew out of Jackson’s material gains during the 
Twenty-Fourth Congress (1835-1837.) What ground Jackson had lost due to his heavy-
handed exercise of executive power during the bank wars, his party had regained by the 
spring of 1837.437 The administration party, in the minority by three senators when the 
                                                 
435 In December 1835, Jackson had sought “a practical reform in the whole paper system of the country,” 
and, to that end, recommended that Congress adopt conditions for the State banks “with a view to the 
gradual disuse of the small bills.” 
436 Rives’s Jan 10, 1837 speech in Register of Debates, XIII, 343-360; See, also: Dingledine, 263-267. 
437 Jackson’s party had controlled the Senate at the beginning of the first session of the 22nd US Congress 
on December 5, 1831, but the opposition had gained enough seats to over-power them by the time the 
second session closed in March 1833. The 23rd US Congress was the only term during Jackson or Van 
Buren’s tenure that the opposition controlled the Senate for the duration of both sessions. Towards the end 
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term opened in 1835, closed the second session with a ten-man majority. In addition to 
the administration-friendly senators from the newly minted States of Arkansas and 
Michigan, ten of Jackson’s political allies, all committed to his program of fiscal reform, 
joined the Senate from December 1835 to March 1837, mostly replacing dead or resigned 
members of the opposition.438 This partisan shift gave Jackson’s party the leverage to 
elect Francis Preston Blair printer to the Senate for the upcoming Twenty-Fifth US 
Congress.439 The administration’s program also triumphed in the judicial branch where, 
on February 12, all five of Jackson’s appointees on the Supreme Court concurred in 
                                                                                                                                                 
of the first session, three men who had been elected as Jackson’s supporters (none of whom returned for the 
24th US Congress) joined with twenty-three opposition senators in passing a resolution censuring President 
Jackson for removing the public deposits from the Bank of the United States. By the close of the 23rd 
Congress’s second session on March 4, 1835, the opposition held a ten-seat majority (counting the two 
Nullification party members, who tended to act as swing votes.) The opposition maintained a tenuous grasp 
on their majority in the Senate when the 24th US Congress convened in December 1835, but had already 
started losing its grip. By the end of the second session in March of 1837, they trailed the Jacksonians by 
ten seats.  
438 At the start of the first session in December of 1835, anti-Jacksonians out-numbered the Jackson party 
by five seats (counting the two Nullifiers). Van Buren’s friend John M. Niles (CT) was appointed to anti-
Jacksonian Nathan Smith’s seat after he died in December 1835; Virginian William Cabell Rives, who had 
famously resigned in  February of 1834 rather than fulfill his instructions to vote to return the deposits to 
the Bank of the US,  replaced vocal anti-Jacksonian John Tyler, who had resigned because he refused to 
follow instructions to vote for Benton’s expunging resolutions; Similarly, Richard E Parker, whom Van 
Buren would offer the position of Attorney General when he became president, replaced anti-Jacksonian 
Benjamin Leigh, who had also resigned because he refused the VA Legislature’s instructions to vote for the 
expunging resolution; Jacksonian and one-time Grand Master of the Grand Lodge of North Carolina Robert 
Strange (NC) replaced Willie P Mangum, who had voted to censure Jackson in 1834 and was now running 
for president as an anti-Jacksonian on the South Carolina ticket; and, lastly, Alexander Mouton (LA), who 
went on to implement radical reforms as Governor of Louisiana (e.g., abolishing property requirements for 
suffrage and holding public office, balancing the budget by selling state assets, pushing an anti-tax 
platform, opposing all internal improvements state expenditures, and eradicating the prison monopoly), 
replaced anti-Jacksonian Alexander Porter who resigned on January 5, 1837, due to illness. Both new 
states, Arkansas and Michigan, brought Jacksonians to the table: William S. Fulton and Ambrose H. Sevier 
(AK), and Lucius Lyon and John Norvell (MI). The tenth Jacksonian to enter the Senate during the 24th US 
Congress, Robert C. Nicholas of Louisiana, filled a vacancy caused by the death of another Jacksonian 
before he was able to take his seat. 
439 Because Blair’s partner, John Cook Rives, shared a last name with a principal actor in this chapter, 
William Cabell Rives, I will use Blair’s name alone when referring to the Globe’s editors to minimize 
confusion. Blair won the election with twenty-eight senators voting in his favor, but two voted for Mr. 
Allen and one ballot remained blank. Given that Gales & Seaton received nineteen votes, with nineteen 
opposition senators serving in the Senate at the time, it seems reasonable to infer that three administration 
senators had already leaked from the party-line ranks, foreshadowing the trouble over the printer that swept 
the House at the beginning of the Twenty-Fifth Congress.  
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Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, an anti-monopolist decision that effectively 
empowered States to limit or dismantle corporations.440 Considered either a coup for 
States’ rights or a blow to the inviolability of contracts, depending on one’s side of the 
aisle, the ruling also provided the legal infrastructure for States to shutter private banks at 
their discretion.441 
Even though Rives’s more moderate currency bill passed the Senate by an 
overwhelming majority, and was endorsed by the House with a preponderance of 
administration men voting in favor, most newspapers painted Rives as the leader of a 
strident minority.442 Benton and his cohort declared a mandate for their program of fiscal 
reform, triumphant in the wake of Van Buren’s election, the recent Supreme Court 
decision, and expunging Jackson’s censure from the Congressional Record. Media 
coverage of Congress strengthened their position, depicting Benton’s faction as 
dominating the party, and controlling the administration’s policy and message. Rumor 
even spread that Benton had sat in on Van Buren’s first cabinet meeting, basically 
dictating his position on the Treasury Circular with support from Attorney General 
Benjamin F. Butler and Postmaster General Amos Kendall, both of whom were 
                                                 
440 The surplus of Jackson men in the Senate also afforded them the leverage to push through the 1837 
Judiciary Act, passed during Jackson’s last days in office, which increased the Supreme Court by two 
members, bringing the total number of Jackson-appointees to seven out of the nine Supreme Court justices. 
Jackson appointed five men to the Supreme Court from 1835 to 1837 alone, all loyal to him, and all hailing 
from politically contested southern states (Taney from MD, Wayne from GA, Barbour from VA, Catron 
from TN, and Smith from SC. When Smith declined the seat for personal reasons, Van Buren appointed 
McKinley of AL.) 
441 Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1780–1860 (Harvard University Press, 1977), 
115–39; Naomi R. Lamoreaux and William J. Novak, Corporations and American Democracy (Harvard 
University Press, 2017), 8–9, 259–60; Edgar J. McManus and Tara Helfman, Liberty and Union: A 
Constitutional History of the United States, Concise Edition (Routledge, 2014), 150–66. 
442 Which faction dominated the party—and which group formed a strident minority— also depended on 
the source. Although most of the administration party aligned behind Rives and Nathaniel Tallmadge in the 
Senate, most “Anti-Monopolist” and Whig coverage implied that Benton’s faction controlled the 
administration’s policy and message. 
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considered strident Anti-Monopolists.443 As the Twenty-Fourth US Congress shuttered its 
doors for the summer, the Anti-Monopolist ascendancy in the party seemed assured. The 
political pressure for compromise passed, and Rives’s bill got lost in President Jackson’s 
pocket.  
Virginia power-broker Thomas Ritchie, whose Richmond Enquirer set the tone 
for the more politic elements in Van Buren’s party, regretted the bill’s failure, reminding 
the new Van Buren administration that it had to “do its duty—and its friends keep 
united,” so that “all will be well.” 444 Although Ritchie publically dismissed the ‘whig’ 
rumor that a struggle between Benton and Rives divided the administration’s friends, in 
his private correspondence he worried that the party would schism over the Treasury 
Circular if Van Buren refused to rescind it. Not only did the circular provide the 
opposition with leverage against the party, but in the wake of the imminent financial 
crisis, the people would seize upon the Treasury Circular as the cause of their distress and 
clamor against the government. And, he insisted, they would be right to do so. Van Buren 
had a duty to consider less what his predecessor had done than what would promote the 
good of the country now. The coming crisis would require that all of Van Buren’s sincere 
friends support him against the common enemy, but his “metaphysically mad” 
commitment to the Treasury Circular threatened to alienate men whose interests and 
feelings “naturally and deeply enlisted [them] in the success of the present Republican 
Administration.” Citing Burke, he advised that “a statesman never losing sight of his 
                                                 
443 “April 8, 1837-- Miscellaneous,” Niles’ Weekly Register 52 (1837): 82. 
444 Cursory Sketches of a visit of the editor of the “Richmond Enquirer” to Washington City. From the 
Richmond Enquirer of the 8th inst. 18th March, 1837. 
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principles” should be “guided by circumstances.” If Van Buren judged contrary to the 
“exigencies of the moment,” “he may ruin his country forever.”445 
Even if Rives and company had successfully mediated Jackson’s hard-money 
policies, however, the force of the financial panic that engulfed the money market and 
banking system in the spring of 1837 would still have determined the course of American 
politics. Tremors of market instability long preceded its collapse, but it only registered on 
a national scale during Van Buren’s first month in office, as major mercantile houses and 
brokerage firms in New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and New Orleans failed. 
Van Buren’s only campaign promise had been to maintain Jackson’s policies, a pledge he 
redoubled in his inaugural address, but Jackson’s pocket veto of Rives’s currency bill left 
Van Buren without an explicit statement on monetary policy. Surrounded by Jackson’s 
advisers and press, all of whom denied the reality of commercial distress, Van Buren 
passively allowed the Specie Circular to stand without open avowal or mediating 
revision, in spite of commercial and political pressure to repeal it.446 In the absence of 
material concessions to the heterogeneous interests in his party, Van Buren reinforced the 
popular impression that he would do nothing to stall the party’s shift towards radical 
reform.447 
                                                 
445 Charles Henry Ambler, Thomas Ritchie; a Study in Virginia Politics (Richmond, Va., Bell Book & 
Stationery Co., 1913), 190. 
446 Five senators voted against S. 144, a Bill Designating and Limiting Funds Receivable for the Revenues 
of the U.S., all Jacksonians: Lewis Linn and Thomas Hart Benton of Missouri, John Ruggles of Maine, 
Thomas Morris of Ohio,  and Silas Wight of New York. In the House, it passed with 52% of the vote (126 
Ayes), but only 29% of the House voted against it (71 Nays.) Nearly 20% of the members did not vote.    
447 As the New York Herald summarized, “We are on the eve of a revolution.” (Included in the dispatch 
from the American correspondent for the London Champion and Weekly Herald, the excerpted New York 
Herald article was originally published on April 20, 1837. MONEY AFFAIR. The Champion and Weekly 
Herald (London, England), May 13, 1837; Vol I, No X) 
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The opposition predictably blamed the administration’s national currency 
experiment for the distress. Through their negligence, the “great panic makers at 
Washington” had willingly sacrificed the “working men”— “so dearly loved and 
regarded before election”— to the “gold humbug of salaried politicians,” sending the 
prospect of comfortable subsistence for families “up the Mississippi in silken purses.”448 
For years, they had paid lip service to “useful and faithful” laborers, but, once in office, 
they effected a “financial coup d’etat,” securing a monopoly over gold and silver.”449  
Meanwhile, the Globe and the Albany Argus, and every paper that excerpted 
them, dismissed reports of financial distress as rumor-mongering, a political fiction 
conjured to scare the “the democracy of numbers” into submission. They censured the 
“political panic makers,” who secretly worked to secure the power of bank monopolists 
via the “great political engine” of the moneyed power in Great Britain, which, they 
declared, still effectively controlled politics in the United States.450 The Globe traced the 
origin of the “panic” to a “regular systematic plan” that Nicholas Biddle and his foreign 
allies devised back in 1834 to expand the banking system by gradually increasing the 
government’s taxing power, imposed through the circulation of paper money, and 
establishing a monopoly of exchange businesses. The Globe called for a boycott of all 
papers engaged in publishing “panic articles” or who have hired “panic letter writers” in 
                                                 
448 Rutland herald. (Rutland, Vt.), 25 April 1837. Chronicling America: Historic American Newspapers. 
Lib. of Congress., Image 3  
449 MONEY AFFAIR. The Champion and Weekly Herald (London, England), May 13, 1837; Vol I, No X. 
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service to the trans-Atlantic “moneyed aristocracy.” 451  Only then would the country 
allay the panic, restore confidence, and bring relief.452  
Possibly, if Jackson had signed Rives’s bill as a conciliatory measure towards 
his party’s base or if Van Buren had made a definitive statement about the circular some 
time during his first hundred days in office, they could have mitigated the political and 
fiscal fallout of the ensuing financial crisis.  But while Jackson’s administration had 
projected strength, Van Buren began his tenure vulnerable to rumors of party disaffection 
and personal weakness. Internally, portions of the party that had acquiesced to Jackson’s 
strong-hold refused to bend to Van Buren’s will. Van Buren had encountered resistance 
from the moment Jackson had made clear his intentions to ensure his succession. Four 
States (Tennessee, Alabama, Illinois, and South Carolina) had refused to even send 
delegates to the 1835 national party convention. As a representative of New York’s 
Albany Regency, Van Buren’s ascendancy also stirred up regional power struggles, 
especially with Virginia’s ruling class. So long as he had operated behind the scenes, Van 
Buren had balanced the party’s interests with relative success, but once perched in the 
                                                 
451 “Let the community one and all discontinue taking or advertising in any one of the papers, which have 
been engaged in sending forth panic articles, or have had their hired panic letter writers employed for that 
purpose; that alone will do more to allay the panic, restore confidence and cause relief, than all the 
meetings of merchants, or the issue of $10,000,000 of…” Daily Herald and Gazette (Cleveland, 
Ohio), Tuesday, May 02, 1837; Issue 282.  
452 Not all administration papers took a hard line defending Jackson’s policies. As it had in 1834, financial 
panic and its media coverage betrayed the political fault lines within the administration ranks. For example, 
Thomas Ritchie, who had privately conveyed his reservations to Attorney General Butler, published an 
article in April on “The distress,” in which he expressed his doubts about the policy of retaining Jackson’s 
circular and floated the idea of implementing Rives’s currency bill. Operating as one wing of Van Buren’s 
partisan arsenal during Jackson’s tenure, Ritchie’s Enquirer had often conveyed the image of heterodoxy in 
administration ranks. In his role as the administration’s “steam Doctor,” Ritchie used his Richmond 
Enquirer to deal out “broken doses” to the public: diluted bits of policy designed to test the popular 
reaction to potential policy shifts. The Enquirer’s tempered analysis, constrained to tweaking a vector of 
monetary policy, gauged whether compromise on the circular would read as weakness politically and also 
planted the seeds necessary to justify a shift in policy as firmly rooted in the administration’s commitments 
to its broader base. (A "better feeling". From the Journal of Commerce. New-York Spectator (New York, 
New York), Monday, May 01, 1837.)  
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executive chair, he needed a Van Buren of his own to manage the party. Unlike Jackson 
in 1832, Van Buren had not taken office with enough popularity to conduct his affairs 
with impunity (or even enough leverage to control party policy.)453  
At the end of May, Van Buren finally called for a Special Session of the 
Twenty-Fifth Congress to begin September 1st, leaving three months for press speculation 
to fill the vacuum generated by his silence. Over the summer, Van Buren played a waiting 
game. Cloistered with a select group of his advisers—Treasury Secretary Levi 
Woodbury, Attorney General Benjamin Butler, and internationally renowned anti-bank, 
anti-paper economist William M. Gouge—he focused on building a legislative program 
to satisfy his anti-Monopolist allies without alienating his broader base.454 In the interim, 
he avoided publically committing to any position and left his party organs to track the 
country’s temperature. Even from his Hermitage, Jackson made himself heard, but Van 
Buren uniformly refrained from public statements, and refused to attend public dinners.455 
                                                 
453 In spite of the fact that the opposition split their votes among four different candidates, Van Buren had 
squeaked by with 50.8% of the popular vote. Although he received 170 electoral votes (out of the 148 
necessary to win), the county-by-county election results reveal a fragmented race with Hugh Lawson White 
and William Henry Harrison offering close races in most states. Huge swaths of the states Van Buren 
dominated (Maine, Louisiana, Arkansas, Missouri, Illinois, and Michigan) lacked the apparatus for popular 
elections. Van Buren’s vice presidential candidate, Richard Mentor Johnson, had not fared nearly as well. 
Virginia’s faithless electors had voted for William Smith for vice president, leaving Johnson one electoral 
vote shy of the requisite 148. A Senate vote in February installed him as Van Buren’s vice president. (Sean 
Wilentz, The Rise of American Democracy: Jefferson to Lincoln (W. W. Norton & Company, 2006), 447–
65; Joel H. Silbey, Martin Van Buren and the Emergence of American Popular Politics (Lanham, Boulder, 
New York, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 101–36; Holt, Political Parties and American Political 
Development, 47–59; Donald B. Cole, Martin Van Buren and the American Political System (Princeton 
University Press, 2014), 256–84; Freehling, The Road to Disunion, 295–341.) 
454Both Woodbury and Butler had served under Andrew Jackson since his first term. As Jackson’s Treasury 
Secretary, Woodbury had been instrumental in protecting the administration after Jackson removed the 
deposits from the US Bank in 1833 and in killing the Second Bank of the United States. Attorney General 
Butler, on the other hand, had been Van Buren’s law partner before joining Jackson’s administration in 
1833. 
455 "Small Change." Globe [Washington, District Of Columbia] 2 June 1837: n.p. Nineteenth Century U.S. 
Newspapers.  
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Unfortunately, Van Buren’s caution read as an unwillingness or inability to direct the 
country in a time of crisis.456   
THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY, PART III: PRINT, PAPER, AND THE CONSERVATIVE 
REVOLUTION 
Van Buren’s tactic of testing the waters through proxies reinforced the 
impression that he did not wield power so much as submit to it: that, as a “mere cipher in 
the government,” he served at the command of Andrew Jackson’s Kitchen Cabinet.457 
The common knowledge that Kentuckians Amos Kendall and Francis Preston Blair 
“controlled” Van Buren agitated regional jealousies, particularly in Virginia and New 
York. Having kept a close watch on the Globe’s growing immoderacy, Richmond’s 
Thomas Ritchie observed with alarm the public perception that Van Buren served at the 
Globe’s discretion. In a confidential letter to Attorney General Butler, he cautioned 
against the course taken by the Globe editors and other vocal Anti-Monopolists.458 In the 
past, the party’s strength had rested on a combination of a fractured opposition and a 
willingness to discard non-conformists, but political conditions had changed. The Whigs 
                                                 
456 According to the opposition, he was so afraid to comment that he took refuge in “non commitalism,” 
lacking the “nerve” and “sagacity” to extricate himself from the present crisis. Well enough in his proper 
place, the New York Spectator declared, Van Buren was “totally unfit to manage the government car.” In 
his June dispatch, the London Times correspondent, the “Genevese Traveller,” characterized Van Buren as 
timid, hesitant, and indecisive. The antipode of General Jackson, he wrote, Van Buren would rather 
surrender the helm in a storm than make his own decisions. (“President Van Buren." Pennsylvania Inquirer 
and Daily Courier [Philadelphia, Pennsylvania] 26 Aug. 1837; "Washington Correspondence." Morning 
Herald [New York, New York] 30 Aug. 1837: n.p. Nineteenth Century U.S. Newspapers; Multiple News 
Items. New-York Spectator (New York, New York), Thursday, July 06, 1837; The “Genevese Traveller” 
was well known stateside as the “A Spy in Washington,” i.e., Matthew L. Davis.) 
457 "A Speck of War." Pennsylvania Inquirer and Daily Courier [Philadelphia, Pennsylvania] 2 Aug. 1837: 
n.p. Nineteenth Century U.S. Newspapers.  
458 In allowing the Globe to speak on his behalf, Van Buren implicitly endorsed its views, including its 
attacks on William C. Rives, Van Buren’s close friend, who had repeatedly sacrificed his own ambition to 
promote the party’s interests. (Thomas Ritchie to Benjamin F. Butler, published in Charles Henry Ambler, 
Thomas Ritchie: A Study in Virginia Politics (Bell Book & Stationery Company, 1913), 188-191.) 
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had consolidated power as a party and the administration could no longer afford to 
alienate such a broad swath of its base;459 without the “conservatives,” the administration 
lost the House.460 The party’s inconsistency on banking fueled these reports of infighting 
and, by the end of the summer, the Daily National Intelligencer reported that the “Van 
Buren Tallmadge men,” refusing to go any further with loco-focoism, had delivered an 
ultimatum: “Either must Mr. Van Buren yield, or the party will sever.”461 
The substance fueling the Globe’s rage against the money threatened to 
consume the whole party, but Van Buren remained tight-lipped on his own course. 
Without knowing where Van Buren would fall on the looming bank question, the 
heterodox elements of his party diverged on how to act. The editor of the Herald “had 
reason to know” that Van Buren intended to withdraw from the Globe faction and support 
Rives in revolutionizing the democratic party from its “very flower” in New York, 
Virginia, and the South.462 In one widely reprinted anecdote, a “consistent” member of 
the Democratic Republican family, when asked to which party schism he belonged, 
replied: “I intend to be on Van Buren’s side as soon as I can find out which side he is 
on!”463 Even Thomas Ritchie’s Enquirer vacillated on where Van Buren might fall 
                                                 
459 "The Extra Session of Congress will commence on Monday next, the 4th inst." Fayetteville 
Observer [Fayetteville, North Carolina] 30 Aug. 1837; "Correspondence of the Courier." Boston 
Courier [Boston, Massachusetts] 31 Aug. 1837 
460 Before the financial crisis exploded, the American public had elected 31 administration senators and 128 
administration congressmen to the 25th US Congress. When Van Buren left office four years later, only 22 
administration senators and 97 administration congressmen remained to serve in the 27th US Congress. 
"American Affairs." Times [London, England] 17 July 1837: 3. The Times Digital Archive, 1785-2008. 
461 Editors' Correspondence." Daily National Intelligencer [Washington, District Of Columbia] 18 Aug. 
1837 
462 "Important Political Movement." Morning Herald [New York, New York] 21 Aug. 1837 
463 NB: This interaction definitely did not occur in real life. (More of the New Experiment. From the 
Baltimore Chronicle. Fayetteville Observer (Fayetteville, North Carolina),Wednesday, August 16, 1837; 
Issue 1054. Category: News); Multiple News Items. Daily Herald and Gazette (Cleveland, 
Ohio), Saturday, August 12, 1837; Issue 68; Multiple News Items. Fayetteville Observer (Fayetteville, 
North Carolina), Wednesday, October 04, 1837; Issue 1061.) 
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ideologically. Everyone prophesied, but “the boys in the secret” remained “as mum as 
mice.”464 
Growing restive, this silent majority found its voice in the establishment of a 
new national paper in Washington, the Madisonian. The Madisonian promised to reflect 
the “true sentiments, measures, and interests, of the great body of [the administration’s] 
supporters.” It would faithfully represent the administration’s “real policy,” not dictate it, 
like the Globe did. Where the Globe had disrupted the country, disoriented its domestic 
self-respect, and damaged its international honor and credit, the Madisonian stepped up 
to implement “a political reform in the theory and practice of the national 
government.”465 
In his prospectus for the new publication, editor Thomas Allen chastised “some, 
from whom better things were hoped,” for their “head-long pursuit of extreme notions 
and indefinite phantoms, totally incompatible with a wholesome state of the country.” 
Their “unwise adherence to the plan for an exclusive metallic currency” had increased the 
country’s distress by impairing public confidence in the credit system, and provided the 
opposition with leverage to unseat the administration. For too long, the party had been 
hijacked by a small group promoting “visionary theories,” who seemed more interested in 
pursuing their economic and political reforms than in responding to the financial and 
social crises that threatened to destroy the country. In contrast with the conduct of those 
men who remedied abuses by “destroying the institutions with which they are found 
connected,” the Madisonian promoted “more conservative principles.”  
                                                 
464 ("Washington Correspondence." Morning Herald [New York, New York] 30 Aug. 1837: n.p. Nineteenth 
Century U.S. Newspapers.)  
465 From Thomas Allen’s July 1837 Prospectus, published in the first edition of the Madisonian (Thomas 
Allen, “Prospectus,” The Madisonian, August 16, 1837, Vol I, No. 1.)  
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Before the Madisonian’s first issue came out, the Globe network set out to 
discredit it. One of the Globe’s satellites, the New Orleans Bee, attacked the paper as a 
“shallow artifice,” a bank paper in disguise, published by the “conservative” editors of 
the National Intelligencer to divide the “liberal party.” For the uninitiated, the Bee 
explained, “The term “Conservative,” under which this publication is ushered to the 
world, is perfectly understood in England, and is used in a similar sense here.” Men 
interested in maintaining an order that benefitted them materially—the great bankers, the 
Barings Sir Robert Peel, the Duke of Wellington, Lord Lyndhurst, Nick Biddle, and other 
kindred spirits—were all conservatives.466  
Still, the Bee claimed, no rival could supplant the Globe as the administration’s 
paper. Over the previous two years, in its role as printer for the 24th House, the Globe had 
maintained a vice grip on political discourse. It already held the commission to serve as 
the public printer for the 25th US Senate; the House, having closed the session without 
voting, would elect its printer at the beginning of the 25th US Congress. If it received both 
House and Senate commissions, with thousands of dollars in government money fueling 
its press, it would be positioned to act as a monolith, crushing opposition and gradually 
suffocating any men and any administration presses that crossed it. 
But the new paper in Washington did threaten the Globe’s monopoly over the 
administration’s message and its control over the party’s media. Partisan presses buzzed 
that Van Buren, tiring of the Globe’s “tyranny,” secretly approved of the Madisonian.467 
The New York Morning Herald even suggested that the paper began as a conspiracy 
                                                 
466 The New Orleans Bee. "The bank party... the Madisonian." Globe [Washington, District Of Columbia] 
09 Aug 1837 
467 “The Madisonian. Burlington free press. (Burlington, Vt.) 1827-1865. 23 Aug 1837 
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originating “in the very centre of the palace at Washington.” According to the Herald, 
Van Buren and Rives, “one and indivisible,” planned to cast aside the Globe just as 
Jackson had discarded Duff Green’s Telegraph half a decade earlier.468 The new party 
organ could then implement a campaign to generate popular support for State banking 
(and ensure Rives’s succession over Benton.)469  
Van Buren quickly disabused any notion that he stood with the “conservatives.” 
In his September 5th message, he publically declared his allegiance to the Anti-
Monopolists, firmly coming down in favor of the Independent Treasury system.470 In his 
usual circuitous language, Van Buren laid out a plan to end Jackson’s State bank system 
and bring the public revenue under the auspices of the Executive, reasserting the 
government’s right (and the constitutional imperative) to accept payment in specie alone. 
He acknowledged that this arrangement extended his branch’s power, influence, and 
                                                 
468 Support for the narrative can also be found in the Morning Herald: Awful Doings in Our 
Party. Morning Herald (New York, New York),Saturday, August 05, 1837; Issue 65. Category: 
Editorial Gale Document Number:GT3013918206 
469 Although both opposition and anti-Monopolist papers claimed that Rives helped start the Madisonian, 
Dingledine traced the origin of the new paper to Tallmadge, who had connected with New York lawyer 
Thomas Allen in the winter of 1836-1837. Tallmadge wrote to Rives about his plan on May 31, 1837, but 
Rives demurred. He was still in close contact with Van Buren, who had recently solicited for his advice on 
the banking crisis, and he resisted damaging that relationship. Ultimately, Tallmadge and Nathaniel Niles 
midwifed the Madisonian into existence. (Dingledine, 276-277, 283-284)  
470 Congressional Globe, Monday Sept 11, 1837, p. 4. For weeks, Whig pundits had predicted that the 
contest for House Speaker would finally bring the conservatives over to the Whig camp, that they would 
refuse to vote for anti-banker James K. Polk, but, on the first day of the Special Session, Polk won the 
Speakership with a slim margin over his old nemesis, Tennessee Whig John Bell. With 224 members 
present (18 representatives were absent during the vote), and 113 votes need to win, James K. Polk 
received 116 votes, John Bell received 103 votes, and 5 votes went “scattering.” At least one administration 
representative did not vote for Polk, but otherwise the election likely split along party lines. (The individual 
votes were not recorded because the House voted for Speaker by ballots, not viva voce.) For the Whig 
predictions, see, for example: "Congressional." Atlas [Boston, Massachusetts] 14 Aug 1837; 
Correspondence of the Courier. Boston Courier (Boston, Massachusetts) 04 Sept 1837. For the background 
to the conflict between James K. Polk and John Bell, founder of the Tennessee Whigs, see: The Rise and 
Fall of the American Whig Party: Jacksonian Politics and the Onset of the Civil War (Kindle Locations 
1296-1344). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition; Howe, Daniel Walker (2007-09-29). What Hath God 
Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815-1848 (Oxford History of the United States) (p. 390). 
Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition. 
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patronage, but maintained that he had little choice given that the State banking system 
had failed and the people had repeatedly rejected a national bank.471 Postmaster General 
Amos Kendall’s report, which followed as an addendum to Van Buren’s message, stated 
the official stance on specie unequivocally: “Gold and silver are the only constitutional 
and legal currency of the United States,” and the only currency that could be offered 
legally to public creditors.472  
Eventually, Van Buren’s dissenters would hash out their grievances with the 
administration in the debates over Van Buren’s proposal, but they made a strategic choice 
in taking their first stand on the first vote after Van Buren’s message: the House election 
for public printer. For years, at the close of every congress, the Senate and House each 
elected a printer for the next congress. These contests—and the rules governing them—
had always been politically contentious, revealing the dividing lines within party 
coalitions, and setting the stage for new ones. 473 Over the course of the 1830s, the printer 
                                                 
471 Under the present form of government, Van Buren said, “the intervention of the executive officers in the 
custody and disbursement of the public money seems to be unavoidable.” Note his use of passive 
construction. (“Monday, September 11, 1837,” Congressional Globe 25th Congress 1st Session (1837): 4-
9.) 
472 “Monday, September 11, 1837,” Congressional Globe 25th Congress 1st Session (1837): 9-10. 
473 Editors filled their pages with items lifted directly from other papers, and the printer who enjoyed the 
immense public patronage and access provided by the congressional contract could afford to spread its 
news. In the midst of the Jacksonian-States’ rights break-up in 1831, Kentucky Senator Richard Mentor 
Johnson (who later served as Martin Van Buren’s vice president) nominated Calhounite Duff Green to 
serve as printer to the Senate. He won that commission on February 5th, and the House contract a week 
later, making him the public printer to all of Congress for the next two years. Five days later, Green’s 
Telegraph published Calhoun’s correspondence with Monroe detailing Jackson’s misconduct in his 1818 
invasion of Florida, finally severing the loose cords that had held the Jackson-coalition together and forever 
alienating both Calhoun and Green from Jackson’s affections. For the next two years, then, the 
administration suffered through Green’s invective, reprinted nationwide. When the 22nd US Congress 
opened the floor for printer-nominations in 1833, Senator Benton unsuccessfully advocated changing the 
time for election to the first week of the new Congress. The administration party had lost its majority since 
the session had started, and they feared that the opposition would re-elect Duff Green or, possibly worse, 
Gales and Seaton. Both fears came true. After eleven ballots, Gales and Seaton won the House contract.473 
A week later, after intensive political wrangling, the Senate elected Duff Green on the ninth ballot. The 
next time Congress had to elect a printer, in early 1835, the debates lasted for months, punctuated by 
accusations of bribery, executive abuses, and excessive government spending. The anti-Jacksonians held a 
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debates directly reflected the administration’s power in Congress. If Van Buren could 
successfully exert party discipline like Jackson had, then the House’s election would go 
as smoothly in the fall as the Senate election had in the spring. With an administration 
majority in the House, and the Senate commission already secured, Francis Preston 
Blair’s Globe seemed poised to control the printing for all of Congress. With a bare 
majority of votes required to win, the Globe should have walked away with the contract 
after the first ballot. Yet, in ballot after ballot, the Globe fell short of the vital number. A 
handful of administration men refused to vote for the paper.474 
When the election for printer started, John C. Clark, who had loyally served 
Van Buren’s New York regime for fifteen years, nominated Madisonian printer Thomas 
Allen. On the first ballot, Allen received twenty-two votes—enough to prevent Blair from 
winning an election that should have been a walk. The administration party 
unsuccessfully attempted to stall the election until after the body had voted on Van 
Buren’s proposal, hoping that they could pass it before a hostile press did irreversible 
damage to the party’s prospects.475 Suddenly, the election had become a contest for 
                                                                                                                                                 
majority in the Senate and increasingly hostile John Bell served as Speaker of the House; the administration 
party responded to the hopeless situation by stalling. In the Senate, Benton attempted to “reform” the 
process by repealing the congressional rules governing printer elections. After weeks of argument, and 
seventeen ballots, the Senate elected Gales and Seaton on February 28th. The House, on the other hand, 
never elected a printer. The obstructionist administration party introduced a resolution that the elections 
should be made viva voce, which effectively blocked the vote. During the 24th US Congress, the only time 
when the administration party faced little overt internal resistance, the administration press finally won a 
Congressional contract. When the 24th Congress convened in December 1835, the House elected Blair on 
the first ballot. A year and a half later, in March 1837, the Senate elected Blair as its printer for the 25th US 
Congress on its first ballot. The House, having closed the session without voting, would elect its printer at 
the beginning of the 25th US Congress For the resolutions and debates, see: 23rd Congress 2nd Session Cong. 
Globe 308 (1835) Thursday, March 5, 1835; “Monday, February 2, 1835,” Congressional Globe 23rd 
Congress 2nd Session (1835): 153, 163-164.; Congressional Globe, 291)  
474 "Election of Printer—Io Poean!" New-York Spectator [New York, New York] 11 Sept 1837; Our 
Evening Edition of Yesterday. "From Washington." Morning Herald. 12 Sept 1837. 
475 New Yorker Isaac H Bronson, whom Polk would appoint to the first US District Court for the District of 
Florida nearly a decade later, submitted a resolution to delay the election for two weeks, permitting the 
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dominance, with the perceived strength of Van Buren’s party, the Anti-Monopolist 
monopoly over the media, and the viability of Van Buren’s program all at risk.476  
The Whigs capitalized on the administration’s disunity by proceeding with the 
election. At the very least, they could subject the administration to a humiliating debate 
over a seemingly trivial question of government bureaucracy during a time of national 
crisis.477 On the outside, they could irrevocably divide the party, push through their own 
printer (Gales and Seaton) and make a grab at controlling the national discourse.478 
                                                                                                                                                 
Clerk (Walter S. Franklin, a longtime friend of James Buchanan) to decide who should serve as printer in 
the interim. Another New Yorker, William Taylor, submitted a resolution that they authorize the House 
printer for the last Congress to serve until they resolved the election, which meant they would continue 
using the Globe as the House printer until they appointed a new one. Meanwhile, Ratliff Boon raised the 
polarizing topic of viva voce voting. This tactic had successfully waylaid voting on the printer in 1835. 
Virginian John M. Patton amplified the debate by suggesting that all officers of the House should be 
elected viva voce. While on its face, the push for open voting represented a democratic and populist call for 
transparency, real violence lay behind the threat of viva voce. Both parties employed physical intimidation 
to ensure conformity, and the administration party, in particular, had become notorious for manipulating the 
spoils system to exercise party discipline and systematically hamstringing party members who failed to fall 
in line. (Register of Debates in Congress 11, pt. 1 (1835): 573-574)   
476 When Duff Green had the commission, his articles appeared ubiquitous, reprinted in newspapers across 
the Union, but once he no longer had that enormous amount of patronage, he largely vanished from the 
national scene.  Calhoun Letter to Duff Green. Washington, Fort Hill, 27 July 1837, J. Franklin 1859-1937 
Jameson, William Pinckney Starke, and John C. Calhoun, Correspondence of John C. Calhoun., 1900, 374-
377. 
477 Virginia Whig Henry A. Wise goaded Allen’s supporters into an open declaration of dissent. He 
insinuated that the Conservatives hid behind the ballot’s “veil for safety” because they feared that they 
might “offend the President” if forced out in the open. But their cowardice was misguided: ““You are every 
man of you marked,” Wise said, “Your doom is sealed.”477 Infamous for his temper and easy recourse to 
physical violence, Wise’s personal reputation underscored the potentially violent consequences of crossing 
the wrong members of Congress. Though the surface text of the speech belittled the repercussions of 
breaking party discipline, it made public record the implicit threat that conservatives would suffer 
professional, political, and potentially physical harm for their non-conformity. Fellow Virginian James 
Garland rose to the bait, admitting that he belong to the party that “had been called conservatives,” and 
while he hoped they were not marked, or “put aside, as the "fatted calf," for execution, he had no terror at 
the prospect because he stood “pledged to his constituents to support a set of opinions which the editors of 
the Globe stand pledged to war against.” Recalling the parable of Roman Consul Titus Manlius, who had 
his son executed for disobedience, Garland declared that even “if he was to be executed,” he would never 
desert his principles: “My country first, and then with the party with which I can honestly and 
conscientiously go.” John Clarke, who had nominated Thomas Allen in the first place, also acknowledged 
that he voted for Allen over Blair. Realizing that his little band had placed the party in an awkward 
position, he moved to lay the subject on the table, but too late. (25th Congress 1st Session Cong. Globe 13 
(1837) Monday, September 11, 1837.  For Wise’s reputation, see: Craig M. Simpson, A Good Southerner: 
The Life of Henry A. Wise of Virginia (UNC Press Books, 2001), 38.) 
478 The Senate opposition had successfully used this tactic in 1835. Register of Debates in Congress 11, pt. 
1 (1835): 697-698. 
 226
Partisan papers declared the election proof that the party “has no binding” and that those 
administration men who opposed the Globe would also oppose the President. The 
“twenty horse power” who voted against Blair possessed the means of defeating all of the 
party’s measures, the Morning Herald reported. The party must either “fall,” or “come 
back to first principles.” Either way, ““Divide” is now the word.”479 
In the first political vote of the new session, after three days and twelve ballots, 
“some ten or a dozen Judases” secured Thomas Allen as public printer and irrevocably 
altered the political dynamic on the floor of the House. The fact that Van Buren failed to 
get his printer elected confirmed that the entire balance of politics had shifted since the 
24th Congress had closed the previous March. Combined with Van Buren’s explicit 
pledge to the Anti-Monopolist wing of his party, it cemented the schism in Jacksonian 
politics, proving that the administration coalition could no longer abide under the same 
roof.480 At last, the Boston Atlas declared, “the Conservatives had openly revolted.”481  
Several Whig papers noted the irony of ascribing to these men the moniker 
“Conservatives.”482 The Courier reported incredulously that men who once promoted the 
“destructive policy of Jackson-Van Burenism” to an extreme had now been dignified with 
                                                 
479 From the Herald’s correspondent Talleyrand, No. XIII., Washington, Sept. 5. "From Washington." 
Morning Herald [New York, New York] 08 September 1837. 
480 According to Calhoun, both the administration party and the opposition had divided into two parties 
apiece: the administration into “administration proper” and the “conservatives,” and the opposition into the 
“States rights” and “Nationals.” Although Calhoun subsequently aligned with Van Buren’s party, the 
“conservatives” in the administration party had tended to support States’ rights measures, and the 
“administration proper” to promote what Calhoun had considered “National” measures. (Calhoun Letter to 
Anna Miss Anna Maria Calhoun. c. c., Washington, 8th Sept. 1837, J. Franklin 1859-1937 Jameson, 
William Pinckney Starke, and John C. Calhoun, Correspondence of John C. Calhoun., 1900., 377-378.) 
481 "Congressional." Atlas [Boston, Massachusetts] 14 Aug 1837 
482 "Speaking of the objects of the Whigs reminds us of an expression used by us in a few hasty remarks in 
our last Friday's paper…" Daily National Intelligencer 11 Sept 1837. 
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the name “Conservatives.”483 The Daily National Intelligencer stressed that “the 
Conservatives” did not promote Whig principles, but held “less anti-republican,” “less 
agrarian,” and, therefore, “less politically obnoxious” sentiments than the Globe party. 
For those confused by the name, the article clarified for its readers that “the 
Conservatives” could only be considered “conservative” “in certain particulars.”484 J.H. 
Pleasants (the Richmond Whig’s editor) mocked the absurd pretense of this “little party” 
who, “after all its insults to the Constitution,” had suddenly become “far too conservative, 
too much attached to the Constitution, too jealous of presidential patronage,” to support 
Van Buren’s Sub-Treasury scheme.485 
In calling out the hypocrisy or self-interested cynicism of the Conservatives, 
these papers touched on the central problem of party politics in a political system that 
theoretically abjured political parties.486 How could men, purporting to be part of the 
same party, hold such disparate and contradictory views on essential questions of public 
policy? If, as the administration claimed, the Jackson-Van Buren party formed out of 
their mutual commitment to the fundamental principles of democracy, and if they 
opposed the banks (and all monopolies) as a function of adhering to those principles, then 
every man true to democratic principles should promote the policies naturally derived 
                                                 
483 "Election of Printer." Boston Courier [Boston, Massachusetts] 14 Sept. 1837: n.p. Nineteenth Century 
U.S. Newspapers.  
484 NB: the article uniformly addressed the party as “the Conservatives,” with scare-quotes around both the 
article and the noun. (“Speaking of the objects of the Whigs reminds us of an expression used by us in a 
few hasty remarks in our last Friday's paper, which, we understand, has been considered susceptible of an 
inference which we did not intend to authorize. Daily National Intelligencer (Washington, District Of 
Columbia), Monday, September 11, 1837; Issue 7669.) 
485 "THE NINETY-FOUR WHIGS, who threw themselves away upon twenty-two Madisonians, may find a 
merited rebuke in the following extract from Mr. Pleasant's Letter to the readers of the Richmond Whig." 
Boston Courier [Boston, Massachusetts] 921 Sept. 1837] 
486 NB: parties, which imply discipline, structure, bureaucracy, and calcification, as opposed to factions, 
which developed naturally as part of the political process.   
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from them. Disagreement on fundamental questions of policy, therefore, designated 
either a fault in reasoning from first principles, or the destructive influence of passions or 
interests in party ranks. Either the “conservatives” were not truly democrats or the 
dominant party was not truly principled. Ultimately, this position reinforced the political 
binary; like the “dominant party,” the Whig opposition argued in a bipartisan framework: 
men either stood with them or against them.487  
Having spent years accusing the opposition of being unprincipled and anti-
ideological, members of the administration party now found themselves vulnerable to the 
same critique. Heterodox party members now faced a choice: either stand with Van Buren 
against the banks, or stand exposed as a pro-bank, pro-soft money, pro-capitalist, anti-
democratic, anti-egalitarian, neo-federalist. In just over a year, the policies advocated by 
the “conservative wing” of the administration party had gone from being normative to 
putting them beyond the pale of party-adherence.488 
Of course, rumors of a split in the dominant party served the interests of the 
parties who spread them. For the opposition, they generated the sense that the 
administration party verged on disintegration. Perceived infighting betrayed the 
administration party’s political weakness and ideological incoherence, which confirmed 
the opposition’s claims about its artificiality. If the party fractured under Van Buren, then 
it had, in fact, been merely a cult of personality, a one-man Jackson party with delusions 
of endurance. This evidence of the administration party’s profligacy also had the 
                                                 
487 Cf. Michael F. Holt, The Rise and Fall of the American Whig Party: Jacksonian Politics and the Onset 
of the Civil War (Oxford University Press, 2003) 
488 And a policy that the Whigs had advocated in 1834 (the Sub-Treasury) had gone from being considered 
fundamentally federalist to basically radical in the span of three years.  
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potential to unify the opposition in anticipation of their prospects as real contenders for 
political power.  
The Anti-Monopolist faction, on the other hand, wielded the rumors of 
fragmentation to secure a stronghold on the party’s political agenda, exercising an 
implicit threat that they would abandon the party if it failed to meet their demands. They 
operated from a truly ideological position: anti-institutional and anti-government, their 
intolerance of compromise reinforced their claims to principled purity, outside the bounds 
of party discipline (largely because, at this point, they dictated it.)489 Up until this point, 
the majority faction (the “Monopolists” who favored a mixed-currency compromise and 
gradual shift to hard currency) had relied on the ideologically populist and democratic 
rhetoric now inextricably associated with the Anti-Monopolists to build its partisan base. 
If the administration party lost this vector of the party, then they forfeited their 
ideological essence. 
MERCENARY POLITICS AND ARMED NEUTRALITY 
Across the country, popular papers decried the “unprincipled,” “mercenary,” 
“partisan” politicians in Washington, who appeared more interested in policing party 
lines than resolving the bank crisis. Nevertheless, the session wrenched onward without 
any movement. Thomas Ritchie wrote to Rives to “keep cool” and compromise, but 
Ritchie failed to account for the impact that the schism had on the party’s political and 
public image. After months of employing every newspaper in its arsenal to threaten or 
cajole the Conservatives into submission, the administration could not now negotiate with 
                                                 
489 NB: the Anti-Monopolists operated from an ideological position in terms of their arguments. I intend to 
make no claims about the necessary coherence between their rhetoric and the content or outcome of their 
policy positions.  
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them without betraying weakness. Having taken the stand on ideological grounds, they 
could not combine with them on a compromise measure without opening themselves to 
charges of impurity. The administration had to remain committed to their current 
trajectory or risk losing the entire game.490  
Senator Silas Wright redoubled the party’s commitment to Anti-Monopolist 
ideology in his September 14th bill for an Independent Treasury system. Building on 
President Van Buren’s message, the bill made clear that the Anti-Monopolists did not 
merely intend to separate the United States government from banks, they intended to 
separate it from banking entirely. The proposed bill required that public officers should 
act as depositories, instead of State banks, and directed them to keep the public money 
without loaning or using it until the time came for them to dispense with it.491 No longer 
would public money provide the funds that allowed State banks to extend credit, expand 
commerce, and encourage foreign trade, as then Treasury Secretary Robert Taney had 
recommended they do when Jackson first sent the federal deposits to them four years 
earlier.492 In eliminating the possibility of surplus funds, Wright’s bill also short-changed 
federal funding for internal improvements, striking a blow in that decades-long political 
battle and appealing to the remaining contingent of Nullifiers.493 Wright placed the 
system’s implementation and management under the executive branch. Granting Treasury 
Secretary Woodbury complete oversight over the Independent Treasury, the bill relied on 
the discretion of a man famous for his opposition to banks and paper money.  
                                                 
490 Ritchie to Rives, September 20, 1837, John P. Branch Historical Papers of Randolph-Macon College, 
Volume 3, 224-225. 
491 Either by transferring it or paying it out to federal payees.  
492 September 26, 1833 Treasury Circular, Kinley, 29-30. 
493 The bill itself recalled Calhoun’s 1835 deposit bill, which proposed a similar mechanism for controlling 
the public money under the legislative branch. 
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The administration’s aggressive strategy risked more than the balance of 
Congress. By October, it appeared that they risked the national balance of power, as well. 
If Van Buren failed to re-integrate the Conservatives before the approaching midterm 
elections, he risked losing both his home State (New York) and Virginia, both 
battleground States and both States where Conservatives had established a beachhead in 
the prior year. As the elections loomed, nearly a third of Van Buren’s party in the Senate 
voted to adjourn and end the debate on Wright’s Independent Treasury, hoping to table 
the trouble until after the election.494 Unwilling to compromise with the Conservatives 
but unable to pass Wright’s bill without them, the Senate faced a stalemate.  
John C. Calhoun had been waiting for years for just this moment. The 
vulnerable administration desperately needed allies and Calhoun was perfectly positioned 
to dictate terms. In his letters home, he expressed his intention to exploit the party’s 
internecine tension to reclaim the “old Jackson party” for slavery, States’ rights, and free 
trade. That he now held Van Buren’s fate in his hands merely sweetened the deal.495 
Calhoun seized the opportunity to destroy the credit system and “break the last of our 
commercial Shackles,” kicking off legislation that might prevent the federal government 
                                                 
494 With the exception of the senators from Alabama, every administration senator who voted to table the 
Independent Treasury bill came from a state with an impending and uncertain election—Georgia, Indiana, 
Maine, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Virginia—and Van Buren’s party ultimately lost traction in 
every one of them. 
495 Watching the fallout from the president’s message, Calhoun wrote his son, “Van Buren has been forced 
by his situation and the terror of Jackson to play directly into our hands and I am determined, that he shall 
not escape from us. We have now a fair opportunity to break the last of our commercial Shackles. I mean 
the control which the North through the use of Government credit acting through the banks, have exercised 
over our industry and commerce.” In a letter to his daughter Anna, be reveled in the irony that “the author 
of the Safety  fund system and the favourite of New York (the State above  all others the most benefitted by 
the Union of bank and state)  should be forced by circumstances, which he could not control, to give the 
fatal blow to his own offspring and supporters!” (Calhoun Letter to Anna Miss Anna Maria Calhoun. c. c., 
Washington, 8th Sept. 1837, J. Franklin 1859-1937 Jameson, William Pinckney Starke, and John C. 
Calhoun, Correspondence of John C. Calhoun., 1900., 377-378.) 
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from interfering in the southern economy.496 During the debates over Wright’s bill, 
Calhoun offered an amendment that essentially granted legislative sanction to Jackson’s 
Specie Circular.497 On the day that the Senate concluded its debate over Wright’s bill, it 
adopted Calhoun’s amendment. Once passed, the bill would now explicitly convey the 
government’s divestment from the credit system, effectively rendering bank notes illegal 
tender in the payment of government dues, and degrading the bill’s gesture towards 
gradually changing the currency.498  
With Calhoun and his States-Righters, the administration—barely—had the 
numbers to push Wright’s Independent Treasury bill through the Senate at the end of the 
special session. When the opposition could no longer stall (and failed to table) the bill, it 
squeaked by with a vote of twenty-six to twenty-one on October 4, 1837.499 
Unfortunately for Van Buren and his allies, although the Conservatives held a much 
                                                 
496 As discussed in the previous chapter, Calhoun speculated that without the bank system, the North could 
no longer use government credit to control Southern industry and commerce. 
497 The amended bill would phase out all non-specie payments to the government over the next four years 
and repeal the 1816 resolution that allowed for payments in bank notes in the first place. In proposing a 
gradual shift from mixed to exclusively metallic currency, Calhoun’s amendment did not differ 
superficially from Rives’s position the previous January, but as Rives pointed out during Senate debates, 
Calhoun’s call to “repeal” the 1816 resolution sanctioned Jackson’s pocket veto of Rives’s January 1837 
bill. In his undelivered March 3, 1837 veto message, deposited in the State Department, Jackson appended 
Attorney General Butler’s opinion on Rives’s bill, which reiterated that the Secretary of the Treasury had 
no duty to receive bank notes as legal currency, and that the laws enforcing the resolution of 1816 had 
expired. (President, United States, and James Daniel Richardson. A Compilation of the Messages and 
Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897. authority of Congress, 1897, 285- 286.) 
498 The bill’s new clause barely passed with twenty-four votes (to twenty-three opposed); and twenty-five 
percent of Van Buren’s party joined the Whigs in voting against it. Calhoun’s initial amendment called for 
modifying the 1816 resolution, but he changed the language to meet Ohio Senator Thomas Morris’s 
objection to the government receiving “bank notes of any description.” (25th Congress 1st Session Cong. 
Globe 80 (1837) Tuesday, October 5, 1837; Wilentz, The Rise of American Democracy, 2006, 458–64; 
Bray Hammond, Banks and Politics in America from the Revolution to the Civil War (Princeton University 
Press, 1991), 496–99; Silbey, Martin Van Buren and the Emergence of American Popular Politics, 2005, 
119–38; Holt, Political Parties and American Political Development, 52–54.) 
499 The six administration men who opposed the bill (one-fifth of the administration party’s representation 
in the Senate) irrevocably outted themselves as “Conservatives” with this vote: John King (GA), John 
Tipton (IN), Robert Nicholas (LA), Nathaniel Tallmadge (NY), Samuel McKean (PA), and, of course, 
William Rives (VA). John Ruggles of Maine, who also self-identified as a Conservative, was recorded as 
“no vote.”  
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smaller proportion of seats in the House than the Senate, they still took up enough space 
to suffocate the Independent Treasury after a week and a half of debate. On October 14th, 
fifteen administration congressmen joined one-hundred and fifteen members of the 
opposition in tabling Wright’s bill in the House.500 They repeated this trick during the 
following session and for the next three years, forestalling a change in American fiscal 
policy that had appeared inevitable before the Conservatives revolted.501 
In stalling the Independent Treasury, the “little Conservative band of armed 
neutrals” kept a divisive administration policy in front of the American public, 
continuously demonstrating Van Buren’s weakness on a national stage and providing 
fodder for the opposition.502 But their success in destabilizing Van Buren came at their 
own expense. Although they held their own State conventions in 1838, 1839, and 1840, 
and won races at the national and local level, the Conservatives themselves ultimately 
held sway only briefly, and then were consigned to the margins of political history. 
Within five years, about half of those Conservatives who remained in politics had bled 
back into Van Buren’s party, and half joined the Whigs. Several of the more outspoken 
                                                 
500 They also finally repealed the 1836 Specie Circular. (Graff, Henry Franklin. The Presidents: A 
Reference History. Macmillan Library Reference USA, 1997., 134) 
501 During the first regular session of the 25th United States Congress (on March 26, 1838), the Independent 
Treasury (S. 157) passed the Senate twenty-seven to twenty-five. Eight administration senators joined the 
opposition in voting against the bill. Five senators who voted against the bill were already considered 
Conservatives after the October vote. The other three had their own reasons. Calhoun defected after Albert 
Cuthbert (Van Buren party from Georgia) successfully struck the specie clause from the bill, and both 
James Buchanan and Felix Grundy had been instructed to vote against the bill by their state legislatures. 
Administration men in the House introduced an Independent Treasury bill (H. 597) that retained a specie 
clause, but the opposition prevented it from being read a third time or engrossed at the end of June. The 
following February, Wright’s version of the bill (S. 258) passed the Senate twenty-eight to fifteen, but the 
House adjourned without considering it. (Cole, Donald B. Martin Van Buren and the American Political 
System. Princeton University Press, 2014., 333, 341) 
502 John M. Niles, “On Mr. Rives's Resolution.” Appendix to the Congressional Globe 25th Congress 3rd 
Session. 
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Conservatives left politics entirely.503 By the time they held their first national convention 
in 1840, they had already lost the battle over the Independent Treasury and with it the 
battle over the essence of the “democratic republican” party.504  
When the Independent Treasury finally did pass, it only did so as a product of 
institutional failure.505 Van Buren’s party obstructed elections in Pennsylvania, New 
York, Michigan, Virginia, Delaware, and New Jersey. Five of these States had vacancies 
in the Senate when the Twenty-Sixth United States Congress began in December 1839. 
Van Buren’s machine ensured that senators who had been crucial in blocking the 
Independent Treasury bill were either excluded from higher office or stalled on their way 
to Washington. Administration men at the State level refused to endorse anyone who 
would not pledge support for the Independent Treasury in the upcoming Senate. In 
Pennsylvania, the “Buckshot War” blocked Conservative Samuel McKean from re-
election, in spite of popular support, leaving Van Buren loyalist James Buchanan to cast 
Pennsylvania’s sole vote in favor of the bill.506 The Van Buren-controlled New York 
State Senate blocked Nathaniel Tallmadge’s election in March 1839, leaving New York 
without a senator until January 1840, when the Whigs controlled both houses and 
                                                 
503 John King of Georgia resigned after the 1837 special session rather than obey instructions to vote for the 
Independent Treasury. (Kulikoff, Allan. The Agrarian Origins of American Capitalism. University of 
Virginia Press, 1992., 87) Daniel Kilgore of Ohio resigned in October of 1838 “on the ground that the 
election of a Sub-Treasury man as his successor proves that the people disapprove of his course.” (The 
New-Yorker. v.6 1838-1839., 75 (Oct 20, 1838) Indiana’s John Tipton died in 1839. Samuel McKean, 
blackballed by Van Buren’s party in Pennsylvania during the 1839 election, attempted suicide on June 30, 
1840 (the day the treasury passed); he survived his injuries, but died the following year.  
504 “The Hon. William C. Rives, of Virginia, and the Great Conservative Convention at Auburn—the 
Journey up the North River—The Scenes and the Incidents—Arrival at Albany—Breakfast with Governor 
Seward—Loco Foco Convention At Syracuse—Arrival at Auburn—the Ladies—Organization of the 
Meeting—the Speeches, &.c. SCC. From the New York Herald, Oct. 3,” Hezekiah Niles et al., Niles’ 
Weekly Register, 1841., 156-159 
505 Emma Teitelman, personal communication, February 2015.  
506 The clash in Harrisburg also prevented his replacement, Van Burenite Daniel Sturgeon, from qualifying 
to vote in the Senate until the day after the Independent Treasury vote. 
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successfully elected him. Tallmadge arrived to take his position on January 27, 1840, four 
days after the Independent Treasury vote. Local party politics also delayed Michigan 
Whig Augustus Porter from joining the Senate until two weeks after the vote.507  
Unresolved party disputes prevented Virginia508 and Delaware509 from filling their open 
Senate seats for two years. Both States were left with only one US senator apiece until 
Whigs gained control of their State legislatures in 1841. Tennessee’s Hugh Lawson 
White resigned rather than follow instructions from the Van Buren party-controlled State 
legislature to vote in favor of the bill, leaving Felix Grundy to cast Tennessee’s sole vote 
in favor of the Treasury.510  
When the Senate voted on the Independent Treasury Bill in January 1840, then, 
ten senators missed the crucial vote, eight of whom would have voted against the bill,511 
                                                 
507 In spite of its repeated attempts, the Michigan legislature failed to fill the position left by Van Buren 
supporter Lucius Lyon when he finished his term in March 1839. They indefinitely postponed the election 
until they met again the following year. When they met in January 1840, the newly Whig-dominant 
legislature passed an act explicitly “to provide for the election of United States Senator” which gave finally 
them the leverage to elect Whig Augustus S. Porter to the Senate at the end of the month. (Utley, Henry 
Munson, Byron Mac Cutcheon, and Clarence Monroe Burton. Michigan as a State, from Its Admission to 
the Union to the Close of the Civil War, by B. M. Cutcheon. Publishing society of Michigan, 1906, 162.)  
508 By the time that William C. Rives came up for re-election in 1839, the Van Burenites had withdrawn 
their endorsement and some pro-Independent Treasury Whigs refused to support him because he had voted 
in 1836 to expunge Jackson’s censure. Virginia’s administration party attempted to use Rives as a wedge to 
break the state’s Conservative party, painting him as a Clay-partisan who would no longer support any 
democratic or Van Buren policies. Unable to agree on an alternative, the Virginia state legislature 
indefinitely postponed the election twice, in 1839 and 1840. Finally, in 1841, the Whig-dominated Virginia 
legislature elected Rives to the Twenty-Seventh United States Senate without a fight. (Dingledine, 330-332, 
340, 358-359, 376.)  
509 Whig Richard Bayard had resigned in September 1839 to become the Delaware Supreme Court’s Chief 
Justice, but the Van Buren party majority in Delaware’s General Assembly failed to appoint his successor. 
His seat remained vacant until he was re-elected to the Twenty-Seventh United States Senate in 1841. 
510 White’s colleague, Ephraim Foster, had resigned the prior March for the same reason. Democrat Felix 
Grundy, who was still serving as Van Buren’s attorney general, replaced him, setting off a national scandal. 
In response to mounting criticism, Grundy resigned his cabinet position, but the Senate refused to confirm 
him because he had been elected while still part of Van Buren’s cabinet. As a result, Grundy resigned his 
Senate seat in mid-December and the Tennessee state legislature responded by re-elected him within days. 
511 Based on their previous votes and private statements.  
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which would have led to an even split.512 Ultimately, twenty-four senators (all Van 
Buren’s men) voted in favor of the bill in the Senate on January 23, 1840, and eighteen 
opposed it, including four administration men.513 It is unclear if Van Buren would have 
allowed the bill to come to a vote if faced with a full roster in the Senate. Although the 
measure would have passed (with Vice President Johnson casting his tie-breaking vote), 
it did not have enough public support for Van Buren to push it through a recalcitrant 
Congress. Even with a majority in the Senate, Van Buren had to delay bringing the bill to 
the House until after two contested New Jersey congressional elections had been resolved 
in his party’s favor at the end of June. Without those five seats, Van Buren could not trust 
that his party would win the vote.514  
On July 4, 1840, Van Buren signed the bill into law in what could only be 
considered a pyrrhic victory.515 Van Buren’s fixation on this unpopular issue tanked his 
                                                 
512 Maryland Whig John Spence and Massachusetts Whig Daniel Webster also missed the Independent 
Treasury vote. But Webster was absent because he had returned from a trip to England mid-January, and 
Spence was on leave for the session’s duration, appearing on the floor only sporadically. 
513 Richard Young and John Robinson of Illinois, Robert Nicholas of Louisiana, and John Ruggles of 
Maine all voted against the Independent Treasury. Nicholas and Ruggles had long advocated the 
Conservative position, but both Young and Robinson had voted in favor of the Independent Treasury 
during the first debates over it in 1837.  
514 Inconsistencies in New Jersey’s 1839 congressional elections invalidated the returns from two districts. 
Back in December, Van Buren’s party used its bare majority in the House to exclude New Jersey’s 
predominantly Whig delegation until a Congressional committee determined which party should have those 
seats. Known as the “Broad Seal War,” this conflict started when ten New Jersey representatives (five 
Whigs and five Administration) showed up to fill five contested seats in the House in December 1839. 
Because of New Jersey’s election policy, the state had no Congressional delegation at all until after they 
had resolved the dispute, so the state’s Whig governor voided the questionable returns, granting the open 
seats to the five Whigs who had won without those votes being counted. New Jersey’s Democratic 
Secretary of State rebelled from the decision, certifying the five Democrats who had originally won. 
If the New Jersey Whigs were permitted to take their seats, the administration would have lost its majority 
in Congress: at the start of the 26th United States Congress, the House had 119 administration men and 118 
in opposition, not counting these disputed seats. Back in December, Van Buren’s party used its bare 
majority in the House to exclude New Jersey’s predominantly Whig delegation (the 119 administration 
representatives voted to investigate the election, instead of ceding those seats to the Whig delegates and 
losing their majority in Congress.) (Jeffery A. Jenkins, “Partisanship and Contested Election Cases in the 
House of Representatives, 1789-2002) 
515 On June 30, 1840, 124 congressmen voted to pass Van Buren’s Independent Treasury (S. 127.) Of that 
number, three Whigs and one Conservative broke party discipline and voted for the bill. Walter Colquitt, 
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chances for re-election and the compromises he made to pass it completely reshaped his 
party in a way that ultimately excluded him from it. The party narrowed ideologically 
under Van Buren’s tenure, increasingly favoring the two factions he empowered during 
the struggle for the sub-treasury: the Benton-led expansionists and Calhoun’s pro-slavery 
faction. Neither of these groups trusted Van Buren to advocate for their interests. For one, 
he had always been cagey on his own attitude toward slavery. Although he courted the 
pro-slavery vote by defending States’ rights, deploying the gag rule in Congress, and 
declaring that he would never sign a bill abolishing slavery in DC, he had often 
advocated non-federal solutions on questions of slavery so that he could avoid taking a 
positive position. During his career, he had been associated with the American 
Colonization Society, defended the right of people of color to act as witnesses in court, 
and consistently opposed slavery’s expansion to new territory, a position he maintained 
when rejecting Texas’s 1837 bid for annexation. Pro-slavery agitators even considered 
his behavior in the Amistad case suspect, since he essentially volleyed the case to foreign 
powers. When he came out publically against annexing Texas in 1844, he torched his 
relationship with both the pro-slavery and expansionist wings of the party.  
In purging the democratic party of those members unwilling to conform 
ideologically, the more radical democratic and anti-capitalist elements paved the way for 
an ideologically (and nominally) coherent Democratic party. The 1840 Democratic party 
platform declared that Congress had no power to interfere with the States’ domestic 
                                                                                                                                                 
Mark Cooper, and Edward Black, all Georgia Whigs, joined the Democratic party for the subsequent 
Congress. George Hopkins, who been elected to the 26th Congress as a member of the Conservative party, 
supported the bill and also ran as a (successful) Democratic candidate for the 27th Congress. On the other 
hand, two Democrats (William Wick and John Campbell) joined two Conservatives, six Anti-Masonics, 
and ninety-seven Whigs in voting against the bill. 
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institutions and that party members would not abide any efforts “by abolitionists or 
others,” to induce Congress “to interfere with questions of slavery, or to take incipient 
steps in relation thereto.”516 The publication marked the first time a national party issued 
a formal platform and the first time that any party explicitly declared its intention to 
defend slavery. In fact, only after the Conservative defection does it make sense to refer 
to the Democratic party. At its 1840 national convention, the party officially adopted the 
name “Democratic” and in the “Proceedings of the National Democratic Convention,” 
delegates uniformly referred to Van Buren’s party as the “Democratic party” and the 
“Democrats.”517 Before this shift, the parties lacked coherent ideologies, but this conflict 
solidified each party’s public image, and confirmed the power of polarizing invective in 
the hands of a swelling popular press. Ultimately, then, the Conservative revolution 
resulted in a complete realignment in American politics, leading pro-slavery and 
expansionist factions to dominate the Democratic party after 1840, while also giving 
them the rhetorical space to cast themselves as the defenders of American values and the 
Whigs and other opposition parties as foreign conservatives.  
 
  
                                                 
516 The convention also excised Van Buren’s vice president from the ticket because he had lived in a 
marriage-like relationship with his slave, Julia Chinn, and because he insisted on educating their daughters. 
517 Only the men from Tennessee, Felix Grundy and convention president William Carroll referred to it as 
the “Republican party” in their speeches. (Democratic National Convention, Proceedings of the National 
Democratic Convention: Held in ... Baltimore, on the 5th of May, 1840. Embracing Resolutions, Expressive 
of the Sentiments of the Democratic Party of the Union: And an Address, in Support of the Principles and 
Measures of the Present National Administration (Printed at the Office of Blair & Rives, 1840), 3, 21.) 
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CHAPTER 4: THE ORGANIC REFORMER 
Since Jackson’s first election, the Democratic party’s strength had rested on a 
combination of a fractured opposition and a willingness to discard non-conformists. After 
the “soft money” Democrats defected, however, the Whigs consolidated power as a party, 
and consistently (if unevenly) disrupted Democratic dominance at the State and national 
level. By the end of the 1830s, the Whigs had become the country’s de facto 
“Conservative” party in domestic and international media, characterized as a facsimile of 
foreign conservatism and, likewise, linked to the centralization of power, aristocratic 
class structures, international banking, and the protection of amalgamated wealth. As the 
last chapter addressed, the Democratic party in this period used the label “conservatism” 
instrumentally to associate its opposition with foreign and reactionary parties, and with 
corporate capitalist interests, in particular. “The tendency of American Conservatism,” 
wrote the Globe in 1839, “is at bottom British Conservatism,” a struggle between 
moneyed power and popular power, and of “mercenary influence against popular rights.” 
Like the British aristocracy, the Whigs wanted nothing more than to “perpetuate and 
extend corporation abuses” in order to “oppress and rob the people.”518 Although both the 
Whig and Democratic parties harbored men with corporate, capitalist, and banking 
connections, common knowledge at the time almost exclusively identified those interests 
with the Whig party. 
                                                 
518 The only difference between British and American Conservatives was the method they used. In Great 
Britain, the Conservatives preserved the mechanism of aristocratic abuse to “oppress and rob the people.” 
In the United States, they fought to “perpetuate and extend corporation abuses for the same purpose. 
(Francis Preston Blair, ed., “Mr. Clay’s Lieutenant—The Conservative Crusader,” Extra Globe, 1839, 228–
29.) 
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In his three-volume work on America, British radical social reformer James Silk 
Buckingham examined the American Whig’s policy positions and determined that they 
basically reproduced their Tory and high-conservative Whig counterparts in England. 
“The conservatives are here called Whigs,” he wrote, “and they correspond in political 
character and sentiment with the Whigs of England; being quite as loud in their 
professions of liberal principles, but quite as unwilling to carry them out into practice.” 
Buckingham observed that, like their namesakes, the American Whigs sought to amplify 
money’s voice in political operations. Economically capitalist and commercially 
protectionist, they promoted monopolies and chartered (or incorporated) banks and toyed 
with the idea of limiting the franchise to citizens with property.519 In their attitude toward 
“the people” and universal rights, Buckingham elaborated, they sympathized “almost 
universally” with the English Tories, fighting democratization and permissive voting 
laws, and, just like the Tories had earlier in the decade, they obstructed debate over 
slavery, being “generally hostile” to its abolition. Overall, Buckingham found the 
American Whigs “quite as conservative” as Conservatives in England.520 
If foreign observers concluded that the Whigs fostered anti-democratic, anti-
popular, and classist tendencies, they could hardly be accused of mischaracterizing the 
party. Certainly, outspoken proponents for the national bank and other pro-banking 
measures found a more comfortable home in the Whig party than among the Democrats; 
and prominent Whigs like Daniel Webster, with overt ties to international capital, 
compounded the public perception of their essentially foreign “whig” or “corporation” 
                                                 
519 Referring specifically to Daniel Webster’s political economy, Buckingham observed that “He is what in 
England would be called truly Conservative.” (James Silk Buckingham, America Historical, Statistic and 
Descriptive, vol. 1, (London and Paris, 1841), 331.) 
520 Buckingham, America, 59-62. 
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conservatism.521 As the LocoFoco movement appeared to overrun the Democratic party 
in the late 1830s, moreover, some Whigs expressly longed to import the kind of foreign 
conservatism that would wipe out America’s emergent labor parties, advocating measures 
that attempted to secure social distinctions in a land without codified class heredity (even 
if it structurally and legally perpetuated class-stratification.) In a March 1840 letter to his 
colleague at the Baring Brothers financial firm in London, Webster complained that “our 
locofocoism… is not a whit better than your socialism.” In their blindly obstructionist 
opposition to capitalist measures, he reported, the Loco Focos prevented the federal 
government from resolving State debts, which devalued US Treasury notes on the 
international market and threatened American welfare at home and abroad. Considering 
their “miserable exhibition” in the most recent congressional session, Webster concluded, 
“We need a Conservative party more than you do.”522 Later that year, Webster’s 
“Conservatives” consolidated their political power in a national campaign that completely 
transformed American democracy. 
Ironically, considering the theoretical antagonism between conservatism and 
popular rule, the “Conservative” Whigs were the ones who cemented the popular turn in 
national politics.523 Breaking with tradition, Harrison stumped for himself, as part of a 
                                                 
521 “Individual Responsibility. From the Washington Globe,” Dover Gazette & Strafford Advertiser, May 
25, 1844.  
522 A.R.M. Lower and Daniel Webster, “An Unpublished Letter of Daniel Webster,” The New England 
Quarterly 12, no. 2 (June 1939): 360–64. 
523 John Gerald Gasaway, “Tippecanoe and the Party Press Too: Mass Communication, Politics, Culture, 
and the Fabled Presidential Election of 1840” (Ph.D., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1999), 
attn: 309-320, 
http://proxy.library.upenn.edu:2299/docview/304504133/abstract/B7486148024D4F6BPQ/1; James J. 
Connolly, “Introduction: The Problem of Pluralism in Antebellum American Politics,” in An Elusive Unity: 
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centrally-coordinated national spectacle.524 In an unprecedented frenzy of rallies and 
marches—featuring drinking, music, and overblown oratory—the Whigs trotted out 
William Henry Harrison, once again, but this time as a national (instead of a regional) 
candidate.525 During the 1840 presidential election, the Whigs touted their candidate as a 
political outsider, a plainspoken hero and self-made man, who would end government 
corruption and the political spoils system, and his opponent as a member of New York’s 
elite, a physically weak, effete lifetime politician, who spent more on his clothing than on 
his constituents, and who had ridden the coattails of a former president as far as they 
would go.526 Reporting on these Whig political conventions, the Western Messenger (a 
Cincinnati-based Unitarian journal edited by Transcendentalists James Freeman Clarke 
and William Henry Channing) reprimanded the Conservative (Whig) party for 
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increasingly indulging in this kind of “popular flattery.” In their conventions, the 
Messenger disclosed, the Whigs called forth the “prejudice and hatred of the poorer 
classes,” resorting to “slang and nicknames” and fomenting public drunkenness. In their 
choice of leaders, they defaulted to the “available candidates,” when the “great aim of the 
true Conservative party, from the time of Washington, has been to withstand demagogism 
in all its forms.” In pandering to the people’s lowest instincts, the Whigs made them unfit 
for self-government and created the conditions where they would soon no longer govern 
themselves.527 
At the end of the campaign, the Whigs successfully mobilized a large number of 
Van Buren’s opposition: eighty percent of eligible voters made it to the polls (compared 
with 56% in 1836) and the new voters cast their ballots for Harrison. Though Van Buren 
received a comparable number of votes in both the 1836 and the 1840 elections, the 
influx of opposition votes swept him out of office. The Whigs marshalled William Henry 
Harrison to the presidency with strong support from the border States and the deep South, 
and took control of both the House and the Senate, to boot.528 For the first time in forty 
years, the “party of Jefferson” lost the South, due in no small part to the fact that the 
                                                 
527 James Freeman Clarke, William Henry Channing, and James Handasyd Perkins, eds., “Political 
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Whigs had seized the initiative on slavery.529 In addition to nominating a slave-holder for 
president, they orchestrated and passed the first total gag on receiving anti-slavery 
petitions in the House.530  
The Whig coup thoroughly destabilized the Democrats. Not only were they afraid 
that the Whigs would overturn the reforms they had implemented over the past decade, 
but they were shocked that the Whigs had won, at all.531 The comprehensive 
“Conservative” victory contradicted their teleological narrative of progress, in which any 
American party constituted on anti-democratic principles could not thrive because it 
contravened the “fundamental principle of our organic law, which is Democracy.” The 
Democratic Review encapsulated this position in an article it published two years earlier 
about the Whig loss in the 1838 midterm elections. Even if an anti-democratic party like 
the Whigs successfully deluded a large portion of the population to vote against their 
natural instincts and affinities, “by the profession of a popular character directly at 
variance with the true spirit of its measures, and with the known and avowed opinions of 
all its principal leaders and controlling influence,” and with its “nonsensical tirades” 
about rigged elections and corrupt deals, or about the Democratic party’s hostility to 
“commerce, credit, and national industry and prosperity,” or about the “abuse of power 
                                                 
529 When the question of Van Buren’s “Southern principles” re-emerged during the 1840 election, Whig 
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and ambitious monarchical aspirations of [the Democratic party’s] leaders,” the 
Democratic Review declared that the Whigs could not sustain those lies for long. As a 
party, it went against everything it claimed to support in its campaigns and no party that 
had “any thing to conceal, any false professions to make, any unavowed ulterior objects 
to attain” could flourish in a country with “free institutions, universal suffrage, and 
unrestricted liberty of discussion.” Surely, the people would see past its abject 
falsehoods; surely, they would realize that it intended to undermine their popular rights. 
Without the “vital and conservative principle of pure democracy” flowing through its 
body, the Whig party was a “hollow and a rotten thing” subsisting on “decay and 
destruction,”532 and it would inevitably crumble under the weight of its own nothingness. 
When the Democratic Review had predicted the Whig party’s imminent demise in 1838, 
it had voiced the common Democratic-party consensus. Progressive democratic theory 
determined that the Whigs were doomed.  
When, instead, the Whigs routed the Democrats in 1840—and, again, somehow 
hoodwinked the white working-class into voting against their interests—the Democratic 
party scrambled to account for the loss. Immediately after the election, the Globe 
concluded that the Whigs won because they spent an unprecedented amount of money.533 
The pro-slavery faction, on the other hand, pointed to Van Buren’s weakness on State 
rights, and the frontier Democrats blamed the perception that he had prioritized eastern 
interests over western development.534 Calhoun seized the opportunity to push the pro-
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slavery agenda and Benton to encourage expansion; party Democrats re-entrenched 
behind those positions to bolster their trans-regional appeal in the deep South and the 
frontier States.535 
The new balance of power in the Democratic party further alienated those 
Democrats harboring anti-slavery sympathies (many of whom abjured the Whig party for 
its accommodationist position, but had also become increasingly uncomfortable with the 
Democrats after Calhoun re-entered the fold in 1837), and caused a rift among Democrats 
active in workingmen’s causes, marginalizing those reformers who viewed slavery and 
territorial acquisition as tools that profited merchant-capitalists at the expense of labor 
and the debtor class. To be part of the Whig party meant aligning with capitalists and 
banks; to be part of the Democrats meant aligning with slave-holders and their imperialist 
enablers. So long as these two parties remained the only options for those reformers who 
sought to be politically engaged, to be anti-bank or anti-capitalist—to be pro-labor—
entailed opposing express freedoms for people of color.536 At the national level, the 
                                                                                                                                                 
regional campaigns. In the East, they promised to oppose land policies that benefitted the frontier States; in 
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Chickasaw and Choctaw during the Northwest Indian War and the Shawnee in Tecumseh’s War, and his 
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Democratic party acted as a unit, but their fractured consensus remained evident in State 
and local electoral and legislative politics, and vividly re-emerged on the national scene 
every four years, like clockwork.537 
After the election, the Democrats embraced the same popular Whig tactics they 
had thoroughly excoriated during the 1840 campaign in order to restore their connection 
with the white working-class.538 This shift exposed and amplified tensions within the 
Democratic party and between equality-oriented reformers over the value and 
implications of popular politics. At the time, social activists tended to equate democratic 
and equality-oriented reform; to fight for one was to fight for the other. But the decisive 
Whig victory demonstrated that popular or democratic reforms would not necessarily 
benefit the working class, especially if something within the system itself gummed up the 
works. In a corrupt democratic system, where capitalists controlled the franchise and 
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misappropriated funds to finance their elaborate and seductive political campaigns, 
private wealth distorted the popular voice. Even the most unconditional supporters of 
democratic principles recognized that the election reflected poorly on the state of 
American democracy. If the anti-democratic party simultaneously rigged the elections 
and manipulated access to voting in their favor, then popular reforms actually increased 
their strength and prevented emancipatory changes for the working class (or any other 
marginalized or structurally-disenfranchised group). The Whigs compounded these 
concerns when they shifted their politics toward nativism in the 1840s. In opposing 
immigration, inciting anti-Catholic (functionally, anti-Irish working-class) sentiment, and 
pushing against liberalizing naturalization laws, they suppressed the populations that 
traditionally voted for the Democratic party.539  
In this context, the Whig push to consolidate power in the federal government 
took on a sinister aspect. Their democratic critics warned that these totalizing systems 
exploited every ounce of control willingly ceded. In the same way that capitalists and 
bankers deployed debt to create a dependent debtor class, they charged, the Whigs 
wielded federal funding to transform the States from independent bodies into subordinate 
vassalages, and their citizens from free men to peonage. Federal planning, federally-
funded roads and canals, federal standards and regulations all reinforced this artificial 
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hierarchy, while federal education programs indoctrinated the country’s subject 
populations so that they perceived the system as natural. As soon as the Whigs 
successfully concentrated their authority in a hegemonic bureaucracy, their Democratic 
opposition predicted, they would use the power unilaterally to reshape the electorate and 
impose their will. If equality-oriented reformers sought to effect real social change, then 
they might have to look beyond democratic means.  
Before the 1840 election, the Whig Daily National Intelligencer had anticipated 
that the Democratic party would fall out over their positions on popular electoral politics 
and popular reform. Calhoun’s faction had initially allied with Van Buren’s LocoFocos to 
further their collective anti-capitalist aims and the two parties shared a contempt for 
federal control, the Intelligencer observed, but they entertained mutually exclusive 
theories of government. Calhoun’s pro-slavery phalanx relied on disproportionate 
representation and an unequal distribution of power to protect slavery from the northern 
tyranny of numbers, while the LocoFocos privileged popular democratic rule over 
republican safeguards, and programmatically promoted universal emancipation. 
According to the Intelligencer, the LocoFocos had temporized their position on Southern 
slavery in order to secure Southern votes against the Northern banks, but they could not 
sustain that position for long. Philosophically, the LocoFoco concept of the “largest 
liberty” embraced the “emigrants of all races, and the colors of all human kind,” 
predisposing them to “abolition for the whole human race, as well as to the abolition of 
all restraining law.” Furthermore, their commitment to democratic principles meant that 
they would invariably flow in the direction that democracy thrust them: if the majority of 
the people willed down “slave institutions,” then “down they must go.” Eventually, their 
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totalizing theory of democracy would effectively unleash the same kind of hegemonic 
consolidation as Whig federalism—a majoritarian absolutism in which the Northern 
community imposed its will on the Southern. In that case, the Daily National 
Intelligencer projected, slavery’s real defense lay with the kind of anti-popular 
“Conservatism” associated with the Whig party—a conservatism that believed in 
contracts that could not “be repealed by a majority at will” and constitutions that the 
“majority may not in an hour upset.”540  
In the uncertain political atmosphere following the election, Calhoun reached out 
to northern political activists similarly skeptical about the absolute value of popular 
democracy, wary of consolidation, and disaffected with the Democratic party’s 
leadership—most notably, radical reformer and Democratic party proxy Orestes 
Brownson. In the 1830s, Brownson had explicitly lifted his basic operating principles 
from Calhoun’s political writings, which he habitually reviewed in his journals and cited 
in his articles and public speeches. Although Brownson opposed slavery and had twice 
spoken at Anti-Slavery societies, he had long supported Calhoun, attracted by his State 
rights doctrine and his opposition to corporate capital and private banking. After reading 
Brownson’s April 1838 article on “Slavery—Abolition,” Calhoun had returned the 
affection, starting a correspondence with Brownson about philosophy and politics, 
confiding in him his own desire to publish a treatise on the nature and object of 
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government, and subscribing to Brownson’s journal (the Boston Quarterly Review), 
which he cited and recommended to his friends.541  
In Brownson, in particular, Calhoun found a loyal lieutenant and a metaphysical 
counterpart. In Calhoun’s theories of government, Brownson found the socio-political 
means to obtain his teleological aims. Brownson’s hybrid meta-political philosophy 
anticipated the popular split in the Democratic party. Starting in the 1830s, Brownson 
built an eclectic vision of organic progress based on his involvement with the 
Transcendentalist and social utopian movements that prioritized practical methods to 
secure social equality and justice over the reflexive (and, he argued, counter-productive) 
adherence to popular government. In their “mania for governing,” Brownson wrote in 
1838, American Democrats had lost sight of their purpose in fighting for political power 
in the first place: to establish the liberating social conditions in which men and society 
could freely fulfill their divinely-appointed destinies.  
Brownson had company in this unexpected affiliation. In the early 1840s, a 
number of northeastern anti-banking and pro-labor reformers turned to Calhoun for the 
same reasons that Brownson had. Like Brownson, they distrusted Van Buren’s personal 
politics, viewing him as an empty suit who paid lip service to democratic doctrine 
because it would get him elected, and bowed to the peoples will, regardless of whether it 
was right or just, because it would keep him in office. Like Brownson, they prioritized 
worker’s rights over other kinds of reform, and had grown increasingly hostile to the 
Northern anti-slavery movement because (they claimed) it attempted to legislate the 
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material conditions of Southern slaves of color—damaging the delicate balance between 
State and federal jurisdiction—while it hypocritically ignored the crippling poverty of 
white workers in the North. It was work like Brownson’s that forced this double bind 
between race and class, in the first place, because the logic of organic reform demanded 
that activists choose improvement for one group over another, or sacrifice their chances 
for progress, at all. In Calhoun, these reformers found a politician who voiced the 
exploitation suffered by the white laboring class and grasped the dangers posed by the 
banking industry; a revolutionary in the original sense of the term, who promised to 
dismantle the wretched machinery of party politics, to prune the government of political 
spoilsmen, and to return the Democratic party to the “purity” of the Jeffersonian era.542 
Calhoun’s relationship with northern anti-banking and pro-labor reformers exposed the 
fault lines in American radical and democratic politics—between the anti-capitalist, free 
trade, and pro-labor positions—and heightened the internecine tensions between the 
“proletarian” parties (in Brownson’s prescient phrase) and the various iterations of the 
anti-slavery movement.  
In the time between Harrison’s election and the next presidential campaign, 
American democracy experienced a series of convulsions that reinforced Brownson’s 
distrust of popular democracy. Influenced by the French romantic socialists, particularly 
Hugues-Félicité Robert de Lamennais and Pierre Leroux, Brownson stressed the organic 
generation of socio-political communities, as well as the dangers posed by the 
centralization of power.543 What Brownson came to refer to as “social Democracy” (and, 
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eventually, as “conservatism”) dovetailed with Calhoun’s doctrine of State rights, which 
grounded power in decentralized organic communities, and his concept of concurrent 
majorities, which theoretically absolved individuals and groups of their particular, 
material identities and pushed them to engage one-another’s essential humanity. Over 
time, Brownson developed a synthetic approach that balanced the destabilizing 
tendencies of the country’s “movement” parties without sacrificing the nation’s forward 
motion. Combining French romantic socialist theories, Saint-Simonian idealism, German 
romanticism, and the organic attachment to established forms, Brownson bridged the 
Transcendentalist notion of progress and Calhoun’s constitutional originalism, 
advocating a leveling conservatism that bred equal rights organically from the nation’s 
established constitutional order.  
When Calhoun geared up to take over the Democratic party in the early 1840s, 
Brownson donated his voice and his public platform to the cause. Brownson’s 
increasingly explicit self-identification with Calhoun in the wake of the catastrophic 1840 
election clarifies the shift in the way Brownson described his own politics in this 
period—from “radical” to “conservative”—and the evident discomfort it caused among 
his more popularly-oriented radical and reformist peers. Even as Brownson’s alliance 
with the democratic party deteriorated in the 1840s, and after his express conservatism 
made him an outcast among reformers, Brownson retained his affinity for Calhoun, who 
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found in him a fierce and unwavering northern proponent of State rights and against 
majoritarian politics. By the time the 1844 election rolled around, Brownson had been 
declared apostate from the Democratic party for his conservatism and summarily excised. 
Although Brownson’s continuous exposition in the service of Calhoun’s candidacy 
ultimately led to his political exile, it also anticipated and contributed to the ideological 
and strategic restructuring of the Democratic party as it shifted from popular reform to 
“popular conservatism” in the late 1840s. His transition from radical reformer and 
Democratic party proxy to self-confessed conservative prefigured the Democratic 
trajectory toward increasingly coercive and authoritarian modes of governance, and his 
theory of organic reform forecast the generation, through the combination of organic 
philosophy and Calhoun’s leadership, of a uniquely “democratic” conservatism.  
THE RADICAL 
Like William Cabell Rives, Brownson once seemed an unlikely figure to associate 
with conservatism, at all. Born into poverty and adopted by a middle-aged farming 
couple in Vermont as a small child, Brownson received negligible formal education.544 
After apprenticing with a Universalist minister for nine months, he obtained his 
ordination in 1826, served as a pastor in half a dozen different congregations in the 
burned-over district of New York, and worked as the editor for the Universalist Gospel 
Advocate. When the Advocate fired him in 1829, they did so because his outspoken social 
meliorism hemorrhaged their subscribers and his progressively radical views alienated 
the Universalist brass. By the time he left the Advocate, Brownson had attracted radicals 
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Fanny Wright and Robert Dale Owen, who reprinted his articles in their New Harmony 
Gazette. Eventually, he joined forces with the Workingmen’s movement in New York, 
writing for Wright’s Free Enquirer in 1829. Through Wright, he encountered what he 
later described as “philosophical sentimentalism,” characterized by the works of 
Bernardin de St. Pierre, Madame de Staël, Benjamin Constant, Chateaubriand, Adam 
Smith, and Johann Georg Jacobi. In July 1830, Brownson established the Genesee 
Republican and Herald of Reform in upstate New York, a paper dedicated to promoting 
universal public education, working-class representation in legislatures, and anti-
monopoly legislation, and ending debtors’ prisons and caucus politics.545 Two months 
later, the General Convention of Universalists for the New England States 
excommunicated him for his radicalism.  
For the next decade, Brownsons’s equalitarian, anti-capitalist, and pro-labor 
politics defined his public persona, as did his association with the Transcendentalists. 
After spending time leading small Unitarian congregations in New Hampshire and 
Massachusetts, Brownson wound up just outside of Boston in 1836, where he founded 
the Society for Christian Union and Progress, a working-class ministry devoted to 
creating social change through education.546  In September 1836, Brownson’s friend, 
Unitarian minister George Ripley invited him to join a new group of like-minded idealists 
meeting at his home: the Transcendentalist Club.547 Like the other Transcendentalists, 
Brownson had spent the prior decade immersing himself in German and French literature 
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and had come to take an eclectic and idealist approach to religion.548 In particular, he 
embraced the synthetic eclecticism of French philosopher Victor Cousin, with whom he 
frequently corresponded (and who considered him one of the “best philosophical 
intellects in America”549). Like Cousin, Brownson adopted a philosophical perspective 
that combined the French “psychological” method with Schelling and Hegel’s brand of 
German idealism. In a November 1836 monograph, he credited German romantic 
Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher, French romantic Benjamin Constant, and German 
radical Charles Follen (a German émigré who had lost his professorship at Harvard 
University during the anti-abolitionist purge in 1835) with inspiring his “New Views of 
Christianity, Society, and the Church.”550 Through these philosophers, Brownson 
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reflected, he had come to understand that religion (not organized religion, but the true 
religion) operated as humanity’s Bildungstrieb, the key to individual perfectibility, social 
justice, and ultimate freedom.551 By the mid-1830s, Brownson had also encountered the 
French romantic socialist Hugues-Félicité Robert de La Mennais, whose work he 
translated and reviewed in Boston’s literary journals. When the economy collapsed in 
1837, Brownson connected his advocacy for equal rights La Mennais’s emancipatory 
Christianity, developed in his radical Paroles d' un Croyant [Words of a Believer]. 
According to La Mennais, the “soldiers of equality” believed that God gifted the earth to 
all mankind, Brownson said, and they demanded that “it be left open to all.”552 In fighting 
privilege and advocating social change, Brownson insisted that he only looked to bring 
the civil government in line with God’s prescribed order. To support himself as he built a 
“church of the future” that embodied and propelled this spirit of progressive change, 
Brownson edited another journal devoted to social radicalism, the Boston Reformer.  
The apotheosis of Brownson’s democratic activism occurred after Van Buren took 
office in 1837, when the party recruited him to advocate on their behalf. In writing for the 
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Reformer and other Christian periodicals, Brownson’s rhetorical flair had attracted 
Democratic-party loyalist George Bancroft, who used his influence in the party to secure 
Brownson a position administering the Marine Hospital of Chelsea. Though Brownson 
had long denounced party patronage, and had only recently joined the Democratic party, 
the opportunity came with an income that finally allowed him to establish his own 
journal, the Boston Quarterly Review (hereafter: BosQR).553 In his introductory remarks 
to the BosQR’s first edition (published in January 1838), Brownson abstained from 
endorsing any particular party by name, but wrote, instead, that he hoped his review 
might contribute something to the “power of the great Movement Party of mankind.” In 
sympathy with the Locofocos’ drive to elevate labor, with the Abolitionists’ demand to 
free the slaves, with the effort to reform and rationalize religion, and with the pursuit of a 
profounder metaphysics than Hume’s base ‘Sensualism,’ Brownson dedicated his BosQR 
to aiding the “progress of Humanity,” wherever he saw it.554 Over the next four years, the 
BosQR published contributions from Transcendentalists Elizabeth Peabody, George 
Ripley, Margaret Fuller, and A. Bronson Alcott, Democratic politicians and literati 
Alexander Hill Everett, George Bancroft, and John L. O’Sullivan, and utopian socialists 
William Henry Channing and Albert Brisbane.555 
Unlike many of his colleagues in the Democratic party, however, Brownson 
distinguished between his advocacy of democracy and the widespread trend to endorse 
unqualified popular sovereignty. In his first article for the BosQR, Brownson urged his 
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fellow Democrats to reconsider their position at this stage of American history. Popular 
sovereignty had served a particular purpose in a particular point in time in the United 
States, he explained. Once, it had been a rallying cry for the friends of freedom and 
progress, empowered the people, and given them legitimacy. In many places, less 
advanced than the United States, it continued to serve that purpose. Yet, Brownson 
reminded his fellow democrats that words like “popular sovereignty” changed their 
meaning as circumstances changed:  
in contending for the same form of words, we are not always contending for the 
same doctrine, and that in giving up an old form of words, we do not necessarily 
give up the old truth we had loved. Words ever change their import as change the 
circumstances amid which they are uttered. The form of words, which yesterday 
contained the doctrine of progress, to-day contains a doctrine which would carry 
us backward. The watch-word of liberty under one set of circumstances becomes 
under another set of circumstances the watchword of tyranny. It is the part of the 
wise man to note these changes, and to seek out new watchwords as often as the 
old ones lose their primitive meaning.556 
In principle, Brownson conceded, contemporary constitutional theory empowered the 
people, assembled in their sovereign capacity, to enumerate and protect individual and 
minority rights. In practice, it made those rights contingent on the will of a popular 
majority, and, in so doing, usurped an authority it did not have. Once the doctrine of 
popular sovereignty vested sovereign authority in the people, Brownson clarified, it 
granted them absolute power in their collective capacity as the state. In effect, it 
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transferred the people’s sovereignty to a ruling majority, which disenfranchised 
minorities and reduced individuals to “fraction[s] of the body politic.”  In politics, this 
majoritarian rule destroyed “manliness of character” and independent thought, 
transforming politicians into time-serving cowards, and reducing the political process to a 
matter of numbers. Instead of looking for the most honest and capable men, who would 
promote just policies for the public good, it forever recurred to the question of 
expedience, asking which men and what agendas could most easily be sold to the public. 
As a result, Brownson observed, the “assertion of the sovereignty of the people” in the 
United States had become “the assertion of the right of the majority to tyrannize at will 
over the minority, or the assertion that the people, taken individually, are the absolute 
slaves of the people, taken as a whole.” Popular sovereignty no longer functioned as a 
“doctrine of progress” in the United States, Brownson judged; it now inclined toward 
democratic absolutism. 
From Brownson’s perspective, “Democracy” should be defined by its aims, not its 
gross mechanics. As Brownson understood it, “the word Democracy” signified a social 
and political philosophy that propelled the masses toward social equality and individual 
freedom. Therefore, he made the argument for democracy as a system of government that 
codified justice, as opposed to viewing it in terms of popular sovereignty or popular 
government. Corresponding with Fichte’s notion of citizenship, Brownson’s vision of a 
justice-based “Democracy” hypostasized the doctrine of “true liberty,” leaving men “free 
to do whatever it is just to do, and not free to do only what it is unjust to do.”557 In the 
place of popular or state sovereignty, both of which generated their own brands of 
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tyranny, Brownson’s Democracy commanded a socio-political system in which justice 
obtained absolute sovereignty, leading to an organization that balanced social order with 
social equality. It subjected every group and each individual to the same laws, and 
demanded their loyalty and obedience to the state only so long as its government operated 
within its legitimate sphere. To be a “democrat” in Brownson’s sense of the word meant 
fighting for justice and equality for the masses, for social order and social progress, for 
minority rights against majoritarian tyranny, and for a government that governed less.558  
In addition to its glancing similarity with Calhoun’s theory of government, 
Brownson’s critique echoed French socialist Hugues-Félicité Robert de La Mennais’s 
Modern Slavery, which Brownson had translated into English in 1836 for the Boston 
Reformer, and, especially, his Paroles d'un croyant [Words of a Believer], which 
Brownson had cited in earlier speeches and would excerpt at length in his October 1838 
BosQR.559 In Paroles, Lamennais exposed the backwardness of a “liberal” system that 
framed essential human rights as a restricted contractual privilege predicated on 
citizenship and obedience. First and foremost, Lamennais wrote, nations existed to 
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generate liberty, which he described as the “living power” that permeated existence, the 
“guardian genius of the domestic heath, the protector of social rights, and the first of 
those rights.” Without liberty, men had nothing—no rights, no growth, no life. Any 
nation that did not fulfill this emancipatory mission should be quarantined, Lamennais 
advised, so that the “breath” of its people “may not infect the rest of the world.”560 
Brownson, likewise, insisted that rights belonged to men by virtue of their human nature 
and could not be granted or suspended at the pleasure or caprice of a popular authority. 
“We are free… because we are men,” Brownson declared, “It is not a privilege of 
American citizenship, but a right of universal Humanity.” Governments that presumed to 
control and dispense these rights as privileges broke the boundaries of their natural 
jurisdictions, creating an “artificial state of society” that “disturbed the natural relations 
between man and man.” To “end to this great system of privilege,” Brownson argued, “is 
now the great aim of Democracy.561  
THE POLITICS OF REFORM 
On one level, Brownson’s story picks up a narrative strand left dangling at the end 
of the second chapter, in the heterogeneous approach to civil and social organization in 
the mid-nineteenth-century United States and the impact of transnational sources on 
theories of social order and change. Like his peers in the Transcendentalist and social 
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reform movements, Brownson had the habit of describing his political position as 
“conservative” in the late 1830s, and to advocate cultural solutions to social problems (in 
lieu of revolution, destruction, or violence). Though his critics rushed to renounce his 
radicalism, Brownson noted in the opening edition of his Boston Quarterly Review 
(January 1838) that the majority of the American people also fought for better social 
conditions and greater equality, and that the “American people are not revolutionists. 
They are conservatives.” To be a “conservative in this country,” Brownson insisted, “is to 
be a democrat.”562  
American reformers like Brownson could afford to “think with the Radical” and 
“act with the Conservative,” he argued, because democracy put them on the path that 
organically led them toward social justice and equality. Living in a democracy, men 
naturally progressed toward freedom—toward the absolute rule of justice—gradually 
developing their common sense with universal humanity. Even in its imperfect practice in 
the United States, the democratic form of government trained men that “man equals 
man.”563 To “cure” the evils bred by their invasive and overactive popular government, 
the American “doctor of laws” could simply follow the lead of the American “doctor of 
medicine” and let nature guide them (because “nature is the best physician.”) Living in 
the “most enlightened country” in the world (the United States, natch), all they had to do 
to achieve perfect liberty was to sit down at the “feet of Great Nature” and learn to 
govern however God ordained.  
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Progress always had been and always should be a slow process, Brownson 
admitted, but the reformer, like the law-doctor, could still play a part in closing the gap 
between the American theory and its practice. In this context, acting with the 
“Conservative” meant effecting reform through education in the German Bildung model. 
Specifically, Brownson clarified in later articles, reformers should promote the study of 
German and French literature because it would correct the country’s tendency toward 
unchecked popular radicalism, on the one hand, as well as counteract the country’s 
aristocratic tendencies, galvanized since the revolution by the cultural imperialism of 
English literature. Unlike English literature, German and French scholarship 
harmoniously united the elements of order and liberty, stimulating progress and the 
“perfectibility of man,” and laying out the “peaceable and orderly means by which to 
effect it.”564 Once reformers improved the country’s system of philosophy and morality 
by introducing these sources, purified and rationalized public religion, and effectively 
raised public discourse, Brownson promised, they could sit back, relax, and “let things 
take pretty much their own course.”565  As it had in Fichte’s early writing, then, political 
society performed an instrumental service, in Brownson’s philosophy: it provided the 
means (through cooperation and mutual improvement) to propel its members toward 
individual perfection, universal equality, and complete unity in a perfect society.566  
But this perspective—this position on the epigenetic nature of reform—came with 
a price. A teleological framework fundamentally grounded in the concept of natural 
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history, it implied a linear progression through stages of development, which called for 
an architecture of accretion that generated a hierarchy of need. In other words, it laid the 
burden on its men of genius to figure out which or whose problems took priority and how 
to address them in a way that created a solid infrastructure for future change. In 
Brownson’s romantic metaphor, “The tree has its natural growth, and by natural growth 
attains its height. It is not made higher by being plucked up by the roots, and held up by 
artificial means.”567 Faced with a metastasizing economic crisis and rising race-based 
violence in the late 1830s, social reformers diverged over the best methods to pursue 
social justice (through State or federal legislation, through the court system, or through 
apolitical, extralegal, or non-governmental organization) and, essentially, which issue 
should take precedence— economic parity for the white working class or freedom for 
people of color.568 
Two additional factors complicated this algorithm for northeastern reformers in 
the late 1830s. First, John C. Calhoun’s pro-slavery faction re-aligned with the 
Democratic party, which made him the voice of the Sub-Treasury bill and the most 
prominent exponent of anti-capitalist radicalism in national politics. As previous chapters 
addressed, Van Buren’s position on slavery remained ambiguous before he became 
president, giving anti-slavery Democrats reason to hope that he might not use the office 
to reinforce or promote the institution, even after his support for the 1836 congressional 
gag rule and other pro-slavery measures. During the 1836 presidential campaign, 
northeastern democratic reformers with anti-slavery sympathies had criticized Van 
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Buren’s accommodationist and pro-slavery propaganda, but few of them bought the line 
that he was a “Northern man with Southern principles.”569 Instead, they reasoned that he 
said what he had to in order to keep the people’s party in power.570 When Calhoun 
returned to the Democratic fold in 1837, however, the party palpably shifted toward pro-
slavery policies, forcing reformers who associated with both the workingmen’s and anti-
slavery movements to make a choice. They could either continue their association with 
the Democratic party and advance their pro-labor agenda politically, or they could choose 
to eschew mainstream politics entirely and come at their activism from a different 
angle.571 
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Second, at the same time as Calhoun’s faction took a firmer hold of America’s 
government and pushed the Democratic party more solidly into the pro-slavery camp, 
Garrison drove the abolitionists to the opposite extreme, outright rejecting politics as an 
avenue for change, dissent, or reform. In December 1837, he severed his affiliation with 
the Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Society and elaborated a radically apolitical, anti-
establishment, and anti-institutional mission statement in the Liberator. In the December 
15th edition, he expanded the abolitionist mission to encompass universal emancipation 
from subjugation in any form (from slavery, from servitude, from government) and 
explicitly embraced both women’s rights and non-resistance as part of his platform.572 
The gesture to emancipate women alongside slaves alienated those of Garrison’s allies 
who saw it as a strategic mistake to conflate the two issues, as well as those men opposed 
to women having a political voice, at all (even if they supported women’s education and 
right to work, as Brownson did). Furthermore, Garrison’s argument for non-resistance 
tacitly made the case that slaves—more than any other group—retained the right to 
appeal to physical violence in defending themselves, their families, their liberties, and 
their wages, both as individuals and in their collective capacity as a nation.573 Just as 
Calhoun’s return to the Democratic party marked its adherents as complicit in the 
protection and expansion of slavery, Garrisonian extremism generated the perception that 
anti-slavery activism required a narrowly construed set of beliefs and behavior to which 
adherents had to commit or be unceremoniously expelled from the movement.574 
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Democratic reformers with anti-slavery sympathies struggled to assimilate their 
incompatible impulses by focusing on a brand of socio-cultural activism that combined 
their pro-labor and anti-slavery aims. But not Orestes Brownson. In 1838, Orestes 
Brownson knew exactly where his priorities lay. “First, we must settle the bases of 
individual freedom,” Brownson insisted in the second number of his BosQR (which he 
devoted to the “rights of Man”) then “we may proceed to make all details harmonize with 
it.”575 That meant putting abolition on the backburner, for now. 
In their rush to emancipate the slaves before they fixed individual rights by law, 
Brownson charged, the abolitionists counterproductively weakened the safeguards put in 
place to protect individual freedom, in the first place—State rights foremost among 
them—and threatened to thrust a whole new group of people into the already 
overcrowded field of disenfranchised and impoverished workers. Brownson took the 
opportunity in his April 1838 review of William Ellery Channing’s “Slavery,” to connect 
Calhoun’s doctrine of State rights with the radical emancipation of workingmen, and 
explain how abolitionists threatened to upset the balance that would eventually lead to 
their own victory against slavery. Borrowing directly from Calhoun’s playbook, 
Brownson attested that the States stood in relation to each other “precisely as the United 
States as one nation stands in relation to France, England, or Mexico.” Because each 
sovereign State comprised a separate nation, any attempt to interfere in the internal policy 
or social institutions of another State of the union violated international law. The “right of 
the people of the non-slaveholding States” to control slavery in the South, Brownson 
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wrote, “is precisely what it is in relation to [slavery] in Constantinople, or in any foreign 
slave-holding state.” So long as the States remained “distinct, independent communities,” 
they endowed their individual members with a personal significance lost in the 
homogenizing mass created by an all-consuming central power. “When hundreds and 
thousands of our citizens are banded together to trample on the rights of independent 
communities in the holy name of Freedom herself,” Brownson confessed, he grew 
alarmed for those individual rights. “One barrier leaped, another may be,” he warned, 
“and when communities can no longer make their rights respected, what can the 
individual do?”576 In pressuring the federal government to abolish slavery, abolitionists 
pushed it to assume an authority it did not have; destroying the “equilibrium between the 
individual and the state,” they “endanger[ed] the freedom of both.”577 
Ironically, Brownson argued, the southern institution of slavery generated the 
impulse necessary to protect individual freedom and counterbalance federal hegemony in 
the current system. In the North, the focus on social freedom came at the expense of 
individual rights because it led Northern reformers to promote strong government. As 
Brownson had noted in the first edition of his BosQR, political and social rights were 
meaningless without individual liberty, which federal centralization gradually sapped. A 
consolidated government had a voracious appetite and would not be sated until it had 
ingested everything, and absorbed the individual into the body of the state. Because of 
slavery, however, each Southern planter acted as a petty sovereign, just like the feudal 
barons of Europe, and, like the feudal barons, they jealously guarded their individual 
freedom and their state sovereignty. Furthermore, Southerners could not even perceive 
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the need to free the slaves unless they felt secure in their own rights as individuals. Until 
they “settled the controversy about state rights and individual rights and obtained the 
amplest security for both,” Brownson determined, “it is as unwise as it is useless to touch 
the question of slavery.” Once they got the government out of the hands of business men 
and into the hands of the people, and the government treated everyone equally without 
regard to class, and every man possessed his entire freedom under the authority of equal 
laws, and they had obtained “all the individual freedom of the savage state with all the 
order and social harmony of the highest degree of civilization,” then, and only then, could 
they attend to the “Negro's right to be free.”578  
When William Lloyd Garrison suggested that Brownson’s position on slavery 
made him a traitor to true reformers, Brownson objected.  “By many years of hard labor, 
I have gained the name of Horrid Radical, Rash and Headstrong Innovator,” he wrote to 
Garrison, “This name is my [sic] all on earth. I have worn it so long that it is dear to me, 
and I am unwilling to have it torn from me.”579 Still, he admitted that he had become less 
disposed to “revolutionary movements” or “sudden and violent changes” over time. As 
he read more social philosophy and history, Brownson explained, he had embraced the 
organic approach to social change. “Nothing can come before its time,” he reminded 
Garrison, “The human race is in progress. It goes onward, but it is step-by-step. One step 
only can be taken at a time.” Given the practical question of which step they should take 
now, he insisted that the slavery of the poor must end before the slavery of the “negro” 
could be addressed. In fact, by the logic of organic reform, the “progress and triumph of 
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true democracy in the non-slaveholding states” would inevitably bring about the “certain 
abolition of slavery at the South.”580 Brownson claimed that he did as much for the 
abolition of Southern slavery through his efforts on behalf of Northern workers, 
therefore, than anyone who labored directly for abolition, though he admitted that he 
never personally mentioned abolition by name or had it in his mind while he organized. 
On the other hand, John C Calhoun first contacted Brownson on the strength of this 
article, so even with the benefit of the doubt about his implicit and unnamed long-term 
aims, Brownson’s argument evidently gave comfort to the enemies of abolition and 
proponents of slavery. 
In anticipation of the 1838 midterm elections, Brownson drew an even sharper 
distinction between abolitionist agitation for people of color and his own advocacy for 
the white working class in the BosQR.581 As the last chapter indicated, popular opinion 
had turned against the administration party’s “visionary” labor politics after the 1837 
economic panic.582 Between June 1837 and August 1838, Whig candidates had won 
65.2% of all congressional races and 66.7% of all governors’ races (including 
Brownson’s home-base in Massachusetts), and Van Buren’s Sub-Treasury bill had twice 
failed to pass the House. Meanwhile, the Whigs painted their antagonists all of one piece 
in their political broadsides: crowding the abolitionists, loco-focos, jacobins, radicals, and 
revolutionaries all into the democratic camp.583 From Brownson’s perspective, abolition 
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would short-circuit or prevent the labor reforms essential to a free democracy. So long as 
the two movements remained connected in the popular and political imagination, the 
abolitionists hurt the cause for labor, especially as they radicalized. 
Showing uncharacteristic political savvy, Brownson retraced these political 
boundaries in his October BosQR, dividing the “conservative” friends of labor from the 
“insurrectionist” abolitionists. Just like the rest of the country, Brownson insisted, the 
labor movement had grown alarmed by the abolitionists’ dangerous tactics and 
revolutionary agenda.584 Unlike the abolitionists, the labor movement understood that 
everything must come “in its time and in its place.” The slaveholding States must be left 
to extend legal protection to the “negro” as he advanced internally, so that he could 
“imperceptibly but surely… grow into a freeman, if a freeman he can become.” Instead of 
going to other States in search of monsters to destroy, labor advocates recognized that 
they best served the “negro” by developing democratic freedom in their own societies 
and looked to “elevate the free white laborer” in their own States.  
Abolition could not be achieved without overturning the existing social order, 
Brownson argued, but workers’ rights and banking reforms could. In fact, they were 
essential to its preservation. At its best, Brownson maintained, democracy fostered both 
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“conservative” and “progressive” elements, harmoniously combining liberty and order.585 
In the United States, the Democratic party simultaneously represented the country’s 
conservative and movement party, fighting to preserve country’s political system in its 
original spirit, as the framers of the constitution intended, while implementing reform, 
“for the purpose of preserving American institutions in their real character.”586 Unlike the 
abolitionists, Brownson wrote, “we have accepted with our whole heart the political 
system adopted by our fathers” as Humanity’s “most brilliant achievement.” Taking their 
stand on the American “Idea,” the Democrats refused to countenance any changes, 
innovations, or “alleged” improvements that did not strictly accord with the US 
constitution, or that threatened to unsettle the constitutional balance of power between the 
Federal government and the States.587 “As a lover of our race, as the devoted friend of 
liberty, of the progress of mankind,” Brownson reflected, “we feel that we must, in this 
country, be conservative, not radical.”588  
Regardless, Brownson’s name quickly became a byword for extreme 
Locofocoism and social democracy in the opposition press, which cited his publications 
as evidence of the Democratic party’s agrarian leanings.589 During the 1840 campaign, he 
went so far in his advocacy for the working class that the Democratic party tried to 
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silence him, and the Whigs reproduced his most incendiary work as propaganda for their 
party.590 His political infamy as a public radical reached its pinnacle in July 1840, when 
Brownson penned “The Laboring Classes,” a review of Carlyle’s Chartism in which he 
proposed restructuring the entire political-economic system (including eradicating the 
banking system and the privileged monopoly over capital) to generate a social 
revolution.591 Wage labor relegated a portion of society to virtual slavery, he argued, and 
the market denied them the capacity to lift themselves from poverty to self-subsistence.592 
Inheritance law perpetuated this inhumane structure of inequality across generations. The 
evils of structural inequality, “inherent in all our social arrangements,” could not be 
“cured” unless they produced a radical change in society itself. Like Calhoun, whose 
speeches he consistently recommended to his readers, Brownson located the root of these 
evils in government interference, linking economic injustice to government excess. 
Government should legislate to aid the working class, and only to that end. It had 
overgrown its limits when it became invested in perpetuating privilege, especially 
through the federal control of the banks. Government should legislate to aid the working 
class, and only to that end “There has been far too much government,” Brownson 
insisted, “as well as government of the wrong kind.” So, to cure the nation’s social ills, 
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Brownson recommended a great “undoing,” the country’s representatives to repeal all 
laws that propped up its inherently unequal and unjust commercial system at the expense 
of the laboring classes. “You must abolish the system or accept its consequences,” 
Brownson wrote, “No man can serve both God and Mammon.”  
Even though his position lost him both contributors and subscribers, Brownson 
refused to back down. As the Morning Post reported, Brownson’s “zeal for the rights of 
man knows not the bounds of conservatism; that word appears not to exist in his 
vocabulary.”593 In October 1840, he published a ninety-one-page defense of his nineteen-
page article in which he acknowledged that he demanded the “most radical” social 
reforms and redoubled his critique of organized religion, capitalists, and inherited 
property. Since American society “is bound to furnish equal chances to all her members,” 
he asserted, they must enact measures that would end the “horizontal division” between 
capitalists and labor.594 Addressing the critics who called him a “Jacobin” and the 
“American Robespierre,” in November 1840, Brownson reportedly responded that he 
liked those names, and intended to “immortalize the old sans culottes” in a novel in 
which Robespierre would be featured as the hero.595  
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How did this man—once considered the prophet of the lower classes, and widely 
condemned as the exponent of social revolution and anarchy—come to be known as one 
of the most conservative men in America?596 The answer to that question can be found in 
the reorganization of the Democratic party after 1840. As the introduction indicated, the 
Whig victory exposed the doctrinal and political tensions within the Democratic party 
over the value of popular sovereignty, the practical structure and metaphysical purpose of 
democracy, and the nature and pace of change in a democratic republic. At the same time 
as the party divided philosophically over these issues, it also course-corrected 
strategically towards popular politics. To undercut Whig authority, the Democrats 
indicated that the Whigs had stolen the election by manipulating the public and 
subverting their will, and that the Whig’s policies intended to undercut the free 
expression of the public voice. While the Democrats aimed to reclaim their position as 
the country’s popular party, they also enhanced the popular tactics in their electoral 
arsenal. As a result, the party edged out those democrats who either publically questioned 
popular democracy or who promoted political candidates like Calhoun, who disapproved 
of the unmediated expression of the popular will. Brownson fell into both of those 
categories, and, so, (in some ways) fell into conservatism.597 
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THE DEMOCRATIC PATHOLOGY  
The triumph of “whig conservatism” in December 1840 forced democratically-
minded radicals in the North to reflect on their role in the new socio-political order, to 
prioritize their reforms, and to organize strategically. In the “great controversy between 
Conservatism and Democratic Progress,” they asked, what were they trying to protect or 
advance? Did they contend for “democracy” or something else—an end for which 
democracy theoretically provided the means? If O’Sullivan had been correct—if 
Democracy acted as the fundamental principle of the country’s organic law—then could 
they find a version of democracy that produced the kinds of changes that they wanted to 
see in the world? Did “democracy” entail a specific form of a government (the political 
enfranchisement and direct representation of the common people in political bodies) or 
could it be understood as an effect (the practical empowerment or rule of the common 
people in society considered as a whole)? And, if Democracy could be understood 
teleologically (as an end, and not a means), then what social organization or method of 
government could achieve it?  
In his own heterodox response to the election, Brownson strained the 
philosophical boundaries of big tent democracy. Brownson devoted his first edition of the 
BosQR after the Whig victory (January 1841) to diagnosing the disorder that led to these 
election results and finding the best strategy to engage (or disengage) with a hostile 
administration and an unreliable democracy. His programmatic resolution amalgamated 
Calhoun’s constitutional conservatism with his own “social democratic” politics.  
In his first article, Brownson imagined “Conversations with a Radical,” written by 
“a Conservative,” which provided an overview of the two sides at issue in the current 
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conflict between the Democratic and Whig parties, and restated his own past positions 
against capitalist inequality and in favor of social progress.598 In the second article, 
Brownson laid out his perspective on “The Times,” including meditations on political and 
religious factions; the English System (i.e., capitalist power), which he compared to 
Roman Catholic imperialism; and the resistless progress of the Democratic spirit. In the 
third article, Brownson set out his policy recommendations for the “Friends of the 
Constitution and of Equal Rights” going forward, advising them to form a “true 
democratic party” that conformed to the State rights and Locofoco ideals, and worked 
toward a decentralized organic community and social equality. In his fourth article, 
Brownson published his fall 1842 Address to the Workingmen’s Association of 
Charlestown, MA, in which he distinguished between “social” and “political” Democrats 
and reiterated the need to unite the social Democrats in a single party. Also pejoratively 
termed the “LocoFocos,” Brownson had explained, social Democrats were former 
Jeffersonian Democrats who “having realized political equality [and] passed through one 
phase of the revolution, now passes on to another, and attempts the realization of social 
equality, so that the actual condition of men in society shall be in harmony with their 
acknowledged rights as citizens.”599 Brownson closed out the review with a set of 
Literary Notices that essentially comprised a reading list for social radicals.600 Brownson 
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used the opportunity of his concluding notice on François Guizot’s Essay on the 
Character and Influence of Washington in the Revolution of the United States of America 
to remind his audience, in a subtle dig at president-elect, that the American people were 
too great to ever be at the mercy of “great chiefs” like Harrison. In the long run, 
individual men exerted a limited influence in this country, he wrote, and even outsized 
figures like George Washington only helped the people achieve the glory that was their 
due. Implicitly, Brownson urged the people to see themselves as the collective author of 
their own independence, still free to resist and save their country. 
In addressing “The Times” in his second article, Brownson blamed society’s 
present condition on the combined efforts of English imperial capitalists and their 
American political counterparts (the Whigs). In every epoch, Brownson wrote, the 
Conservatives had relied on some “absurd fiction” to “retard” the “growth” of the 
Democratic spirit and to bring large populations under their control. For years, the 
“British political party” in the United States (the Whigs) had perpetuated the absurd 
fiction that the United States benefitted from a free and independent capitalist exchange 
with England, and that the wholesale adoption of Britain’s consolidated capitalist 
system—replete with a National Bank and a protective tariff—would bring prosperity 
and stability to the United States. By seditiously spreading the “political heresy 
of CONSOLIDATION” and the “aristocratical doctrine” of a “central nationality,” England’s 
Conservative agents in the United States sought to undermine the true nature of the US 
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federal constitution in its “restricted and State Rights character.” A “central national 
government” could not exist in the United States, Brownson reminded his audience, 
unless it was enforced by “those coercive means which are in their very nature 
incompatible with republican institutions” because “the extent of our country over every 
natural climate; the vast geographical peculiarities of the distinctive States, and the 
diversity of their relations to external nations, preclude[d] the possibility of one general 
government legislating for the whole.” With British capital its materiel and consolidation 
its grand strategy, Brownson charged, British capitalists engaged in a covert type of 
imperial warfare against the United States. By spreading their political and capitalist 
ideology across the country, they ultimately intended to transform it into a British vassal 
state. 
When the US National Bank scheme failed to subvert American democracy in the 
1830s, Brownson reported, the English “infected” the United States with the “disease” of 
abolition. Whole communities now suffered from the “disease in its raging stage.” The 
British capitalist and consolidationist ideology organized the entire structure of the 
debate, so that no matter which side won in principle (the abolitionists or the pro-slavery 
faction), they both reinforced consolidation and capitalism, in practice. Fostered by 
“clans of consolidationists” and backed by the “whole English system,” the contaminated 
abolitionist population framed slavery as a “national sin” that required a national 
solution. The southern and western consolidationists who opposed them, on the other 
hand, promoted slavery as a “national blessing.” In their arguments, they all assumed an 
“important difference” in working a man hard “for a pittance of money” and working him 
hard “for a pittance of food,” which glorified money over liberty and reduced the 
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abolition question to a conflict between slave and wage labor. In effect, the entire debate 
naturalized the consolidated and capitalist system that the British intended to promote.  
To counteract Britain’s biological warfare, “morally healthy” Americans might be 
able to contain abolitionism in a “lazaretto” (a quarantine station) until it had exhausted 
its “dangerous force,” but Brownson warned that no earthly means could put down the 
“communal passion” roused on either side. Like any disease, he wrote, it must “run a 
natural course to the peculiar crisis.” Nonetheless, Brownson urged his Democratic 
partisans to remain optimistic about the country’s future. He insisted that the current 
national distemper indicated a deeper pathology that boded well for both social progress 
and equal rights. Collective societies always entered into an “irruptive [sic] stage” (i.e., 
the stage of an infectious disease when the skin breaks out in rashes) when it confronted 
the “resistless progress” of some new “mighty spirit,” Brownson explained. What looked 
on the surface like a devastating, degenerative ailment actually indicated an epidemic 
communal reaction to a major “evolution” in the country’s social organization.  
Brownson acknowledged that Harrison’s election might set back the “Liberalists” 
for a day, but he assured his readers that the “new social spirit” of Democracy would 
prevail over the artful mistruths spread by their country’s factious Conservatives. The 
“supreme law of consecutive social passions” dictated that a “NEW unity of patriotic 
feeling” would emerge in the United States, resulting in a “complete reorganization of the 
host of republicans.” This new class of republicans—conjoined by their “ardent love of 
individual liberty” and their mutual hatred for England and everything it represented—
would ensure the true “conservation” of American institutions. In the recent general 
election, faction had enjoyed a “festival triumph” based on their Conservative fictions, 
 282
but Democracy would inevitably “fell and root up all the stately products of [their] 
artificial cultivation” and “plough deep the surface of the whole earth, to the final 
annihilation of even the germs of fiction” that had once allowed the Conservative 
enemies of progress to rule. 
Brownson followed up his diagnosis with a prescriptive call to action for the “real 
friends of Equal Rights and Social Progress.” In his third article on “Our Future Policy,” 
Brownson urged the “real Democracy” to unite in a single party that promoted a strict 
construction of the constitution at the federal level, and pursued a “true democratic 
policy” of social and political equality at the State level. Although a significant majority 
of Americans prioritized the plight of the working class, Brownson observed, they had 
allowed themselves to be divided from one another on false issues during the election. 
Because they conflated State and federal politics, they had joined competing national 
political parties designated “Democrat” and “Whig,” instead of combining into a single, 
unified worker’s party. At the same time, some reformers who might otherwise have been 
their political allies condemned political action entirely and abandoned the political 
sphere altogether; and some of the leading democrats who should have joined the 
political fight for social justice, rejected the use of positive legislation to generate equal 
rights because they refused to see the government by any light other than its negative 
agency. This political and philosophical insolvency led to their failure at the polls. To 
reunite the “true democratic party of the country” under a single banner, they must 
recommit themselves to this country’s mission: to “emancipate the proletary,” to 
“ennoble labor” and elevate the working class, and to “make every man really free and 
independent.”  
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As the late election proved, the democracy (i.e., the common people) could not be 
fooled by empty promises. It refused to vote reflexively for people and parties “called” 
democratic; for a party to secure its support, it must “be democratic” and its men 
must “be democrats.” To win it over, Brownson contended, the “real Democracy” had to 
prove that their policies would do more than “merely assuage the pain of the social 
wound, without healing it.” Falling back on “first principles,” they had to enact measures 
that would either “destroy the social fabric entirely, or reconstruct it as it should be.” 
Addressing the recalcitrant reformers and the negative-liberty democrats, Brownson 
stressed that civil government operated both as society’s agent and the instrument by 
which society functioned, and that Democrats had a duty to use it to produce moral and 
social progress, to create legislation and organizations that protected individual rights and 
also forced those individuals to “perform their duties towards one another.”  
In their practical political apparatus, Brownson recommended that they follow the 
model endorsed by John C. Calhoun and his “State Rights friends.” According to 
Calhoun, the US Constitution distinguished between the role that the State and federal 
governments played in securing equal rights and social progress, setting up the States to 
act like “Foreign Nations to one another, Free, Sovereign, Independent States, in no sense 
responsible one to another.” Considering this relationship, Brownson advised his 
colleagues to dissever the connection between the “politics of the State” and the “politics 
of the Union,” and establish separate federal and State parties so that “a man’s views on 
Federal politics” would no longer serve as the “criterion of his merits on questions of 
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State politics.”601 Statesmen should ask and expect different things from their State and 
federal governments. Since democratic parties only worked within single bodies politic 
(like nations), Brownson suggested that they form a Constitutional (or Union) party at the 
federal level made up of the smaller States, the slave-holding States, and the country’s 
“real Democracy” (i.e., the “real friends of Equal Rights and Social Progress”), who 
would resist consolidation and create the space for equal rights to be adopted at the State 
level. In each of the States, Brownson advocated State-wide Democratic parties, which 
would focus their efforts on dismantling corporate and banking monopolies and the paper 
money system. In the short term, Brownson admitted, these bold measures might “give us 
the gripes,” but “it is better to take a medicine, which will expel a lingering disease and 
restore us to health” than “to be always sick.”602 
In spite of Brownson’s prescriptions, the people refused to take their medicine. 
During the special congressional session that spanned from May to September 1841, the 
27th US Congress dismantled Van Buren’s banking reforms. In their last week in session, 
six months after Harrison took office and five months after his death turned John Tyler 
into “His Accidency,” the House Whigs resurrected the National Bank, overturning 
President Tyler’s second veto against it to do so.603 
                                                 
601 Cf. Brownson’s foreign nations and Calhoun’s states are nations in his 1841-02 speech defending the 
presidential veto power. 
602 The Globe also came out against Brownson. (“Brownson Disclaimed,” The Madisonian. (Washington 
City [i.e. Washington, D.C.]), 21 Jan. 1841. Chronicling America: Historic American Newspapers. Lib. of 
Congress.) 
603 The House voted to pass H.R. 14 (establishing and incorporating a national bank) on September 10, 
1841, over-ridding President Tyler’s second veto in two months (the first time, Tyler vetoed the Senate’s 
version of the bill). A day after President Tyler delivered his veto message, 103 Whigs and zero Democrats 
pushed the bill through, with 74 Democrats and 6 Whigs (counting Robert M.T. Hunter, who had been 
elected as a State Rights Whig from Virginia) opposed. A quarter of the House missed the vote. (“TO 
PASS H.R. 14, THE PRESIDENT’S VETO NOTWITHSTANDING. -- House Vote #260 -- Sep 10, 
1841,” GovTrack.us, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/27-1/h260.) 
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Convinced that this breach signaled the end of the Whig party, Calhoun began 
coordinating his sympathizers to orchestrate a reformation in American politics and 
government. At the end of October 1841, Calhoun wrote to Brownson that they had to 
grab this opportunity to rescue the government and restore the constitution.604 To secure 
their advantage, he insisted, they must beat out the “spoilsmen” of their own party at the 
“game of President making,” uniting the “sound portion” of the party behind someone 
who genuinely represented their principles. In “strict confidence,” Calhoun elliptically 
gestured toward his own designs on the country’s highest office.605 If the country 
determined that he, alone, could guide it through this essential “reformation,” Calhoun 
wrote, then he would dutifully accept the responsibility of the presidency. Brownson 
enthusiastically agreed, determined to inoculate the democratic republic against both 
Whig conservatism and popular Democratic radicalism. 
On the last page of the final number of 1841’s BosQR (October), Brownson took 
a moment in his literary notices to reflect on  the relative nature of radicalism and 
conservatism in the United States. He had been berated as the “very ne plus ultra of a 
Radical” for years, he remarked, but compared with Clinton Roosevelt’s radical Science 
of Government Founded on Natural Law, for example, or any of a number of other 
reform projects he had received in the last few months, he should be renounced for his 
“conservatism.” Unlike his “Radical brethren,” Brownson confessed, he believed that a 
country’s “geographical position, the productions of its soil, the genius of its people, and 
of its existing institutions” predetermined the reforms it could handle, and precluded any 
                                                 
604 Brownson, Early Life, 305. 
605 Calhoun was less cagey in a letter to his son the next day: “Many of my friends think the time has 
arrived when my name ought to be presented for the next presidency. It is my own impression, that, if it is 
ever intended, now is the time.”  
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reforms that required the “introduction or the destruction of a fundamental principle” or 
that attempted to do anything other than clear away “anomalies” or develop “admitted 
principles.” Since he clearly could not run with the “wildest of Radicals,” he joked, he 
might try his hand “at being the staunchest of Conservatives” in the years to come.606  
Though he had no way of knowing it at the time, Brownson’s agreement to aid 
Calhoun’s presidential ambitions would eventually fulfill his ironically-voiced wish. 
Between the time that the Whig-majority Congress opened its first regular congressional 
session in December 1841 and Calhoun withdrew from the presidential race in early 
1844, Brownson fought for Calhoun’s nomination behind the scenes. In collusion with 
South Carolina representative Robert Rhett, Alabama representative (and then senator) 
Dixon Lewis, and New York labor activist John Hecker (one of the founders of the Loco 
Foco movement), Brownson penned addresses to be read at rallies, published anonymous 
articles and pamphlets in Calhoun’s favor, and briefly (in late 1843) entertained the idea 
of editing an openly pro-Calhoun paper. In his own work, Brownson continuously (if 
more subtly) promoted Calhoun as the country’s “reformation” candidate. In addition to 
reviewing Calhoun’s speeches and citing him directly, he also weaved Calhoun’s theories 
of government into his own metaphysical reflections, creating an eclectic hybrid between 
Calhoun’s anti-capitalist republicanism and, as it happened, French romantic socialism.607 
Based largely on the strength of this work, Brownson’s Democratic colleagues would 
declare him “too conservative” for their tastes by the end of 1843. In the “great 
controversy between Conservatism and Democratic Progress” that took place in this 
period, they decided, Brownson came down on the wrong side of history.  
                                                 
606 Brownson, 523 
607 Brownson, Early Life, 341-342. 
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THE GREAT CONTROVERSY  
As it had with democratic activists, the 1840 “Conservative” victory challenged 
the country’s social reformers, in general, to question where conservatism fit in their 
vision of progressive change and to generate a response to it. Among the 
Transcendentalists and social utopians, it sparked a conversation about the relationship 
between conservatism, progress, and reform in a democratic republic. In August 1841, 
Cincinnati lawyer Jordan A. Pugh gave a speech on “Political Conservatism” to the 
fraternal order of Alpha Delta Phi, distinguished by its Transcendentalist influences and 
its tendency to breed abolitionists and social activists. Political Conservatism opposed 
change, Pugh declared, seeking its security in the structure of society, itself. Because it 
wanted to perpetuate established institutions and sustain the country’s political relations, 
political conservatism divided society into different departments, framing a complicated 
system of government that checked the power of its constituents.608 To prevent social 
advancement, it created classes by legislation and rendered men the “miserable slaves” of 
its social organization.609 That type of political conservatism might be necessary in 
England, Pugh observed, but the United States did not need to “fetter” man with 
“restrictions,” “crush him by exactions,” or “legislate him into nothing.” Because it 
enjoyed democratic institutions and treated man with dignity as a “unit in God's 
creation”—not of merely the “member of a class”—the United States had cultivated a 
“new race” of humanity in which each man acted as his own “conservator.” In the United 
                                                 
608 Paraphrasing Clarke, but retaining his language. (Clarke, 4) 
609 Recalling the lessons of the French revolution, he asked how they could consider this conservatism 
successful when it evidently failed to exert a conservative influence and, instead, inevitably led to violence: 
“Where was their conservatism when they were yielding themselves up to the guillotine, or flying for 
refuge to foreign lands? Such are the natural, the inevitable consequences of such establishments: they 
oppress men, they keep them ignorant, they render them the miserable slaves of a social organization, they 
compel them either to starve or to revolutionize.” (Clarke, 8) 
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States, alone, a man could be trusted with his “own destinies” because he could “preserve 
himself.” So long as they kept their social organization “just and equal” and always 
looked for the “happiness of the whole body,” Pugh remarked, political conservatism 
would remain unnecessary in this country. Americans would find “conservatism” in their 
own constitutions.  
Two months later, in an October 1841 sermon on “Reform and Conservatism,” 
Transcendentalist James Freeman Clarke counseled his congregation to mediate between 
their polar impulses to either extreme conservatism or extreme radicalism. As he saw it, 
the “separation and hostility” between conservatism and reform gave rise to unnecessary 
and counter-productive social conflict. Instead, he exhorted, “every one ought to be a 
conservative, and every one ought to be a reformer,” just like Jesus Christ. A “great 
reformer,” Jesus Christ was also a “true conservative” because he knew that the human 
mind entangled “the roots of truth and error” together and he “forebore pulling up the 
tares lest he should root out the wheat also.” Similarly, in their own lives, Clarke 
encouraged his audience to fearlessly combine the old and new, dismissing neither 
orthodoxy nor liberalism in their search for truth.610 
An “indifferent Whig” himself, Transcendentalist Ralph Waldo Emerson crowed 
at Van Buren’s defeat for the same reasons that his Democratically-affiliated brethren 
did. But he did not care for Harrison and he had no real hope that the new administration 
would induce innovative legislation.611 As a party, Emerson reflected, the Whigs were 
too timid to accommodate the friction necessary for constructive change. “The Whig 
                                                 
610 Clarke, 4, 8.  
611 Ralph Waldo Emerson, The Selected Letters of Ralph Waldo Emerson, ed. Joel Myerson (New York and 
Chichester, West Sussex: Columbia University Press, 2013), 239; Grodzins, American Heretic, 2002, 208. 
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assumes sickness,” he wrote in his journal, “and his social frame is a hospital.” Instead of 
enacting laws that accorded with “primal law,” the Whig party legislated for the “present 
distress,” putting the universe in “slippers and flannels, with bib and pap-spoon, 
swallowing pills and herb tea.”612 Nonetheless, Emerson denied that the Democratic party 
had the monopoly on democracy or humanity. The Democrats had better principles, the 
Whigs had better people, but neither had anything in practice. Emerson leaned Whig 
because he considered the Democratic leadership to be “worse men” than the Whig 
leadership, but, in his final analysis, he found “no great difference” between the two 
parties. The “democracy” espoused by the Democratic party was “no more principled 
than the conservatism” and the party had no higher objects. Both parties rested on an 
antiquated liberalism (a “whiggism”) that undercut real reform. “To vote at all for either 
party is whiggism,” Emerson  remarked, “and it is only a little more to vote for those 
whose bias is conservative.”613 This ideological compression generated an artificially 
constrained set of political parameters for state-driven social change.614 In addition, 
Emerson reasoned, because reformers relied on political parties as the engines to advance 
their causes, this state of affairs produced a profound tension within and between the 
                                                 
612 Ralph Waldo Emerson, Journals and Miscellaneous Notebooks: 1841-1843, ed. William H. Gilman and 
J.E. Parsons (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), 87. 
613 Ralph Waldo Emerson, Journals and Miscellaneous Notebooks: 1841-1843, ed. William H. Gilman and 
J.E. Parsons (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), 287-288. 
614 NB: The use of ideological to refer to “a systematic scheme of ideas, usually relating to politics, 
economics, or society and forming the basis of action or policy” did not come into usage until the end of 
the nineteenth century. In the late 1830s, “ideological” was a synonym for “speculative” or “idealistic,” and 
indicated something “occupied with or motivated by an idea or ideas, especially of a visionary kind.” The 
OED dates the origin of this usage to an 1837 Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine article on Napoleon. 
("ideology, n.". OED Online. September 2016. Oxford University Press. 
http://proxy.library.upenn.edu:2440/view/Entry/91016 (accessed December 02, 2016); "ideological, adj.". 
OED Online. September 2016. Oxford University Press. 
http://proxy.library.upenn.edu:2440/view/Entry/91012 (accessed December 02, 2016).) 
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various reform movements as they jockeyed for the small amount of space allotted to 
them.615 
Emerson reflected on this dynamic in a series of lectures on “the Times” days 
before the Whig-majority Congress started its first session (in December 1841). “Every 
Age, like every human body, has its own distemper,” Emerson announced from his pulpit 
in Boston’s Masonic Temple, and a “new disease” had “fallen on the life of man” in the 
present age. Coming up against the great monolith of Conservatism, “entrenched in its 
immense redoubts, with Himmaleh for its front, and Atlas for its flank, and Andes for its 
rear, and the Atlantic and Pacific seas for its ditches and trenches, which has planted its 
crosses, and crescents, and stars and stripes, and various signs and badges of possession, 
over every rood of the planet,” reformers shrank before their task. Instead of challenging 
Conservatism’s claim to this vast expanse of time and space, they ceded the ground; 
when Conservatism presumed the authority to “give” to whomever it wanted and to 
“exclude and starve” whomever it willed, they turned on each other and fought for its 
patronage. They built nothing positive—founding, instead, a negative faith in rejection, 
repudiation, and criticism. Scorn of inadequate action gave rise to inaction. “Paralyzed by 
uncertainty,” they got caught in a purgatory of indecision, a proliferation of thought-
pieces without the production of plans. Finally, distrusting their principles, they relied on 
material forces: on “men, on multitudes, on circumstances, on money, on party; that is, 
                                                 
615 Maurice Gonnaud, An Uneasy Solitude: Individual and Society in the Work of Ralph Waldo Emerson 
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on fear, on wrath, and pride.” They had lost their sense of the sublime, Emerson 
concluded, their supreme nature, the vital, causative force that drove them with 
unbounded energy and power toward the Everlasting. “All the children of men attack the 
colossus [of Conservatism] in their youth,” Emerson lamented, “and all, or all but a few, 
bow before it when they are old.”616 
In his second lecture, “The Conservative,” Emerson compared the two parties that 
divided the state—Conservatism and Innovation—and asked which party the “great, 
brave, and beneficent man” should choose. Unsurprisingly, his evidence mounted up in 
favor of the Innovators (the radicals, reformers, and idealists) and against the 
Conservatives. In his lecture, Emerson imagined a dialogue between these two parties 
(just had Brownson had a year before), where the Conservatives stood in as thinly-veiled 
surrogates for the disappointingly inert Whig party. In this exchange, Emerson had the 
idealist voice his own private critique of the Whig party as a criticism of conservatism— 
verbatim, down to the slippers and the herb-tea. In this same language that Emerson 
dismissed “the Whig,” the idealist observed that the conservative “assumes sickness as a 
necessity, and his social frame is a hospital.” Just like the Whig, the conservative treated 
the world like a patient with a terminal illness, and turned every social phenomenon into 
an biological disorder that could be clinically diagnosed and contained. In this 
framework, the conservative naturalized man-made systems, projecting the iniquities they 
produced onto the bodies of their victims. Conservatives believed that misers were born 
that way, the consequence of a long-standing and vicious “system of trade” that had 
                                                 
616 “The Times: Introductory Lecture (1842),” in The Political Emerson: Essential Writings on Politics and 
Social Reform (Beacon Press, 2004), at 52, 53, 61, 65, 69. 
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“stereotyped itself in the human generation.”617 Since sickness had secured its footing, 
the idealist recounted, “leprosy has grown cunning, has got into the ballot-box; the lepers 
outvote the clean; society has resolved itself into a Hospital Committee, and all its laws 
are quarantine.” Conservatives adapted every social sector—religion, education, and 
law—into a mechanism for its bare maintenance. They did not care about the future; they 
had no intention in steering the world “toward greatness” or fostering the “glory of a new 
and more excellent creation.” They ruled to ensure that the days and years continued to 
pass and to “make the world last our day.” Still, the Conservatives were not worthless, 
Emerson concluded. They existed instrumentally, that they might spark true reform. 
Mankind’s hope—that they might c and one day achieve it—grew on this “wild crab of 
conservatism.” So, Emerson, too, remained hopeful, “It is much that this old and 
vituperated system of things has borne so fair a child. It predicts that amidst a planet 
peopled with conservatives, one Reformer may yet be born.”618 
Where Emerson saw creative antagonism, and Clarke attempted a systematic 
integration, Brownson found the potential for a living synthesis between conservatism 
and reform. A month after Emerson’s address, Brownson took James Freeman Clarke’s 
October sermon as an opportunity to develop the subject for his January 1842 BosQR.619 
He started the review with an expression of respect and gratitude for his 
                                                 
617 NB: In Emerson’s use, “generation” signified a meaning akin to the twentieth-century word “genome.”  
618 Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Lectures on the Times: II. The Conservative,” in Nature: An Essay ; And, 
Lectures on the Times (London: H.G. Clarke, 1844), at 109, 110, 112, 114. 
619 Reviews like the BosQR and the DemRev needed an item to review as a pretext to discuss a particular 
subject, but they occasionally clarified that they did not intend to endorse the original source when they 
chose to write about it. In this particular review, Brownson began his article with an explicit statement to 
this effect: “WE do not introduce this sermon [James Freeman Clarke, The Well-Instructed Scribe; or 
Reform and Conservatism (Boston, 1841)] to our readers in consequence of its intrinsic merit, for it is but a 
common-place performance, altogether beneath the talents and genius of its author,--a most estimable man, 
and a successful preacher;--but for the purpose of saying something on the very important and deeply 
interesting subject it broaches.” 
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Transcendentalist colleague because he, too, had tried and failed to reconcile 
conservatism and reform. He, too, had long wrestled with the paradox that the human 
race “was made for progress,” and, yet, it assimilated tradition, just as the “body 
assimilate[d] food”—it could not be divested of it. In his faith that he could overcome 
this tension systematically, Brownson admitted, he had also promoted the doctrine that 
the “true reformer” should work to “fulfill the old, never to destroy it,” compelling his 
disciples to pivot perpetually “from the past to the future, and from the future to the past, 
in endless gyration,” making no progress. Brownson had “no conception of the 
impotence” of this doctrine, he claimed, until he found Clarke reproducing it in his own 
sermon. In reading “conservatism to reformers,” and “radicalism to conservatives,” 
Brownson realized, Clarke converted neither and alienated both. Blowing “hot and cold 
in the same breath,” he succeeded only in creating a nauseating lukewarmness and 
producing a state of “absolute indifferency” in his audience. Like Clarke, Brownson 
wrote, he, too, had once “mistaken an imbecile eclecticism, for a powerful and living 
synthesis,” but not anymore.  
After a decade dedicated to Victor Cousin and Théodore Jouffroy, Brownson had 
discovered the philosophy of French romantic socialist Pierre Leroux in 1841, and with 
him, the secret to combining the “past and the future into a living unity,” and collapsing 
the difference between the “stationary” and the “movement” parties.620 As Brownson 
argued implicitly in this article and explicitly in the July 1842 BosQR (when he addressed 
Leroux’s De Humaniti) Leroux’s doctrine of Progress created a “real synthesis” in the 
“actual life of the race, and in that of the individual.” Because “we are the past, as well as 
                                                 
620 Breckman, Warren. “Politics in a Symbolic Key: Pierre Leroux, Romantic Socialism, and the Schelling 
Affair.” Modern Intellectual History 2, no. 1 (2005): 61–86. doi:10.1017/S1479244304000320. 
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the presentiment of the future” in Leroux’s philosophy, Brownson attested, every man 
embodied a “living synthesis” of “what has been, and of what is to come.” Conservatives 
and reformers merely struggled in varying degrees for progress.621 In the place of Kant’s 
abstract, theoretical epigenesis, Leroux posited a literal epigenesis, effected by God’s 
intervention through the agency of “specially inspired and extraordinarily endowed 
individuals,” who acted as the “providential agents of the progress of the race.”622 
Though all men descended from the same bloodline, some families and nations had 
benefitted from a “continued superior moral, intellectual, and physical culture,” which 
improved their blood over the course of human history. These “more advanced nations” 
produced superior stock, with larger moral and social capacities than children of other, 
less educated, bloodlines. 
This line of argument quickly got Brownson in trouble with his fellow 
democrats—because it suggested that heredity justified social inequality—and even the 
Whig-affiliated New-York Daily Tribune, run by Brownson’s personal friend and political 
adversary Horace Greeley, remarked on the “conservative” tendency of Brownson’s 
recent writings.623 To short-circuit this criticism, Brownson clarified in his July review 
that the trajectory he had described reflected a spiritual, as opposed to a natural, 
                                                 
621 Brownson concluded his article on Reform and Conservatism, “We go for progress; not in truth, for 
truth is immutable, but in the knowledge of the truth; and that truth is no innate property of our souls. We 
are not born in possession of it. We obtain a knowledge of it only by a sincere and earnest study of man and 
the universe, the Bible and the life of Jesus. We have no wish to separate ourselves from common 
humanity. We go with our brethren. Their traditions are ours; their God is our God; their faith is our faith; 
and all we ask of them is to permit us to labor in common with them for a more perfect understanding of 
the Gospel, and a more complete realization of the great truths, in both man and men, in the individual and 
society, in church and state, in industry, science, and art, in the whole sphere of man's life and activity” and 
then the following article is “Art. IV.—Speech of Mr. Calhoun, of South Carolina, on the Distribution Bill, 
in the Senate of the United States, August 24, 1841.” (Orestes Augustus Brownson, The Boston Quarterly 
Review, vol. V (Boston: Benjamin H. Greene, 1842), 84. 
622 Ibid., 75. 
623 “The Most Clear-Sighted as well as Vigorous Radical Writers of Our Day,” New-York tribune. (New-
York [N.Y.]), 11 Jan. 1842. Chronicling America: Historic American Newspapers. Lib. of Congress. 
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development.624 Brownson acknowledged that his January number had placed too much 
emphasis on the theory of hereditary descent by natural generation, in which progressive 
change occurred only within a single family line. Rather, Brownson emphasized, Leroux 
attributed progressive change to divine intercession, a “spiritual generation” in which 
God acted as the developmental force on successive generations, irrespective of their 
“order of birth.” Metonymically, Brownson explained, humanity lived its own life as a 
“collective being,” just as individual beings lived theirs. Recursively, the race 
(understood Platonically as the “virtuality of man” or “human nature”) operated as the 
“potentiality of the individual,” which developed by the same “law of growth” as 
individuals did in their passage from infancy to manhood, continuously assimilating 
divine truth based on God’s progressive revelation.625 By this process, “humanity as the 
virtuality of the individual” became “enlarged,” increasing the human potential from one 
generation to the next, so that “children of later generations are born…with greater 
internal capacities” than the former.626 Succeeding generations transmitted their progress 
through imbrication, each becoming the objective portion of the next generation and 
transmitting to them the “higher life” that had grown within them according to their 
Capacity and their Works. In this way, Leroux injected a providential (divine) element 
into the doctrine of Progress—echoing Leibniz’s law of continuity, or continuous 
creation, by which he equated an organism’s conservative and productive actions with the 
                                                 
624 NB: the Democrats may have thought Brownson’s Lerouxian doctrines leaned aristocratic, but the 
Whigs still considered him a French Jacobin (“To the Editors,” Daily National Intelligencer (Washington, 
District Of Columbia), Friday, June 10, 1842; Issue 9147.) 
625 Breckman, Leroux, 77. 
626 Brownson, De Humaniti, 278. 
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creative capacities of the divine will.627 Leroux resolved the tension between the past and 
the future, conservatism and progress, therefore, by transferring it into the symbolic 
register.628 
In his concluding note for the July BosQR, Brownson credited Leroux for 
correcting the aristocratic tendencies evident in his January number. Through Leroux, 
Brownson revealed, he had come to understand that “spiritual generation” caused most of 
the differences that he had habitually naturalized in his prior work. Furthermore, 
Leroux’s symbolic synthesis corrected the weaknesses that he had identified in other 
progressive doctrines. From his engagement with Leroux, Brownson hoped that “those, 
who suppose us less democratic than formerly,” would realize that “we are more so.” 
Whatever that meant. 
The July number marked Brownson’s last full edition of the BosQR. The journal’s 
finances forced him to shutter it with the October 1842 issue, in which he announced his 
merger with John L. O’Sullivan’s United States Magazine and Democratic Review 
(hereafter: DemRev). If Brownson genuinely believed that his readership would find him 
more democratic than they had before, he did nothing to curtail his criticism of other 
radicals. In the single article he published in his last BosQR, Brownson indulged in a 
hundred-and-twenty-six-page long dissection of Theodore Parker's Discourse on Matters 
Pertaining to Religion, which amounted to an autopsy on Transcedentalism.629 In his 
second contribution to the DemRev the following month (November 1842), in which he 
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discussed the utopian Brook Farm community (an experiment in socialist living that 
Brownson’s close friend George Ripley started in 1841), he took aim at the other major 
philosophical movement sweeping American reform: Fourier’s “System of 
Association.”630 Since March 1842, Horace Greeley had given Fourierist Albert Brisbane 
a weekly column in his Whig-affiliated New-York Daily Tribune, where Brisbane 
proselytized for Fourier.631 Although Brownson praised Brook Farm, itself, his 
November article so thoroughly ravaged Fourierism in the process that the DemRev 
published a “Protest” on Fourier’s behalf in its next issue.632 
Brownson rounded out the year with a lecture in front of the Mercantile Library 
Association at the Broadway Tabernacle Church during which he laid out the philosophy 
of government that would get him excommunicated from the Democratic party faithful 
by the close of 1843. Speaking on the subject of government, Brownson protested against 
                                                 
630 Technically, Brook Farm was a joint-stock company, not a commune. (Barbara L. Packer, The 
Transcendentalists (Athens and London: University of Georgia Press, 2007), 155. 
631 Brisbane published the pro-Fourier articles in the Tribune from March 1842 through September 1843. 
After Brownson’s piece in the Democratic Review, Brisbane published an article on “Conservative 
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none. He does not do away with present institutions, to begin de novo with unknown and arbitrary laws and 
customs; he progresses from the present to the future, gradually and by slow degrees, as individuals grow 
from infancy to manhood without losing their identity of personality and character.” (“Conservative 
Reform, New-York daily tribune (New York, NY), November 15, 1842; Carl J. Guarneri, The Utopian 
Alternative: Fourierism in Nineteenth-Century America (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 
1991), 33-34; Robert C. Williams, Horace Greeley: Champion of American Freedom (Ithaca and New 
York: NYU Press, 2006), 66; Adam-Max Tuchinsky, Horace Greeley’s New-York Tribune: Civil War-Era 
Socialism and the Crisis of Free Labor (New York and London: Cornell University Press, 2009), 66-67.) 
632 O’Sullivan, himself, wrote the “Protest.” Brownson even sent his eldest son, Orestes, to live and study at 
Brook Farm from 1842-1843. (Brook Farm,” Brownson, O. A., The United States Democratic Review, 
Volume 0011, Issue 53 (November 1842), 488) Also, the categorization of Brook Farm as “Communist” 
comes from Brownson’s description in his February 1843 article on “The Community System” (The United 
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word would have been cheering amidst such a tempest of abuse as fell upon us from the conservative sky.” 
(Ripley to Brownson, December 18, 1842, H. F. Brownson, Early Life , 311-315.) 
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calling the US form of government a “Democracy” based on his understanding of the 
dynamic between humanity, individuals, and the state. Ideally, Brownson insisted, 
government existed to control the diversity of individuals so that each person had the 
liberty to be himself without disrupting the delicate balance by which society sustained 
the essential connection between each individual and his humanity. In a democracy, the 
will of the people was sovereign, with no outside control. In the United States, on the 
contrary, the constitution and the laws governed the people, affording them the order 
necessary for them to manifest their own particular destinies. “We do American 
institutions grievous wrong… when we call them democratic,” the New-York Daily 
Tribune reported Brownson saying, “they are better than that, they are republican, 
looking solely for the public good.” In this sense, Brownson explained, the United States 
“most nearly approached a general model” of government because its form replicated the 
ideal relationship between diverse individuals (the State Governments) and the unified 
human Race (the Federal Union). The universal human Race and individual men lived 
symbiotically: the Race provided the vital material for each man to become a distinct 
individual, but no single man embodied the totality of humanity. Likewise, the States 
drew from the Federal Union the vital elements of their nature, but they, too, retained 
their integrity as distinct entities.  
Reading into Brownson’s talk the subtext of the comte de Saint-Simon, the 
Tribune praised its balance between conservatism and reform in the same language it 
used to describe Fourier’s doctrine of association. As the Tribune had explained in an 
article on “Conservative Reform” three weeks earlier, Fourierists believed that “the 
soundest principles of innovation are conservative” in policy, seeking to improve existing 
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institutions “gradually and by slow degrees,” progressing from the “present to the future,” 
like an individual person growing from “infancy to manhood without losing their identity 
of personality and character.”633 Though Brownson differed from the Fourierists on 
several essential points, the Tribune found that his lecture resonated with Fourier’s calls 
for universal unity and harmony through the varied association of mankind. Compared 
with Fourier, the “most conservative of all reformers,” Brownson’s discourse proved 
“eminently conservative and yet full of genuine love for Man and a zealous regard for his 
rights,” according to the Tribune.634 
Brownson’s December 1842 discourse marked the culmination of an entire year 
covertly stumping for Calhoun’s presidential candidacy and signaled the more explicit 
position he would take in Calhoun’s favor in 1843. His language called back to his 
analysis of Calhoun’s Distribution speech (Janurary BosQR), in particular, in which he 
clarified the “grave error” the party had committed in translating the word 
“Republicanism” by the word “Democracy,” sparking their ruinous habit of treating their 
party and their institutions as democratic, when they were not. By focusing on the 
relationship between the individual and his universal humanity, Brownson brought in 
Leroux, whose “living synthesis” provided a model for how the US might continue to 
operate in dynamic tension between the States and the Union, and whose doctrine of 
progressive revelation vindicated representative over popular forms of government. 
Though the Tribune failed to note it, Brownson’s argument traced the metaphysical 
contours of Calhoun’s republican and State rights doctrines. In lecturing on 
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“Government, its Origin, Organization and End,” Brownson released an opening salvo in 
his year-long bombardment on the subject in the pages of the DemRev—ranging from 
synthetic philosophy, the community system, and universal history, to popular 
government, the present state of society, and a three part series on the “Origin and 
Ground of Government”—all aimed to re-shape the public mind in Calhoun’s favor.  
THE CONSERVATIVE 
What played out in the pages of the DemRev in 1843 as a pitched battle between 
“Conservatism and Democratic Progress” more accurately represented internecine 
campaigns within the Democratic party between the forces for Martin Van Buren and the 
forces for John C. Calhoun. In a sort of call-and-response over the course of the year, 
Orestes Brownson would write a provocative article making the case for Calhoun with 
varying degrees of transparency, and John L O’Sullivan would reply with an editorial 
meant to mollify his readers and mediate Brownson’s decree, while subtly promoting 
Van Buren’s cause. On one level, Brownson and O’Sullivan debated popular democracy 
and organic conservatism, but, as the 1840 Whig Daily National Intelligencer had 
predicted, their conflict came down to the essential inconsistency within the Democratic 
party between LocoFoco and pro-slavery politics. As the 1844 presidential election 
loomed, the Democrats threatened, once again, to break up over the direction and thrust 
of their party.635 
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In the April 1843 DemRev, Brownson wrote a scathing indictment of popular 
sovereignty in a polarizing editorial on “Democracy and Liberty.” He started his essay 
with a warning to his “democratic brethren” that he intended to say “many severe things” 
to and about them in the course of his argument, and that he hoped they would be able to 
retain their good humor, since he did it for their own good.636 Mistakenly, he wrote, they 
had believed that a “purely democratic” form of government would lead to the “Freedom 
and progress of all men,” and “especially of the poorest and most numerous class.” They 
assumed that external restraints on individual and collective freedom, alone, prevented 
the people from gaining both the capacity and the drive to reach their highest individual 
and social potential.637 But the people had yet to demonstrate the least capacity for 
intelligent reflection on public policy and political affairs. During the 1840 campaign, 
Brownson recalled, “Truth had no beauty, sound argument no weight, patriotism no 
influence.” The people followed men, not principles. They had no real understanding of 
the practical differences between political positions and no desire to learn them. 
Consequently, though they had enthusiastically sustained Jackson, they rejected Van 
Buren, even though he pursued the same policies. The people had viewed those men 
“who had devoted their lives to the cause of their country, of truth, justice, liberty, 
humanity,” as their enemies and voted, instead, to “make cattle of themselves.” In fact, 
Brownson conjectured, the people had so little grasp of their constitution or what it meant 
to live in a democracy, that “no measure of public policy can be proposed, so absurd or 
so wicked but it shall find popular support.”  
                                                 
636 Brownson, Democracy and Liberty, 374. 
637 Brownson, Democracy and Liberty, 382 
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Brownson reminded his Democratic colleagues that their government was a 
“political organism,” invested with the power of a “living constitution,” which prescribed 
certain protective and regulatory mechanisms designed to protect the people’s 
sovereignty and liberty from this capricious and chaotic rule of the mob. When misguided 
politicians removed the restraints on the popular will, however, they eroded these 
practical, structural guaranties that protected individual rights and secured personal 
freedom. Not only had their popular democratic doctrines proven insufficient to obtain 
and secure popular rights, Brownson insisted, they actually damaged the positive exercise 
of personal liberty. “We fear no attacks on Liberty but those made in the name of 
Liberty,” Brownson wrote, because men obsessed with the word “Liberty” substituted 
“passion for judgment, enthusiasm for wisdom,” and broke down everything that stood in 
their way. “Liberty with them [was] merely political,” reducible to the freedom to vote or 
seek public office, and for each man to follow his own will wherever it led him. They had 
no sense of the delicate balance between resistance and control that liberty required. They 
had no concept of what structures an organic community required to sustain true 
individual liberty.  
In spite of their claims, Brownson refused to consider these men “democrats” in 
the proper sense of the term. For Brownson, the Democratic party “at heart” resembled 
Calhoun’s vision: it stood against paper money, protective tariffs, corporate capital, and 
federal consolidation, and favored free trade, State Rights, strict construction, low taxes, 
and small government. A true democrat, in Brownson’s sense, fought for the “general 
melioration in the speediest manner possible of the moral, intellectual, and physical 
condition of the poorest and most numerous class.” Democrats who advocated popular 
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doctrines, on the other hand, could never effectively secure its adherents true liberty, 
practical freedom, or sustainable progress because popular suffrage in the United States 
primarily furthered the interests of the “money power” at the expense of the proletaries. 
In the end, popular democracy offered no greater protection for marginalized 
communities than hierarchical forms of government did.638  
Brownson concluded his article with a panegyric for conservative activism. The 
“love of liberty” still burned deep and clear in his “true manly heart,” he reflected, but his 
experience as a social activist and democratic political operative had finally led him to 
reject the destructively radical politics of his youth. Though he still believed in the radical 
side’s progressive aims, he had seen that their anti-establishment methods failed to effect 
real social change. Even if they succeeded in tearing down church and state, he reflected, 
they would gain nothing. Once they destroyed the progress of thousands of years, they 
had no assurance that the human race would not develop on precisely the same lines as it 
had before, re-constituting its old abuses. In their effort to acquire freedom and progress, 
radicals swept away the infrastructure and authority necessary to secure them.  
With age had come the clarity that liberty was not the absence of order; liberty 
existed “only in and through order.” Social justice and human progress required 
guarantees for freedom and good government built into the organismic working of the 
system, itself. The “only true way of carrying the race forward,” Brownson wrote, “is 
through its existing institutions,” advancing religion through the Church and society 
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through the State. Brownson conceded that this Realist approach to progressive change 
might give his readers the false impression that he had abandoned the Movement Party, 
which he denied. Within the Movement, Brownson explained, two groups vied for 
ascendency: a “radical section, seeking progress by destruction” and a “conservative 
section,” which sought progress “through and in obedience to existing institutions.” The 
conservative reformers understood that progressive change could not grow out of a 
destructive radical impulse, but must be planted on “firm reality.” Between the two, 
Brownson contended that the wise man chose the conservative side.  
Brownson held an unpopular stance on popular sovereignty, and, having 
expressed these views in a national forum during a Whig presidency, he placed himself in 
a tenuous position with his Democratic colleagues. Anticipating his readers’ outrage at 
Brownson’s anti-democratic position, John L. O’Sullivan injected some damage control 
into the proceedings. Following Brownson’s diatribe, he published an editorial note that 
distanced the DemRev from Brownson’s personal politics and mitigated his attacks on 
popular sovereignty, without completely undercutting Brownson, himself.639 Jokingly, 
O’Sullivan blamed Brownson’s ideological about-face on his rapidly-advancing years (in 
April 1843, Brownson was just shy of forty and O’Sullivan was twenty-nine). Having 
passed the “grand climacteric of life,” O’Sullivan explained, Brownson’s views had been 
subject to the “usual process” by which the young Liberal “so often becomes 
metamorphosed into the old Conservative.” Still, O’Sullivan speculated that he and 
                                                 
639 When it came to attacking conservatism, O’Sullivan allowed someone else to make the direct hits. 
Immediately following his “Note,” O’Sullivan inserted a literary notice of Chapin’s Philosophy of Reform 
that basically republished highlights of his argument against conservatism. 
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Brownson might not differ so much, “after we get below the surface of names and 
phrases.”640 
While O’Sullivan agreed with Brownson that the 1840 election had been a 
disaster, he argued that the Whig victory proved that the popular democratic principle 
worked. In “turning us out neck and heels as they did so very unceremoniously in 1840,” 
O’Sullivan determined, the people acted “just about right.”641 In the “revolution, or rather 
the revulsion, of 1840,” the Democrats had lost not because the people were stupid, but 
because the party’s policies had failed (particularly Jackson’s “Pet Bank experiment”). In 
fact, O’Sullivan proposed that this choice reflected a kind of popular conservative logic. 
Through its acts of self-government, self-reliance, and self-development, the popular 
mind exercised its own conservative wisdom. If, in its freedom, the popular mind made 
mistakes, they were necessary for it to “grow from inward to outward, through vice into 
virtue.”642 Though Brownson had expressed his disappointed in the people’s capacity to 
embrace abstract truths and progressive reforms, O’Sullivan suggested that they might 
have instinctively understood that they were morally and physically unprepared for those 
kinds of changes.  
In his defense of popular self-government, O’Sullivan made a similar argument as 
the German romantics had at the turn of the century. Seeming to echo Schiller, 
O’Sullivan described the “constitution” as an internal force that operated both within 
individuals and within nations to regulate their organization. In this way, he noted, a 
national constitution performed the same function as an individual’s “common sense” or 
                                                 
640 Even as early as 1843, the “old Conservative” was an established trope. “Note,” John L. O’Sullivan, The 
United States Democratic Review, Volume 12 (Langtree and O’Sullivan, 1843), 391. 
641 Ibid., 388-389. 
642 Ibid., 390. 
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conscience, operating as a stable principle that judged the external force of the world on 
the organic system. People became sovereign when they had developed a free 
constitution: a transcendent, disinterested internalized law of reason that governed all of 
their other, lower (sensorial) systems. Any community enlightened enough to possess a 
free constitution would never suffer a violent revolution, by definition, because each 
member of that community had internalized the “social vis inertia,” (the spirit of 
“conservatism”) which served as a sufficient guarantee against abusing their power to 
change their government. This “good” conservatism acted as a universal spirit that 
ensured harmonious order and movement by acting as a co-ordinate centripetal principle 
against the centrifugal force of radicalism and reform. The fact that the United States 
already possessed a free constitution proved that the “general good sense, the social vis 
inertia, the universal spirit of a true and good conservatism” already prevailed in their 
community. What Brownson saw as a weakness, then, O’Sullivan categorized as the 
system’s greatest strength. Popular sovereignty—the capacity of the popular will to 
change its government’s forms and machinery—served as a corrective built into the 
primary principle of its organization. 
Unfortunately, O’Sullivan’s attempt to diffuse the mounting tension between 
Brownson’s philosophy and the DemRev’s audience failed either to mollify his readership 
or to quell Brownson. Infamously humorless, Brownson responded to O’Sullivan with a 
series of increasingly hostile editorials, irrevocably damaging their relationship. Over the 
course of the next six months, Brownson heatedly defended himself in the pages of the 
DemRev. In his first editorial after O’Sullivan’s April “abuse,” Brownson claimed that he 
had worked too hard and for too long in the “great and glorious cause of freedom and 
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progress,” to “slough off” into a “cold and heartless conservatism” in his dotage.643 He 
reminded his readers that he had initially avoided party politics because he did not think 
the Democrats sufficiently radical for his tastes, and he joined the party only after they 
adopted the principles of “Social Democracy” (i.e., the southern State Rights and 
Locofoco doctrines) during the 1837 financial crisis. While he acknowledged that a 
“revolution” had occurred in his opinions after Van Buren lost, he denied that the election 
(or any other “earthly or unearthly” power) could turn him into a Whig. He still 
considered himself part of the Democratic party, and an advocate of its leading measures, 
in spite of the fact that he been “formally excommunicated” from it on several occasions. 
Like all “true Democrats,” he wrote, he struggled for “Equal Rights and Equal Chances;” 
he differed from the party solely in his approach to achieving that end.  
Recent events—the 1840 election, the Whig Congress, the Dorr War—
demonstrated that the Democratic party desperately needed to change their tactics if they 
wanted to achieve social equality. Following Benton, the party continuously framed the 
political contest as a conflict between “MAN and MONEY,” arguing that the country’s 
problems turned on the divide between corporations and businesses, on the one hand, and 
labor, on the other. With everything else being equal, they reasoned, a fair vote would 
necessarily favor the working classes, since they made up a larger portion of the 
community.644 Nonetheless, the “party of Money” always prevailed.645 On the strength of 
the “revolutionary and mobocratic doctrines preached by Mr. Clay and his Whig friends,” 
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the people voted against their interests. In light of these results, Brownson pleaded with 
the Democrats to recognize the impotence of popular democracy to secure workers’ 
rights or achieve any effectively popular reform. So long as the people could be duped 
into voting for the wrong party or the wrong policies, they could not be trusted to protect 
their own civil freedoms or hope to improve their “moral, intellectual, and physical” 
conditions. They must be controlled, somehow.  
Writing on “Popular Government” in May 1843, Brownson argued that the engine 
guiding and advancing social change must be located in the structure of the system, itself. 
True social amelioration could only be obtained if authorized by and evolved from the 
present order—that is, from the constitution understood in Leroux’s organic sense as the 
totality of relations, or the materialized whole.646 In this model, the constitution, acting as 
the sovereign power, existed in and flowed through the actual organization of the body 
politic, ensuring that the “whole” operated through the parts without threatening to 
disrupt their coordinate functions. With this understanding of constitutionalism, 
Brownson proposed that the Democrats “make themselves a true CONSTITUTIONAL 
PARTY” on the basis of Calhoun’s weighted system of concurrent majorities. Brownson 
insisted that Calhoun’s theory of government would secure a “much larger share of 
individual freedom” and leave a larger field to “Free-Will, Conscience, Reason, and the 
Bible” than the “consolidated democracy against which I have so often and so 
indignantly protested—and for protesting against which I am called a conservative and an 
aristocrat.” In the place of simple majority rule (the representation by one of all), 
Calhoun’s system increased the relative voting power of a numerically smaller group, so 
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that they counterbalanced the majority. Concurrent majorities cancelled out each other’s 
material interests, so that only their universal interests remained, forcing them to engage 
with each other as “men and citizens,” without recourse to their particular identities. This 
formula basically reduced all political conflicts to questions of class. Although this 
system theoretically dissolved identity politics based on the fungible (and potentially 
fluid) measures of class, education, and profession, it simultaneously reinforced the 
political disenfranchisement of women and people of color, since their essentialized and 
naturalized organic differences of race and gender could not be erased, changed, or 
canceled out.  
In his note responding to this article, O’Sullivan conflated the Democratic party 
with Van Buren’s politics and labeled dissenting voices (like Brownson’s and, implicitly, 
Calhoun’s) as anti-democratic. While O’Sullivan acknowledged Brownson’s 
consistency—his eclectic philosophy, O’Sullivan noted, had always combined 
“speculative radicalism” and conservatism—he reiterated that Brownson seemed to lean 
more heavily on his conservatism lately. It was one thing to give “conservative vetoes” to 
minorities in order to protect their rights, but another thing entirely to sabotage the 
People’s sovereignty, compare them to livestock, and suggest that they needed to be 
controlled by government machinery. O’Sullivan confessed that he also supported 
concurrent majorities in theory, if implemented at the foundation of a new civil polity. In 
the United States, however, politicians invoked the term “minority interests” as a blind 
for special interests (and classes) already supported by a long legislative history and 
operating at the expense of equal rights. Given this dynamic, O’Sullivan recommended a 
course of treatment based on the “homoeopathic principle that similia similibus curantur 
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[like cures like].” Once in control, the people must be allowed to implement positive 
measures to counteract the “manifold mischiefs of past mis-government.”647 As the true 
(but previously silenced) majority, they should be given free rein to act in their capacity 
as the “great repealing and reforming power” so feared by reactionary conservatives.  
In his recent work in the DemRev, O’Sullivan reflected, it “certainly seemed as if 
Mr. Brownson meant with particular emphasis to proclaim himself” part of that category 
of conservatism attached to existing systems of abuse and oppression. Like many radicals 
after the Whigs overthrew the Democrats in 1840, O’Sullivan observed, Brownson’s 
disillusionment had led him to expressions against popular sovereignty that resonated 
with the “highest ultraists of the anti-democratic school of politics.” In contrast, and 
counter-intuitively, O’Sullivan viewed the Whig victory as the breaking point in the 
“great disease of Whiggism, so long and deeply festering in the political body.” In taking 
political power, the Whigs had lost the strength that they had generated in their 
opposition to Democratic hegemony during the 1830s; without the Democrats to assail, 
they lost the coherence they had built on their collective animosity. With the public mind 
in a healthier state than it had been in years, O’Sullivan predicted that the parties would 
finally pass the Independent Treasury, vindicating Martin Van Buren and marking an 
essential step in the “onward progress of the high destiny of our country” and its 
institutions.648  
Though O’Sullivan kept the partisan source of his political disagreement with 
Brownson in the margins, Fourierist and Democratic journalist Parke Godwin called out 
the internecine conflict by name. In the Pathfinder (NY), he whittled Brownson’s 
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argument down to this single point, “it seems that all [Brownson] meant to say in that 
article was, that he was a believer in Mr. Calhoun’s notions of government.” As a former 
supporter, himself, Godwin sympathized with Brownson’s allegiance in favor of Calhoun 
and against the “democratic simplism” represented by Democratic party leaders like 
Martin Van Buren, Silas Wright, James Buchanan, and George Bancroft. “They have no 
originality of thought, and much less any real vital power,” Godwin reported, “There is 
no life in them, only the imitation of life.” In contrast, Calhoun’s system of concurrent 
majorities and local rights functioned to “nerve society, in its transition from the civilized 
or incoherent order, to the harmonic or combined order,” which Godwin compared to the 
developmental point in the life of the individual when the “childish trebble” changes into 
“manly bass.” For these reasons, Godwin acknowledged that, like Brownson, he had also 
promoted Calhoun’s candidacy, in spite of his position on slavery, because he had 
believed that Calhoun’s principles would eliminate slavery, alongside other “social and 
political evils,” once they were put into play. Recently, however, he had come to the 
conclusion through his study of Fourier that Calhoun’s temporary fix would only slow 
society’s growth; since societies had no need, like men, to physically pass from boyhood 
to manhood, they could skip that step and jump straight to being a harmonious social 
organism.649  
Between July and October 1843, Brownson made the case for Calhoun in a series 
of articles in the DemRev that demonstrated the vital urgency for a significant (but 
conservative) change in the country’s leadership and organization based on its present 
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condition. Starting with his July review of Thomas Carlyle’s Past and Present, Brownson 
diagnosed the illness that ravaged the universal social organism, and especially the 
“Saxon portion of it,” brought about by man’s worship of money and made chronic 
through the systemic antagonism between master-workers and workers, Capital and 
Labor. Modern society suffered from a potentially fatal disease: industrial capitalism. 
Building on Carlyle’s description of England’s working class, Brownson traced the 
morbid anatomy of industrial capitalism through the degraded condition of Boston’s 
poor, the “four thousand victims of man’s infamy,” all able-bodied men and women who 
had begged for work “with tears in their eyes,” and, finding none, submitted to the 
indignity of soup and bread lines run by charitable societies. Even under the “virtuous 
and intelligent rule of the democracy,” a “whole nation of working-men bound hand and 
foot,” died starving, “while there is bread enough and to spare” and “poor human mothers 
[were] driven to devour the flesh of their own offspring” in order to survive. The “whole 
head is sick, the whole heart is faint,” Brownson judged, quoting Isaiah, because of the 
“evil” inherent to an “Industrial Order” that failed to sustain a significant portion of the 
population above the poverty line.650  
Referring to his infamous 1840 article on the “Laboring Classes,” Brownson 
recalled that he had offered his own “Morrison Pill” to relieve these symptoms, but the 
public had rejected his cure.651 They resisted treatment because they refused to believe 
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effects (curative or side). The “Morrison Pill” was a byword for fake medicine.  
 313
they were ill, Brownson explained; they mistook the “hectic flush on the cheek for the 
hue of health.” Determined not to waste his own prescriptions (even if they were “quack 
medicines”), Brownson proposed to leave the resolution to the natural leaders of industry, 
religion, and politics, whom he hoped to sway with his depiction of the metaphysical 
peril they faced, and the dangers that their present system posed to the constitution of the 
state. 
Before the disease proved fatal, Brownson called on these men to treat its 
systemic causes—particularly their disordered way of thinking about their relationship 
with the community. Over the years in which he had written about “political organisms,” 
Brownson reminded his audience, he had always maintained that “we must be 
conservative” in the United States. He had argued that the constitutional order in this 
country contained within itself the elements of progress necessary for change, and that 
activists had an obligation to work within that framework. In fulfilling their social 
mission, Brownson had always insisted that reformers “preserve the order established by 
the wisdom of our fathers” because he thought that theirs was the only path to finding the 
“higher order of civilization for mankind.” Once men substituted the “worship of 
Mammon for the worship of God,” however, they developed a faith in human 
philosophies, “in mere theories concerning Supply and Demand, Wealth of Nations, self-
supporting, labor-saving governments,” finding their heaven in financial success and their 
hell in the failure to make money. Under the thrall of the Industrial Order, he wrote, they 
lost their faith “in the Noble, the Beautiful, the Just,” and their sense that a Higher power 
existed. To heal the country, Brownson charged, the country’s leadership must reconnect 
the nation to the sublime, govern in a way that benefitted the poor as well as the “rich 
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capitalists and trading politicians,” and reorganize industry so that it provided for the 
subsistence of the entire population and justly redistributed its profits. Though he did not 
mention Calhoun by name in this article, Brownson’s policy recommendations spelled 
out Calhoun’s political platform. In proposing that the people reconsider the method they 
used to choose their leadership, moreover, Brownson gestured toward the battle over 
political succession being waged behind the scenes of the Democratic party.  
Over the summer, Brownson distilled what separated him from O’Sullivan and 
other popular democrats: he treated society as a living organism, and they treated it as a 
collection of individuals, “held together by that rope of sand, enlightened self-interest.” 
Speaking at Dartmouth College at the end of July, Brownson argued that the “broad and 
solid foundation of society” rested on an organic conception of human relations in which 
each man represented a “distinct phasis652 of humanity” that no other man embodied.653 
No one in this system could be spared. Because each man performed a unique service in 
the “manifestation or representation of humanity,” anyone who wounded one man, even 
the “least significant” one, damaged the “mighty heart of universal humanity herself.” On 
the basis of this essential interconnectedness, society became a “living organism, with a 
common centre of life, and a common principle of vitality; a one body with many 
members, and all the members [were] members one of another.” This organic framework 
led the scholar, the moralist, the politician, and the religious minister to address 
themselves to the diversity of needs in their communities, finding the combination of 
inspiration and instruction that would propel each man toward the progressive realization 
                                                 
652 A phasis is a particular point in the life cycle of humanity as an organism. 
653 Brownson, Scholar, 13-14 
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of his own destiny and, incidentally, contribute to the continuous growth of creation 
toward realizing God’s “Infinite Ideal.”  
In his three-part series on the organic “Origins and Grounds of Government,” 
which the DemRev ran from August through October 1843, Brownson elaborated his own 
metaphysical and teleological framework for civil government, contended for its 
perfecting and emancipatory purpose, and explained how Calhoun’s conservative vision 
would lead them there. Brownson argued that popular democrats, like O’Sullivan, 
misunderstood the nature of society and the reason that human beings needed 
government. The problem with modern democratic theorists, Brownson reiterated, was 
that they had “no conception of society as an organism,—no conception of the unity of 
humanity as the generative principle of individuals”—which led them to “lose sight of 
the diversity of individual function, and try to compress all individuals into one, with one 
and the same individual, and social, function.” Brownson railed against their popular 
theory of democracy, expressed in a blind and insatiable leveling tendency, which 
regarded men as interchangeable parts. By indulging in the impulse to level downward, 
he complained, they 
advanced an anti-intellectual doctrine of equality that reduced everyone to their basest 
interests, stunting society’s organic growth and perpetuating the conditions for inequality 
that it had intended to supplant, in the first place.  
In terms of governing, Brownson noted, popular democratic theory begged the 
question. It assumed the “freedom of every individual as the condition of securing the 
freedom of every individual.” Yet, government did not exist because men were born 
equal, as the Declaration of Independence claimed; it existed because they were not 
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equal. “It is precisely because men are not free and independent, because they cannot be 
free, and each in a condition to perform his special function in the social body, without 
government, that government becomes necessary.” Government existed to make men 
equal before the law and to order society in a way that granted them the liberty to realize 
their human potential. 
 In Brownson’s organic theory of government, in contrast, government arose in 
response to “man's nature”—to his “inherent and essential want of humanity.” Brownson 
demonstrated that “what we term human society, is not a mere association of equals,” as 
Fourier would have it, “but a Living Organism” in which humanity operated as the “one 
vital force active in all, the lifecurrent, that flows through all individuals, making them 
all members of one living body.” Following Leibniz, Brownson defined “humanity” as a 
real, causative drive (the vis activa) that operated in the material world, to bring 
individuals the substance without which they could not exist. They existed because they 
acted and humanity drove that existence. As the “generative principle of men,” humanity 
served the same purpose in the universal human social organism as the vital force served 
in the human body. In this context, the atomized or disaggregated individuals that 
provided the base units for O’Sullivan’s contract theory of government did not reflect 
reality. Evoking Leroux, Brownson made man and society coterminous. Since “Man out 
of society is a solecism; is not man” and societies had never existed without government, 
Brownson reasoned, then government must also serve an essential purpose in the divine 
structure of reality. Given that God created and governed everything “after its kind,” the 
practical end of human government must be found in the “provision for the freest and 
fullest manifestation of humanity in the life of individuals” or, put simply, the “Freedom 
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for each individual to act out his own individuality.” The only way individuals could 
exist in their full potential was to live in a society that gave full reign to their power to 
act—that is, to their humanity. Because man accessed his humanity incompletely, 
however, he was prone to misdirect or misuse his causative energy, to oppress other men 
or seek personal gain at their expense, and that was why he needed government.  
When someone like John L. O’Sullivan witnessed the chasm between the 
country’s emancipatory ideals and the impoverished condition of its great mass of 
citizens, he thought the discrepancy could be resolved by amplifying the voices of the 
poor and disenfranchised classes, but Brownson disagreed. From Brownson’s vantage, 
the poorer classes all viewed themselves as future masters and voted as if they already 
belonged to that class. They voted against the particular expression of their humanity 
because they had no capacity to recognize it and, through it, to be drawn to those men 
who shared it. Like Charles Lane said in the Dial, “Our organic reforms are not organic 
enough” because they never reached the life force (humanity) in the organ that most 
needed reforming: the individual man, himself.654 Men as individuals had to be brought 
closer to their own humanity before that force (their humanity) could pull them toward 
the humanity of others in incrementally and concentrically larger social organisms. By 
design, the civil government, combined with the moral force of individual statesmen, 
acted as the “directive power” that controlled and guided man’s natural propulsion, 
keeping him obedient to God’s will and on the path toward self-actualization through 
communion with humanity, nature, and God. 
                                                 
654 Charles Lane (1843-10- continuation- 188-204- Social Tendencies. "The Divine End In Society Is 
Human Perfection."  [Continued From Dial For July.]  
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In the organic framework, individuals served specialized, coordinated functions in 
their social organism, which the political apparatus served to secure and help order. The 
precise form of this apparatus developed out of the organic constitution of its host—its 
genius, its pursuits, its soil, its geography. “If universal human society be an organism,” 
Brownson explained, “each nation is also an organism on a smaller scale, and has its own 
vital force and central principle, which is the life of its members.” God endowed each 
nation with life, creating a national organism, which, like man, strove to realize its 
potential—to manifest its destiny. In Brownson’s turn of phrase, each nation struggled 
always to actualize its faith or ideas in its national life. Consequently, men like 
O’Sullivan and Brownson, who dabbled in national metaphysics, had to be careful in the 
way they talked about the country, in the kinds of ideas they introduced, in the ways they 
shaped its faith. Their faith and ideas must be “just and true” because with “false faith, 
with false ideas,” the nation’s life could be “only death.”  
Brownson attributed the present conflict within the Democratic party to its 
confusion about the country’s dominant faith. Their faith was not democratic, it was 
republican. “The party is wrong in calling itself the democratic party, and its faith 
democracy,” Brownson cried, “Its faith is republicanism, and it is the Republican party, 
and it should correct the misnomer of which it is guilty.” As the “true interpreter” of this 
faith, Brownson distinguished between its attachment to democratic ends (which he 
promoted) and its misguided promotion of democratic forms (which he decried). He 
claimed that all Democrats “aimed at the moral, the intellectual, and the social elevation 
of the great mass of mankind,” especially the working classes, and sought to establish a 
framework for individual freedom and progress grounded on the condition of social 
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order. Although they often agreed on policy matters, however, they never converged 
behind a single Democratic philosophy of government. In an absolute democracy of the 
kind promoted by the DemRev, Andrew Jackson, William Henry Harrison, and Thomas 
Dorr (as well as Dorr’s highly-placed supporters: Martin Van Buren, Governor Marcus 
Morton of Massachusetts, and Governor Henry Hubbard of New Hampshire), popular 
sovereignty swept away all other external controls and made men into gods. Nothing 
constrained the individual from acting in an absolute democracy, if he could convinced 
enough people to follow him, because nothing bound him except for public opinion or the 
popular will, “however expressed or collected.”  
Brownson rejected as revolutionary any attempts to reorganize the government 
according to these prevailing democratic theories. In terms of the US government’s 
practical organization, Brownson claimed he had nothing to add to Calhoun’s solution. 
Following Calhoun’s constitutional theory of government (as elaborated during the 
nullification crisis and in his 1842 speech supporting President Tyler’s bank vetoes), 
Brownson characterized the United States as a constitutional republic, where “the people 
are free to act only within certain limits, only through prescribed forms, and, however 
unanimous they may be, only such of their acts are laws, as are done through these 
forms.”655 The US constitution contained within its structure the mechanism for progress, 
making it ideally suited for its political organism. By its nature, the constitutional 
republic produced the ideal balance between the individual’s propelling force and the 
                                                 
655 Cf. Calhoun’s February 26, 1842 “Speech in Support of the Veto Power” and Brownson’s January 1842 
article in the BosQR on “Constitutional Government,” which Brownson also cited for background about the 
“real theory” of constitutional government in the United States. (John Caldwell Calhoun, “Speech in 
Support of the Veto Power, Feb. 28, 1842,” in Speeches of John C. Calhoun: Delivered in the Congress of 
the United States from 1811 to the Present Time (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1843), 477-489; Orestes 
Augustus Brownson, “Constitutional Government” in The Boston Quarterly Review, vol. V (Boston: 
Benjamin H. Greene, 1842), 27-59.) 
 320
government’s directive force. Though Brownson acknowledged, as Calhoun had, that the 
people retained the right to resist (and even subvert) their civil government, he 
maintained that they could never desire such a change because their government 
encompassed “all that can be wished” in its constitution. Compressing Calhoun’s 1837 “I 
am a conservative” speech, Brownson attested: 
Every true American must say with Mr. Calhoun, “I am a conservative in the 
broadest and fullest sense. I solemnly believe that our political system is, in its 
purity, not only the best that ever was formed, but the best possible, that can be 
devised for us. It is the only one by which free states, so populous and wealthy, 
occupying so vast an extent of territory, can preserve their liberty. Thus thinking, 
I cannot hope for a better. Having no hope of a better, I am a conservative.” 
So long as the American people preserved their institutions “in their purity,” and 
administered them according to their “true intent and meaning,” Brownson wrote, their 
government would never give them cause to revolt. To the extent that imprudent 
Democrats resolved the government into a democracy in practice, however, they altered 
its character, polluted its structure, and undermined its capacity to attain its true organic 
ends.656  
Though the United States already enjoyed a perfect constitution, therefore, the 
burden fell on well-educated and well-informed American statesmen, like Calhoun, to 
guard against any departure from its “true nature” or any attempts to administer it in any 
way that deviated from its organic republican principles. From their “elevated position” 
and their “commanding genius,” these statesmen were particularly well-positioned to 
                                                 
656 Brownson, Origin and Ground of Government, 361 370, 372. 
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“operate powerfully on the masses.” Alongside scholars, priests, and moralists, these 
great men drove the moral force that elevated the great mass of people, increasing their 
intelligence and enlarging their moral capacity. As moral authorities, virtuous statesmen 
educated and directed the people, they sought out and publicized (even unpopular) truths, 
and they sacrificed their own interests to generate a “higher social and individual good.” 
Adding Calhoun to the political pantheon of great men, Brownson asked, “What would 
have been our country but for Washington, Jefferson, [Samuel] Adams, Jackson, and last 
but not least, Calhoun?” This act of self-sacrifice, itself, modelled the sort of behavior 
that inspired the masses to meet the demands of good government. In fact, Brownson 
alleged, “we owe the preservation of the Constitution, and the liberty of this country” to 
just one such man. In the course of his public life, John C. Calhoun had risen up against 
the majority of his countrymen to prevent the “popular invasion of the Constitution,” 
risking his career and (nearly) his life. As soon as “party animosities” and the “wrath of 
defeated interests” subsided, Brownson predicted, the people would come to understand 
that Calhoun had salvaged the “true nature” of their institutions, and they would make 
that man their president.657  
By the end of the year, O’Sullivan could no longer ignore that Brownson had 
transferred his “Stentor voice” and “Ajax arm” from the “camp of the People” into the 
“antagonist array.”658 In his final note on Brownson’s tenure at the DemRev, O’Sullivan 
explained that he could not reconcile Brownson’s professedly egalitarian motives, on the 
                                                 
657 Brownson, Origin and Ground, 132, 376. 
658 Back in May, O’Sullivan defended Brownson against criticism of his inconsistency or intellectual 
restlessness, but his December editorial offered a more cutting indictment of Brownson’s ideological 
conversion. (“Mr. Brownson’s Recent Articles in the Democratic Review,” John L. O’Sullivan, The United 
States Democratic Review, Volume 13 (Langtree and O’Sullivan, 1843), 655, 657) 
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one hand, with his continued expression of the “strongest doctrine ever advanced by the 
worst enemies of the people” in language that sounded just like the phrases despots used 
to justify their tyranny. He speculated that Brownson had been seduced into the party of 
respectability, wealth, and social ascendency (i.e., the Whigs), who had “eagerly 
welcomed him to a prominent position.” In the December 1843 edition of the DemRev, 
O’Sullivan announced that he had recused Brownson from his position at the 
magazine.659  
In January 1844, Brownson opened the first edition of his eponymous journal (the 
Brownson Quarterly Review) with an extended defense of his own politics. In spite of his 
public split with “Democracy,” he maintained that he was, “of course,” a democrat. He 
was a “democrat,” that is, in the sense that democrats constituted and administered 
government so that it broke down “all factitious distinctions of class or caste” and 
maintained—in practice—the people’s equality before the law. By these standards, 
Brownson asserted, he fought harder to secure the “substantial freedom” of the “poor and 
more numerous classes” than those democratic theorists whose popular doctrines 
fertilized the field for self-professed “democratic” politicians, “who with their lips praise 
the people, and with their hands pick their pockets, or those who act as jackals to the 
dainty chiefs who are too exalted to plunder — except by proxy.” 660 It might be tempting 
                                                 
659 O’Sullivan claimed that he did not dismiss Brownson because his conservatism had alienated 
subscribers, and, also, that he did not fear Brownson’s impact on the democratic principle. Instead, he 
announced that Brownson intended  to issue his own Review where his views could find full expression. In 
his grandiose style, O’Sullivan declared that a thousand Brownsons could not discredit “the name, or the 
thing, or the party, of Democracy” or lead “the public mind backward into the anti-popular habits of 
thought and feeling.” Surely, some Shakespearian line about protests applies here. (“Mr. Brownson’s 
Recent Articles in the Democratic Review,” John L. O’Sullivan, The United States Democratic Review, 
Volume 13 (Langtree and O’Sullivan, 1843), 655, 657) 
660 Orestes Augustus Brownson, The Convert: Or, Leaves from My Experience (E. Dunigan & Brother, 
1857), 244–245. 
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to dismiss Brownson’s democratic claims as dissimulation. Certainly, in his lifetime, 
most of Brownson’s American colleagues considered him to be unpredictably heterodox, 
at best, and, more likely, treacherously hypocritical. Still, the evidence suggests that he 
remained a member of the Democratic party and exclusively backed Democratic 
candidates (albeit with a healthy dose of criticism) until the northern arm of the party 
withered at the start of the Civil War. Brownson had not, in fact, joined the Whigs or 
accepted their patronage (and, unlike William Cabell Rives, he never would), but, like 
Rives, he had abrogated the party line in questioning its ideological orthodoxy. Echoing 
other Democratic-dissenters “ycleped Conservative” in the prior decade, Brownson 
argued that the Democratic party—in marginalizing dissenters who protested its more 
extreme democratic tendencies—subverted the egalitarian and liberal ends it explicitly 
advocated. Like Rives, Brownson declared that he had not left the Democracy, but that 
the Democracy had left him.661 
In prescribing to himself “Conservatism,” Brownson claimed, he merely named 
the driving force behind real democratic reform. Based on Leibniz’s Law of Continuity, 
Brownson emphasized that the Present and the Future “must be always regarded as 
intimately linked with, and evolved from, the Past.” Working from the incomplete 
patrimony inherited from past generations, each successive generation improved the 
conditions of their race. Brownson elaborated that this principle compelled him to “take 
the Conservative side” in politics, “in this country, at least.” In the United States, he 
declared, statesmen should treat their fundamental institutions like churchmen treat the 
Gospel: though they might develop and apply the laws, they should not change or dismiss 
                                                 
661 Given that he drew on the French socialist traditions, Brownson also resonated with Rives’s 
philosophical leanings. 
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them. They must fight to preserve the existing order without alteration or amelioration 
“not authorized by it, and capable of being evolved from it.” If that position seemed 
incongruous or undemocratic to his former colleagues, he asked them to reflect on their 
own arguments for progress and reform. Unlike their European and British fellow-
travellers, Brownson pointed out, they lived in a Constitutional Republic, a system with 
the mechanism for democratic reform built into its political organism. That was what he 
meant by “Conservatism,” he wrote, that “We may seek progress, but only progress under 
and through existing institutions.”662 According to this logic, American democrats 
already took the conservative side, so long as they did not confuse the means of reform 
(constitutionalism) for its end (democracy).  
In addition to publically embracing “Conservatism” in his opening Review, 
Brownson announced his conversion to Catholicism.663 Philosophically, Brownson’s 
conversion marked his departure from the organic constitutional conservatism that he had 
cultivated through the BosQR, the pages of the DemRev, and his work for Calhoun. 
Whereas he had once understood that the State ordered and nurtured the social organism, 
defined by its particular expression of the universal vital force of humanity, Brownson 
now envisioned the universal human organism as the fragmented body of Christ, which 
must be healed by the same “curative process” by which nature healed any wounded 
body. Just as nature threw off “bruised flesh” and formed “new flesh” by virtue of the 
“vital principle, which is in the broken body” and in its “several parts,” Brownson 
projected that the universal Church would be healed through the operation of a single 
                                                 
662 Brownson, Introduction, 17, 19. 
663 Many of Brownson’s contemporary (and most of modern) critics blamed Rome for his ideological-
reversal, but several of Brownson’s friends at Brook Farm and among the Transcendentalists followed his 
lead religiously (including George Ripley’s wife, Sophia Ripley, and Isaac Hacker), but not politically.  
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organic principle—the vital force of love—that expressed the “living principle still in the 
broken body of our Lord, and in all the fragments into which it has been broken.”664 
Though Brownson had often criticized other reformers for abandoning the political 
sphere as their central field of operation, he now promoted the Church as the “divinely 
appointed medium of individual and social regeneration and progress,” and found that he 
must, therefore, “labor to enlist men on its side, under its banner, as the preliminary 
condition of Reform.” The Church (even in its fragmented condition) supplanted the 
State as the mechanism for change that propelled the scattered pieces of God’s body to 
recombine in one “living and indissoluble” organism.665 Serendipitously, Brownson’s 
announcement coincided with Calhoun’s decision to remove his name from consideration 
at the Democratic party’s Baltimore convention. 
A CONSERVATISM TO CALL ITS OWN 
The story of how Orestes Brownson became a conservative illuminates the 
essential ambiguity expressed in the development of American conservatism—that is, 
outside of its instrumental use, what would it mean to be Conservative in a democratic 
republic? What might the philosophical conservatism of constitutional republicanism 
look like? With the “destiny of Europe settled for the next century in favour of 
conservatism,” American author Horace Binney Wallace had predicted in 1838 that the 
                                                 
664 Orestes Augustus Brownson, “The Church Question,” Brownson’s Quarterly Review, 1844, 57–84, at 
78. 
665 Brownson, “Introduction.” 27-28. 
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“unbridled license of democracy” in America would eventually “work out a conservatism 
of its own.”666  
Twenty years later, in an 1859 essay on “Politics at Home and Abroad,” Orestes 
Brownson reflected bitterly on the kind of conservatism that American democrats had 
built in the interim. Ever since Jackson’s election, Brownson claimed, the Democratic 
party had encouraged a totalizing democratic absolutism that promoted democracy in 
theory and form at the expense of true freedom and equality in practice. From 
Brownson’s perspective in 1859, this Democratic conservatism was the unbridled license 
of democracy that Horace Binney Wallace had anticipated in 1838. To consolidate 
power, the Democratic party exploited the language of popular reform and individual 
autonomy, promising to rid the government of corruption and excess, to reduce its size 
and its reach, to remove government interference in commerce and secure a system of 
free trade, and to restore to each white man the liberty to pursue his own unique destiny. 
Through an aggressive and polarizing popular politics, they removed all constraints on 
the immediate and capricious expression of the majority’s will in the name of 
“conservatism,” while simultaneously ensuring that their popular reforms empowered the 
right kinds of voters, privileging immigrants and the white working-class (who tended to 
vote Democrat), at the expense of people of color. Operating politically as the unchecked 
growth of the democratic principle, democratic conservatism had become an insatiable 
force that gradually destroyed the very liberty it had once set out to advance.667  
                                                 
666 Horace Binney Wallace, Stanley: Or, The Recollections of a Man of the World (Philadelphia: Lea & 
Blanchard, 1838), 212. 
667 Orestes Augustus Brownson, “Politics at Home and Abroad,” Brownson’s Quarterly Review, 1859, 
191–225, at 214-215. 
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The next chapter will examine the peculiar conservatism that democracy birthed 
in the middle of the nineteenth century. With the combination of Calhoun’s leadership 
(and pro-slavery conservatism) and the overwhelming push toward popular politics in the 
1840s, the Democratic party generated a popular conservatism, which might just be what 
organicism should look like in a democratic republic. Whereas the Jackson-Van Buren 
party had aligned with leftist (or ultraist) politics internationally, the national Democratic 
party re-oriented its politics in the 1840s away from the late Jackson-Era emphasis on 
ideological purity toward a trans-regional alliance based in a politics of shared identity. 
Having assimilated the biological and genetic models of statehood, they constituted 
liberty as a function of whiteness and formulated whiteness as a privilege predicated on 
subjugation. Borrowing from British organic, German romantic, and French socialist 
thought, Democratic political theorists cultivated a vision of American society that 
conjoined white Western frontiersmen, white Southern yeomanry, and white Northern 
labor to promote “conservative” Democratic policies such as property rights, territorial 
expansion, strict construction, State rights, limited national government, and free trade, 
all of which served as proxy arguments for the protection and extension of slavery. Pro-
slavery politicians from both sides of the aisle advanced the slave-economy (and its 
corollary emphases on rural life, family values, and organic hierarchy) as the solution to 
the nation’s class crisis. Unlike wage-labor, they argued, domestic slavery united capital 
and labor in an organic system that vulcanized the country against the social unrest that 
plagued capitalist societies. Within this system, pro-slavery ideology formed the 
conservative basis of a national metaphysic—infusing every element of society with 
purpose and meaning, it structured the state within an organic familial hierarchy and 
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knitted the country together in a holistic and balanced national system. By 1859, 
Brownson observed, “Conservatism has come to mean, with us, filibusterism, the 
acquisition of our neighbor's land, the extension of negro slavery, the reopening of the 
slave trade, and placing under the ban of society every publicist who raises his voice 
against such conservatism.”668 Possibly, no ‘publicist’ was better suited to elegize 
American conservatism than Orestes Brownson in 1859, since that particular strain of 
American conservatism might not have existed without his contribution. 
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CHAPTER 5: SLAVE CONSERVATISM IN AMERICA 
In 1844, ex-governor of New York William H. Seward reflected from the comfort 
of his (brief) political retirement that “American politics are utterly unintelligible to 
Europeans.” In Great Britain and on the continent, he observed, irreconcilable political 
principles distinguished the various parties from each other, creating clear and 
insurmountable barriers between them. The Legitimist, the Juste Milieu, and the 
Republican might sit together in the Assemblée nationale, and the Tory, the Whig, and 
the Radical might all attend the British Parliament, but they could never come together in 
principle. When these politicians visited the United States, Seward noted, they expected 
to find the two parties arraigned along similarly incompatible lines, with a movement 
party advocating republicanism and progress, and a conservative party in opposition. In 
the United States, however, the names that classified political parties indicated “unreal 
differences” within a homogenous population. Regardless of their nominal differences, 
Seward wrote, “we are to a man… opposed to slavery, advocates of morality, virtue and 
religion, all jealously conservative of State rights, and all willing and resolved to stand or 
fall with the Union.”669  
Progressive republicans they all might be, but they were by no measure united in 
their opposition to slavery. The emancipatory forward thrust of American politics 
benefitted an increasingly conscribed population in this period, as States rolled back civil 
rights for free people of color and slavery “assumed an aggressive attitude” during the 
1844 presidential campaign.670 After the pro-slavery expansionist Democratic candidate, 
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James K. Polk, won the presidential election, democratically-affiliated abolitionists 
redoubled their criticism of the highly constrained American political system, in which 
one party professed the “most liberal principles” (claiming to be the “true friend of 
popular government” and assuming the name “democratic”) and the other boasted of its 
conservative character (because it promoted the tariff, the banking system, and 
“the Union as it is”), while both parties maintained their national position through their 
alliances with slaveholders.671  
By the mid-1840s, slavery had obtained political hegemony, dominating both 
major political parties and directing the national conversations about conservatism and 
progress. During the internecine debates over slavery that led to the Methodist Episcopal 
split in 1844, the disputants tacitly agreed that the “conservative ground of the discipline” 
led to their complicity in upholding slavery. In 1845, the official History of the 
Organization of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South maintained that the middle or 
“conservative” Conferences might be anti-slavery in principle, but the “vital 
conservatism of the Methodist Discipline” required that they oppose any action on the 
question of slavery, in practice. This conservatism in both religion and politics “would 
not so much preserve the existence of slavery itself,” the Anti-Slavery Bugle pointed out, 
but it “clings to, and keeps in existence, those obstacles to emancipation, that alone 
prevents the abolition of slavery.”672 In an 1846 article on “ANTI-SLAVERY in the 
                                                 
671 The address of the Southern and Western Liberty Convention, held at Cincinnati, June 11, 1845, to the 
people of the United States 
672 “Anti-Slavery Bugle. (New-Lisbon, Ohio) 1845-1861, December 04, 1846, Image 2,” December 4, 
1846; Richard Carwardine, “Methodists, Politics, and the Coming of the American Civil War,” Church 
History 69, no. 3 (September 2000): 578–609; Mark A. Noll and Luke E. Harlow, Religion and American 
Politics: From the Colonial Period to the Present (Oxford University Press, 2007), 178–94; Charity R. 
Carney, Ministers and Masters: Methodism, Manhood, and Honor in the Old South (LSU Press, 2011), 37–
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UNITED STATES, the radical London Daily News reported that this attitude toward 
slavery pervaded American politics. Though the two great American parties professedly 
represented the “two elements of politics, conservatism and progress,” the Daily News 
observed, they differed “very little from each other” in reality, merely operating as stand-
ins that alternately traded off who ran the government and who acted as the opposition. 
With the slave-holding States controlling the balance of power, the Daily News predicted 
in 1846, the country’s policy “will be the propagandism of the manacle and the lash” 
until either God or the people lost their patience, and finally demolished the system of 
slavery.673  
Like many other radical sources, the Daily News presumed that societies 
progressed from repression toward emancipation. In this framework, unjust and unequal 
governments would inevitably fall, regardless of the scientific formulas they created to 
protect their status quo. Reporting on “SLAVE CONSERVATISM IN AMERICA” in a 
June 1846 editorial, the Daily News connected American conservatism with the “quack 
medicine of external and skin-deep conservatism” that had developed across the Atlantic 
after the French Revolution. Ever since the French encyclopaedists had voiced the 
“cabalistic words” that awakened the common man to light and freedom, “scientific 
Conservatists” had searched in vain for the prescription that might delay the inevitable 
decline of their coercive systems:  
                                                                                                                                                 
47, 90–109; Donald G. Mathews, Slavery and Methodism: A Chapter in American Morality, 1780-1845 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 212–82. 
673 “ANTI-SLAVERY in the UNITED STATES,” Daily News (London, England), Friday, April 17, 1846; 
Issue 75. NB: Charles Dickens established the London Daily News in 1846 to provide a radical counterpart 
to moderate Whig-leaning Morning Chronicle. 
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“Into all schemes of government (as they are called, by an apt derivation from the 
equally exact science of astrology), erected in our day by the alarmed professors 
of political economy, what is called the Conservative element enters in very large 
proportion. We hear, every now and then, that some French chemist has 
discovered a new antiseptic substance, by the applications which a dead body may 
be preserved for an indefinite period of time against the advances of natural 
decay. It is for a similar end that our political savans spend their efforts. 
Something must be invented by whose means a stone-dead element of social 
organization may be kept decently above ground, without transmitting 
intelligence of its demise to the nostrils of those interested. In proper scientific 
classification this is known as a conservative element. In plain English it means 
simply a method of preserving that which ought no longer to be preserved; that 
which has no longer in itself an inherent principle of life.” 
In Europe, Conservatists overwhelming relied on the “infallible recipe” for stability that 
amounted to reminding men to respect their particular State because “it is old.” In the 
United States, however, Conservatists faced the problem that nothing in their country was 
old. Confronted with an irremediable “historical parveneuism,” they attempted to create 
the fiction of age. Conjuring a “dim mist” of ambiguous antiquity around the 
Constitution, they spoke with reverence for the “glorious compact” of their “fathers,” a 
scripturism that implicitly invoked the “Noachic” era.674 To protect slavery, they taught 
the American people to regard the Constitution as “something too sacred to be looked at 
                                                 
674 “Noachic” marks a sly reference to the discriminatory arguments about Ham as a separate race. (e.g., 
Josiah Priest, see: Colin Kidd, The Forging of Races: Race and Scripture in the Protestant Atlantic World, 
1600–2000 (Cambridge University Press, 2006), 38.) 
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closely,” in spite of the fact that the framers provided them with a mechanism to change 
the Constitution at its inception. Whenever the public debate touched on slavery, the 
News noted, they claimed that the Constitution was “too sacred to be subject to that 
immutable law of nature which demands of everything that it grow or die.” In this 
attitude, America’s “blind conservers” reflected the same renitence as their European 
counterparts. Yet, they would never find in the “pharmocopaeia of their political 
economy” a preventative of destiny. They could neither shield their constitutions from 
the laws of nature nor themselves from God’s attribute of justice, which had already 
doomed their system. Echoing the major medico-philosophical treatises in the period, the 
Daily News charged that the “great conservatism of nature is change and reproduction,” 
through which God acted as the agent of human destiny, and that divine justice, alone, 
worked as the “antiseptic for government formulas.”  
For their part, American politicians who advocated for slavery agreed with the 
Daily News, in principle. They, too, sought a conservatism that balanced the country’s 
core principles with its organic and healthy progress. They simply disagreed on who 
should benefit from that change and what elements of the American system they wanted 
to reproduce. Whereas the Daily News forecast a society where the triumph of progress 
meant slavery’s demise, slave-owners and their apologists developed a worldview in 
which the institution of slavery actively protected American society and operated as the 
essential agent by which the country realized its divinely-ordained destiny. Living in the 
“simple, pure, conservative atmosphere of the country,” southerners maintained that 
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“purity of sentiment and of purpose, which is the only true conservatism” in the United 
States.675  
Not only did the institution of slavery offer a superior model of production, pro-
slavery southerners maintained, it also produced a more stable and humane social 
organization than the northern manufacturing-industrial complex. According to Florida 
representative Edward C. Cabell, the “moral power of slavery” generated the purest 
“spirit of freedom and true republicanism.” Whereas the industrial cities of the North 
filled with paupers, the southern people enjoyed the most “individual happiness” of 
anyone in the world, secure in the knowledge that their social organization insured their 
“life, liberty, and property.” Even northerners implicitly grasped the superiority of the 
southern system—its inbuilt conservatism—which placed them in a bitter double bind. 
They knew that they could never compete commercially with slavery, which explained 
why they fought so hard to tear it down, but they also recognized that slavery “naturally 
exert[ed] a conservative influence” on the entire Confederacy. Northerners affected the 
position that the South needed the Union to survive, but they had it backwards—the 
South did not need the Union’s protection, the North did. In a time when popular, labor-
led revolutions dominated the international press, Cabell warned the North not to alienate 
the part of their country that offered them the greatest degree of stability.676 The 
“conservatism of slavery” might one day be necessary to save the North from the 
“thousand destructive isms infecting the social organization of [their] section.”677 For this 
                                                 
675 John Cook Rives, ed., The Congressional Globe: Containing the Debates and Proceedings of the 
Congress : With an Appendix, Embracing the Laws Passed at That Session (City of Washington: John C. 
Rives, 1851), 74.  
676 NB: distinction between the US perception that labor drove the European revolutions, with the reality  
677 31st Congress 1st Session Appendix Cong. Globe 242. 
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reason, southern Whigs and Democrats declared, the founding generation had made 
slavery a fundamental part of the country’s “organic law,” framing the constitution and 
building their institutions to protect and perpetuate slavery, as well as its corollary 
commitment to white hegemony.  
The ontological assumption that societies should be organic provided a 
comprehensive, hierarchical schema that continuously reinforced pro-slavery priorities 
and reflexively protected the southern property in slaves. Democratically-affiliated pro-
slavery politicians, in particular, stressed the role that the rural, “white” laboring class 
(southern yeomanry and free labor, alike) played in creating a stable society and insisted 
that they should be the primary beneficiaries of the country’s social progress and 
territorial gains. At the same time, they asserted that “white” labor sustained their socio-
political position on the basis of organic subjugation. While the anti-slavery forces 
argued that slavery degraded labor, slave-holders rejoined that “white men” enjoyed an 
equality in slave States that could not exist “where the same race fill the places of master 
and menial,” as in the North. The “white laborer” found himself “elevated by having a 
caste below him.” With the prevalence of “black” labor (slaves) in the South, menial 
employment was a transitory state for the white laboring class, who made up the 
“conservative portion” of US society. Integrating research from chemistry, biology, and 
the social sciences with the increasingly popular doctrine of free trade, pro-slavery 
southerners argued that without slavery, the essential, conservative element of “white” 
labor would disappear from American life. 
Non-slaveholding “national conservatives,” meanwhile, maintained an ontological 
commitment to the Union that ultimately led them to capitulate to pro-slavery demands. 
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In their efforts to hold the Union together, they tacitly (and often explicitly) reinforced 
the programmatic commitment of pro-slavery “conservatives” to define and defend the 
organic constitution of their communities—with an ever-expanding definition of 
“community” that ultimately encompassed the entire United States as well as its 
prospective States and territories. Throughout the contentious process of admitting new 
states into the Union, they negotiated the tenuous grounds on which the Union persisted 
through political compromises, as much concerned with what they did not articulate or 
enforce, as what they did. This dynamic made abolition, in specific, and slavery, in 
general, a discursive taboo that nonetheless seemed to dominate every conversation. It 
stalked the halls of Congress during legislative debates over the laws governing the 
movement of bodies between States, which bodies could be restricted from entering or 
residing in States, and which new bodies politic should be allowed to enter the Union and 
under what conditions. Southerners claimed the right to prohibit free people of color from 
entering their States, and the prerogative to take their slaves wherever they saw fit to 
travel or relocate, while new territories (like Oregon) submitted State constitutions that 
excluded all people of color (free or enslaved) in an effort to preclude the entire question 
of slavery. Influenced by the new science of race, northern and southern “conservatives” 
alike framed their inter-sectional discontent in terms of managing people of color.  
In effect, their divergent social organizations generated two distinct models of 
conservatism: white nationalism (a predominantly northern and northwestern 
phenomenon) and white hegemony (holding sway in the south and southwest). White 
nationalism envisioned a country populated exclusively by “white” people, and vented its 
hostility toward the continued co-existed of the “black population” through socio-
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political oppression, antipathy to slavery (which slaveholders insisted benefitted “the 
blacks”), and their programmatic commitment to segregating, isolating, and ultimately 
separating the “black” population from their midst. As historian David R. Roediger has 
noted, politicians built national coalitions on the basis of a shared “white” identity, 
disseminating “a vision of a “free white republic” without significant African-American 
presence.” Legislating against the spectre of race on behalf of “white” people living 
“largely in the absence of people of color,” they promised to “shore up exclusionary 
efforts in the face of real and perceived threats of in-migration of those not categorized as 
white.”678 White hegemony, on the other hand, propagated the idea that the “white 
population” represented a superior race with a moral duty to dominate, care for, and 
potentially uplift the dependent “African race.” In coming to America, Mississippi 
Democrat Jefferson Davis preached, the “sons of Ham” came to their destiny—a place 
where the institution of slavery provided for their happiness and usefulness as it prepared 
them to fulfill their own civil and social destiny.679 Generally, but not exclusively, white 
nationalists also endorsed “white” superiority. Yet, they reasoned that the co-existence of 
an inferior alongside a superior race corrupted both groups, which led them to advocate 
for separation, for example, through colonization in Africa. Notwithstanding their 
incompatible programmatic implications, white nationalist and white hegemonic appeals 
produced the same effect. In the words of historian James Brewer Stewart, “No matter 
what their qualities or accomplishments African Americans must be branded by 
                                                 
678 Roediger, “The Pursuit of Whiteness: Property, Terror, and Expansion, 1790-1860,” 590. 
679 30th Congress 1st Session Appendix Cong. Globe 913. 
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pigmentation alone as members of a perpetually inferior race.”680 In the politics of the 
period, people of color represented a chronic contagion that continuously threatened to 
upend the country’s organization, and that different strains of American conservatism 
promised to manage or cure.681  
To expose the process by which race and slavery shaped American conservatism, 
this chapter will look at the incorporation of the State of Missouri (1820-21), the State of 
Florida (1845), the Oregon Territory (1848), and the Mexican annexations (from the 1848 
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which ended the Mexican-American War), as well as 
related disputes over federal naturalization laws, “fugitive” slaves, and the slave trade in 
DC.682 The competing positions articulated through these debates exposed the 
intransigence of conservatism as a political schema. The organic model resisted 
compromise. It judged every component and potential part of the system on its organic 
relation to the whole. For the United States, this criteria interrogated every State that 
entered the Union and every individual that entered into and passed between the States. 
Because the country’s health and longevity depended in large part on its constituent 
                                                 
680 James Brewer Stewart, The Emergence of Racial Modernity and the Rise of the White North, 1790-1840 
(Source: Journal of the Early Republic, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Summer, 1998), 181-217, at 206 
681 Cf. James Oakes’s discussion of “racial consensus theory” in Contesting Slavery. James Oakes, 
“Commentary: Conflict vs. Racial Consensus in the History of Antislavery Politics,” in Contesting Slavery: 
The Politics of Bondage and Freedom in the New American Nation, ed. John Craig Hammond and Matthew 
Mason (Charlottesville and London: University of Virginia Press, 2011), 291–303. 
682 As political scientist Rogers Smith noted, “The only successful new exclusionary efforts [on the elective 
franchise] were the ones Jacksonian supported, aimed at denying the vote to free blacks, mulattos, and 
often Native Americans. As new states were formed and the older states held constitutional conventions 
during these years, the status of these groups was hotly contested, with the champions of racial minorities 
almost always losing. None of the new western states granted blacks the vote, and often even assimilated 
Native Americans were disenfranchised as nonwhites (though Minnesota banned only “uncivilized 
Indians.”) Oregon added Chinese immigrants to the list of the racially excluded. Tennessee formally took 
the franchise away from propertied free blacks in 1834, North Carolina did so in 1835, and Pennsylvania in 
1838. New Yorkers repeatedly defeated referenda that would have lessened the prohibitive property 
requirements that black voters had to meet, although they also refused to abolish black voting completely. 
By the Civil War, blacks had some form of franchise in only six states (Maine, Vermont New Hampshire, 
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and, formally, New York.)” (Rogers M. Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting 
Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History (Yale University Press, 1999), 215–16. 
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makeup and their organic interaction, questions of State citizenship, federal naturalization 
laws, the admission of new States, and, especially, the extension, proliferation, and 
prospective permanence of slavery took on vital implications. The unresolvable tension 
over these issues culminated in an attempt at compromise legislation in 1850, which 
aspired to “remedy” all of the country’s “open and bleeding” wounds over slavery. 
Though the Compromise of 1850 provisionally resolved the disputes that grew out of the 
Mexican-American War (the Texas-New Mexico boundary, New Mexico and Utah’s 
territorial governments, California statehood), and the “slavery question” (foreclosing 
DC’s slave trade and providing federal legislation to forestall “fugitive slavery”), it also 
exposed the fundamental antagonism between “national” (or “white nationalist”) and 
“slavery” (or “white hegemonist”) conservatism. The country could be “white” or it 
could have slaves, but not both. 
RACE QUARANTINE 
As the definitive southern institution, slavery had shaped the thrust and direction 
of American conservatism ever since the concept of organic sovereignty gained currency 
in the 1820s.683 Starting with the debates surrounding Missouri’s constitutional provision 
barring “free negroes and mulattoes” from entering the State, pro-slavery politicians 
                                                 
683 I do not mean to suggest here that slavery only began shaping American politics and institutional 
development in the 1820s, or that race as a category of exclusion only became salient within the framework 
of organic nationalism. The first US Naturalization Act (1790) expressly limited naturalization to “free 
white” aliens who had resided in the United States for a period of two years. The act remained silent on the 
potential citizenship rights of native-born people of color. Subsequent naturalization acts (1795, 1798, 
1802) tweaked the residency requirements and added a provision requiring aliens to declare their intent to 
become US citizens, but they all retained the “free white” provision. This facet of the law led to disputes 
over whether native-born free people of color could be considered “aliens.” If the state categorized them as 
“aliens,” then they could be denied citizenship rights in perpetuity, since the law did not permit non-white 
aliens to become citizens. If the law treated them as natives, denizens, or subjects, however, then the 
question of their eligibility to be naturalized remained open.  
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repeatedly used the States’ authority over their own health laws (and, specifically, the 
States’ right to institute quarantines) to circumvent the federal constitution’s privileges-
and-immunities clause. “It would not be denied,” Virginia representative William S. 
Archer asserted when the House took up Missouri’s constitution in December 1820, “that 
a state might exclude citizens of other states for contagious disease, by quarantine 
regulations.”684 Citing the “law of self-preservation,” Archer and other strict-construction 
democratic-republicans asserted that State legislatures reserved the right to reject or 
imprison those citizens of other States who posed an existential threat.685 Just as they had 
a right to exclude “paupers, lepers, and persons infected with pestilential diseases” from 
contaminating their States, they argued, they had the right to prohibit free people of 
color.686 These laws did not locate the contagion in the visible manifestation of their 
blackness, but rather in the metaphysical condition of their freedom. They asserted that 
the legal distinctions between “whites” and “blacks” grew naturally out of their 
physiological (or organic) differences, signified by their color. From their perspective, 
people of color were physiologically indisposed to the rights they had been accorded 
them in free States. The combination of unwarranted and unassimilable civil rights in 
people of color generated a particularly malign and highly communicable disorder. 
                                                 
684 Virginia representatives bore the brunt of this debate in the House: see, e.g., Alexander Smyth (VA-
DR); William S. Archer (VA-DR); Philip P. Barbour (VA-DR) 
685 Concurrent with the Missouri discussion, the House considered a bill to incorporate a National Vaccine 
Institution, which would centralize management of the small-pox epidemic (and facilitate rapid responses 
to the spread of other contagious diseases.) The bill only passed to the Senate after they amended it to be 
incorporated “within the District of Columbia, so that it did not confer additional power on the federal 
government to interfere in the self-regulation of the states. The Senate tabled the bill. 
(7AbridgmentoftheDebatesofCongress, 8-9; Journal of the Senate of the United States of America 
(Washington: Gales & Seaton, 1820), 143. 
686 7 Abridgement of the Debates of Congress, 32 
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Organic discrimination did not create the disparities in their socio-political statuses, they 
insisted, it reflected them.  
Similar laws were already on the books on the books in Virginia, Ohio, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, Georgia, Maryland, South Carolina, and Delaware, but admitting 
a State that had such a provision in its constitution gave it the cover of national 
sanction.687 In March 1821, a joint House and Senate committee passed a resolution to 
admit Missouri on the ambiguously-worded condition that its legislature should never 
pass any laws that excluded any citizens from the enjoyment of their constitutional 
rights.688 Basically, Missouri could keep the offending clause, but it had to find other 
ways to control and exclude people of color, which it did.689 As the second chapter 
indicated, laws motivated by race-distinction followed the logic found in British and 
German organic theory. Within this framework, States that ignored or denied organic 
difference in their statutes disregarded their “best good sense” and transgressed against 
the natural order. Whereas slavery exerted a net positive influence on people of color— 
physically, morally, and intellectually civilizing and improving them—freedom degraded 
them and endangered the public morals of those white citizens living in their proximity. 
Because “whites” and “blacks” could never enjoy equality within a political body, their 
                                                 
687 For example, Ohio set up prejudicial laws that severely undercut the migration of people of color to 
Ohio, but it did so after Congress affirmed its state constitution and admitted it into the union. In the cases 
where states put discriminatory laws on the books after ratification, the federal government avoided the 
appearance of officially sanctioning such laws. Stephen Middleton, The Black Laws: Race and the Legal 
Process in Early Ohio (Ohio University Press, 2005), 42–55. 
688 We have Henry Clay to the thank for the wording, here and later. 
689 Like Massachusetts and Ohio, Missouri relied on the legislative precedent of poor laws—requiring that 
people of color register with the state (by obtaining a license) and, in some cases, post bond—to manage 
their “undesirous” population without technically abrogating their commitment to honor their citizenship 
rights. (Harriet C. Frazier, Runaway and Freed Missouri Slaves and Those Who Helped Them, 1763-1865 
(McFarland, 2004), 62–65; Kunal M. Parker, Making Foreigners: Immigration and Citizenship Law in 
America, 1600–2000 (Cambridge University Press, 2015), 76–77; Hurd, The Law of Freedom and Bondage 
in the United States, 14, 146, 158, 161, 191, 216–17.)  
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legal incorporation on those grounds could only lead to their unhappiness and mutual 
degeneration.690  
Over the next twenty years, the science of organic difference— including 
phrenology, ethnology, anthropology, craniology, anthropometry, physiognomy—
flooded the United States, providing a positivist alibi for legislating race-inequality.691 In 
his popular work on Slavery, as it Relates to the Negro, Or African Race (1843), 
professional pseudo-scientist and Biblicist Josiah Priest laid out the empirical evidence 
(in which he included scripture) that the “negro race” lacked the physiological capacity 
for freedom. Citing English surgeon William Lawrence’s Lectures on Physiology, 
Zoology, and the Natural History of Man, Priest argued that the “anatomical 
organization” of the “negro race” generated an inferior “moral and intellectual character,” 
an “insensibility of the mind, with respect to the moral feelings of the heart, as well as to 
the sufferings of others,” removing them from the “common sympathies and moral 
feelings of humanity” and fueling their innate tendency toward violence, anti-social 
behavior, and sexual deviance.692 As a result of their physiological differences, Priest 
wrote, the “idea of liberty, freedom, and independence” in the “bosom of a negro man” 
did not arouse the same “sensations, hopes and expectations,” that it did in the “bosom of 
                                                 
690 Philip P Barbour, 7 Abridgement of the Debates of Congress, 28; Forbes, The Missouri Compromise 
and Its Aftermath, 118–19, 155–56, 231. 
691 NB: in the 1840s, “positivist” referred to the teaching of French sociologist Auguste Comte, who 
advocated using scientific (i.e., empirical) knowledge to systemically change and improve society.  
692 Unlike Priest, Lawrence explicitly intended his evidence of organic inferiority to motivate the “superior” 
races to meliorate the conditions of the lesser races. Writing about the inferior organization of the “Negro” 
skull and its negative effect on their faculties, Lawrence warned against using his findings to justify 
oppression. Furthermore, Lawrence stressed, the “Negro race” as a whole equaled all other races in terms 
of their “natural goodness of heart.” Nonetheless, he concluded that the most striking “distinction of color” 
between the races could be found in the “preeminence” of the “white” race in their “moral feelings and in 
mental endowments.” (Sir William Lawrence, Lectures on Physiology, Zoology, and the Natural History of 
Man: Delivered at the Royal College of Surgeons (Benbow, 1822), 313–14, 412, 414, 429.) 
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the whites.” For the white man, liberty represented the means to improve himself and his 
race through the pursuit of knowledge, social order, and self-control; for the slave or 
“free black man,” liberty signified a holiday free from restraint or control, an excuse to 
indulge in laziness and the “animal passions.” Priest attributed the physiological 
differences between the races and the corresponding impact on their moral capacity to 
God’s intervention. During the Noachic era, God refused to grant the “race of Ham” the 
“great conservative powers,” which drove the engine of all human independence and 
progress. Without these “conservatives powers,” the “Negro race” lacked the capacity to 
elevate itself to the physical, moral, and constitutional demands of freedom. Because God 
“estimated the African race as exceedingly inferior,” he decreed their perpetual servitude 
to the white race. “To exalt this people therefore, to political equality [with white men],” 
Priest concluded, “will be to admit of a deteriorating element in the midst of superiors, 
which will amount to nothing more or less than a blemish in the heart of the institutions 
of the country.”693 
In the same vein, political proponents of organic discrimination in the 1840s 
denied that the privileges-and-immunities clause extended to people of color, in the first 
place.694 On December 6, 1844, the South Carolina legislature resolved that “free negroes 
and persons of color are not citizens of the United States within the meaning of the 
                                                 
693 Slavery, as It Relates to the Negro, Or African Race: Examined in the Light of Circumstances, History 
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constitution, which confers upon the citizens of one state the privileges and immunities of 
citizens of the several states.” South Carolina defended its discriminatory statutes and 
resolution on organic grounds, referring to the precedent it had set in its own 1835 act.695 
This act guarded against “free negroes and persons of color” on the “principles of public 
policy, affecting her safety and her most vital interests.” The use of the feminine pronoun 
in this act reinforced the analogy between South Carolina and a real, live human being, 
and implicitly stressed the state’s vulnerability against physical attack—in this case, the 
attack of a white woman by a person of color. Regardless of the political status 
inappropriately granted to people of color by other States, South Carolina asserted that 
southern States reserved the right to treat them as nature intended. As the 1845 New 
Englander and Yale Review noted, in slaveholding States, the “whole colored race” lives 
“under, but not of the state.”696   
To a certain extent, South Carolina’s resolution adhered to the precedent set in US 
Attorney General William Wirt’s November 1821 opinion of the “Rights of Free Negroes 
in Virginia,” which would form the basis for Chief Justice Taney’s 1857 Dred Scott 
opinion. In contrast with the South Carolina resolution, however, Wirt predicated his 
definition of citizenship on the Enlightenment framework common to the revolutionary 
era, which tied the legal status of “citizen” to civic action. As Wirt argued, the category 
of “citizen” required its holders to act like citizens: voting, holding office, bearing 
                                                 
695 South Carolina’s 1822 Negro Seaman’s Act also provided precedent for using the quarantine laws to 
defend prejudicial statutes, but the legislature chose not to rely on that controversial act in this instance.   
696 The Review also emphasized that South Carolina’s resolution ignored the federal construction of 
citizenship and relied, instead, on the more restrictive opinion laid out in a recent Kentucky ruling. Like 
Kentucky, South Carolina contended that citizenship status implied a hierarchy between the “highest class 
of subjects,” who possessed all of a polity’s civil, political, and religious rights and privileges, and other, 
lesser, categories of inhabitants. (“Massachusetts and South Carolina,” New Englander and Yale Review 3 
(July 1845): 435.) 
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witness, serving in the military, equal treatment before the law, and the freedom to marry 
white women.697 Because “free people of color” in Virginia did not enjoy the “full and 
equal privileges of white citizens in the State of their residence,” he argued, they could 
not be considered citizens of the United States.698 State restrictions on civic rights 
functionally alienated people of color, transforming them into “sojourning strangers.”  
In referring to its own organic insecurity in relation to people of color, however, 
South Carolina’s resolution more closely followed the logic found in Hugh S. Legaré’s 
March 1843 opinion on the “Pre-emption Rights of Colored Persons,” which he premised 
on an organic relationship between people of color and their country of native birth. 
Legaré made his national reputation in the 1820s after founding the Southern Review, in 
which he popularized British and German romantic thought.699 In 1843, when he wrote 
the opinion, he reportedly owned the work of only six contemporary writers: Coleridge, 
                                                 
697 Although the prohibition against exogamy ran in both directions, statesmen only cited it as evidence of 
the negligible freedom for men of color and not as a limitation on the freedom of white men. This 
inconsistency implies that they judged citizenship, in part, on a man’s freedom to marry a white woman, a 
presumption that further marginalized and denigrated women of color.  
698 Wirt also noted that Congress already recognized the distinction between “citizens of the United States” 
and “persons of color, natives to the United States” in its 1813 and 1817 acts regulating seamen, which 
Chief Justice Taney would reference in his 1857 Dred Scott opinion.  
699 Intellectual historian Michael O’Brien credits Nathaniel Beverley Tucker with authoring the first 
southern Romantic theory of government, but acknowledges that Hugh Legaré might also lay claim to that 
title. Truly, his admixture of classical and romantic thought makes him hard to pin down systematically. He 
habitually quoted August von Schlegel and Madame de Stael, and, alongside such “exemplary men” as Sir 
Walter Scott, Schiller, Wordsworth, and Thomas Moore, he wrote an extensive review of Lord Byron, with 
whom he both identified (because they were both geniuses with physical deformities) and disavowed (for 
his unpatriotic cosmopolitanism). Legaré also spent a semester studying natural philosophy, mathematics, 
and chemistry at the University of Edinburgh, which might explain his attachment to Dugald Stewart and 
Adam Smith, whom he once described as “the author of one of the most ingenious, and by far the most 
eloquent work on the…metaphysical branch of moral philosophy, that has ever been published,” the Theory 
of Moral Sentiments. In a side-note relevant to this project, Legaré joined William C. Rives in Paris in 1828 
on his way to meet August von Schlegel in Bonn. (Due to extenuating circumstances, Legaré did not 
actually meet Schegel for another seven years). (Michael O’Brien, Intellectual Life and the American 
South, 1810-1860: An Abridged Edition of Conjectures of Order (Univ of North Carolina Press, 2010), 
865; Mary Swinton Legaré, Writings of Hugh Swinton Legaré ...: Consisting of a Diary of Brussels, and 
Journal of the Rhine; Extracts from His Private and Diplomatic Correspodence; Orations and Speeches; 
and Contributions to the New-York and Southern Reviews (Burges & James, 1845), 31–32; Michael 
O’Brien, A Character of Hugh Legare (Knoxville: Univ of Tennessee Pr, 1985). 
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Channing, Goethe, Thomas Moore, and Herder. As Legaré had described it in his earlier 
writings, masters and slaves developed an intimate family relation by the “law of human 
nature” and the “law of our hearts.” From this common affection, slaves experienced the 
“feeling of loyalty” and their masters a “sort of parental or patriarchal kindness.”700 In 
1843, therefore, the slave could not be an “alien” because the slave was a “part of the 
family.” Similarly, regardless of his political status, Legaré considered the freeman a 
denizen, born under this country’s jurisdiction and, therefore, “capable of all the rights” it 
bestowed.701 Unlike South Carolina’s legislature, Legaré reasoned from organic common 
sense grounds that free people of color enjoyed some civic rights, regardless of whether 
their parent-States denied them political rights. Still, even the paternalistically-granted 
liminal status that “denizenship” conferred confirmed the essential otherness of people of 
color under US law.702 Legaré may have acceded to the free person of color’s right to 
pre-emption alongside US citizens and immigrants awaiting naturalization, but he also 
reinforced the presumptive organic hierarchy between white men, who could become full 
citizens, and people of color, whose race marked them as requiring special care and 
whose civic status relegated them to perpetual statelessness.  
                                                 
700 Mary Swinton Legaré, Writings of Hugh Swinton Legaré ...: Consisting of a Diary of Brussels, and 
Journal of the Rhine; Extracts from His Private and Diplomatic Correspodence; Orations and Speeches; 
and Contributions to the New-York and Southern Reviews (Burges & James, 1845), 288–89. 
701 In legal parlance, a denizen was an intermediate status between a “natural-born subject” and an “alien.” 
In James Kent’s 1827 Commentaries on American Law, Volume 2, which Legaré reviewed in the 1828 
Southern Review, Kent connected the status of denizenship to the “common law doctrine of natural and 
perpetual allegiance by birth,” found in Volume 1 of Blackstone’s Commentaries and also in South 
Carolina’s civil statute. In natural history, a “denizen” referred to a “plant or animal believed to have been 
originally introduced by human agency into a country or district, but which now maintains itself there as if 
native, without the direct aid of man.” (Commentaries on American Law by James Kent (O. Halsted, 1832), 
39–40; Legaré, Writings of Hugh Swinton Legaré ..., 118–19; “Denizen, N. and Adj. : Oxford English 
Dictionary,” accessed February 25, 2017, 
http://proxy.library.upenn.edu:2440/view/Entry/49985?rskey=jZYckE&result=1&isAdvanced=false#eid.) 
702 Smith, Civic Ideals, 258; Powell, A Community Built on Words, 171–73. 
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The outcome of Florida’s application for statehood in 1845 encapsulated this shift 
in attitudes. When Congress approved Florida’s statehood that March, its constitution 
contained an exclusionary provision nearly identical to Missouri’s, granting the Florida 
General Assembly authority to “prevent free negroes, mulattoes, and other persons of 
color, from emigrating” to the State.703 In the House, Maine Whig Freeman H. Morse 
proposed an amendment indistinguishable from Congress’s 1821 restriction on 
Missouri’s constitution, but a large majority shot it down. When the bill to admit Florida 
passed to the Senate, Virginian William S. Archer (now a Whig and a senator) reprised 
the arguments about self-preservation that he had made during the Missouri debates 
twenty-five years earlier, but, this time, he referred the Senate to South Carolina’s 
quarantine laws. Maine Whig George Evans protested that the South already had a 
remedy for people fomenting unlawful activities (arrest and punishment), and need not 
prohibit free men who carried no evil intentions in their hearts for the sole reason that 
they “happened to have a black skin.” Archer’s response reinforced the notion that free 
people of color could not be granted the presumption of innocence because free 
blackness, itself, caused the harm. To clarify, Archer asked the Senate to consider a 
hypothetical situation in which South Carolina had no laws of quarantine and an infected 
ship docked in its harbors. Even if this vessel had no idea it carried yellow fever or the 
plague, he attested, its presence would still risk spreading an “infectious and fatal 
disease” among the State’s inhabitants. Given the inherent danger that such vessels 
posed, South Carolina rightfully assumed a pro-active position and implemented 
preventative measures against all such vessels. Just as no one would expect South 
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Carolina to “stand willing victims to the pestilence that was about to come upon them,” 
they could not fault Florida for implementing the same “laws of self-preservation” 
against inherently dangerous people. Regardless of their harmless intent (which Archer 
found dubious), free people of color threatened evils “ten thousand times” greater than 
the grievance southern States caused them through their exclusion.704  
Georgia Whig John MacPherson Berrien implicitly denied that free people of 
color had grounds to object to these laws, in the first place, because he (falsely) alleged 
that no States recognized them as fellow-citizens. Without citizenship, he argued, they 
had no protection under the privileges-and-immunities clause. In advocating the illusory 
rights for free people of color and attempting to interfere in the constitution of sovereign 
States, Berrien asseverated, he could only assume that their self-appointed protectors in 
the Senate acted out of partisan motivations. Though he sympathized with the impulse, he 
reminded his fellow Whigs that “there are principles which rise above all party 
associations, because they are essentially vital—instinctive with life itself, and self-
preservation.” In his estimation, a State’s right to regulate its own constitution—
especially in relation to people of color—was one of those principles.705  
Although Berrien and other advocates of codified organic discrimination 
technically mischaracterized the legal status of free people of color, they did touch on the 
reality of their contingent citizenship. Even opponents of Florida’s prohibition, such as 
Indiana Whig Albert S. White, acknowledged that many State laws reflexively treated 
free people of color “as paupers, just in the same manner that German or Irish emigrants, 
                                                 
704 Francis Preston Blair and John C. Rives, eds., The Congressional Globe, Containing Sketches of the 
Debates and Proceedings of the Second Session of the Twenty-Eighth Congress, vol. XIV (City of 
Washington: Blair & Rives, 1845), 380–81. 
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or the vagrants of the country, were treated when they were liable to become a charge 
upon the pockets of the people.” In general, these States also presumed people of color to 
be “fugitive” slaves until proven otherwise. Even the language describing people of color 
who had escaped from bondage reinforced this dynamic, since it treated refugees as 
“fugitive” from the law and, therefore, treated all people of color a priori as criminals 
until they could prove their innocence.706 Though these States technically considered free 
people of color “citizens,” their laws consistently alienated them—literally, treating them 
as they treated non-citizen “aliens”—in an attempt to erase the spectre that free people of 
color represented. This alienation expressly grew out of the perception of their organic 
otherness, based on the increasingly naturalized premise that race reflected an inborn set 
of interests that created an insuperable barrier between people.  
Furthermore, because democratic-republican theory predicated political 
representation on the basis of shared interest, essentialized organic difference precluded 
the agency of free people of color in their own governance.707 According to Senator 
                                                 
706 In a similar vein, the nominal use of “slave,” like “criminal,” reduced the person to their legal status. 
When not at work, a working man was just a man, but slaves and criminals were stripped of all of their 
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707 The sympathetic (or sensibility) model of republican self-government predicated an individual or 
group’s fitness for citizenship on their capacity to have the proper physiological (sympathetic nervous) 
reactions to external stimuli and to respond appropriately. Bodies determined interests; similar bodies 
shared interests, alienated bodies could not. Strong republics depended upon fully integrated individual 
bodies bonded in their shared interests by their common feeling, common sentiment, common sense. As 
early as 1794, African American ministers Richard Allen and Absalom Jones grasped the implications of 
physiological othering in a republic, when they responded to Mathew Carey’s exclusionary and disparaging 
account of the behavior of “black people” during the 1793 yellow fever outbreak in Philadelphia. In his 
account, Carey had depicted a cohesive, sympathetically unified group of mostly “white” people, who were 
only stalled in their commitment to saving the people of Philadelphia by uncaring, neglectful, money-
grubbing, and thieving “black” nurses. In contrast, Allen and Jones wrote that they had “seen more 
humanity, more real sensibility from the poor blacks, than from the poor whites.” As historian Sarah Knott 
recounted, Allen and Jones set out to correct the record because they “understood, as Carey perhaps did 
not, that social belonging depended on the claim to sensibility; it did not just easily flow from it.” (Absalom 
Jones et al., A Narrative of the Proceedings of the Black People, during the Late Awful Calamity in 
Philadelphia, in the Year 1793 : And a Refutation of Some Censures, Thrown upon Them in Some Late 
Publications (Philadelphia: William W. Woodward, 1794), 10, 
 
 350
White, this structural disenfranchisement meant that the “colored man” had “no 
advocates” in Washington, leaving Congress with the obligation to “anticipate the 
judgment of the Supreme Court, and decide against him.” On this basis, Senator White 
objected to authorizing Florida’s organic exclusion because it would amount to a broad 
congressional sanction for the constitutionality of southern laws prohibiting free people 
of color.708 Nevertheless, Democrats voted monolithically to admit Florida 
unconditionally, as did southern Whigs, and the bill passed.709 Whereas Missouri had 
obtained admission to the Union only on the condition that it curtail its organic 
prohibition (at least, superficially), every motion to add the same restriction to Florida’s 
statehood failed. As White predicted, this vote tacitly sanctioned contingent citizenship 
and confirmed organic discrimination as a national project. A decade later, US Supreme 
Court Chief Justice Robert Taney (whom Jackson appointed) repeated these arguments as 
self-evident proof that people of color lacked de facto citizenship.710 
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THE CONTAGION 
Using the same logic of organic exclusion, members of the new Native American 
party made the case to restrict foreign immigration, arguing that the “Old World” 
disgorged its worst elements onto American shores—criminals, parasites, and foreign 
agents sent to infiltrate and overthrow the American government (i.e., Catholics). This 
type of nativist sentiment gained traction in Louisiana, for example, after Irish Catholic 
Edward Douglass White won the governor’s race in 1835 and surged alongside 
immigration numbers in the 1840s. Like other States home to major port cities (such as 
Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania, which also experienced an uptick in 
nativist activity), Louisiana housed a disproportionate percentage of the country’s 
immigrant population. Foreign-born residents made up  a quarter of the State’s white 
population, a number that accounted for nearly half of the entire immigrant population in 
the South.711 During Louisiana’s 1845 constitutional convention, nativist representative 
Thomas H. Lewis advocated for prohibitive residency requirements to prevent the 
incursion of “persons who are foreign to us in sentiment and feeling” and to ensure that 
the people granted suffrage in Louisiana could prove that they “are identified with us and 
attached to our institutions.” Every government had “some fundamental principles—
some conservative power to maintain its existence,” Lewis attested, a “conservative or 
preservative” power “essentially necessary to its well being.” In a republic, this 
conservative principle was located in the ability to deny the privilege of citizenship to 
foreigners and strangers: to say to the teaming masses on its shores as God did to the 
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engulfing waters of chaos in the act of creation, “thus far thou shalt go, but no farther.”712 
This conservatism ensured that the people granted voting rights had the “love” of this 
country “emplanted” in their breasts, and “bound up with the strongest ties.” 
Furthermore, by including the natives of other American States in his embargo, Lewis 
proposed another barrier against the threat of abolition.  
Six Native Americans won congressional seats in the Twenty-Ninth US House of 
Representatives (four from New York and two from Pennsylvania). That House opened 
its first session in December 1845 with a resolution from Massachusetts Whig Robert C. 
Winthrop (John Winthrop’s descendent) to amend the country’s naturalization laws. 
Given the results of the 1844 election (the Democratic victory), he proposed that the 
House make changes that would protect the “purity of the ballot box” against “improper 
influence” and “gross frauds, destructive alike to the rights and morals of our citizens and 
the stability of our institutions.”713 Pennsylvania representative Lewis C. Levin, who had 
stimulated the violent attacks on Irish-Catholic immigrants during Philadelphia’s 1844 
nativist riots, pled with his colleagues to maintain the “true American policy” of “self-
defense against foreign contamination” by raising the bar for naturalization.714 Referring 
to the riots during the 1844 presidential campaign, he alleged that “drilled bands of armed 
foreigners rushed with impetuous fury upon native-born Americans,” which he further 
                                                 
712 Lewis quoting Job 38:11 (God’s speech from the whirlwind) (Proceedings and Debates of the 
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described as a collision “naturally incident to the unbridled passions of those foreigners,” 
who were “strangers to constitutional rights” and had been accustomed to the use of 
physical force in the “Old World.”715 Desperate for the “foreign vote,” Levin charged, the 
Whigs and Democrats had distorted the facts of these riots—absolving the “foreigners” 
and indicting the Native Americans—in their attempt to “disease and poison the popular 
mind” against the Native American party and in favor of these “foreign cabals.” In 
contrast with these traitors, Levin swore to protect the “peculiar exalted, distinctive 
character” of their “homogeneous nation” against foreign influence and moral 
degradation. On behalf of all of the people of these United States, Levin pledged himself 
to the “living principle” of “Native Americanism,” the “embodied vitality of all that is 
pure in life, lofty in patriotism, and sublime in achievement.”716 Levin’s position echoed 
a widespread belief among medical practitioners that disease resulted from the violation 
of physiological law—not just the physical laws, but the vital laws governing all organic 
life—and it presaged an identical argument about slavery’s vital role in US society that 
gained currency at the end of the decade.717 
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Time in Congress did nothing to dampen Levin’s commitment to this vital 
principle. Toward the end of Levin’s first term in Congress, New York Democrat George 
O. Rathbun submitted a bill to regulate passenger-accommodations for trans-Atlantic 
voyages—an issue of public health, since the cramped quarters exacerbated an already 
unsanitary environment. Levin responded with a proposal to rename it “a bill to 
accommodate paupers and criminals of Europe in their migration to the United States.” 
Quoting Burke, he reminded his colleagues that “wise men… apply their remedies to the 
causes of evil which threaten to be permanent.” Easing foreign immigration did not 
“remedy the evils” affecting the American people, it aggravated them and increased the 
power of a political party even now in the pocket of foreign governments (i.e., the 
Democrats). “Can the tenants of the poor houses of Europe,” asked Levin, “land on our 
shores with faculties so formed by nature, or so fashioned by education, as to become the 
conservative element of our free institutions, whose very basis demands intelligence, 
patriotism, and virtue in the voter?” Obviously not. In Jefferson’s time, he continued, 
when only “educated and responsible men” who seamlessly “melted into the mass of the 
American population” emigrated to the country, statesmen still deemed it necessary to 
institute a five-years residency requirement in “self-defense.” Now, considering the 
“deteriorated character of the foreign population” currently immigrating, the Native 
American party proposed “astringent checks, and astringent only” to “save the 
country.”718 An astringent medicine, of course, binds together soft organic tissue and 
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Pennsylvania) 
 355
hardens it; the nerves and muscle fibers contract, making the organism resistant to 
external irritants and nervous excitement, which medical science believed heightened 
morbidity. An astringent immigration policy, by extension, would harden the country’s 
porous borders, protecting it from outside contaminants, increasing its resistance to 
infection, and bonding its organic constituents together.719  
Though the mainstream parties generally relegated Lewis’s Native Americans to 
the margins of national politics in the late 1840s, the surgent nativist appeal resonated, in 
part, because it channeled a pervasive existential anxiety related to foreign contagion and 
competition. In the first place, in the late 1840s, the United States faced real pathogenic 
epidemics. In addition to the potato disease that drove Irish emigration to the US in 
unprecedented numbers, soldiers fighting in the Mexican-American War (est. April 25, 
1846) brought home malaria and yellow fever, and the influenza pandemic spread from 
Europe to the Americas in 1848.720 In 1849, the English cholera outbreak reached 
American shores, again, and rapidly spread across the country, hitting hardest in New 
York, Chicago, and in cities all along the Mississippi (especially St Louis and New 
Orleans, which seemed to incubate every infectious disease that hit its shores.)721 In the 
same period, immigration rates tripled: from 1841 through 1845, 430,336 people became 
legal permanent residents of the US; from 1846 through 1850, 1,282,915 people gained 
that status. Meanwhile, mid-1846, Great Britain repealed its Corn Laws, gradually 
phasing out the tariff on imported grain over the next three years. By 1849, Britain’s 
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Whig government had retrofitted its political economy on free trade principles, opening 
up a larger market for American agriculture and a broader field of competition for 
American manufacturing, and further exacerbating sectional tension over commercial 
policy in the United States.  
With Britain’s new position on protection, the South anticipated a growth 
economy, particularly after the Democrat-dominated Twenty-Ninth US Congress passed 
the Walker Tariff, which brought the tariff down to rates not seen since before the 1828 
Tariff (of Abominations), and the Warehouse Act, which facilitated the import market.722 
Still, they remained at the mercy of Congress—whomever controlled Congress, 
controlled the country’s economy—and while Southern wealth increased, so did the 
Northern population. Both the 1846 treaty with Great Britain resolving the boundaries of 
the Oregon territory and the war with Mexico (1846-1848) compounded the problem 
because each raised the spectre of new states and, if the Missouri compromise held, the 
probability became that free states would soon outnumber slave states.723 Although 
Pennsylvania Democrat David Wilmot’s proviso (to prohibit slavery from extending to 
any new territories acquired during the Mexican War) failed to pass during the Twenty-
Ninth Congress’s first session (1846-1847), it aggravated the slaveholders’ persecution 
complex.724 In December 1847, Congress confirmed Iowa’s admission to the Union as a 
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territory acquired in the process). By the close of the Twenty-Ninth Congress’s first session, in August 
 
 357
free state, bringing the total to fourteen free states, with Wisconsin’s imminent 
application on the horizon. Plus, the Whigs had retaken the House in the midterm 
elections, which meant that the more schismatic southern Democrats confronted the 
prospect of a nationally-oriented and conciliatory conversation over the territories.725 
In this context, pro-slavery conservatism took hold of the South, as they fought to 
defend their proportionate weight in Congress (against the ever-encroaching northern 
population) by either preventing annexation or preserving the new territories for 
slaveholders. As usual, Calhoun grabbed the lead in articulating this position, addressing 
the Senate in February 1847 on the “Slavery Question” during the vote on the Three 
Million Bill (which would provide the means to conclude the Mexican-American War, 
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and had an analog to the Wilmot Proviso attached). Calhoun submitted four resolutions 
demanding unequivocally that the slaveholding States had an equal right to emigrate to 
the new territories, along with their property (slaves). Any other policy discriminated 
between the States and unjustly deprived them access to their “joint and common 
property” and any law enacted with these effects clearly violated the constitution, States’ 
rights, and the perfect equality that should exist between citizens. With his choice of 
language, Calhoun subtly shifted the perspective on the problem presented by territorial 
acquisition. Instead of merely framing it as a prohibition on “slavery,” Calhoun framed it 
as a prohibition on the “slaveholding states”—a figure of speech that conjured the 
geography and substance of the States themselves, as well as their residents. In this way, 
he implied that the proviso discriminated against huge swaths of the American 
population, as opposed to discriminating against an institution that many political 
economists and slave-owners doubted would thrive in the region at issue, in the first 
place.726 The slaveholding States represented the “conservative power” of the country, he 
asserted, and any policy short of perfect equality tended “directly to subvert the Union 
itself.”  
Calhoun traced the congressional bias against the slave-holding States to the 
pernicious tendency to think of their country as a nation. During the proviso debates, for 
example, Rhode Island Whig James F. Simmons held that the “people of the United 
States” should be considered equivalent with the “people of the States united.” Out of this 
                                                 
726 Pitching the battle as a confrontation between “slave-holding” vs. “non-slaveholding” states, as opposed 
to “slave states” vs. “free states,” for example, was also an incisive rhetorical move. It defined everyone 
according to whether or not they held a specific kind of property, keeping the argument in a system that 
presumed slavery’s perpetuity and thereby naturalizing it, instead of defining themselves by the object of 
their oppression (slave) and against America’s most cherished principle (freedom). 
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“mere change of language,” Calhoun remarked, he and his cohort spread their fiction of a 
“National” government. By this abstract notion of “nationality,” Calhoun argued, non-
slaveholding States masked their intention to transform the slaveholding States into 
second-class citizens. Because nations functioned as single organisms with differentiated 
parts, national governments could (and arguably should) treat them in such a way as to 
enable them to fulfill their unique functions, but not necessarily identically or equally. 
Through this national schema, the northern States sought to nationalize “Dorrism,” 
coerce the southern States into subjecting their “peculiar institutions” to majoritarian rule, 
and crush them.727 They had made no effort to hide their intentions, Calhoun continued. 
In a conspiracy stretching back to the 1840 London’s World Convention, they had openly 
colluded with a foreign government (Great Britain) to abolish slavery in the United 
States. Calhoun accused them of bypassing established diplomatic and foreign policy 
channels to meet secretly with the British Foreign Secretary (Lord Aberdeen), with whom 
they conspired to “expel the white population from the southern States” and replace them 
with people of color.728  
Everyone knew that the founding generation did not want a “national” 
government, Calhoun declared, and that the people would not have tolerated it. Their 
forefathers framed a federal government: a union of States. With the constitution, they 
manifested a “combination of nations,” not a “single nation.”729 When George 
Washington advocated adopting the Constitution, he did not refer to the “nation” or even 
                                                 
727 Calhoun aimed his allusion to “Dorrism” specifically at Simmons, who had fought for Thomas Wilson 
Dorr’s liberation from prison after the Dorr Rebellion. 
728 NB: Calhoun did not use the phrase “people of color” here. Rather, he referred cryptically to “others… 
who are now under our control” (i.e., slaves). 
729 Ibid., 467. 
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a “consolidated Government,” but to the “Union.” The States stood in front of the federal 
government like twenty-nine individual (white male) constituents, with equal rights and 
privileges. In a system based on justice and equality between these individuals, the 
government would not enrich some individuals at the expense of others, but rather would 
look to higher ends, to the greater good and prosperity of the whole. Like any common 
property, the new territories should be shared and enjoyed equally, not given as a 
monopoly to a single section.  
Borrowing the schema of the French socialists, Calhoun presented the 
organically-integrated southern society as an alternative to the unstable capitalist system 
predominant in the North. By uniting “capital and labor” in a single system, he asserted, 
the slaveholding States protected the Union from the “political revolution, anarchy, civil 
war, and widespread disaster” that plagued other countries. The slaveholding States “are 
the conservative portion—always have been the conservative portion—always will be the 
conservative portion,” Calhoun declared. Years ago, Calhoun recalled, he had a 
conversation with some English gentlemen about the “wonderful phenomenon” that had 
kept the Union together. “Without any suggestion or leading remark of mine,” Calhoun 
reported, Lord Stanley (now leader of the British Conservative Party) had said that “it 
was all owing to the southern States.” That is—the Union persisted because of the 
slaveholding States. They held the balance of power of “these United States” in their 
possession, Calhoun reminded the Senate. For this reason, the “North is as much 
interested in upholding the slaveholding States as the latter can possibly be themselves.” 
So long as the slaveholding States received their due, Calhoun reassured the Senate, they 
would continue to act as the country’s conservative power, maintaining its equilibrium 
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and upholding this “glorious Union of ours” for future generations. Though they had 
often been accused of “creating excitement” in these chambers, he demurred, the 
slaveholding States had so far merely “stood upon the defensive,” only modestly 
protesting against the calumny thrown their way. If the non-slaveholding States continued 
their “aggressive policy,” however, he refused to put odds on their chances.730  
Even those southerners who demurred on calling slavery, itself, “conservative,” 
still effectively agreed that “Conservatives” of either party must commit themselves to its 
protection. Slavery did not destabilize the Union, they argued, agitation on slavery 
(including any policy or activity that brought the question of slavery into the halls of 
Congress) did. Border-state Whigs like Maryland’s Reverdy Johnson, for example, 
stopped short of arguing that slavery exercised a “conservative influence” on the 
country’s “free political institutions.” Yet, even if the South’s peculiar institution, itself, 
did not mark its value to the Union, Reverdy continued, southern valor on the battlefield 
distinguished its people and their “morality, religion, and patriotism” placed them 
alongside the eminent civilizations of the world. Anyone who attempted to interfere with 
Southern society—who would dishonor or degrade its men by placing them on unequal 
footing with the rest of the country—threatened the Union with civil war. Immediately 
after Reverdy’s speech, the Senate voted down the anti-slavery proviso, and returned the 
Three Million Bill to the House, where it passed without the restriction on slavery.  
At a Whig meeting in Georgia in October 1847, John MacPherson Berrien (last 
seen denying people of color citizenship status during the House debates over Florida) 
identified the Whig party with a conservatism that protected slavery as an article of faith. 
                                                 
730 Ibid., 453-454 
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Particularly in anticipation of campaign season, Berrien noticed, the Democrats 
harangued the Whigs to publically define their principles, on the assumption that they had 
none. It had become clear to him, however, that their party’s principles were “embodied” 
in the word “conservatism.” In contrast with the Democrats, the Whigs stood for:  
“that conservatism which would guard the constitution as a sacred casket—which 
would look to it as to the ark of the covenant of our political, civil and religious 
liberties—that conservatism which would preserve the coordinate branches of the 
government, and limit each to its respectively defined powers, and a strict 
accountability of public officers—that would see to it that... there was a clear 
grant of power for each governmental act—of that conservatism which formed 
our constitution and had preserved us as a people, and which was aptly expressed 
in the homely phrase of “let well enough alone”.” 
The Democratic party had pursued a war of acquisition, he claimed, even though it 
violated the constitution and threatened the harmony of the Union. The Democratic party 
had introduced the Wilmot proviso into their national legislation and the “northern 
democracy” intended to “engraft” it onto all future territory. The Democratic party was 
falling apart over the co-constituent issues of slavery and equality. Meanwhile, Berrien 
said, “our whig brethren at the north” had joined their southern counterparts in opposing 
territorial acquisition on constitutional grounds. Unlike the northern Democrats, the 
northern Whigs had anticipated that new territory would raise “dangerous questions” in 
the capitol, and act as a “firebrand” on their national legislation. Northern Whigs 
understood that “perfect equality” in the territories barred the exclusion of slavery from 
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it.731 Berrien insisted that the constitution itself granted them the right to take their slaves 
to the northern territory, if they wished, but that he would prefer that they drop the 
matter, entirely, and leave the cursed land to Mexico.732 
THE IMAGE OF CONSERVATISM 
For an over-determined number of reasons, American politics experienced a tidal 
shift in 1848. As they headed into a major election cycle, everyone heated up the tenor of 
their public rhetoric. Since losing the 1846 midterm elections, the Democratic party 
continued to bleed membership over its “imperialist” war in Mexico and the corollary 
crisis over slavery in the territories. Having been consistently challenged by the Whig 
opposition for a decade, they now also faced a substantial anti-slavery critique internally. 
In October 1847, six days after the Liberty party convened its national convention, David 
Wilmot (of “proviso” fame), New York commercialist and Regency-Democrat Churchill 
C Cambreleng, and magic Van’s son John (Van Buren) assembled in Herkimer, NY, to 
repudiate the New York State Democratic Convention, which had taken place in 
Syracuse at the end of September. Namely, in a resolution that the Syracuse convention 
had refused to even discuss, they declared their “uncompromising hostility to the 
extension of slavery into territory now free.” These “Barnburner” Democrats endorsed 
the Wilmot proviso over the general wishes of their party. Over the next year, they joined 
other disaffected Democrats and Whigs to create the Free Soil party, which offered a 
broader platform and less controversial appeal than the Liberty party. In August 1848, it 
summoned its first national convention, and nominated its first national candidate—
                                                 
731 73 Niles' Nat'l Reg. 113, 128 (1847-1848) 
732 If the constitution had, in fact, given southerners the right to take their slaves to a territory that did not 
yet exist, then it arguably contained all the magical properties subsequently attributed to it. 
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Martin Van Buren—threatening Whig dominance in the East-North-Central States 
(Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin) and siphoning off Democrats in the 
critical electoral States of New York and Pennsylvania.733  
Across the Atlantic, meanwhile, labor organized. Egalitarian movements 
threatened political regimes, legal institutions, and property rights in Great Britain, 
Europe, and Russia. In January 1848, the Austrian Empire faced civil disobedience 
strikes and riots in Lombardy, Sicily, and Naples, which spread to Tuscany in February. 
That same month in France, Louis Philippe abdicated the French throne and a new 
government forged between political and social republicans took his place, re-organizing 
the country on modified socialist principles.734 Upon hearing the news, students rioted in 
Vienna, the capital of the Austrian Empire, where they were soon joined by the Viennese 
laboring class.735 Prince Metternich, who had served as Chancellor for the Austrian 
Empire since the Missouri Compromise, failed to control the masses and the Empire’s 
head of state forced him to resign. Days later, the Austrian Empire’s Governor-General in 
Hungary responded to Hungary’s intensifying independence movement by granting its 
petition for a parliamentary monarchy. By the summer of 1848, American newspapers 
reported riots in Prague and Berlin, where mobs attacked the Prussian arsenal, and the 
militarization of the conflict in Italy between imperial and popular forces. In France, the 
                                                 
733 Corey M. Brooks, Liberty Power: Antislavery Third Parties and the Transformation of American 
Politics (University of Chicago Press, 2016), passim; Holt, The Rise and Fall of the American Whig Party, 
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100; Joseph G. Rayback, Free Soil: The Election of 1848 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2015), 
187–90, 206–12, 218–29; Holt, Political Parties and American Political Development, 16, 66–67, 194–95, 
203. 
734 Marx and Engels’s Manifesto of the Communist Party also came out in February 1848. 
735 Students from the medical disciplines provided the principal leadership in this movement because lax 
government censorship restrictions in these fields provided the faculty cover to radicalize their pupils. 
(Reuben John Rath, The Viennese Revolution of 1848 (University of Texas Press, 1957), 45–50.) 
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republican government’s inconsistent and inadequate social and political reforms 
fomented discontent among the working class in Paris, who armed themselves, organized, 
and rose up in a grisly confrontation that lasted three June days and counted casualties in 
the tens of thousands.736 The European “Springtime of Peoples” (Völkerfrühling) 
destabilized the region, leading to years of infighting and popular insurrection, and, in the 
American imagination, constantly looming on the edge of the Atlantic. 
For the United States Democratic party, the blossoming popular violence in 
Europe (and its threat in the United Kingdom) served a dual purpose. The revolutions that 
began in 1848 supplied the Democrats with a series of vivid images pitting popular 
democracy against repressive regimes (i.e., the Feds). But those same images also 
indisputably displayed the chaos that followed the unmitigated destruction of long-
established institutions by social revolutionaries. For a party that needed both its 
democratic and pro-slavery elements to win national elections, that last detail was key. 
While they praised the democratic initiative shown by rebellious parties in Europe, they 
also reiterated the party doctrine that Calhoun had long established. The United States 
embodied the best possible political system imaginable, ideally suited to protect the 
individual free agency of its white (male) citizens. However, it would remain so if and 
only if they protected their institutions (i.e., slavery) as they had received them, without 
alteration, and enabled their free exercise, without constraint or artificial intervention.  
Gradually, pro-slavery politicians and their allies adopted this position, which 
allowed them to play both sides of the foreign conflict, regardless of their party-
affiliation. They exploited the anxiety attached to the international condition by situating 
                                                 
736 “Foreign News,” Niles’ National Register 74 (July 12, 1848): 24–25. 
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their arguments to secure their property in the context of social revolution and popular 
self-defense. For example, during a House discussion on the relationship between the 
federal government and the territories, South Carolina Democrat Joseph A. Woodward 
explicitly connected the effort to prohibit slavery from the northwest territories to the 
communist threat in Europe. The US Constitution existed expressly for the purpose of  
protecting individual rights, he insisted, and, chiefly, personal rights in property 
(including slaves). The legitimacy of their entire system of government rested on its 
ability to secure (and, when necessary, restore) this property. “Slavery, therefore, is 
national,” Woodward reasoned, and existed by “recognition and guaranty everywhere.” 
To defend these rights, Woodward explained, the Constitution made all of the 
government’s powers and particularly its legislative powers “conservative under our 
system,” meaning it could not legitimately “destroy anything for the sake of which it was 
instituted.” It could not seize jurisdiction over the “general institution of property,” it 
could not challenge certain types of property, and, certainly, it could not “abrogate 
property, and substitute communism.” Any act that infringed on these rights violated the 
“fundamental ideas of our political institutions,” breached the conditions on which 
constitutional authority rested, and constituted just cause for “popular revolution.”737 As 
Woodward did, pro-slavery politicians continuously raised the spectre of national 
revolution if they were not satisfied with the safeguards extended to their organic 
institutions. Yet, at the same time, they reiterated that the “conservative” South, alone, 
                                                 
737 Joseph Addison Woodward, Speech of Mr. J. A. Woodward, of S.C., on the Relations Between the 
United States and Their Territorial Districts: Delivered in the House of Representatives of the U.S., July 3, 
1848 (Washington: J. and G.S. Gideon, Printers, 1848), at 10-11. 
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protected the United States from the more dangerous strains of radical ideology currently 
agitating the established natural order in Europe.738   
Not for nothing, the anti-slavery press characterized the national legislature in 
1848 by its “pro-slavery conservatism.”739 For their part, Northern Whigs (particularly 
those with ties to trans-Atlantic capital, inter-state commerce, or companies undertaking 
major internal improvement and transportation projects) assumed a conciliatory posture 
toward slave-holders, thinking that a large enough moderate or center position existed for 
them to occupy. Likewise, they reached out to their southern cohort in the spirit of 
compromise with promises to protect their property and their rights. With few exceptions, 
the extent to which a party, policy, or person convincingly supported pro-slavery interests 
after 1848 (even passively, through non-intervention, non-exclusion, and popular 
sovereignty) signified the measure of their conservatism and, therefore, their fitness for 
office (in the case of parties and people) or implementation (as per policies and 
legislation).740  
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During the Thirtieth US Congress, which opened its first session in December 
1847, the nation’s representatives attended to the territorial fallout from the Mexican-
American War, the disbursement of the Oregon territory, and the looming presidential 
election. In his annual message, Polk reiterated his 1846 admonition to resolve Oregon’s 
organization and recommended that Congress begin the process of turning New Mexico 
and California into US territory. Spurred by the president’s message, New York’s Daniel 
S. Dickinson and South Carolina’s John C. Calhoun each offered a series of resolutions 
that demonstrated the polarized positions within the Democratic party on expansion.741 
Dickinson’s first resolution favored an aggressive program of geographic expansion, 
reflecting the majority view of the party. In his second resolution, he laid out the party’s 
emerging notion of popular sovereignty, proposing that Congress foster residential 
sovereignty and self-government by “leaving all questions concerning the domestic 
policy” within the territories to the “Legislatures chosen by the people” of those 
territories. As soon as possible, Calhoun offered his own set of resolutions denouncing 
the entire expansionist agenda. “To conquer Mexico, and to hold it either as a province or 
to incorporate it in the Union” departed from the Government’s “settled policy,” 
conflicted with its “character and genius,” and would ultimately subvert “our free and 
popular institutions.” Specifically, the new territories threatened Calhoun’s projected 
slave republic, particularly if the Senate adopted Dickinson’s stance on taking received 
law as precedent and respecting each territory’s organic government. Because Mexico 
                                                                                                                                                 
or territorial governments from barring slave-holders from bringing their slaves into new acquisitions, i.e., 
“non-intervention” on slavery. Lewis Cass based his version of “non-intervention” on the doctrine of 
popular sovereignty, promoting an approach to territorial government where the people residing on the land 
determined their own laws and legislation on slavery. (Holman Hamilton, Prologue to Conflict: The Crisis 
and Compromise of 1850 (University Press of Kentucky, 2015), 145.  
741 Dickinson represented the “Hard” or “Hunker” faction of New York’s Democratic party. 
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outlawed slavery in 1829, the residents of former Mexican territory could reasonably 
argue that their foundational domestic organization precluded it. 
Oregon posed a similar problem. Congress had made its first attempt to devise a 
territorial government for Oregon in 1846, after the treaty with Great Britain settled its 
boundaries, but the bill stalled over its over its race-related provisions.742 In the early to 
mid-1840s, Oregon had attracted settlers dreaming of an uncorrupted white Eden: mainly 
small Missouri farmers tired of competing with slave-labor and other middle-class 
aspirants who blamed people of color for their condition. Whereas Missouri and Florida 
each had constitutional provisions that excluded free people of color from residing within 
their borders, Oregon’s 1843 Organic laws excluded all people of color from settling in 
the territory, at all, including slaves.743 The provisional government also included 
language from the 1787 Ordinance barring “slavery” and “involuntary servitude” from 
the territory northwest of the Ohio river.744 In the House in January 1847, Illinois 
Democrat Stephen A Douglas submitted the measure, basically formalizing Oregon’s 
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provisional constitution, including the relevant section of the 1787 Ordinance. The bill 
passed, but the Senate tabled it on their last day in session, effectively killing it.745  
When (now Senator) Stephen A. Douglass submitted a new Oregon bill to the 
Senate in early January 1848, it contained the same controversial provisions. Defending 
Oregon’s Organic Laws two days later, Dickinson recurred to the precedent set by the 
Declaration of Independence, which recognized the people’s “inborn” right, by virtue of 
their “innate sovereignty,” to fashion a government “suited to their condition” in all that 
pertained to their “domestic concerns.” Oregon’s inhabitants had successfully 
implemented just such a government, he argued, reaching their own conclusions about 
domestic slavery without the aid of outside “ordinances,” “provisos,” or “unalterable 
fundamental articles.”746 Conflict only arose when the federal government attempted to 
stick its nose where it did not belong. Let local communities build their own institutions, 
suited to their own particular interests, Dickinson reiterated, and let the federal 
government devote its energy to national issues. Having harmonized with the “spirit of 
the Constitution,” he said, the country could turn its attention to fulfilling the imperial 
destiny allotted to them, without undue conflict on ancillary issues, like slavery.747  
The Whigs, meanwhile, framed their opposition to territorial expansion as a 
“conservative” stance against policies known to create dangerous friction on the question 
of slavery. They asserted that the Democrats disturbed the harmony of the Union with 
their inconsistent politics, their hypocritical policies, and their insatiable lust for new 
land, while the “great Conservative Whig party” remained steadfast, rooted in the 
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constitution and compromise. When their election of Massachusetts Whig Robert C. 
Winthrop to Speaker of the House generated controversy, one of their southern 
representatives published a letter in the national Niles Weekly Register to reassure the 
southern public that the Whigs would do nothing to endanger their sacred institutions. 
“The Whig party, North and South, is characterized by a spirit of conservatism,” 
Florida’s Edward C. Cabell wrote. Unlike the Democrats, the Whigs embraced the 
“whole country,” refusing to be influenced by a “narrow, contracted, selfish, sectional 
policy,” by which he meant abolition. While the Democrats had supported Martin Van 
Buren—who had once acceded the “right of Congress to abolish slavery in DC” and who 
had “voted to place free negroes on a footing with whites” at the New York 
Convention—“most” of the Northern Whigs would willingly cast their ballot for a 
“Southern man for President of the United States” in the upcoming Whig national 
convention.748  
After the Whigs nominated a slave-holding war hero from Louisiana in June 
1848, they argued that southerners had no reason to seriously consider any other 
candidate. Untried as Taylor might be in the field of politics, he had already distinguished 
himself on the field of battle. In addition, they argued, his southern provenance and his 
property in slaves marked him as conservative—unassailable on the major issues of the 
day. “His advocates, of whatever original party denomination, feel that they are 
Conservative Republicans,” Pennsylvania Whig Joseph R. Ingersoll claimed, “and they 
sustain him because they know him to be of the same character.” In the only publicized 
account of his views (an April 1848 letter to a Kentucky tobacco manufacturer), Taylor 
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stated that the “high conservative power” of the veto “should never be exercised except in 
cases of clear violation of the constitution, or manifest haste and want of consideration by 
Congress.” Of course, what a man considered unconstitutional depended to a large degree 
on what latitude he called home. For example, Pennsylvania’s Andrew Stewart read a 
national platform suited for the whole country into Taylor’s letter, while North Carolina’s 
Willie P. Mangum believed that Taylor would take especial care of the southern States. 
While most Whigs attested that Taylor would implement his “conservative veto” on any 
legislation resembling the Wilmot proviso (or otherwise limiting slavery), some Whigs 
read into his putative opposition to territorial expansion an unstated distaste for extending 
slavery. In fact, because Taylor lacked a political past, the Whigs posed him in whatever 
manner they wished during the campaign, positioning him as a “conservative” candidate 
that appealed to the entire country.749  
The Democrats did not fail to miss this nuance of the Whig campaign, or to press 
the issue on the public record. In one of many exchanges over the presidential election 
that erupted during the regular course of business in Congress, Democratic senator Henry 
S. Foote, from Mississippi challenged General Taylor’s fitness for office as a Whig 
candidate, interrogating his Whig colleagues on Taylor’s stance on traditional Whig 
policies, such as the national bank, internal improvements, and high tariffs. To further 
bait the Whigs, Foote speculated that Taylor was secretly a “Wilmot-proviso man,” like 
his vice president (New York’s Comptroller and former congressman Millard Fillmore). 
Though Taylor had confronted this charge before, Foote noted, he had never directly 
denied it. In fact, Foote said, the Whigs as a party avoided a straight answer on where 
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they stood on the Wilmot proviso, specifically, or slavery, in general. Whereas the 
Democratic party platform plainly stated that Congress had no constitutional power to 
interfere with slavery and promised to resist any efforts to compel Congress to do so (i.e., 
the Wilmot proviso), the Whigs side-stepped the issue, mentioning neither “slavery” nor 
“abolition” in their national platform. They avowed Taylor’s “sound conservative 
opinions” and his “true fidelity to the great example of former days, and to the principles 
of the Constitution as administered by its founders,” and assuming that these vague 
assertions would reassure the South of their fidelity.750 But their professed 
“conservatism” merely raised more questions. Conservative “is a word of many imports,” 
Foote charged, “In what way are they conservative? The devils in hell were sent there to 
dwell in never-wasting fire, that they might be conserved there for eternal punishment. 
There might be conservative for evil as well as for good. Did they propose to conserve a 
national bank, &c.?” The Whigs had yet to respond with satisfaction to these lingering 
questions, Foote charge. Until this “image of [Whig] conservatism was shivered by the 
sledge-hammer of truth,” Foote demanded that the Senate remain in session.751 In fact, 
the Senate did not adjourn for another two and a half months, and they spent the rest of 
the summer wrangling over slavery in the territories, providing ample opportunity for the 
Whigs to show their true colors. Unfortunately for Foote, Democratic infighting over 
slavery dominated the debate.  
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By the time the Senate finally returned to Douglas’s Oregon bill at the end of 
June, two new free State Democrats from Wisconsin had joined their ranks, marking the 
first time in American history when both the northern and southern sections of the Union 
enjoyed equal representation. Like the 1847 bill that the Senate had trashed, Douglas’s 
1848 bill included a provision that arguably placed the territory under the jurisdiction of 
the 1787 Ordinance.752 In addition to Dickinson’s advocacy for the bill on popular 
sovereignty grounds, anti-slavery representatives repeatedly pushed for amendments that 
would make the injunction against slavery explicit. New Hampshire Independent 
Democrat and abolitionist John P. Hale declared his intention to use the bill to decide the 
question of slavery, once and for all. The Senate had the responsibility, he contended, to 
determine whether the Declaration of Independence acted as a “practical element of our 
political institutions” or whether its assertion that “all men are born free and equal” 
provided nothing more than a “rhetorical flourish.”753 This claim represented a broader 
strategy employed by the growing anti-slavery faction in Congress. They sought to 
establish the Declaration of Independence as authoritative precedent for their assertion 
                                                 
752 In an impotent attempt to avoid controversy, the authors of the Oregon bill took a Russian-nesting-doll 
approach to hiding its provision prohibiting slavery. The twelfth section of the bill provided “that the 
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that the American revolutionaries founded the government on the basis of universal 
liberty and equality, and that they intended slavery to melt gradually away.754  
Reprising his argument against the extension of the ordinance to the new 
northwest territories, Calhoun urged the Senate to consider the danger that these types of 
documents, founded on the erroneous doctrine of equality, incubated and eventually 
unleashed on an unsuspecting population. Paraphrasing Leroux via Brownson, Calhoun 
explained that man might be equal in a state of nature, but maintained that if he lived in a 
state of nature, he could not be considered man. Man needed society for the “proper 
development of all his faculties, moral and intellectual” and for the “very existence of his 
race,” and societies required governments. Therefore, Calhoun reasoned, the Creator 
must have formed man for the political state, “into which he is impelled irresistibly, and 
in which only his race can exist and all his faculties be fully developed.”755 Because all 
men were born into this political state, which included the social sphere, all men were not 
born free and equal. Just like the German romantics, Calhoun described liberty as the 
endpoint of a long trajectory of personal and collective development. As people rose in 
the “scale of intelligence, virtue, and patriotism,” he said, they acquired an understanding 
of the nature and purpose of their government, and tended less and less toward “violence 
and disorder.” Liberty was the “noble and highest reward” bestowed on those whose 
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“mental and moral development” had reached a stage where they no longer required the 
power of government to keep their impulses in check.  
According to this developmental model of liberty, the proportion between a 
particular government’s “quantum of power” and an individual’s quantum of liberty 
“must necessarily be very unequal among different people, according to their different 
conditions.” In Europe right now, he noted, the leading cause of anarchy was the rush to 
grant “unbounded and individual liberty” to everyone, “without regard to their fitness 
either to acquire or maintain” it. Similarly, the doctrine of equality had performed a 
powerful function in the United States in taking down the British government, but it also 
posed a grave threat because it grounded their government on a lie. As a result of its 
influence, when Jefferson wrote the Declaration of Independence and proposed excluding 
slavery from the territory northwest of the Ohio river, he took an “utterly false view of 
the subordinate relation of the black to the white race in the South.” Jefferson had 
wrongly concluded that the “black” race, though “utterly unqualified to possess liberty,” 
were “as fully entitled to both liberty and equality” as the “white race,” and that “to 
deprive them of it was unjust and immoral.” Calhoun traced the country’s present 
disarray to the moment that Jefferson admitted this misconception into the Declaration. It 
“lay dormant” for decades, he said, but “in the process of time it began to germinate, and 
produce its poisonous fruits.” Like a noxious weed, it now threatened to overwhelm the 
country’s political institutions.756  
Though most of the debate on the Oregon bill centered around the twelfth section 
(applying the 1787 Ordinance), the question at issue involved more than just slavery. As 
                                                 
756 Anti-slavery advocates echoed precisely this sentiment, but reversed the figures. 74 Niles' Nat'l Reg. 49, 
64 (1848-1849) 
 377
New York’s Barnburner Democrat John Dix pointed out, the Senate’s decision on this 
bill would determine the organic makeup of the United States, in addition to its 
predominant commercial-industrial system. Because the bill tacitly sanctioned Oregon’s 
Organic laws prohibiting people of color, they compelled Congress to confront “one of 
the most interesting and important problems both for the American statesman and 
philosopher,” a “subject of vital importance to every section of the Union,” which 
concerned its strength and security from “external aggression,” as well as its vulnerability 
to “intestine disorder and violence.” What would be the character of the people 
occupying this continent, he asked, of “what race or races” shall this “vast population” 
consist? Arguing in favor of the bill as written, Dix imagined the Oregon territory as a 
sacred space for the white race, the starting point for a white empire stretching beyond 
the limits reached by the ancient Romans.757 Unlike the Roman empire, however, Dix 
envisioned an empire “founded in peace, and extending itself by industry, enterprise, and 
the arts of civilization,” peopled entirely by the superior stock of the “Caucasian” race. In 
fact, he claimed that the entire country’s “public order and prosperity” depended on a 
homogenous population, identical in the “great outlines of their physiognomy, animal and 
moral” and filled with the “same blood,” supplied and augmented by “homogenous 
currents” of refugees flooding the country from Europe. “The nearer the great body of 
our people—those especially who till the earth—approach the same standard intelligence 
and political importance,” Dix insisted, “the more likely we shall be to maintain internal 
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tranquility in peace, and bring to the common support in war the united strength of all.” 
In Dix’s white nationalist fantasy, the northwest territories provided a pristine landscape 
on which they could test this theory. The “white race” could satisfy both their material 
and spiritual needs on the open frontier, where they would work the land themselves and 
reap its rewards. This form of labor would reinforce their particular suitability for the 
rights and privileges granted freemen, as would their physical isolation from corrupting 
influences.758 
Where, in this vision, did people of color fit? Culling from the scientific theories 
of race, which had developed to flesh out the concept of organic sovereignty, Dix argued 
that people of color fit only where the terrain necessitated their labor, within the current 
boundaries of the southern States. Otherwise, he considered them an “inferior cast,” 
counting for nothing in the physical or intellectual strength of the “body politic.” 
Regardless of whatever the “liberal and humane” might attempt to do on behalf of the 
“African” race, he maintained, “they cannot change the unalterable law of its destiny.” It 
had already entered the “first stage of retrogradation,” where it no longer reproduced its 
own population. In a few generations, Dix predicted, by the “slow but certain process of 
nature, working out her ends by laws so steady, and yet so silent, that their operation is 
only seen in their results,” the “black race” would be extinct. Public prejudice aided this 
process along—excluding them from white privilege and keeping them socially 
degraded—but Providence ordained it. By the “force of immutable laws,” Dix reminded 
the Senate, a “degraded class is always, and must be” an element of insecurity and 
weakness within a superior population. In that case, the extension and artificial 
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regeneration of the slave population to the northwest territories—against the express 
wishes of the sovereign community living there, as well as the recommendations of 
political economists and agricultural experts—worked against the long-term interests and 
safety of the American people.759 
Even more so than Missouri or Florida, then, Oregon’s exclusionary conditions 
for entry posed a problem for Congress. Supposing that Congress removed the 1787 
Ordinance language from the bill, Oregon still effectively precluded slave-holders from 
bringing their slave-property into the State.760 Because Oregon’s Organic laws prohibited 
all people of color, including slaves, they forced the Senate to address whether a 
territorial government (or Congress, in sanctioning that government’s laws) had the 
power to “interfere with persons emigrating with their property” into a State. A vote in 
favor of these laws functionally confirmed federal power to interfere with slavery; yet, a 
vote against them sanctioned federal interference in a sovereign territory’s organic 
constitution. If Congress let these laws stand, they established a precedent that would 
allow other territories to exclude slavery pre-emptively. This question gained even more 
urgency after President Polk returned the ratified Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (settling 
the Mexican War) to Congress on July 6th, with a message encouraging them to move on 
provisional governments for the annexed territories as soon as possible. If Congress had 
to respect a territory’s organic laws (so long as they did not violate the Constitution), then 
they would have to admit New Mexico and California without slavery, as well—unless 
Congress determined that the Constitution guaranteed and protected it. 
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After Polk’s directive on the territories, Virginia Democrat Robert M. T. Hunter 
parsed the fine line between granting the federal government the power to intercede on 
behalf of slave-holders and granting it the power to interfere with slavery. As part of its 
power to acquire territory, he argued, the constitution granted Congress the implied 
power to govern its acquisitions.761 Specifically, it invested Congress with the power to 
“train these infant communities under such institutions as may fit them to become 
members of our Confederacy,” until the moment they arrived at their majority, at which 
point Congress had to step back. Hunter maintained that this precise distribution of power 
was “vital to the body politic and essential to the scheme of American association.” The 
Constitution granted these powers to “preserve the existence of this political organism” 
and they must not, therefore, “be perverted to destroy it” by undermining either the 
equality of the States or their proportionate weight. Above all other considerations, 
Hunter insisted, the government must avoid committing itself to anything that would alter 
this society’s “organic structure” or impair its “vital functions.” In refusing the southern 
States access to new territories, Congress crippled the “vis medicatrix naturæ” of their 
political system: their prerogative to transplant their excess slave population to the open 
frontier. In spite of Senator Dix’s claims, Hunter continued, this state of affairs 
“dangerously” diminished the “relative superiority of the white race at home,” as well as 
eroded the South’s capacity to protect their rights at the federal level. The country’s 
safety and prosperity—its very existence—depended on maintaining the southern States’ 
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proportionate equality, which accounted for the “fundamental principle” of American 
society. Without it, he anticipated, the entire Confederacy would become unhinged.762  
Ultimately, Hunter’s argument centered around the crisis of social revolution in 
Europe, and its implications for the political economy of the United States. The industrial 
revolution in England reversed the natural order. Children, whose superior suppleness 
made them particularly suited to working machinery, rose to an unnatural position of 
independence and authority in the family, gradually undermining the paternal hierarchy 
and bringing about a revolution in the household government. This poisonous effect 
worked its way out from inside the family to spread through the manufacturing centers, 
where Hunter described brutalizing lives of crime, destitution, subjection, and suffering. 
While the “doctrines of communism” understandably spread among the laboring classes 
in Europe and the northern United States, Hunter persisted, the social organization of the 
South “naturally” exerted a “conservative influence” on the country. The capitalists who 
ruled the industrial centers of the North discarded their labor like garbage, he said, but 
men “willing to work” did not die for “want of bread” in the slaveholding States. Positive 
legislation, public enactment, and private affection combined to secure the “subsistence 
and protection of the slave, from the cradle to the grave.” In this context, communism 
represented a failed attempt to get at what slavery had already accomplished. The 
Government treated wage labor as a modified form of slavery, redistributing the 
“proceeds of production between capital and labor,” but this imperfect remedy still left 
labor at the mercy of capital. Citing Scottish radical Robert Burns, who had been 
absorbed into the British romantic canon by mid-century, Hunter reminded the Senate 
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that they would not in the South “See yonder poor o'erlabored wight,/ So abject, mean 
and vile,/ Who begs a brother of the earth/ To give him leave to toil.” Unlike the North, 
the slave-holding States had erected a socio-political economy based on the natural 
hierarchy found in all organized life, where the superior organism governed and cared for 
the weaker. While industrial societies fell to moral depravity and misrule, the South 
thrived in an organic system that promoted harmony, prosperity, and progress for all its 
denizens.763 
In fighting over this territory, then, Congress fought over the future of American 
society, over the durability of its institutions, and the stability of its commercial system. 
The institution of slavery acted as the “balance-wheel of this Confederacy,” Hunter 
explained, “the conservative element” standing between the extremes of “Federalism” 
and majoritarian popular democracy. He reminded them that the southern Democrats led 
the charge against the predatory banks, exploitative tariffs, and artificial monopolies, and 
fought for the just distribution of profits between capital and labor. If Congress forbade 
slaveholders from bringing their property into the territories, then they acted against their 
own conservative interests. As the federal government weakened the relative strength of 
its southern States and diminished the capacity of its southern citizens to exercise their 
authority over their own property and ensure the sound operation of their commercial 
system, it damaged its own vital interests, which were fundamentally attached to the 
stability of southern institutions. Without the essential southern phalanx, Hunter 
indicated, the slaves would inevitably revolt, and the blood of the white race would flood 
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the United States. The next day, as if to vindicate this dire warning, the Niles National 
Register published word of the June Paris uprising.764  
On the last day of debate over Oregon’s government, in the midst of a twenty-one 
hour long session, Connecticut Democrat John M. Niles posed the question, “Is the 
principle of slavery more conservative than the principle of freedom?” By definition, a 
conservative principle must enable a system to grow and develop, he observed, but 
slavery had “undergone no essential change” for at least a century. Slaveholders resisted 
any improvement either to their own domestic institutions or to the general government. 
On the contrary, they held the government hostage, paranoid of any movement or 
measure that they did not author. Quoting the last stanza of Lord Byron’s Childe 
Harold’s Pilgrimage, which Frederick Douglass had popularized for its anti-slavery 
themes, Niles recalled the slaveholders’ willingness to dissolve the Union with the 
flippant phrase, “Farewell—a word that has been, and must be,/ A sound that makes us 
linger—yet farewell.”765 During the present discussion, the “slave power” continuously 
took recourse to veiled threats of disunion and violence, baldly declaring their refusal to 
comply with the majority’s decision, if it dared to resist their dominion. Paraphrasing 
Jefferson’s first inaugural, Niles reminded the Senate that the majority’s will served as 
the “vital principle of a republic,” and that the threat of force was the “vital principle of 
despotism.”766 Far from being a “conservative principle” of their popular institutions, 
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slavery was an “incurable” blight on their free republic. Not its conservatism, but its 
intractability made it a “peculiar institution” in the United States. “Such an institution,” 
he determined, “so difficult to be improved or abolished, should not be extended.” 
Instead, Niles pled with his colleagues “by all that is sacred in the past” and “by all your 
hope of the future,” not to reject the “principles of freedom, of justice and humanity” 
found in the 1787 Ordinance.  
In its basic outline, Niles’s speech reflected the prevailing international attitude 
toward slavery: that it represented an outdated, obsolete form of labor that would recede 
as soon as slave-holders stopped propping it up with artificial means.767 As several 
northerners noted during the territorial debates, slave-holders used to share this 
perspective. In prior decades, many of them described slavery as an illness or curse 
transmitted to an earlier generation by Great Britain, which they hoped would pass in its 
own time. Because all systems tended toward liberty, slavery would naturally subside in 
favor of a more progressive order.  
By 1848, however, slaveholders had developed a pro-slavery schema that 
configured white hegemony as the natural (and divine) order, and slavery as its ideal 
system of labor. In the industrial north, the merchants owned the capital and exploited the 
labor, which alienated the parties from each other and antagonized their interests. This 
dynamic generated both social and political conflict, as well as a barrier to fair 
representation in government. The “contest between capital and labor” precipitated 
“human suffering and oppression,” Mississippi Democrat Jefferson Davis observed, but 
because “Slaves are capital,” no such contest existed in the South. With capital and labor 
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coequal in the “mind of the master,” the slaveholder could represent both interests 
without conflict. In addition, Davis explained, slavery elevated the white laborer by 
putting a “caste” below him. As a result, slavery mitigated the class tensions that 
constantly threatened to overwhelm the North. “White men” in the slave States enjoyed 
an equality that could not exist in places where the “same race fill the places of master 
and menial.” Furthermore, because slaveholders and free-trade advocates had allied in 
their opposition to northern protectionism for decades, slaveholders had also fashioned 
slavery as an institution that thrived in a system of free trade, which progressive thinkers 
projected would ideally supplant capitalism, particularly as free trade gained currency in 
British and European commercial agendas. Slaveholders assumed that slavery would 
soon overtake free labor as the superior institution in a free trade market. In this 
worldview, slavery signified the future.  
Pro-slavery politicians also insisted that slavery was morally superior in its 
treatment of “blacks” than the northern social organization because it replicated the 
organic hierarchy between the races. Slave-holding senators agreed with New York 
Senator Dix that the “black population” could not survive in a state of freedom, but they 
expressed outrage that Dix would promote a “policy which seeks, through poverty and 
degradation, the extinction of a race of human beings domesticated among us.” Dix’s 
“hostility to the African race” exposed the cynical nature of northern concern for “black” 
humanity, which only extended as far as it furthered their political interests in weakening 
the South. Hence, northerners fought to dismantle slavery while fostering the degrading 
conditions that they openly acknowledged were destroying the “free black population” 
living in their midst. In contrast, southern slaveholders like Davis, Georgia Whig John 
 386
MacPherson Berrien, and Virginia Democrat James M. Mason argued that the plantation 
system, built on the family-model, generated unbreakable bonds of affection between 
slaves and their masters. Having been “born and brought up in the midst” of slaves, 
Georgia Whig John MacPherson Berrien claimed, Southerners had developed “feelings 
of kindness and forbearance” towards the “sons of Africa” that someone who grew up in 
a free State could never have. On the subject of slavery, Berrien reasoned, a “man’s 
opinions and feelings” depended on the “place of his birth, his education, his 
associations, the habits and feelings and institutions of the community in which he 
lives.”768 Were a free-State critic of slavery to observe the institution in person, Berrien 
predicted that he would find the “quantum of labor” less than in “free” labor societies; he 
would see a “body of laborers cheerful and content,” “fed, clothed, and ministered to in 
sickness and old age” owned by a body of honest, humane, pious, and charitable men.  
Slave-holders argued that the organic structure of southern society provided the 
“best conditions” for “black” race to eventually reach its full potential. Comparing the 
conditions of northern “free blacks” and slaves, Jefferson Davis said they would find one 
group “miserable, impoverished, loathsome from the deformity and disease which 
follows after penury and vice; covering the records of the criminal courts, and filling the 
penitentiaries,” and the other group “contented, well provided for in all their physical 
wants, and steadily improving in their moral condition.”769 When Africans were brought 
to the United States, he said, “they came to their destiny.” Only in the conditions of 
slavery could they makes themselves happy and useful. The slave found his natural 
protector in his master—someone who put his needs above all other considerations. In the 
                                                 
768 30th Congress 1st Session Appendix Cong. Globe 878. 
769 Ibid., 912. 
 387
secure comfort of his master’s household, he was bound up in the ties of affection. Davis 
speculated that slavery “may have for its end the preparation of that race for civil liberty 
and social enjoyment.” The structural hierarchy of plantation slavery progressively 
elevated “the blacks” by their association with a more advanced race, gradually 
improving them until they might one day rise to the condition of liberty.770 Other 
southerners—Whigs and Democrats, alike—agreed. As a matter of fact, though the two 
sides rarely shared a common political language or rhetoric, they shared a common 
discourse around slavery.771 Slavery was their glorious past and, if they played they cards 
right, it represented their patriotic future, as well. 
The final version of the Oregon bill allowed its existing organic laws to remain in 
place, but included a rider promising non-interference on slavery in the territories that 
would become New Mexico and California. In what might be considered just retribution 
for their treatment in 1847, the House immediately tabled the Senate bill. For the next 
two weeks, the House and the Senate volleyed slightly different versions of the bill back 
and forth between their chambers. In the end, a version with the 1787 Ordinance 
language passed.772 On Congress’s last day in session, Polk signed it and, against 
Calhoun’s strenuous objections, included a message to Congress explaining his decision. 
Polk acknowledged that the “transcendent” question of slavery concerned more than just 
property rights. For the slave-holder, it encompassed the “domestic peace and security of 
every family” in the South. Nonetheless, he felt compelled to uphold the Missouri 
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Compromise, which had successfully “tranquilized” the public mind in 1820 and, again, 
when Texas entered the Union in 1845. He closed with an injunction to protect and honor 
this compromise when they dealt with the newly acquired Pacific territories.773 The 
message, which circulated broadly in newspapers, included a lengthy section of George 
Washington’s Farewell Address, a reminder to the people to fight for the “sacred ties” 
that held them together: 
 “The unity of government which constitutes you one people is also now dear to 
you…it is of infinite moment that you should properly estimate the immense 
value of your national union to your collective and individual happiness… 
Citizens by birth or choice of a common country, that country has a right to 
concentrate your affections. The name of American, which belongs to you in your 
national capacity, must always exalt the just pride of patriotism more than any 
appellation derived from local discriminations.” 
Washington (and Polk, by proxy) concluded his message with a warning to the American 
people to guard themselves against sectional jealousies and “distrust the patriotism” of 
any man who worked to weaken their bonds of union. Party men would attempt to divide 
them and alienate their affections from each other, Washington prophesied, particularly 
along “geographical” lines. They would blow the slightest hint of diversity out of 
proportion and misrepresent the “opinions and aims” of other sections, to build up the 
belief that a “real difference” separated them, when no such difference existed. In his 
own words, Polk expressed his conviction that the American people’s “sound patriotism” 
would lead them, upon “sober reflection,” to throw their support behind an equitable 
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compromise on the new territories, one that would respect everyone’s rights. He was 
wrong.774  
Over the next four years, politics became increasingly volatile and polarized 
around the sectional issue of slavery, starting with the election of the second Whig 
president, Zachary Taylor, in 1848.  
NATIONAL PHYSICIANS  
During the debates over the territories, southern slave-holders worked out the key 
facets of their pro-slavery conservatism, which would become the cornerstone of their 
policy positions over the next decade. As part of their revisionist history, they asserted 
that the Constitution grew out of a consensus on slavery, and that it fundamentally 
protected property in slaves. Slavery performed a vital, conservative function in the 
United States, essential to its health and progress. Anything or anyone that threatened or 
infringed on slavery, in any way, could not be considered conservative. For that reason, 
they claimed, slavery must be allowed to be introduced anywhere, regardless of climate, 
terrain, or the preferences of the population already residing there. They argued that the 
slave system of labor had already proven itself superior to free labor, both in productivity 
and morality. Unlike northern capitalists, who oppressed and terrorized their populations, 
slaveholders claimed that they served an enlightened and humanitarian service for their 
labor—that slavery improved and advanced the dependent race that lived among them. 
                                                 
774 In a stroke of cosmic irony, considering the debates over quarantine (proxy debates over people of color) 
that occurred during his presidency, James K. Polk died of cholera at his home in Nashville, TN, three 
months after leaving office. (Niles’ National Register (William Ogden Niles, 1849), 116.) 
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Losing Oregon (at least provisionally) merely strengthened their resolve to protect the 
organic structure of their society and arrest the disease eroding its vital parts.775  
So, what did it mean to be a conservative in this climate? For slave-holders and 
their allies, it meant advocating free trade and opposing capitalists; it meant white 
hegemony over white nationalism; it meant State rights, so long as those rights furthered 
slaveholder interests, and strict construction, so long as that construction authorized 
slavery; it meant a small (federal) government, until slaveholders needed that government 
to enforce their interests and retrieve their property, and it meant an expansive 
perspective on individual liberty and personal freedom, unless that individual was a 
person of color, a woman, or an abolitionist.  
In 1849, Thomas Ritchie summarized the Democratic party’s new “conservatism” 
in the revised prospectus for his Daily Union, which had overtaken the Globe as the 
Democratic national organ during Polk’s administration. In conjunction with his new co-
editor, the aptly named New Hampshire congressman Edmund Burke, Ritchie explained 
that the Democrats represented the “progressive spirit of the age, adapting to new forms 
and conditions,” while also advocating limited government, original and strict 
construction of the constitution, and the individual and property rights “of all”—that is, 
all persons and all property. In order to “faithfully adhere” to the democratic principles 
“laid down and interpreted by the fathers of the republican faith,” Ritchie and Burke 
committed the party to a policy of non-intervention on the question of slavery in the 
territories and DC. He and Burke regarded this position as the “true conservatism,” 
Ritchie wrote, “that conservatism which preserves popular liberty,” while it endeavored 
                                                 
775 They lost the battle over Oregon’s territorial government, but they successfully forestalled its statehood 
for a decade. Congress did not ratify Oregon’s admission to the Union until February 1859.  
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to secure “just and equal protection” to every person and their property. The Daily 
National Whig adroitly termed this position “progressive conservatism and slavery non-
intervention.”776 
For their part, the Whigs had elected the first deep-South president, and they 
continued to call for a conciliatory conservatism that privileged compromise on behalf of 
slave-holders.777 In January 1849, Indiana Whig Richard W. Thompson predicted that the 
executive office would soon emanate a “spirit of popular conservatism” that would “be 
poured like oil upon the agitated waters of party.” Under Taylor’s guidance, Thompson 
said, “we shall neither know the name of North or South, of Whig or Democrat” in the 
“settlement of great national questions,” but rather “be prompted by those high, holy, and 
elevated considerations which exist in the heart of every patriot.” In spite of their 
concessions to southern sentiment, however, the Whigs could not deny (and southern 
Democrats never failed to point out) that their northern wing operated in league with the 
Free Soil party. In 1848, the Free Soil party had poached just enough votes in New York 
and Pennsylvania to sink Democratic candidate Lewis Cass. The Democrats still held the 
Senate, but they had lost substantial ground, and southerners no longer possessed the 
quantum of power in the Senate once Wisconsin’s statehood equalized the number of free 
and slave State senators.778 Similarly, though the Democrats technically retook the 
majority in the House (113 to 107), the nine Free Soil members held the balance, 
                                                 
776 The Whig considered “progressive conservatism” a contradiction in terms, but we know better. 
777 Although Taylor had grown up on a Kentucky plantation, and continued to own land there, he primarily 
resided on his Louisiana plantation at the time of his election. 
778 In the 1848 elections, the Democrats ceded seven seats, or twelve percent of their share of the vote, to 
the Whig party (who gained five seats) and the Free Soil party (who gained two). 
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particularly since five of them had previously served as Whigs.779 Poised on the edge of 
the 1850 census (scheduled for June), national representatives anticipated additional 
changes in the Congressional makeup. Taking into account the country’s migration 
patterns and the influx of immigrants, the census promised to increase representation in 
areas with strong Free Soil support (the Mid-Atlantic and East-North-Central regions) 
and decrease representation for the South Atlantic States (particularly Virginia and South 
Carolina), whose populations had not kept up proportionately with other States.780  
 From the international perspective, the Democratic party had long thrived 
because it allied democratic liberalism with Southern pro-slavery conservatism, and the 
“Conservative” Whigs had maintained their stronghold in the North by uniting social 
liberalism and political conservatism. Conservative writers in the UK attributed this 
paradox to the idiosyncratic role that State-rights played in American politics. “The 
precedents of history uniformly point to circumstances like those of the South, as 
eminently adverse to progress and to the spread of new ideas,” the Glasgow Herald 
observed, “and to those which characterize the North, as invariably breeding a leveling 
and democratic spirit.” European conservatism enshrined the same principles found in 
Calhoun’s State-rights doctrine: strict construction, limited legislative authority, and 
                                                 
779 Of the rest, two had been Democrats, one had been a member of the Liberty party in his only other 
election, and one had been elected for the first time as a member of the Free Soil party. In the Senate, 
which had two Free Soilers, one had been a Democrat and one had been a Whig. 
780 In Michigan, where Van Buren won 15.97% of the vote, and Illinois, where he won 12.6 % of the vote, 
the population had nearly doubled between 1840 and 1850. In Wisconsin, where he received 26.6% of the 
vote, the population had increased by ten times the number it had in 1840 (from 30,945 to 305, 391). In 
New York, where he received 26.43 % of the vote, the population had increased by a third, which may not 
sound like much, but amounted to 667,473 people (i.e., the entire population of South Carolina in 1850). 
Speaking of which, in the same period, South Carolina’s population grew by 74,109 people (from 594,398 
to 668,507) and Virginia’s population by 94,000 (from 1,025,227 to 1,119,348). Due to a change in census 
apportionment, as part of a bill to rationalize and institutionalize the census introduced by Ohio Whig 
Samuel Finley Vinton and formalized in May 1850, Congress experienced a less drastic shift than some 
members feared. (citation assistance: https://www.census.gov/prod/3/98pubs/CPH-2-US.PDF) 
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proprietary autonomy. On both sides of the Atlantic, this position promoted caste 
privilege over democratic rights, yet, in the United States, the leveling northern 
democracy tirelessly advanced southern interests. The Herald traced this relationship 
back to Thomas Jefferson’s “extreme lasser aller” politics, by which he identified federal 
constitutional power as the means by which the government would interfere with 
individual free agency.781 Jefferson’s ideological antipathy to consolidated power 
incidentally generated “liberal” cover for “conservative” Southern policies, and ensured 
that John C. Calhoun and his ilk remained mainstream. In September 1849, however, the 
Herald forecasted a “complete transformation” of political parties in the United States. 
When the New York Barnburners seceded from the Democratic party, it wrote, the entire 
political system shattered. Everyone fragmented; “Calhoun alone holds his old course.” 
From the outset, Taylor’s administration exposed the danger of choosing an 
unknown entity to represent a party’s interest in the executive office. Rather than pick 
major players in the Whig party for his cabinet, he selected nationally-oriented men who 
shared his distaste for partisan politics.782 He also broke with tradition in selecting his 
official printer, establishing and patronizing his own broadside, instead of gifting the 
Whig National Intelligencer the lucrative executive printing contract. Taylor quickly 
                                                 
781 The Herald meant “laissez-aller.” 
782 For his Secretary of Treasury, Taylor chose William M Meredith, a Philadelphia lawyer who first gained 
prominence defending three men of color against a murder charge, opposed free trade, and favored 
reinstating protective tariffs. Taylor picked former Delaware senator John M Clayton, who opposed 
territorial acquisition and slavery-extension, to be his Secretary of State, and anti-slavery and pro-tariff 
Vermont representative Jacob Collamer to be the Postmaster General. Ohio lawyer and former Treasury 
Secretary (under William Henry Harrison) Secretary of the Interior. Virginia congressman William B 
Preston, who had first made a name for himself in politics campaigning for Virginia to abolish slavery, 
served as Taylor’s Secretary of the Navy, and Maryland senator Reverdy Johnson, whose privately held 
anti-slavery views did not prevent him from acting as counsel in some major pro-slavery cases, became the 
Attorney General. (Long after Taylor’s brief administration ended, Johnson famously defended John 
Sanford in the Dred Scott case and Mary Surratt against charges that she conspired to assassinate Abraham 
Lincoln.) Finally, under pressure from his colleagues in the upper South, Taylor appointed Former Georgia 
governor  George Walker Crawford Secretary of War. 
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sank Thompson’s hopes that his hypothetical “popular conservatism” might quell 
sectional tension, as well. Although he owned plantations in Louisiana, Mississippi, and 
Kentucky, and a substantial number of slaves, Taylor had no problem with admitting 
California and New Mexico as free States and he drew a hard line against maintaining 
them in limbo as territories.783 When Texas and New Mexico nearly came to blows over 
their disputed shared border, Taylor backed New Mexico and threatened to send troops to 
enforce their claims. He also endorsed federal power in DC, encouraging Congress to 
attend to the city’s interests and consider what policies might “contribute to its 
prosperity.” In supporting congressional authority over the District, Taylor simply 
restated Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the US Constitution, granting the US 
government the right “to exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever,” over 
the autonomous District that housed it. Nonetheless, DC had long served as a flashpoint 
for pro-slavery and abolitionist activists, alike, who viewed congressional action related 
to slavery in DC as a potential foothold for the federal government to arrogate to itself the 
power to intervene elsewhere. In the context of Taylor’s views—specifically, that quick, 
decisive action in the territories would short-circuit national agitation on slavery—his 
theoretically innocuous stand on DC indicated to Congress that he intended to push them 
to issue conclusive legislation on slavery and the slave trade in the District, as well. 
                                                 
783 In a period when only a third of southern families own slaves and the average family owned 8.6 slaves, 
Taylor owned 154 of them at the time of his death in 1851. When Taylor took office, he sold one of his 
Mississippi plantations (Sligo), but kept Cypress Grove. In 1850, he bought the Fashion sugar plantation 
(Louisiana) for his son, Richard. Historian Karl Jack Bauer observed that Taylor apparently diversified his 
investment portfolio in 1850, putting the money from the Sligo land sale into bank stocks. This transition in 
favor of capitalist holdings may have further alienated him from his southern compatriots. (K. Jack Bauer, 
Zachary Taylor: Soldier, Planter, Statesman of the Old Southwest (LSU Press, 1993), 96–110, 320; 
Freehling, The Road to Disunion, 490–93.) 
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Taylor set out these priorities in his first (and only) annual message to Congress, which 
he clarified in a special message delivered in late January.784  
A week later, Whig patriarch Henry Clay (who had narrowly lost his party’s 
nomination to Taylor the year before) offered his own spin on Taylor’s 
recommendations, laying out eight resolutions that would come to be known collectively 
as the Compromise of 1850. Clay’s stated mission: “to settle and adjust amicably all 
existing questions of controversy” between the States “arising out of the institution of 
slavery.”785 On January 29, Clay resolved that California be admitted to statehood upon 
application, without restrictions regarding slavery (either its exclusion or introduction), 
and that Congress should establish territorial governments in other parts of the Mexican 
Cession, also without restrictions or conditions on slavery. Regarding Texas and New 
Mexico, he proposed that they fix Texas’s shared boundary with New Mexico, and pay 
down Texas’s public debt in return for its promise to relinquish its claims to New 
Mexico’s territory. As related to DC, Clay continued, Congress should not unilaterally 
abolish slavery without popular consent from DC and Maryland or just compensation to 
District slave-holders; however, Congress should prohibit the slave trade within city-
limits. Regarding the question of fugitive slaves, Clay advised legislation that would give 
teeth back to the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act, to effectually provide for the “restitution and 
delivery of persons bound to service or labor,” who may escape to other States or 
                                                 
784 In response to the House’s request, Taylor delivered additional information specifically related to his 
December admonition to turn the territories into states as soon as possible. The House received the message 
on January 21 and the Senate on January 23, 1850. 
785 Henry Clay, Remarks of Mr. Clay, of Kentucky, on Introducing His Propositions to Compromise, on the 
Slavery Question: In the Senate of the United States, January 29, 1850 (Washington: J. T. Towers, 1850), 
3. 
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Territories.786 Otherwise, Clay asserted that Congress had no power to regulate or 
legislate the slave trade between the States, and that the “admission or exclusion of 
slaves” transported from one State to another depended “exclusively upon their own 
particular laws.” This last turn of phrase gestured back to Clay’s wording in the Missouri 
Compromise restriction, which likewise balanced a potential State’s organic laws, and its 
putative sovereignty, with the Senate’s imperative to appear proactive in protecting 
slaveholders’ property.787  
For the purposes of this project, Clay’s compromise measures provide a 
reasonable summary of the issues involved in the 1850 congressional debates. They 
framed the conversation in the Senate and they established context for the parallel 
discussion occurring over the same issues in the House. Still, the details of the resulting 
legislation and the horse-trading involved in getting it passed matter less than the 
                                                 
786 In Article IV, Section 2, the Constitution stated, “No person held to service or labor in one state, under 
the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be 
discharged from such service or labor; but shall be delivered up, on claim of the party to whom such 
service or labor may be due.” In 1793, Congress passed the Fugitive of Slave Act, placing refugees from 
slavery under federal jurisdiction. In an effort to protect free people of color residing within their borders, 
free states enacted personal liberty laws, requiring slaveholders to submit proof of ownership. In 1842, the 
Supreme Court declared these laws unconstitutional in the case of Prigg v Pennsylvania, determining that 
state magistrates may enforce the Fugitive Slave law, if they chose to do so, “unless prohibited by state 
legislation.” This phrasing absolved state authorities from enforcing the Fugitive Slave Act, relinquishing it 
entirely to federal authority, so long as their state laws did not explicitly abrogate federal law in the 
process, as Pennsylvania’s had. The irony here is twofold: first, the court’s ruling in Prigg found in favor of 
the petitioner and against the state, but the ruling actually made it easier for states to avoid capitulating to 
slaveholders’ claims. In effect, it recused them of enforcing the law, which compelled slaveholders to seek 
federal intervention, leading to the second irony. Slaveholders, many of whom advanced extreme State-
rights positions, pressured the federal government to create a more invasive law, calling on Congress to 
extend federal power more intrusively into what they might otherwise consider sovereign States.    
787 For comprehensive accounts of the compromise debates and the resulting legislation, see: Holt, The Rise 
and Fall of the American Whig Party, 476–543; Hamilton, Prologue to Conflict, passim; Michael F. Holt, 
“Politics, Patronage, and Public Policy: The Compromise of 1850,” in Congress and the Crisis of the 
1850s, ed. Paul Finkelman and Donald R. Kennon (Athens, GA: Ohio University Press, 2012), 18–35; Paul 
Finkelman, “The Appeasement of 1850,” in Congress and the Crisis of the 1850s, ed. Paul Finkelman and 
Donald R. Kennon (Athens, GA: Ohio University Press, 2012), 36–79; David P. Currie, “Mr. Clay’s 
Compromise,” in The Constitution in Congress: Descent into the Maelstrom, 1829-1861 (Chicago and 
London: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 157–94. 
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language used to discuss it, and its implications for American conservatism and organic 
sovereignty. 
In the prevailing theories of social behavior, extremist sentiment and activity 
developed in response to over-excited nerves, an organic contagion particularly endemic 
to democratic societies. Presumably, once they removed the root of this excitement, the 
agitation itself would dissipate. Radical parties thrived on antagonism, but could not 
subsist without a continuous source of conflict. In the context of the compromise, 
“conservative” men claimed that they had identified the etiology of the country’s disorder 
(the open question of slavery) and sought the legislative means to resolve it.  
The first thrust of the debate took place in the House, after President Taylor 
delivered his February 13th message relaying California’s constitution for consideration. 
As with Oregon’s, California’s constitution included an explicit provision barring 
slavery, which incited Tennessee Democrat Frederick P. Stanton to protest 
immediately.788 The excitement over slavery during the Thirtieth Congress had grown to 
alarming proportions, Stanton recalled, seeming to presentiate a “disastrous convulsion of 
nature.” The intensity of their debate had indicated a “violent and acute” pathology, 
which may have “yielded to remedies judiciously adopted and firmly administered,” but 
the Thirtieth Congress had failed to discharge its duty to its patient. Over the course of 
the summer and fall, Stanton said, the “symptoms” had worsened. While Southerners had 
been lulled into a false sense of security after the Wilmot proviso died, Taylor’s 
duplicitous management of California revealed that its spirit still lived. His agents had 
                                                 
788 The California constitution also opened with a declaration of rights that echoed the Declaration of 
Independence: “All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are 
enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and 
obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.” Nevertheless, it restricted suffrage to free white men. 
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transmigrated its “living principle” and “breathed” it into the “body of the California 
convention.” Southerners had no choice but to resist California’s admission as an act of 
self-protection, but that act alone would not restore their health.  
All this time, Stanton charged, northern politicians had been building their 
political base on the detritus of southern rights, fabricating a transcontinental coalition at 
the expense of the U.S. Constitution. In the face of such hostility and aggression, Stanton 
asked, how could they expect the South to capitulate to this latest injustice? How long 
could they sustain a union, “Whose deep foundations lie/In veneration and a people’s 
love,” (in Wordsworth’s romantic turn of phrase) once they had ground their ties of 
brotherly affection into dust?789 The “disease in our system… lies deeper than the slavery 
question itself,” Stanton insisted, “It is organic in its character.” After the “disease has 
attacked the heart,” he warned, it might just as easily “seize upon the lungs, or even the 
brain.”790 Now, Stanton feared, the “disease of the body-politic has become chronic and 
inveterate,” extensive throughout the entire system. With its “subtle poison,” he 
remarked, it “taints every organ of the public service.” Although the House had preceded 
so far with apparent calm—in spite of the fact that it took them sixty-three ballots to elect 
Georgia Democrat Howell Cobb Speaker—Stanton apprehended in their proceedings the 
“sallow hue, the listless mood, and the languid action of a patient, thoroughly diseased, 
and insensible to that almost inevitable stroke of fate which seems to be impending.” 
Because they suffered from an organic disease, they must administer an organic remedy 
                                                 
789 Stanton lifted this quote from Wordsworth’s Excursion (1814), generally considered the major work of 
his conservative phase. In context, Wordsworth described the romantic nationalist ideal, where a king 
derived his power—and his throne its stability—from popular affection. (J. R. Watson, Wordsworth’s Vital 
Soul: The Sacred and Profane in Wordsworth’s Poetry (Springer, 1982), 242–43.) 
790 31st Congress 1st Session Cong. Globe 347-350 1850  
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to the affected organs, starting with the “irregular throbbings” of their common heart. To 
preserve their body-politic, they must work to reconstruct their “alienated affections,” 
putting an end to northern fanaticism and abuse. Congress could start this course of 
treatment at once by “restoring the Constitution to its pristine purity” and honoring its 
“sacred compromises,” both in letter and in spirit. In effect, that meant protecting and 
extending slavery wherever slaveholders desired to take it. Only then could they begin to 
heal.  
If Taylor and Clay set the agenda for the congressional debate, Stanton set the 
tone. When the House reopened discussion on California the following week, North 
Carolina Democrat Abraham W. Venable also diagnosed an “organic disease in the 
system,” which he saw advancing with “fearful rapidity” on a vulnerable minority. The 
agitation and disruption that they witnessed in Congress and across the country 
manifested symptoms of “prior and powerful principles of disorganization, long in 
operation,” he argued, which could be traced back to a flaw in their original constitution. 
The people of the United States had designed their constitution to protect the “safety of 
minorities” by limiting the power of “numerical majorities,” but their organization did 
not effectually account for the disorganization bred by power-lust, unequal taxation, and 
party patronage. Meanwhile, the weakened South, casting out for some relief, repeatedly 
returned to the very party coalitions that had caused their distress in the first place:  
We have been often reminded by the press of the necessity of maintaining the 
integrity of the two great national parties, particularly the Democratic, as a 
panacea for the disease which preys upon the heart of this Republic. Like the 
inebriate, who follows the blind impulse of his appetite, and resorts to the bottle 
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as a remedy for his disease, or the confirmed opium-eater, who finds the narcotic 
necessary to allay the nervous turmoil which his vicious habit has produced—it is 
an appeal to an exciting cause to counteract its effects… 
Once in office, party men invariably appealed to the northern majority to sustain their 
authority, fattening them on public spoils at the expense of the southern minority, whom 
Venable claimed paid the brunt of the taxes and received none of their benefit. This 
systemic discrimination produced “organic incurable evil” in their union, in evidence by 
the “new words” introduced to obscure it. They had transmuted the “Federal 
Government” into a “national” Government, and they spoke of “national parties” and 
“national objects,” unaware of the power of names to pervert their institutions or the fact 
that this “new nomenclature” signified the decline of their liberty. In Venable’s imagery, 
the Government took on the aspect of a Shelleyan monster, debased by an immoral 
majority, who had “inverted the order of things.” Repudiating the framers’ intentions, 
they had twisted a Government built to reflect State power into a “means of prostrating 
State sovereignty.” The “creature” now aspired to “control the creator.” These men called 
themselves “conservative,” even as they dismantled the sacred protections of the 
Constitution they claimed to venerate, because they benefitted from the warped system. 
Yet, if the vital question came to a direct vote on the floor of the House, Venable 
predicted that the South would soon discover the true nature of the “conservative friends” 
of whom they had heard so much. As they had before in their lust for plunder, northern 
“conservatives” would turn their backs on the South and strike at the institution of 
slavery. In light of all of this political pathology, Venable concluded, Clay’s compromise 
merely represented another “gilded pill containing the deadly poison. Saying to the 
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generous South, Give, give.” Equal justice alone supplied the Union’s vitality; without it, 
they all bided their time until death.791 
Specifically addressing the “Slave Question,” Louisiana Democrat Isaac E. Morse 
repeated Venable’s morbid hosanna. For the first time in historical memory, Morse noted, 
Henry Clay, John C. Calhoun, and Daniel Webster agreed on something: that northern 
States, in refusing to surrender fugitive slaves, violated the Constitution. Still, not even 
they seemed capable of resolving this “evil.” If not one of the three “masterminds of 
America” could compel the North to fulfill their foundational duties, “then indeed is the 
disease organic, and too deeply seated for the ordinary remedies.” The South had already 
conceded too much. Everyone knew that the Wilmot proviso was defunct in name only; it 
had been reborn as the “Executive proviso” against slavery in the territories expressed in 
Taylor’s message and the “Mexican proviso,” which would uphold Mexican 
manumission as organic precedent for prohibiting slavery in the Mexican Cession. The 
“modern reckless” interpretation of the Constitution endangered southern interests and 
compromised their principles. But they would no longer passively take northern abuse, or 
be seduced by the “siren song” of Union. “No disease was ever avoided by concealing the 
danger, or cured by wishing the patient well,” Morse attested, “so neither discontent nor 
disunion will be prevented or cured by lauding the glories of the Union, or threatening to 
drive the traitors into the Cumberland river.” Rather than wait for a remedy to present 
itself, the South set out to find a remedy of its own. Delegates representing a “large 
majority of southern States” intended to assemble in Nashville in June “with every 
disposition to be calm and conservative.” Morse did not anticipate that their convention 
                                                 
791 31 Cong. Globe 1, 156-165 (1850) 
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would break up the Union—though the “cords” had already “been sundered” and the 
“last one may be easily broken”—but they would air their grievances. Furthermore, 
Morse pre-empted the critique that these perceived aggressions never occurred in realty. 
It did not matter if northern iniquity existed “in truth or in imagination,” he said, “If only 
imaginary, like the disease of the hypochondriac,” then it must be taken even more 
seriously. “The mental is worse than the bodily,” he claimed, citing Macbeth, “for “who 
can minister to a mind diseased?”792 In the end, Morse conceded that Congress could. 
Though this convention might not “allay the irritation under which the southern mind is 
laboring,” Congress had the power to minister to the southern mind by removing the 
source of their mental illness. They could “take away all cause for the convention” 
through a commitment to non-intervention or else an amendment to the Constitution 
explicitly securing slavery.793 
In advocating a constitutional guaranty, Morse repeated the climactic turn in John 
C Calhoun’s March 4th speech on the “Slavery Question.” Still visibly suffering from the 
effects of pneumonia, Calhoun had sat shrouded in his black cloak while Virginia’s 
James Mason read his morbid prognosis794 In the forty-two page manuscript, Calhoun 
described in detail the etiology of the disease that endangered the Union, so that, like a 
                                                 
792 In Act 5, Scene 3, when Lady Macbeth’s doctor informs Macbeth that his wife was not sick, but was 
troubled with “thick-coming fancies,” Macbeth responded: “Cure her of that./Canst thou not minister to a 
mind diseased,/Pluck from the memory a rooted sorrow,/Raze out the written troubles of the brain/And 
with some sweet oblivious antidote/Cleanse the stuffed bosom of that perilous stuff/Which weighs upon the 
heart?” The internal answer to this question, of course, was “no.” Or, rather, that the patient must heal 
themselves, which Lady Macbeth did by auto-defenestration (i.e., jumping out of a window). Presumably, 
Morse did not mean to draw a parallel between the South, whose mental illness (he might claim) developed 
out of their attachment to the providential institution of slavery, and Lady Macbeth, who lost her mind as 
the result of her complicity in serial murders, but that was the comparison his allusion drew. 
793 31 Cong. Globe 1, 327-329 (1850) 
794 Merrill D. Peterson, The Great Triumvirate: Webster, Clay, and Calhoun (Oxford University Press, 
1988), 460. 
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good physician, he could pronounce “by what remedy the patient could be saved.” At the 
end of it, he determined that a constitutional amendment, alone, would heal the damage 
done to the South.795 The Southern States could remain in the Union only if they reached 
a constitutional understanding with the North that restored the equilibrium of power 
between the two sections, and reconstituted the South’s ability to defend itself, its rights, 
and its property against northern encroachment and interference. Although the titans of 
oratory might protest otherwise, Calhoun opined, the Union could no more be saved by 
the eulogistic cry of “Union, Union, the glorious Union!” than a dangerously ill patient 
could be saved by a physician crying “Health, health, glorious health!” A slightly revived 
Calhoun summarized this position viva voce the following week in a pointed exchange 
with Michigan Democrat Lewis Cass. Unlike Calhoun, Cass advocated the doctrine of 
non-intervention exclusively, leaving the question of slavery to the resident sovereign 
population. Calhoun chastised Cass for recommending a “course of palliatives,” which 
relieved symptoms without treating the underlying condition, when dealing with “a 
disease that would be fatal if not finally arrested.” They might as well “treat a cancer” 
that verged on “striking into a vital part” with palliatives, “as to treat [the slave] question 
with palliatives.” In Calhoun’s analysis, the South would not be out of danger—they 
could not consider the disease safely in remission—until they received a constitutional 
guaranty. If the South was not administered this constitutional amendment soon, “it 
would, in the end, be fatal.”796  
                                                 
795 “An amendment that will restore the south, in substance, the power she possessed of protecting herself, 
before the equilibrium between the sections was destroyed by the action of this government. There will be 
no difficulty in devising such provision—one that will protect the south, and which, at the same time, Will 
improve and strengthen the government, instead of impairing and weakening it.”  
796 31st Congress 1st Session Cong. Globe 519 1850  
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Calhoun died of influenza two weeks later (one such death in a minor epidemic), 
but his commitment to slavery as an organic, conservative institution survived him, and 
ultimately effected what he, in his lifetime, could not: a complete reorganization of the 
parties on ‘Republican’ principles.797 So long as slavery remained a facet of southern life, 
but not necessarily its definitive or fundamental institution, representatives could 
maintain nuanced (or passive) views on it, and vote accordingly. For much of the 
Democratic party’s history, southern slavery found a natural ally in the northern 
Democracy, just as Jefferson had predicted, and for precisely the reasons that the 
Glasgow Herald laid out back in September 1849. Both groups prioritized individual 
liberty and opposed consolidated power. And while the northern and western wings of the 
Democratic party had long capitulated to southern interests in exchange for their support 
against federal authority, big industry, and the banks, they had not done so without 
reservations or stipulations, which they were free to have. Diverse political coalitions had 
to work a little ambivalence into their alliances and a healthy dose of ambiguity into their 
platforms to withstand intersectional differences. Once Calhoun and his fellow-travelers 
signified slavery as “an essential principle of their very organism, and indissolubly 
interwoven into the very framework of their being,” co-extensive with the Union and 
                                                 
797 The Democrat appointed to fill Calhoun’s seat, Franklin Harper Elmore, had suffered from a chronic, 
infectious skin disease (erysipelas) for many years, but had it under control. Upon his arrival in the capital, 
however, his infection took the form of a nervous disorder (neuralgia) and he died six weeks after joining 
the Senate. Fearlessly, South Carolina Democrat (and former president of South Carolina College) Robert 
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“infused into the Government at the moment of its birth,” ambivalence was no longer an 
option.798 In a question of life and death, how could they choose death?  
Calhoun had stated outright that he intended California’s admission to serve as a 
“test question” for measuring each representative’s loyalty to the South and it quickly 
transformed into a test act for the Democratic party. By mid-April, the damage to the 
Democratic party began to show, as the fiercer advocates of slavery started to pick apart 
the middle ground. The most outrageous example occurred in a confrontation between 
Mississippi senator Henry S. Foote and Missouri senator Thomas Hart Benton. Calhoun 
and his cohort had colluded against Benton for years, skeptical of his loyalty to slavery 
and free trade, and Foote had a hand in Benton’s political defeat in Missouri politics.799 
Between the close of the Thirtieth Congress and the start of the Thirty-First, Benton had 
made himself anathema to his section and his party by stumping against Missouri’s 1849 
Jackson-Napton Resolutions, which had been based on Calhoun’s February 1847 
resolutions on the “Slavery Question” and denied congressional authority over slavery in 
the territories. In speeches across the State, Benton declared his “personal sentiments” 
against slavery and its “introduction into places in which it does not exist.”800 For that 
reason, he spent the first several months of Senate debate offering a series of amendments 
to prevent the proposed Special Committee from discussing anything other than the 
conditions of California’s admission. At the beginning of April, he openly mocked the 
                                                 
798 Ibid., 778 
799 Henry Hilliard’s April 1, 1849, letter to Calhoun reported that Senator Benton’s “sympathies are wholly 
with the abolitionists.” (Correspondence of John C Calhoun, 1195)  
800 In his address, Benton acknowledged his own tenuous position: “My personal sentiments, then, 
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other measures as “quack medicines” that had been marketed as “real genuine Brandreth 
pills” (a purgative cathartic used to purify the blood), warning that they would “produce 
worse diseases than they are intended to cure.”801 On April 17th, Foote responded to 
another of Benton’s attempts to curtail the Special Committee with an epithet meant to 
draw fire. When an enraged Benton rose from his seat, Foote cocked a loaded pistol at 
him. Amidst cries that they “Be cool,” Vice President Fillmore temporarily restored order 
to the Senate chambers. At the end of April, the Senate formed a Special Committee (the 
Committee of Thirteen) to take the compromise measures out of the Senate for a spell 
and let the members simmer down, a bit. 
Similar, albeit less spectacular, scenes played out with other ambiguously-allied 
figures, like Michigan’s Lewis Cass, who had become less circumspect about his distaste 
for slavery since losing the presidential election, or Missouri’s John S. Phelps, who 
announced his intention to vote for California’s unconditional admission in accordance 
with his constituents’ wishes. Neither Cass nor Phelps could have been considered anti-
slavery, but no one would have called them pro-slavery, either. Unlike Benton—a 
slaveholder who vocally opposed slavery—neither of them took a public stand. Still, 
unilateral southerners, who would accept nothing short of an explicit invitation and a red 
carpet into the territories, took issue with Cass’s doctrine of popular sovereignty, which 
they felt did not go far enough to ensure their rights. Virginia Democrat Lafayette 
McMullen chewed out Benton’s colleague in the House, representative John Phelps, for 
his inadequate commitment to slavery, and Phelp’s suggestion, in reference to Thomas 
Ritchie’s Daily Union, that the Democratic party had endorsed California’s unrestricted 
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admission during the prior congressional session. This claim exposed Phelps as a 
“counterfeit,” who intended to “injure” both Ritchie and the Democratic party. While 
Phelps played politics with the “renegade” “political traitor” Benton, a “southern man 
with northern principles” who had “deserted the South in the most critical period of her 
history,” he diverted the legislature from their vital purpose.802 Congressmen stood in the 
“attitude of great national physicians” to a “body politic” diseased, McMullen exhorted,  
inflicted with a “cancer or tumor” and “sick well-nigh unto death.” They must do 
something immediately to advance the interests of slavery, “or we shall lose this great 
patient.” 
This polarization on slavery, and the impulse to naturalize it through organic 
metonymy, resonated in Clay’s proposal on behalf of the Senate’s Committee of 
Thirteen, as well. On May 21st, Clay presented their recommendation for an omnibus bill 
(covering California, the territories, Texas, the fugitive slave bill, and the slave trade in 
DC) that he described as a “broad and comprehensive scheme of healing” the “open and 
bleeding” wounds that threatened the “well-being, if not the existence of the body 
politic.” With the “country bleeding at every pore,” Clay reminded them, President 
Taylor had submitted a plan that aggravated the injury on the issues he addressed and left 
the other wounds to either heal themselves or bleed out. Taylor would have them admit 
California, “even if it should produce death itself,” and leave the territorial governments 
and Texas boundary to “cure themselves by some law of nature,”—by the “vis medicatrix 
naturæ” or some other “self-remedy.” Taylor offered no course of treatment for the States 
hemorrhaging slaves to the North or to salve the rift over selling slaves in the capital. 
                                                 
802 With the generosity of spirit endemic to the US Congress, McMullen expressed his wish that Phelps’s 
duplicity follow him for the “residue of his natural life.” 
 408
“Unless some such measure prevail,” Clay declared, “instead of healing and closing the 
wounds of the country, instead of stopping the effusion of blood, it will flow in still 
greater quantities, with still greater danger to the Republic.” The committee’s collective 
approach, grouping the legislation in a single bill, prospectively improved its chances of 
passing the Senate and inoculated it against Taylor’s veto.  
Even those representatives who opposed the omnibus bill did not question the 
ontological assumption of organic sovereignty. In enumerating their objections, they 
started from the shared principle that they all lived in an organic system, susceptible to 
the same natural laws as other living organisms, and that their programmatic response to 
systemic disorder must account for its organic properties. For example, both Lewis Cass 
and Tennessee Whig John Bell opposed the territorial legislation after an amendment 
stripped it of its natural remedy for intersectional distress: the doctrine of popular 
sovereignty. On June 5th, the Senate modified the committee bill so that territories could 
not pass laws “interfering with the primary disposition of the soil, [or] establishing or 
prohibiting African slavery,” which would have the effect of superseding or repealing 
local statute. Five days later, Cass dissented from the amended legislation because it 
counteracted the “conservative” power of self-government. Through the exercise of self-
government, he contended, a community’s inhabitants forged and sustained their society 
and preserved their relationship with the “parent country.” Like “every true American,” 
Cass wanted to restore harmony between the sections, but he maintained that “no vis 
medicatrix [could] be found in political nature” that replicated the “conservative” effect 
of self-government.803 After another month of debate, Senator Bell expressed his concern 
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that the altered compromise measures, “may not only fail to heal” the country’s “open 
and bleeding” wounds, but that they would not “even stanch” them. Whether or not these 
measures “heal the surface,” Bell warned, these wounds “will continue to fester within 
until the vital parts of the system are seriously affected.”804 Furthermore, he noted that 
none of their legislation addressed the “inherent elements of dissension” in their 
system—that half of the States maintained the institution of slavery and the other half did 
not. Nor could they completely resolve their chronic “paroxysms” without destroying the 
system, itself, he argued. Instead, they must treat their inevitable intersectional tension as 
an “inveterate and incurable” systemic “disease,” “born in the system” and symptomatic 
of its natural operation. The most that Congress could do, Bell concluded, was to find a 
way to curtail the “inflammation.”805  
Southern Democrats Robert MT Hunter (VA) and Andrew Butler (SC) both 
protested the legislation on the grounds that its proposed remedies exacerbated rather 
than alleviated the cause of their distress. Hunter agreed with Bell that their organization 
naturally and perpetually generated conflict between the “two great antagonist elements 
of our social system” (the slave-holding and non-slaveholding States). Still, Hunter 
claimed, Congress could prevent serious damage by “increasing the vis medicatrix 
naturæ, the self-restoring principle of the system,” which depended on the “proper 
distribution of power between the parts.” Repeating Calhoun’s direction, he urged 
Congress to restore proportionate equality to the South. He explained that the South had a 
greater preponderance of naturally conservative citizens than other portions of the Union. 
“In what other portion of the Union do we find a rural population so complete in all the 
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elements of strength and allegiance,” Hunter asked, “And does not history teach that a 
country population is the safest depository of political power?” In fact, Hunter insisted, 
all of southern history supported the claim that they had exclusively pursued 
“conservative” political action.806 South Carolina’s Andrew Butler offered a more 
concise diagnosis of the problem. In sustaining any compromise, Butler charged, 
southern gentlemen “were literally sowing the seeds of suicidal diseases.”807 A few short 
hours after Butler’s address, President Taylor, whose annual message instigated the entire 
compromise debate, died of “cholera morbus” (in other words, a very bad stomach-ache).  
Paradoxically, the death of a southern, slaveholding, Whig president improved the 
chances that the Compromise legislation would pass. As Daniel Webster wrote to Boston 
bigwig Franklin Haven, “The President [Fillmore] is a sensible man, and a conservative 
Whig, and is not likely to be in favor of any “isms,” such as have votaries at the present 
day.” Webster had no doubt that Taylor’s death “increased the probability” in favor of the 
Compromise. After further discussion with his colleagues on the hill, Webster disclosed 
that “The idea is now general that the Compromise will go through.”808 Unlike Zachary 
Taylor, Millard Fillmore threw the party patronage and the power of the presidency 
behind “conservative” Compromise Whigs, bringing Senators Webster and Thomas 
Corwin (of Ohio) into his cabinet and meeting regularly with Henry Clay, who became 
his unofficial voice in Congress. Unlike Taylor, Fillmore had a working knowledge of 
government, having served in both State and national legislatures, and an understanding 
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of the professional inducements and private deals that generated motion in Washington. 
When Fillmore publicized his intention to approve every constitutional piece of 
legislation that Congress sent him, he signaled that the Compromise would benefit from 
the administration’s support, including whatever spoils or contracts might maintain its 
momentum and ensure its safe passage through Congress. With Taylor gone, then, the 
compromise men could drop the pretense of the collective measure (which faced 
mounting opposition) and split the omnibus bill into its component parts, which they did. 
Democratic and Whig compromise “conservatives” won, at least provisionally. 
Over the next ten weeks, Congress passed the resulting five bills (resolving Texas and 
New Mexico’s border dispute and providing for New Mexico’s territorial government; 
California’s admission; Utah’s territorial government; the fugitive slave act; and 
prohibiting the slave trade in DC) and Fillmore signed them into law. In spite of the effort 
by obscure “Free Soil” men to destroy the “two old conservative parties, of the country, 
the Whig and the Democratic party,” and elevate themselves on the wreck of the Union, 
Georgia Whig William C. Dawson announced in the Senate, the forces of compromise 
and Union had triumphed.809 A month later, Webster reported to President Fillmore that a 
“highly important and conservative change had taken place” in the minds of Boston’s 
                                                 
809 Joshua Giddings, who had led the Free Soil assault on the measures in the House, warned his colleagues 
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they would silence “agitators”—a label they ascribed to anyone who dared to proclaim truths that they were 
too ignorant to understand. They would artificially conscribe the human intellect by state law, like the 
Catholic bishops who walled Galileo up in the walls of his workshop. The people did not oppose slavery 
because they had come under the delusive influence of some political quack, Giddings declared. They 
opposed slavery because they had reflected on the distance between their country’s vaunted ideals and the 
dogged effort of their representatives to “sell women in open market” and “create a traffic in the bodies of 
children.” Their opposition to slavery represented their “progress in morals, and in political intelligence.” 
In “strict accordance with the law of our being,” and with the truth that emanated from the “Divine 
Author,” this type of progress could not be prevented by statute. “Revolutions,” Giddings professed, “never 
go backward.” (31st Congress 1st Session Appendix Cong. Globe 1126, 1643)  
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capitalist elite and among the “respectable portion of the Democrat party.” The following 
year, Fillmore invited the “conservative democrats” to join the “conservative whigs” in a 
joint Union party. Ritchie’s Daily Union scoffed at the proposition. The Whigs had 
“already tried their hand at the business of conservatism” and failed because they rejected 
the doctrines of State rights and strict-construction, the “only basis under our system of 
all true conservatism.”810 Democratic and Whig “conservatives” had made an 
instrumental and fundamentally fungible alliance with the specific goal of removing the 
sources of agitation on the issue of slavery. Once they had accomplished their agenda 
through the compromise measures, the Union stated, they had no reason to continue their 
affiliation. Outside of this specific interest, they shared no other common cause.  
The Compromise kicked off a complete transformation in the national parties, 
burying the Whigs in their “sacred casket” by the mid-1850s, and spawning a new 
national Republican party. In the early 1850s, southern Whigs defected to the Democratic 
party, but the northern Democrats did not join the Whigs. In part, this asymmetry grew 
out of the historical relationship (both real and fictive) between the Whig party, capital, 
and labor rights (i.e., the public perception, especially prominent among workingmen’s 
groups, that the Whigs loved capitalists and hated the poor.) As Ohio Senator Joshua 
Giddings foretold during the compromise debates, “It is too late in the day to make 
intelligent men believe that you have any very pure regard for the laboring men of New 
England, while you sustain laws here to sell the laboring men and women of this District, 
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like brutes in the market; that you have any real intention to pass laws for the relief of the 
laboring men of the North while you keep in force laws for carrying on a coastwise 
commerce in the bodies of southern laborers.” Whig conservatism made them anathema 
to the “social” Democracy of the North, even after pro-slavery conservatism 
contaminated the Democratic party. As a consequence, Republican party ideology 
contained elements of both the Democratic and Whig party platforms, notably the 
democratic support for labor and the Whig’s orientation toward nationalism and their 
reliance on federal (or centralized) authority. 
CONCLUDING THE ALLIANCE OF CONSERVATISMS 
The realignment in party loyalties and priorities after 1848 briefly conjoined the 
“Conservative” Whigs and the “Conservative Democracy”—two types of 
“Conservatives” who formed a tepid alliance to put the territorial questions to rest before 
the politics of slavery radicalized further. This bi-partisan coalition for “progressive 
conservatism and slavery non-intervention” brought together “National” conservatives 
from the Whig and Democratic parties, who advocated measures to temporize the 
extremes on both sides of the slavery question. They were marginally joined by pro-
slavery politicians who sought to reinforce with positive “conservative” legislation their 
“constitutional” right to their property (slaves). In the debates over the ensuing 
legislation, Democratic and Whig “conservatives” united Congress through a complex 
series of alliances as brittle as sugar glass. In the long run, they failed to cut across 
sectional lines because the organic ideology of “slave conservatism” precluded 
compromise. Slavery reflected a metaphysical imperative expressed in the South’s 
material institutions; it could not be disturbed or compromised by outside forces without 
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undermining southern destiny. For pro-slavery “conservatives,” slavery was 
constitutional in every sense: it served as the essential element in the structure of southern 
society and (they argued) the United States Constitution itself was predicated on 
preserving the institution of slavery, which made slavery an essential (literally 
constitutional) American institution, as well. Any compromise on the question 
invalidated this sacred compact and risked the entire structure of American society. In 
this context, “national conservatives”—even those with anti-slavery sympathies—became 
complicit in scaffolding slavery because they rooted their conservatism in the 
perpetuation of the national Union.  
By the 1850s, “conservatism” almost exclusively indicated an ontological 
commitment to white hegemony, which generated a political program that always 
recurred to pro-slavery interests. The principles of organic sovereignty sublimated the 
explicit interests of these policies, while they simultaneously generated a systemic 
imperative for their implementation. Incrementally and imperceptibly, Ohio’s Salmon P. 
Chase observed, the “Era of CONSERVATISM” passed into the “Era of SLAVERY 
PROPAGANDISM,” though it might be more accurate to say that the two eras merged.811 
At this point, pro-slavery Democrats embraced popular conservatism—that is, the 
conservatism “of the people and for the people.”812 Ever since the Locofocos had lifted 
Ely Moore (then president of the National Trades Union) to Congress in 1835, the 
Democracy had pitched the idea that the “people are the conservative party” of the United 
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States. In a constitutional system predicated on equal rights, Moore had argued, the 
people represented the party that fought to secure property and sustain the established 
order. The party’s pro-slavery wing, as well, advocated a conservatism that they framed 
in terms of equal rights, property (in slaves), and institutional security. 
Counterintuitively, considering that he represented plantation-owners in a State with 
restrictive suffrage, Calhoun effectively turned himself and his State-rights party into the 
natural allies of the working-class democracy, aligning his anti-capitalist and free-trade 
attitudes, and his chronic distrust of consolidated power, with their advocacy for labor 
and against banks. Together, they came to represent the “conservative portions of 
society”—the white, male, Christian, (preferably rural) upwardly-mobile “true citizens” 
of the United States.813 The Democratic party promised to advocate for them through 
positive legislation that ensured their access to the country’s riches, and committed 
themselves to defend the natural order of a stable society (slavery included), with the 
conservative portion perched like a cherry on top.  
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CONCLUSION: A REVOLUTION FOR CONSERVATISM 
In his Disquisition on Government (published posthumously in 1851), Calhoun 
left his followers both a diagnostic manual for the Union and a handbook for revolution 
when it became too diseased to save.814 When forming the Union, he wrote, the States in 
their capacity as independent communities created a constitutional government, which 
Calhoun described as an “organism.” In a synecdochic relationship, the constitution 
comprised both the internal structure of the organism, and the whole organism, itself. 
Through their act of creation, the States replicated the dynamic between God and man 
found in Leibniz’s law of continuity. The States endowed their collective constitution 
with both progressive and preservative faculties, each of which represented the 
continuous agency of their creative power, and neither of which could function without 
active State involvement.815 “The supervision of the creating power [the States],” 
Calhoun wrote, “is indispensable to the preservation of the created.” Like Fichte, who 
had argued that the rational state required an equilibrium produced by the “reciprocal 
interaction” of its “organic forces,” Calhoun explained that the Union functioned 
organically as a result of the “reciprocal action and reaction” of all of its parts, which 
kept it in a state of equilibrium.816 The division of power between these parts constituted 
the organism; without it, the organism could not exist. As it had in Blumenbach’s 
configuration, the parts depended on the whole and the whole on its parts. Anything that 
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displaced power within this system, strengthening one part of the organism at the expense 
of another part, vitiated the constituent body.817 
According to Calhoun, this system had operated in perfect harmony up to the 
Missouri Compromise, which activated a latent disease in the US constitution. This 
disease—the belief in slavery’s sinfulness—stimulated the fanatical and political cords 
that ran through their organic system. Its severity was compounded by party patronage 
(i.e., “the Spoils”), a chronic disease “easily contracted under all forms of government” 
but “most fatal” in popular governments, like the United States, where it gave the ruling 
party disproportionate power.818 So long as the States had constrained federal power, 
Calhoun wrote, they had kept these infections in check. In other words, the “belief of the 
sinfulness of slavery remained in a dormant state.” But the 1828 “Tariff of 
Abominations” disturbed the vital equilibrium between the sections, Calhoun contended, 
and Jackson’s 1833 Force Bill ceded the State’s decisive authority to the federal 
government. At that point, the “creature” had usurped the creator’s position, effecting a 
“thorough revolution” in their organic system.  
Ever since then, Calhoun declared, the country had suffered from “too much 
union.”819 In their deranged condition, whoever controlled the federal government and, in 
particular, the executive office, dictated the entire country’s destiny. Anti-slavery fanatics 
fought to control the disposition of the southern States through their command of the 
federal government, and they were not beneath rousing the “strongest passions of the 
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human heart,—avarice, ambition, and rivalry” to do so. Pre-disposed to deal with the 
different portions of the Union unilaterality and universally, the abolitionists displaced 
the people’s attachment from their social community into their political party, making 
them insensible to the diversified needs of their country’s disparate parts.820 This 
unhealthy relationship produced a state of alienation and hostility that would inevitably 
prove fatal to the Union. “The nature of the disease is such,” wrote Calhoun, “that 
nothing can reach it, short of some organic change” in the ontological structure of their 
system.821 As an extension of their original constitutive power, Calhoun clarified, the 
States wielded the power to modify that constitution. This amending power served as the 
“vis medicatrix of the system;—its great repairing, healing, and conservative power;—
intended to remedy its disorders, in whatever cause or causes originating.” In its 
weakened condition, the South was impotent to implement this antidote, but the North, 
which had grown stronger at the South’s expense, had both the resources and the 
responsibility to apply the remedy, or be held accountable for the consequences. At some 
point, the law of communal “self-preservation” would kick in, compelling the Southern 
States to withdraw from the Union. Unless the North acted to restore their constitutional 
equilibrium, Calhoun proclaimed, revolution, alone, must follow.  
Describing the Republic in Crisis from 1848 to 1861, historian John Ashworth 
claimed that “There was no revolution expected here [in 1848]. And none came.”822 But 
there was certainly a revolution forewarned. If the best thing that can be said about the 
revolution that arrived a dozen years later was that it took its time in coming, then that 
                                                 
820 Calhoun Disquisition, 47-49. Cf. Marx, “On the Jewish Question.” 
821 Calhoun Disquisition, 391. 
822 John Ashworth, The Republic in Crisis, 1848-1861 (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 5. 
 419
might be less a commentary on the relative strength of American institutions than on the 
willingness of American politicians to compromise their principles in the short term for 
the illusion of political stability and the remote promise of political gain in the future. 
Again and again, northern “conservatives” assumed that southern “conservatives” would 
pay them Tuesday for pro-slavery today, while the southern “conservatives” refused to 
countenance reciprocity on changes they considered essential to the life of their 
governing organism. They explicitly and repeatedly declared their intentions to incite 
revolution if the North failed to meet their demands: a totalized system of white 
hegemony, grounded in the national institution of slavery, sutured by amendment into the 
US Constitution. 
According to Mississippi Democrat William S. Barry, compromise, itself, 
undermined the country’s “organic law” (i.e., the Constitution). Citing Burke, Barry 
charged that the perpetual dance of revolution and resistance on the House floor made the 
“extreme medicine of the Constitution…its daily bread.” Legislative compromises 
“forced through Congress by a bare majority” claimed the respect due the “original 
creation” of the Constitution, while the “fruit of their pernicious graft” “corrupted” and 
“perverted” its text. With each successive compromise, they moved further away from 
the “letter and spirit” of the Constitution that Washington and Madison had framed in 
1787. The Constitution grew increasingly infected under this “regimen of compromises,” 
Barry lamented, while the “political system subjected to violent and unnatural nostrums” 
became “more radically diseased by the quackery which attempts to relieve it.”823 
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*** 
During the nineteenth century, the organic schema pervaded both transnational 
and trans-Atlantic political thought. As it spread, it transformed the imagined totality. It 
fundamentally altered how members of society viewed social, cultural, and political 
phenomena, as well as their role in shaping, breaking, or preserving their society. By 
mid-century in the United States, this schema had become the normative model for the 
ideal state, providing both the justification for revolutions against artificial rulers (for 
example, a federal government hostile to slavery) and the rationale for repressive state 
action against foreign agents and destructive influences (such as abolitionists), as well as 
the exclusion or quarantine of inorganic and potentially poisonous elements 
(abolitionists, people of color, and ‘unassimilable’ residents, immigrants, and legal 
aliens). Only in this framework could it make sense for an individual or group to assert 
themselves or their doctrines as the “true conservatives” of the body politic. Only after 
people operated under the ontological assumption that they lived (or should live) in an 
organic state, could they claim to represent a living force that kept it alive. 
“Conservative” was one such vital force, a teleological principle manifested in the body 
of the state that flowed through every inch of its material organization, connecting every 
part to the divine drive within itself. The question in this context was not whether a 
society needed conservative principles, but what the nature of those principles might be 
and in what elements of society or in what organization of the political body they might 
be found.  
The moment politicians defended a practice, institution, population, or principle 
as “conservative,” they marked it as a politically volatile, if not untouchable topic, and 
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placed themselves in a position of power against their opposition. A state-organism could 
not survive without its conservative elements, by definition, and anyone rising to tear 
down a publically-recognized “conservative” institution would either have to have some 
politically-astute rhetoric on hand or to somehow de-naturalize its associations. That is, 
they either had to prove that the institution in question was not conservative or that being 
“conservative” was somehow a bad thing. Savvy politicians figured out that whomever 
won the coveted “conservative” position, won the popular political higher ground. In the 
white-nationalist North, free-soil Republicanism occupied that higher ground by 1860; in 
the white-hegemonic South, pro-slavery Democracy did (at least, among those members 
of the social body with political rights).  
Because the organic model of state sovereignty relied on the vitalist concept of 
conservative formation, it had both egalitarian and oppressive potential. The nature of a 
state’s conservative principles depended on the Bildungstrieb encoded in its constitution 
at the time of its original formation. In Fichte’s model, for example, the nation provided 
the living principle (or Bildungstrieb) of an organic state and, therefore, the ideal basis 
for the civic state. But organic nationalism represented only one genus of organic 
statehood. What started as a radically emancipatory model of human potential became by 
the mid-nineteenth century the justification for individual subordination to an “organic” 
community under the protection of the state. In the wake of the 1848 revolutions, 
international right-wing movements embraced ideological nationalism to empower their 
machinery of coercion and control. In fact, the particular development of organic 
nationalism, its instantiation in cultural forms and institutions, and its eventual turn 
towards hierarchical, homogenizing, and repressive modes of power in the latter half of 
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the nineteenth century can be understood as a product of its hybrid philosophical genesis 
in sentimental theory and the developing theories of organic generation and reproduction 
in the long eighteenth century.824  
In the United States, pro-slavery southerners had long adopted the logic and 
language of organic nationalism before ever ascribing to the label “nationalist.” Once 
they assimilated the biological and genetic models of statehood, they constituted liberty 
as a function of whiteness and formulated whiteness as a privilege predicated on 
subjugation. Without slaves, southerners could not be free; by owning slaves, they truly 
understood freedom. Plus, as they ultimately articulated, people of color required the 
hierarchical and paternalistic structures of slavery to live. In this context, any assault on 
their right to own slaves constituted an assault on their constitutional rights and justified 
violent and repressive action against the perpetrators. With the complicity of both major 
political parties (the Democrats and the Whigs), American statesmen promoted slave 
labor and systemic racism alongside culturally homogenizing and materially coercive 
legislation under the “conservative” cover of protecting the constitution “in its original 
purity.”825  
Since organic nationalism advanced an ideal statehood in which each nation 
obtained sovereignty, it provided the conceptual framework and political motivation to 
corroborate and codify “natural” divisions between nations, generating a divisive and 
repressively normative politics of classification. Based on the physiology of a “proper 
body” formulated by eighteenth-century empiricists and formalized in Kant’s aesthetics, 
                                                 
824 Though the long-term arc of nationalist ideology roughly follows this trajectory from emancipation (in 
theory and expression) to repression (in effect and by appropriation), it did not do so necessarily, 
progressively, or in all cases.  
825 Niles’ Weekly Register. Vol. 35. H. Niles, 1829, p. 206-208. 
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organic state-formation incarnated a hierarchical and hegemonic “politics of normality” 
that privileged the anatomical, gendered, and socio-cultural markers of the white, male, 
Christian body.826 As a consequence, organic nationalism created the material conditions 
for structural and ideological racism; its organization, political economy, and policies 
produced the differences within its population that biological theories subsequently 
racialized. By the mid-nineteenth century, members of the proliferating medical 
disciplines had categorized and naturalized these perceptible differences between groups, 
hypostasized as race, mapping the resulting taxonomy onto national distinctions and 
biologically conscribing who legitimately belonged to them. This transformation changed 
the agenda for statehood. States were no longer fundamentally determined by their 
geographical boundaries or their legal and legislative institutions. Instead, the genetic 
makeup of the political community dictated the nature, boundaries, and viability of the 
state.  
Real people of color lived in the lacuna of this discourse in the United States, 
which often sublimated the explicit interests of its policies—its ontological commitment 
to slavery—while invariably reinforcing organic hierarchies based on color, and other 
pro-slavery principles. For both white nationalists and white hegemons, alike, people of 
color embodied an organic, physiological otherness—inerasable, unassimilable, 
irreducible. To call otherness “organic” implied that it existed within the body without 
possibility of abscission and that it structured an individual’s entire being: framing their 
                                                 
826 The concept of race, itself, grew out of late eighteenth-century research in comparative anatomy and 
natural history, typified in Johann Friedrich Blumenbach and John Hunter’s work. (Paul Youngquist, 
Monstrosities: Bodies and British Romanticism (U of Minnesota Press, 2003), 15, 21, 24, 58–65; George 
M. Fredrickson, Racism: A Short History (Princeton University Press, 2009), 56–59; Michael O’Brien, 
Intellectual Life and the American South, 1810-1860: An Abridged Edition of Conjectures of Order (Univ 
of North Carolina Press, 2010), 56.) 
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original organization, governing the laws of their existence, and controlling their 
expression and potential. To call otherness “physiological” presumed a standard set of 
characteristics and a specific measure of value or capacity for that entire group. In short, 
they defined otherness as inherent and constitutional, as well as normative, qualitative, 
and either determinative or prescriptive, depending on whether they viewed physiological 
characteristics as diachronically fixed or if they believed that races had the capacity to 
improve themselves (or be improved) over time, a distinction recalling the division 
between evolutionary and epigenetic theories of development from the eighteenth 
century.  
The hereditary hierarchical social order played a similar, but not identical, role in 
Britain and on the continent, marking physiological differences between castes that 
naturalized their stratification, and structurally discouraged their social mobility, forms of 
contact, and amalgamation.827 But even a British pauper was a citizen, though he might 
lack any of the material or experiential benefits of that distinction. Though 
physiologically differentiated, he was not organically separate—he belonged to the 
British nation.828 In addition, British and continental imperialists centered their nation in 
                                                 
827 In discouraging amalgamation between classes, the British enacted a similar willful blindness to the 
ubiquity of sexual abuse between classes as US slave-holders did. 
828 A comparison between the US treatment of color and the British characterization of the Irish 
demonstrates some illustrative parallels. For example, both justified their structural discrimination by 
noting that the subject group lacked its own history. In an 1856 speech to the Senate on Nebraska and 
Kansas, George W. Jones (D-IA) supported his assertion of the organic inferiority of the “negro race” by 
noting that “nature… has not bestowed upon the negro race a solitary historical character—not one. That 
race have had no poet to perpetuate their history—they have no history…” Similarly, in “A Country 
Without a History. A Speculation on the Irish, from a “Saxon” Point of View,” published in London’s 
Spectator and reprinted in Littell’s Living Age, the author claimed: “The great apparent woes of Ireland are 
physical; its real miseries are moral. However harsh it may sound, yet who can deny that the main and 
monster evil of Ireland is the Irish? As a people, the Irish possess neither self-respect nor a delicate sense of 
honor, nor that ardent desire for progress which alone can be the inspiration of mighty and glorious 
deeds…There must be some cause for all this, besides the mere peculiarities of race. Other branches of the 
Celtic family, if they have something of the same, violence of temperament, have a deeper, sterner 
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a space apart from the organic, physiological other, a physical distance that US white 
nationalists tried to enact in the northwest territories through legislation that excluded all 
people of color from emigrating there. For many, “free soil” signified a land “free” of the 
dual contagion of slavery and free people of color.  
After the surge of organic nationalism in the mid-nineteenth century, “race” came 
to represent a pejorative form of “nation”—or, rather, “race” was what remained when 
describing a people considered indisposed to govern themselves. Nations begot states; 
races were stateless. The ontological commitment to the state as an “organic body” 
played a constitutive role in this process. Restrictive legislation, the curtailment of voting 
rights and political participation, residency requirements, physical and legal boundaries 
on property ownership, biases written into the penal code, and institutional as well as 
super-structural borders on social and class mobility systematically denied people of 
color the defining characteristics of citizenship in an organic state. At the same time, 
biblical race-theorists like Josiah Priest determined that God denied people of color the 
very “conservative principles” by which the “white race have elevated themselves,” and 
speculative white hegemons like Iowa’s Democratic senator George W. Jones claimed 
that people of color lacked the capacity to feel patriotism.829 “I have never heard of a trait 
of character exhibited by an African tribe, or an individual of a tribe or of the race [to 
                                                                                                                                                 
consciousness of duty, and a larger leaven of sound and sober sense. We explain the deplorable moral and 
political degradation of the Irish chiefly by the circumstance that Ireland is a country without a history… 
Now, a country without an historical past possesses not the elements either of true conservatism or of true 
progress: for, after all, it is only where there is pertinacity of conservatism that progress is possible. The 
people that have nothing to conserve can have nothing to develop.” (The Spectator (London: F.C. Westley, 
1847), 12–13; The Living Age (Boston, Philadelphia, New York: Littell, Son and Company, 1847), 88–89.) 
829 Josiah Priest, Slavery, as It Relates to the Negro, Or African Race: Examined in the Light of 
Circumstances, History and the Holy Scriptures; with an Account of the Origin of the Black Man’s Color, 
Causes of His State of Servitude and Traces of His Character as Well in Ancient as in Modern Times: With 
Strictures on Abolitionism (Louisville: W. S. Brown, 1849), 201, 215, 376. 
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which our slaves belong], which denoted the possession of that unselfish and exalted 
emotion” of patriotism as understood by the “citizen of our Republic, the Englishman, the 
Frenchman, or the German.”830 For evidence, Jones looked to the free-State “Fred 
Douglasses,” who lingered in the United States when their exposure to freedom, “white” 
uplift, and literacy should have spurred them to go to their divinely-ordained country 
(Africa) and build up a “free and intelligent nation” on its grounds. “Whiteness” 
presumed the capacity to feel the “sublime emotions” that produced “true patriots and 
pure statesmen,” but “the negro” had to emigrate to Liberia to prove his “love” for “his 
race” and his “pride of nationality.” Their apparent unwillingness to do so proved that the 
“negro race” could not feel the affections for their countrymen and the commitment to 
advancing the “human race” that marked “white” men as ideal citizens for any political 
state. In the political discourse of white supremacy, “blackness” signified a group of 
people organically and historically marked for subjugation, categorically particularized 
and substantially reduced to race, while the prima facie character of “whiteness” was 
universal in its sensibility and aesthetically refined in its attachments. Political 
convention amplified this hegemonic configuration: politicians only specified 
“whiteness” when they discussed the socio-political status of color. As a result, “black 
men” were “black” all of the time, but, in the “absence” of “color,” “white men” in the 
record were just “men.” 
                                                 
830 Martin Van Buren appointed Jones Surveyor-General of the Wisconsin and Iowa Territories in 1840 and 
James K Polk reinstated Jones to that position when he took office. Although anti-slavery politicians 
dominated Iowa’s Democratic party in the late 1850s, Jones voted in the Senate to approve Kansas’s pro-
slavery Lecompton Constitution in 1858 and served as James Buchanan’s minister to New Grenada from 
1859 to 1861. When he returned from Bogotá in December 1861, he had the distinction of being arrested 
for disloyalty to the Union for his correspondence with Confederate president Jefferson Davis. Both of his 
sons served in the Confederate army (34th Congress 1st Session Appendix Cong. Globe 407.) 
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To a certain extent, pro-slavery conservatism cannibalized the nascent left-wing 
in the United States, by hostile takeover of the Democratic party. Historian Matthew 
Karp characterized this position as a “proslavery vision of modernity,” in which 
“proslavery progressives” advanced the institution of slavery as the solution to the social 
inequalities that plagued the capitalist-industrial North, as well as a definitive defense 
against the incursion of foreign radicalism (specifically, socialism and communism).831 
Not only did they depict the southern slave economy as the future of American 
commerce, southern slaveholders even went so far as to argue that slavery had eradicated 
poverty; because of slavery, the South had no poor.832 For a time, these southerners 
acknowledged, the protective tariff had artificially boosted northern free labor over 
southern slave labor, but the North could not compete with the more progressive slave 
economy in an open market. With the American system defeated at home, and the British 
shift toward free trade abroad, pro-slavery southerners predicted, it was only a matter of 
time before the northern labor force discovered that the South enjoyed a morally superior 
system with higher earning potential than free-labor industrialism. As historian Joanne 
Pope Melish noted, the assault on the spectre of color in the North obscured the 
stratification of “white” society. In the South, the illusion of “white” equality could be 
projected because of the material reality of “black” subjugation.833 
                                                 
831 Karp, M. J. (2011). “This vast southern empire” the south and the foreign policy of slavery, 1833–
1861 (Order No. 3463013). Available from Dissertations & Theses @ University of Pennsylvania; 
ProQuest Dissertations & Theses Global. (878686872). Retrieved from 
https://proxy.library.upenn.edu/login?url=http://proxy.library.upenn.edu:2299/docview/878686872?account
id=14707 
832 35th Congress 1st Session Appendix Cong. Globe 250. 
833 Cf. Historian Nancy Isenberg’s perspective on the relationship between class and power in the South. 
According to Isenberg, pro-slavery southerners defended “class station as natural. Conservative southern 
intellectuals became increasingly comfortable with the notion that biology was class destiny.” (Nancy 
Isenberg, White Trash: The 400-Year Untold History of Class in America (Penguin, 2016), 136.) 
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The pro-slavery-dominated Democrats presented themselves as the party for the 
people—although, with the southern influence, the people became more narrowly 
defined. A great change had come over the spirit of the Democrats “within a very short 
period of time,” Ohio Opposition representative (and former Democrat) Timothy C. Day 
observed in 1856. For half a century, Day recalled, the Democratic party “was the star of 
hope for the oppressed everywhere…It was the radical, progressive, revolutionary party, 
opposed to the ‘law and order’ of conservatism.” Now, Day found that same party with 
“one foot on the heel, and the other on the head of the negro.” Talking of “nothing but 
‘law and order’,” the “lion of Democracy” had become the “jackal of slavery.” In the 
same way that they might examine some “wonderful phenomena of nature,” Day advised 
that the public seek after the cause of this radical transformation. “Why is it,” he asked, 
that a “bold, radical, and progressive policy has been abandoned, and the Democratic 
party become retrogressive and conservative?” First, Day explained, the Whig party “left 
all the soul it had, conservatism, to enter the body of the Democratic party” after its 
death. Still, the main reason was that the Democrats had replaced the “living idea” of 
“progress” with the twin ideas of “slavery and office.”834 Along the same lines, 
Massachusetts Republican Henry Wilson told southern Democrats in 1858 to “Go home, 
say to your privileged class, which you vauntingly say ‘leads progress, civilization, and 
refinement,' that it is the opinion of the 'hireling laborers' of Massachusetts, if you have 
no sympathy for your African bondmen, in whose veins flows so much of your own 
blood, you should at least sympathize with the millions of your own race, whose labor 
                                                 
834 34th Congress 1st Session Appendix Cong. Globe 44. 
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you have dishonored and degraded by slavery!”835 In his scare quotes, Wilson pulled 
from South Carolina Democratic senator James Henry Hammond, whose speech on 
admitting Kansas with the pro-slavery Lecompton Constitution has since become 
notorious for its monarchical line declaring “cotton is king.”836 But his fellow-Senators 
(Wilson, especially) jumped on Hammond’s larger argument that the organic harmony of 
the South’s socio-political system generated “the best” social framework “in the world,” 
and an “extent of political freedom, combined with entire security, such as no other 
people ever enjoyed upon the face of the earth.” The South enslaved men of “inferior” 
blood, while the North enslaved their “brothers of one blood,” propelling southern 
“whites” to perfection and northern “whites” to anarchy. The North might complain of 
southern rule, Hammond said, but southern rule had “preserved” the North. The South 
had “kept the Government conservative,” placing it, and keeping it, “upon the 
Constitution,” and that had led to the meagre “peace and prosperity” of the enslaved 
white North.837 
By 1858, the Democrats controlled the House, the Senate, and the White House. 
They had the gall to pretend to be the party of the people, only to renounce those people 
behind closed doors—so long as they lived in a different section of the country. Someone 
like James Henry Hammond, who owned several plantations and hundreds of slaves, 
presumed to dictate what “labor rights” meant to a man like Henry Wilson, who worked 
as an indentured laborer on a farm from the age of ten to the age of twenty. Wilson had 
                                                 
835 35th Congress 1st Session Appendix Cong. Globe 174. 
836 The syntax of that sentence implies that “cotton is king” of “England.” Hammond was crowing because 
the South used to be in thrall to the capitalists who controlled the Bank of England and now the situation 
had reversed itself. 
837 James Henry Hammond, Selections from the Letters and Speeches of the Hon. James H. Hammond: Of 
South Carolina (J. F. Trow & Company, printers, 1866), 317–18, 320–21. 
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literally pulled himself up by his bootstraps (having become a cobbler after finishing his 
indenture and eventually owning a thriving shoe manufactory), while, by contrast, 
Hammond had inherited a huge amount of wealth and then studied under Dr. Thomas 
Cooper at South Carolina College, before getting a law degree. What did he know about 
how the “heart” of the country beat? As a pro-slavery Democrat from South Carolina, 
how could Hammond talk about the power of the ballot box and pretend anything like a 
popular vote brought his party to office when that party had systematically 
disenfranchised the people who would vote for their opposition (locally and nationally)? 
“The moderate, conservative, and national statesmen of the South, of the schools of 
Jackson and Clay, have been driven into retirement,” Wilson intoned, “they are 
ostracised, exiled, placed under the ban of the empire.” A “few liberal national men” 
remained in the House, Wilson admitted, but the halls of Congress were now filled with 
men who had “accepted [Calhoun’s] creed” and bowed to the “imperious sway” of his 
disciples.838 
*** 
 “Slave” conservatives would never be satisfied by compromise because their 
vision of an organic state required an unbounded system of slavery; and “national” 
conservatives could not meet those needs without fundamentally undermining their 
organic vision of an exclusively “white” nation. These two conservatisms did not 
comprise the forces that caused the Civil War, but they reflected and reinforced them. As 
Calhoun had said during his Michigan speech, “Language has been held in this 
                                                 
838 Technically, Wilson implied that everyone embraced the dogma of “South Carolina,” not Calhoun, but 
to describe South Carolina’s “creed,” he almost exclusively cited Calhoun. (35th Congress 1st Session 
Appendix Cong. Globe 170-173.) 
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discussion, which is clearly revolutionary in its character and tendency,” and which 
augured an approaching confrontation between “the conservatives and the destructives.” 
If this dissertation imparts nothing else, it should convey that the relative disposition of 
“conservatives” and “destructives” depended entirely on the perspective of the speaker 
and the context of the speech. In Calhoun’s formulation, language manifested and 
stimulated the popular impulse for revolution—a complication he attempted to resolve by 
policing it. In truth, however, Calhoun only considered “revolutionary” language a 
problem in the mouths of “the destructives” (i.e., the abolitionists or the capitalists, 
depending on his audience). When wielded by politicians looking to rouse a 
“conservative” revolution on behalf of white hegemony and slavery, revolutionary and 
“conservative” language served as an essential part of the political arsenal.839 Pro-slavery 
“conservatives” determined that the vital interests of the country and the health and 
integrity of the Union depended on the mutually constitutive social institution of slavery 
and the sanctified superiority of the “white” race, and built an entire discourse to support 
this worldview.  
A revolution might trash the constitution, tear down institutions, and attempt to 
physically destroy the body politic, but even its resolution does not erase the language 
that incited it. Even a failed revolution like the Civil War does not dissolve the danger 
that language enjoins. The language of “conservatism” survived the Civil War and 
continued to work on the people’s “feelings and principles,” even after the Union was 
resurrected. After the war, Conservative parties became a flashpoint for political and 
inter-ethnic violence. From 1866 to 1881, Conservatives parties organized in Missouri, 
                                                 
839 Debates in Congress (Gales & Seaton, 1837), 303. 
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West Virginia, Maryland, New York, Delaware, Kentucky, Mississippi, Ohio, Michigan, 
Louisiana, Arkansas, Alabama, and Tennessee, sometimes as separate organizations and 
occasionally in affiliation with larger political parties. Like pre-war Conservatives, they 
promised to enforce “law and order” against Republican radicals. Their innovation: a 
terrorist wing (the Klu Klux Klan) tasked with the actual physical violence. In 1867, the 
Nashville Union and Dispatch reported that a “Conservative mob,” composed principally 
of “colored Conservatives” attacked a parade of the “colored Loyal League.”840 Within 
four years, reports of this kind of internecine violence proliferated, leading to extensive 
congressional hearings. In May of 1871, the Senate published a four-hundred and twenty-
three page report detailing a secret organization, established in 1866, that terrorized 
Republicans in the South by “burning, stealing, whipping negroes,” and murdering the 
leading men of the Republican party. In the report, witnesses repeatedly testified that this 
“Ku Klux” was organized for the purpose of advancing the interests of the “Conservative 
party,” which the interrogators clarified as another name for “Democratic.” According to 
the Senate report, the Ku Klux Klan had two objectives: to “overthrow” reconstruction, 
and to disenfranchise “the negro.”841 
In a 2011 article on “The Contemporary American Conservative Movement,” 
sociologists Neil Gross, Thomas Medvetz, and Rupert Russell suggested that ideology 
politics acted as a new social form in the twenty-first century United States, blurring the 
line between status and party and radically altering American stratification. Instead of “a 
fixed category of belief or practice,” conservatism functioned as a “collective identity” 
that evolved over time. “For many contemporary Americans,” they wrote, “political 
                                                 
840 Nashville Union and American, July 18, 1867, 3. 
841 Francis Preston Blair et al., The Congressional Globe (Blair & Rives, 1871), 30. 
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ideology and party affiliation…signal varying degrees of membership in one of two 
increasingly well-recognized social groups—liberals and conservatives—that are 
accorded (and vie for) differential amounts of social esteem in different contexts and 
provide people with highly salient social identities.”842 This project reveals that this 
illusion itself served a purpose historically: political agents in the nineteenth century 
mobilized the narrative of party polarization and atomization to cement their spheres of 
control and maintain a self-serving status quo. The imagined political binary allowed 
both dominant political parties to subsume their positions on historically-divisive issues. 
The same held true in the twentieth century. “Conservative” politics sublimated its 
racism; and “liberal” politics its commitment to market capitalism. Meanwhile, both 
parties displayed their opposition to the other party’s untenable stance on race or the 
economy, a performance that absolved them politically from implementing substantive 
changes to rectify racial and economic injustice. As status parties, “liberal” and 
“conservative” invested the American political regime with the meaning historically 
attendant on socio-demographic factors, like class or race, and drained the political 
potential of inequality to galvanize groups against structural and systemic subjugation.  
This long history of conservatism establishes the integral link between historical 
conservatism and contemporary racial nationalism and opens up an avenue for inquiry 
into the role that biopolitics played in shaping America’s socio-political imaginary and its 
political and institutional genealogy. While neoliberal internationalism has dominated 
global politics and shored up transnational power structures in recent decades, historians 
                                                 
842 Neil Gross, Thomas Medvetz, and Rupert Russell, “The Contemporary American Conservative 
Movement,” Annual Review of Sociology 37, no. 1 (2011): 325–54, doi:10.1146/annurev-soc-081309-
150050. 
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have increasingly turned away from nationalism as a categorical tool for analysis, 
consigning it to the past alongside other historical and discursive fictions. Yet, twenty-
first-century political antagonisms have generated a renaissance of racial nationalism. 
The rise of the “alt right” and retrenchment of white nationalism in the United States (not 
to mention the recurrent threat of state secession), the insidious miasma of colorblind 
racism, the breakup of the European Union, and the looming fragmentation of Great 
Britain reveal nationalism to be a fiction that functions. Tracing the philosophical, 
political, and material history of conservatism in the United States from its origins in 
transnational social theory, moral philosophy, and bio-medical research to its migration 
into U.S. intellectual discourse, its instantiation in U.S. politics, and its naturalization of 
organic sovereignty and white supremacy, this project connects the various iterations of 
twenty-first-century conservatism to their historical and intellectual antecedents. Without 
nationalist conservatism and pro-slavery conservatism, modern conservatism could not 
exist in the United States. 
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